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ABSTRACT
Over the past three decades the notion that western party-systems remain frozen 
has been challenged by the apparent onset of post-industrial trends which threaten 
the support base of old political parties. In particular, scholars rejecting the 
freezing proposition have identified a rise in aggregate electoral volatility, a decline 
in group voting loyalties and the emergence of a New Politics. This study argues 
that the party systems of Australia, Britain and the United States remain 
characterised by aggregate electoral stability, despite a weakening in the extent to 
which electoral choice is structured by long-term political predispositions. In 
addition long-term electoral stability has occurred despite considerable social and 
attitudinal changes with the potential to alter significantly the underlying balance 
of party support. Through the use of national election studies collected between 
the mid 1960s and early 1990s in each country, it is argued that the adaptive 
strategies of political parties represent an intervening variable in the extent to 
which societal change is translated into electoral change. The study concludes that 
the so-called dealigning trends, such as the decline of group voting loyalties and the 
emergence of a New Politics, are an outcome, in part, of the strategic decision­
making of old party leaders seeking to preserve their party's long-term persistence. 
The extent to which parties succeed or fail is not a system determined factor, but 
rather an outcome of the ability of a party organisation to adapt to societal changes 
which threaten its traditional support base.
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Preface
This study is about how political parties ensure their long-term persistence by 
influencing the political environment within which they compete for votes. The 
survival of major political party organisations since the introduction of manhood 
suffrage is an important characteristic of many western democratic party systems. 
Nevertheless, despite the stability of party competition, the emphasis of the 
literature on western democracies has, over recent decades, tended to focus instead 
upon the discontinuity of political alignments and the rise of alternative political 
organisations. Under the weight of the rapid structural changes in advanced 
industrial society, the old major parties are largely viewed as creatures of a past era 
in which habitual social and partisan loyalties guaranteed high rates of support. By 
contrast the new era of political competition is seen as involving new issues and 
new parties, in which the electoral decision of voters becomes one of choice rather 
than loyalty. However, such an interpretation, which largely forms the basis of a 
new orthodoxy in the study of western democratic party-systems, neglects the 
strategic role of political parties in adapting to the potential electoral threats posed 
by ongoing social and attitudinal change.
The aim of this study is to identify, through empirical analysis, the effect of the 
adaptive strategies adopted by old political parties upon the persistence of party 
organisations and the structure of party competition. The general thesis is that 
political parties represent intervening variables in the process by which societal 
change is translated into party system change. Although significant changes have 
occurred in the extent to which electoral behaviour is structured by stable political 
predispositions, the threat of party system instability is in the first instance only a 
potential threat. The extent to which this potential is translated into reality is 
dependent upon the relative success or failure of the electoral strategies of the 
competing parties. Consequently, the historical persistence of a particular party 
organisation represents not a system-determined outcome, but rather an outcome 
of the party's ability to adapt to threatening societal trends and capitalise upon 
favourable societal trends.
The countries examined in this study, Australia, Britain, and the United States, 
provide an opportunity to consider the party adaptation thesis in a comparative 
context. There are three reasons for selecting these three cases. Firstly, there is 
considerable diversity across the countries with respect to the recent success of the 
major-party on the left in adapting to the social and attitudinal changes of advanced 
industrial societies: The Australian Labor Party, in opposition from 1949 to 1972, 
has governed continuously since 1983; the British Labour Party, following some 
success in the 1960s and 1970s, has not formed a government since 1979; whilst the 
Democratic Party, after maintaining House majority status for 36 years, was 
defeated in the 1994 congressional elections. Secondly, the common political 
experiences of the three countries, derived from a shared political culture, are 
particularly conducive to comparative research: each country tends toward a two- 
party system under a majoritarian electoral system; each has an uninterrupted 
democratic tradition extending back to the granting of universal suffrage; and in 
each case the structure of party competition has been shaped, for much of the 
century, between a reformist State-interventionist party and a more conservative 
market-orientated opponent. Finally, the comparative framework is further
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enhanced by the fact that each country also represents a unique aspect of historical 
development: Britain home of the industrial revolution; the United States a frontier 
country settled prior to industrialisation; and Australia, another former colony but 
one which developed its social and political system entirely after the industrial 
revolution.
The first chapter of the study examines the orthodoxy in the study of party 
systems. This states that the structure of party competition throughout the 
western democracies had been frozen during the 1920s. The chapter also examines 
more recent analyses which have identified a "thawing" of those systems over the 
past three decades and introduces the dominant models of electoral behaviour 
which offer complementary individual-level explanations of party system stability, 
namely the sociological, social-psychological, and rational-choice models. These 
models then provide the structure for the chapters which follow in section two 
dealing with changes in electoral behaviour over the period from the mid 1960s to 
the early 1990s. Section two then switches the analysis to an examination of party 
behaviour over the period, in particular to the adaptive strategies of the competing 
major-parties in response to ongoing societal change and their respective electoral 
success. The final chapter then generalises the findings with respect to the three 
countries examined to provide an understanding of the factors underlying party 
system stability and change throughout western party systems.
The empirical findings of the study rely primarily upon four national surveys from 
each country, covering four distinct time periods, namely the mid 1960s, the late 
1970s, the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The Australian data include two national 
opinion surveys, the Australian National Political Attitudes Surveys of 1967 and 
1979, in addition to the 1990 and 1993 Australian Election Studies. The British 
data are drawn from the British Election Study series, covering the years 1964, 
1979, 1987, and 1992. The data from the United States are taken from the National 
Election Study series conducted by the University of Michigan's Centre for 
Political Studies (originally the Survey Research Centre) covering the 1964, 1980, 
1988, and 1992 elections. Further details of the surveys, all of which were 
provided by the Social Sciences Data Archives at the Australian National 
University, are included in the appendix. With respect to all data-sets, neither the 
collectors of the data, nor the respective disseminating organisations, bear any 
responsibility for the findings and interpretations which are presented.
On a personal note, I wish to thank my supervisory panel, namely Clive Bean, 
John Hart, and Ian McAllister, for the guidance, advice, and sense of perspective 
they have provided throughout. It is difficult to imagine completing the study in 
the absence of their valuable assistance. Also greatly appreciated is the assistance 
provided by the staff at the Social Science Data Archive at the Australian National 
University in procuring the numerous data-sets analysed in the study and offering 
technical advice. In addition, I would like thank Stephanie Harris for her ongoing 
support, advice, and contribution through the various stages of the project, as well 
as the ongoing support and encouragement provided by my parents, Pam and Ian 
Hamilton.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE FREEZING OF THE PARTY ALTERNATIVES
The major electoral studies conducted in the United States during the 1940s and 
1950s marked the rapid growth of the behaviouralist approach to political science 
in the post-war years. In these studies scholars found that stability in the party 
preferences of voters was an underlying characteristic of national election 
campaigns and of the party system in general. In particular, long-term electoral 
stability at the individual-level was found to be an outcome of either pervasive 
social group predispositions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954) or, as later 
research identified, psychological partisan attachments (Campbell et al 1960). 
Despite evidence suggesting a lack of political interest among the citizenry, which 
contradicted traditional notions of the democratic ideal, the early behaviouralists 
argued that the role of long-term predispositions in perpetuating established party 
loyalties represented an important mechanism for long-term electoral stability. In 
addition, through the influence of parental socialisation and the consistency of 
electoral appeals which sought to mobilise groups on critical social cleavages, stable 
party preferences facilitated the persistence of the major party alternatives through 
successive generations.
Since the early 1970s, however, scholars have identified a number of electoral 
trends that challenge earlier notions of party loyalty and enduring party system 
stability. These include, in particular, a decline in the electoral impact of social 
group loyalties, a weakening of partisan allegiances, a rise in aggregate electoral 
instability, and the emergence of new political parties (Crewe and Denver 1985). A 
new focus upon volatility and change in the literature on western party systems 
emerged in response to these electoral trends (eg Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984; 
Franklin, Mackie, Valen et al 1992). Whilst some scholars identify structural 
changes in advanced industrial societies as the causal process underlying the new 
era of electoral change (Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 1984), others argue that it is a 
result of changes to the fundamental value priorities of citizens (Inglehart 1977, 
1990a). Nevertheless, compatible with both structural and value change 
explanations (Chandler and Siaroff 1986) is an interpretation that party systems are 
undergoing a long-term transformation. This involves the erosion of voter 
loyalties based on Old Politics alignments, notably class, religious and regional 
cleavages. In its place a New Politics alignment, based upon the conflicts of 
advanced industrial society, is emerging as a new cleavage dimension (Hildebrandt 
and Dalton 1978; Miller and Levitin 1979).
The precursor to this new alignment is often identified in the widespread 
emergence of new social movements, originated in the student and peace 
demonstrations of the late 1960s, which sought to place a range of New Politics 
issues, including the environment, racial and gender equality, citizen participation, 
and civil libertarianism, onto the political agenda (Dalton, Kuechler and Biirklin 
1990). The significance of these new issues is their potential to cross-cut the 
traditional left versus right domain of party competition, whereby issues such as 
economic redistribution and state ownership have dominated the political agenda
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(Inglehart and Rabier 1986). As a consequence, the emergence of New Politics 
issues in advanced industrial societies, and of new political organisations mobilised 
on the New Politics cleavage, represent a challenge to the historical persistence of 
parties that have traditionally mobilised their electoral support on the Old Politics 
issues of industrial society (Lawson and Merkl 1988).
In Britain and the United States the major national electoral studies of the 1970s 
and 1980s provided strong evidence that significant change in voting loyalties had 
occurred, particularly with regard to a withering of the dominant group-voting 
alignments (Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976; Sarlvik and Crewe 1983). Similar 
evidence, based on commercial polling data, was also available in Australia (Kemp 
1978). Electoral results over the period also appeared to confirm the emphasis of 
the literature upon aggregate electoral change, with each country experiencing a 
rapid turnover of administrations (Australia in 1972, 1975, and 1983; Britain in 
1970, 1974 and 1979; and the United States in 1976 and 1980), and the rise in 
support for new political alternatives (eg the Australian Democrats, the Social 
Democratic Party, and John Anderson respectively). Nevertheless, into the mid 
1990s, the historical persistence and electoral dominance of the major parties 
remains an important characteristic of each party system, suggesting that the major 
parties of these countries have, to some extent, adapted to the social changes of the 
mid to late twentieth century. Indeed the central proposition of this study, 
following the work of Sartori (1969), Mair (1983), and Mackie and Rose (1988), is 
that strategic decision-making by the parties represents an important intervening 
variable in the process by which societal changes lead to party system change, with 
party adaptation a crucial element in maintaining electoral support for the party 
organisation, and hence preserving the structure of party competition.
This chapter reviews the literature on political alignments and the persistence of 
the major party alternatives in western democracies, in addition to examining the 
revisionist studies which challenge them. The review includes both the general 
literature on western party systems, and the more specific electoral behaviour 
literature which will form the structure for the individual-level analysis of the 
following chapters. The first section considers the structure of political alignments 
in Australia, Britain, and the United States and the forces that have operated to 
preserve these alignments across time. Section two examines paradigm shifts in the 
electoral behaviour literature, and the implications of these changes for our 
understanding of major party persistence. Section three reviews value and
structural change explanations of the rise of New Politics issues and their 
implications for the persistence of Old Politics alignments. The final section of the 
chapter then presents empirical evidence regarding the persistence of the major 
parties in Australia, Britain, and the United States through an aggregate-level 
analysis of electoral trends and fluctuations.
Social Cleavages and Political Alignments
The definitive statement on the persistence of party alternatives is undoubtedly 
Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) detailed historical analysis of the development of west
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European cleavage structures,1 and their translation into political movements. 
Their "comparative cleavage analysis" covered the period from the late eighteenth 
century to the 1920s, stopping at that point on the grounds that "the party systems 
of the 1960's reflect, with few hut significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 
1920's"(Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 50). Despite the presence of distinct national 
variations in cleavage structures across western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan argued 
that party competition is based universally on four dimensions of conflict. These 
dimensions reflect the translation into the party system of four critical socio­
cultural cleavages, each sparked by movements of protest against the established 
national elite. Two of the cleavages are an outcome of the National Revolution, 
the other two an outcome of the Industrial Revolution.
The National Revolution refers to the nation-building era that spread throughout 
Europe in the wake of the French revolution of 1789. The first cleavage it 
generated centred upon the linguistic and religious differences between the 
dominant culture of the central nation-state and the dissenting culture of peripheral 
communities (centre versus periphery). The second cleavage again involved the 
central nation-state, but in this case in its guise as a secular institution opposed to 
the established privileges of the Church (state versus church). The Industrial 
Revolution, the second key historical juncture, originating in nineteenth century 
Britain. It created new social tensions and conflicts and generated a further two 
cleavages. The initial conflict was between the landed gentry of the political 
establishment and the new class of industrial entrepreneurs (land versus industry). 
However, as resources continued to move from agriculture to manufacturing, a 
new cleavage developed within the industrial centres between those with control 
over the factors of production and those who lacked any such control (owners 
versus workers). The cleavage deepened as the working class progressively sought 
legal, economic and political rights through the organised structure of the labour 
unions, institutionalising their conflict with the owners and employers.
Although the actual forms and combinations of the cleavages differed throughout 
western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan argued it was significant that, whatever 
cleavage structure eventually developed in a particular country, without exception 
it had become institutionalised prior to the nation's final extension of the voting 
franchise. The final push towards universal suffrage then had two dramatic 
outcomes. Firstly, the shock of the voting extension resulted in a form of political 
Darwinism whereby only those parties previously entrenched as mass movements 
in the social structure survived. Secondly, the growth of mass parties and the lack 
of any disenfranchised groups narrowed the support market by limiting the 
potential of new movements to mobilise on any new cleavage. The result was a 
freezing of the major party alternatives in west European polities in the 1920s 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 51).
In Britain, the initial political divisions between the Tories and Whigs represented 
conflict on the centre versus periphery cleavage. In particular conflict was centred
1 In general, scholars view cleavages as "reflecting broadly based and long-standing social and 
economic divisions within society, and the cleavage structure is thought of in terms of social groups and 
of the loyalties of members to their social groups", although a cleavage may also be seen as primarily 
involving attitudinal conflict, regardless of its social basis (Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992, 5).
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between the landed families in the counties and the administration office-holders in 
London, primarily over issues of patronage and privilege (Figure 1.1). The 
industrial revolution then gave an economic edge to this conflict that evolved into 
party competition between the landed Conservatives and urban Liberals (Evans 
1983, 322-32; Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 11-19). Although the Reformation had 
temporarily resolved conflict on the state-church cleavage, the prevalence of 
religious nonconformity among the new urban bourgeois, together with the 
saliency of issues related to religious belief, ensured that the Liberal Party became 
the political expression of the Nonconformist denominations. The denominational 
cleavage was particularly divisive between 1885 and 1910 (Wald 1983, 55-65), with 
the Liberal Party committed to the disestablishment of the Church in the 
peripheries, a degree of social temperance, and non-denominational State education, 
in opposition to the Conservatives as the party of Anglican defence (see also Evans 
1983, 300-7).
The end of the nineteenth century, however, saw the beginning of a diminution of 
conflict between the two groups, assisted by mobility and intermarriage (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967, 19-20), the secularisation of the education system (Wald 1983, 223- 
34), and the resolution of old issues (Miller 1977, 1-9). This created an opportunity 
for the political agenda to embrace a new set of class related issues, promoted in 
particular by the emerging Labour Party. The owner-worker cleavage eventually 
became dominant during the inter-war years as Labour replaced the Liberals as the 
second major party, and parliamentary debate increasingly centred upon conflicts 
in the labour market (Butler and Stokes 1974, 172-80; Miller 1977, 144-58). The 
state-church and centre-periphery cleavages, however, survived through the 
continued concentration of Liberal Party support among non-conformists and 
Celtic communities in the peripheries (Butler and Kavanagh 1993, 271, 324-37; 
Heath et al 1991, 86).
In the United States the initial party conflict of the nineteenth century was based 
upon the religious and cultural issues (including slavery, prohibition, and 
immigration) of the centre-periphery and "pietist-liturgical" cleavages (Knoke 1976, 
19). Thus the Whig/Republican parties represented the Puritan Protestants of the 
rural and small-town regions, and the Democratic Party the non-puritan 
Protestants and immigrant Catholics and Jews concentrated in the larger cities 
(Jensen 1981; Kleppner 1981; Sundquist 1983, 53-5, 89-91). Following the Civil 
War, the Democratic Party also became an organisation of regional defence in the 
states of the old confederacy, united principally in a disenfranchisement campaign 
in response to the Fifteenth Amendment that decreed voting rights "shall not be 
denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude" 
(Key 1949, chapt 25). Rapid industrialisation, meanwhile, had the effect of 
attracting greater numbers of immigrants into the industrial centres, thereby 
reinforcing the cultural and religious divisions, in addition to accentuating division 
between the prosperous states in the north-east and the under-developed states in 
the south and west (Burnham 1974; Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 12).
Although industrialisation failed to generate a successful working-class movement, 
with the demands of workers diffused through early enfranchisement and the 
openness of American society, the weak party system encouraged the working-class
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Figure 1.1: Social cleavages within the Australian, British, and United States party systems. Heavy
shading represents a primary cleavage, light shading a secondary cleavage. Sources: 
Alford (1963), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Encel (1970), Phillips (1970), Butler and 
Stokes (1974), Miller (1977), Ladd with Hadley (1978), Burnham (1974), Jensen (1981), 
Aitkin (1982), Sundquist (1983), Wald (1983), Jaensch (1983), McAllister (1992).
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to seek political representation as a faction within the reformist Democratic Party 
(Ladd 1970, 235-32; Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 31). The Great Depression and the 
legislative response of the Democratic Party, namely Franklin Roosevelt's New 
Deal, eventually polarised the electorate (outside the South) on economic issues and 
established the party's successful New Deal coalition, of which labour unions 
represented a key grouping (Ladd with Hadley 1978, 64-74; Sundquist 1983, 214- 
28). The differing economic priorities and cultural idiosyncrasies of politicised 
religious and regional groups were also reflected in the New Deal party system 
(Phillips 1969): Democratic support concentrated among Catholics (the party 
nominating Catholic presidential candidates in 1928 and 1960), southern white 
Protestants, and non-southern white Protestants of low socioeconomic status, and 
Republican support concentrated among non-southern Protestants of high to 
moderate socioeconomic status (Ladd with Hadley 1978, 42-57).2
Although not cited in the Lipset and Rokkan study, the historical development of 
the Australian party system also conforms to their structural analysis Qaensch 1983, 
45-73; McAllister 1992, 110-15). Although the social divisions of the National 
Revolution had little relevance to a political system developed over a century later, 
conflicts based on religious denomination still played a role in political 
competition. In particular, conflicts existed throughout the Australian colonies 
during the nineteenth century between Catholics and Protestants, reinforced by 
rivalry between Irish and English settlers, particularly on the issue of state funding 
for Catholic schools (Encel 1970, 164-83). The religious cleavage, although rarely 
overt, persisted into the twentieth century erupting twice, once in 1915 on the 
issue of conscription and again during the mid 1950s on the issue of communism in 
the trade union movement, on both occasions precipitating a split in the Labor 
Party between Catholic and Protestant members (Crisp 1978, 210-25). The centre- 
periphery cleavage, however, was largely subdued by the homogeneity of the 
Australian colonies and states. Whilst conflict periodically existed, particularly in 
the years surrounding federation and the 1933 Western Australia succession 
plebiscite, it has not been a feature of party-system alignment (Alford 1963, 178- 
191).
The primary social cleavages in Australian party politics have instead been those 
generated by the Industrial Revolution. The first national elections, held in 1901, 
were predominantly a three-way contest between Free Traders, Protectionists (both 
anti-socialist but opposed on the issue of tariffs), and the Australian Labor Party 
(formed as the political wing of the trade union movement). As support for Labor 
steadily increased in subsequent elections, and with the anti-Labor vote divided 
over what was essentially a short-term political issue, the Free Traders and 
Protectionists finally merged in an anti-socialist alliance in 1909. It was from this 
merger that the first Liberal Party was eventually formed and the class cleavage
2 The Democratic New Deal coalition also included the numerically small groupings of Jews and 
African-Americans (Ladd with Hadley 1978, 57-64).
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institutionalised in the party system (Aitkin 1982, 8-11; Loveday 1977, 429-49).3 
Continued grievances among the rural sector, however, led to the formation of the 
Country Party in 1920 to specifically represent rural interests. Although the 
Country, now National, Party has almost continually operated in coalition with 
the Liberal Party, its ongoing presence has maintained a secondary rural-urban 
cleavage alongside the dominant class cleavage (Aitkin 1982, 185-190; Jaensch 1983, 
67-70).
The Lipset and Rokkan freezing proposition, with regard to Australia, Britain, and 
the United States, is supported both by the persistence of the major party 
alternatives and the relevance of the four critical cleavages to the historical 
development of each party system. However, the significance of the final phase of 
suffrage extension as the point of freezing does require some qualification. Whilst 
such an explanation would appear appropriate in the case of Britain, Labour 
replacing the Liberals as the second major party in the period between the major 
franchise extensions of 1918 and 1928, some modifications are required for the 
other two countries. Thus in Australia, although the granting of adult suffrage in 
1902 preceded the establishment of the modern party system in the late 1900s 
(Aitkin 1982, 8-12), it was over this period that the electorate sustained its largest 
proportionate increase, expanding by over 250 percent, between 1903 and 1913 
(Mackie and Rose 1990). A plausible explanation would be that the expansion of 
the electorate in the early years of federation operated in the same manner as the 
massive franchise extensions in Europe.4 Similarly in the United states, although 
white universal suffrage in 19205 preceded the formation of the New Deal party 
system in the 1930s, a significant proportion of the electorate was not mobilised 
until after the parties had reorientated their electoral appeals (Sundquist 1983, 218- 
9), hence the relatively large expansion in the voting population in the 1936 and 
1940 elections (Mackie and Rose 1990). It would appear that, with regard to the 
freezing proposition, the decisive event in each case was the establishment of the 
modern party system during a period of rapid expansion of the voting electorate 
whereby the subsequent potential for new parties to mobilise was significantly 
reduced.
3 The major non-Labor party in Australia has undergone a number of name and organisational 
changes overtime, but each new party has to some extent evolved from its predecessor, thereby 
maintaining a degree of continuity from Federation to the present. The sequence is: Fusion Party 
(1909-13), Liberal Party (1913-17), Nationalist (1917-31), United Australia Party (1931-44), and Liberal 
Party (since 1944) (Jaensch 1994).
4 Aitkin (1982, 12n) offers a further alternative that "the freezing of party systems occurred because 
of the joint effects of economic and technological progress (facilitating a national electorate or at least 
some regional electorates) and wide suffrage (ending further opportunities for mobilising new, 
unfranchised, sections of the community)."
1 Although formally enfranchised by the the Fifteenth Amendment, various State regulations 
effectively disenfranchised African-Americans until the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s (Mackie and Rose 
1990).
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Developments in Electoral Behaviour
At the time of writing, Lipset and Rokkan's thesis was in accordance with 
dominant views in the field of electoral behaviour regarding the importance of 
social cleavages in structuring the voting behaviour of citizens. Indeed, when 
behaviouralism first emerged during the inter-war years, the sub-discipline was 
heavily influenced by concurrent developments in sociology (Kavanagh 1983, 4-12). 
Two landmark studies conducted in the United States by scholars from Colombia 
University, namely The People's Choice (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948) and 
Voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954), marked the initial dominance of 
the sociological paradigm on electoral behaviour research. The results of their two 
locality-based surveys across the 1940 and 1948 campaign periods showed that there 
were significant and persistent social differences between Republican and 
Democratic voters on the basis of religion, socio-economic status, and rural/urban 
residence (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948, 16-27). The scholars found that, 
despite the intervening influence of the election campaign, these social group 
predispositions, operationalised in the Index of Political Predisposition (IPP), were 
relatively constant over the entire election period. It was concluded, rather 
forcefully, that "social characteristics determine political preference" (Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson and Gaudet 1948, 27).
The Colombia scholars argued that the primary mechanism that explained the 
identified phenomenon of "group voting" was processes of personal and group 
interaction. Whether interaction was with work colleagues, neighbours, or fellow 
parishioners, it provided voters with political information more directly relevant to 
their own personal circumstances than would otherwise be available through 
alternative information sources. Thus cues provided by fellow group members 
simplified an otherwise highly complex voting decision, and by doing so 
homogenised the political leanings of the group (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 
1954, 114-5). Furthermore, evidence showed that political discussion was unlikely 
to cross social barriers so that social characteristics stabilised political attitudes 
through predominantly within-group interaction (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 
1954, 102-9). Groups had initially become politicised through political appeals that 
sought to mobilise the group as whole on issues that were salient to them. Group 
loyalty was then perpetuated through continued social differentiation, generational 
transmission, and the maintenance of within-group contact (Berelson, Lazarsfeld 
and McPhee 1954, 73-5).
Thus the sociological approach to voting behaviour is compatible with Lipset and 
Rokkan's freezing proposition, and indeed may be regarded as its behaviouralist 
adjunct (eg Dalton 1988, chapt 8; Harrop and Miller 1987, chapt 7; cf Kavanagh 
1984, 83-85). Voting loyalties are constrained by clear social divisions that may be 
seen as perpetuating the alignments established in response to the national and 
industrial revolutions. The use of variables based on socio-economic status (owner- 
worker), religion (church-state), and residence (land-industry) in the construction of 
the IPP confirmed the continued relevance of the critical cleavages. Furthermore, 
the Colombia scholars argued, the stability of these social background variables 
over-time ensures that party system stability is maintained: "such ties for the 
individual do not change rapidly or sharply, and since his vote is so important a 
product of them, neither does it" (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, 315).
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Although the identification of the relationship between vote and various social 
characteristics represents an important contribution to electoral research, the 
sociological approach is inadequate as a comprehensive voting model. The major 
shortcoming is its inability to account adequately for short-term electoral volatility. 
Whilst long-term electoral change may be explained on the basis of a critical 
historical event (eg war, revolution, or a period of economic dislocation) which 
alters the pre-existing cleavage structure and the balance of party support in the 
electorate, such events represent very rare moments of severe social change (Key 
1955; Bartolini and Mair 1990, 71-2). Thus, with political attitudes explained 
primarily in terms of socialisation, the sociological approach is unable to account 
for events such as the temporary defection in the United States of traditional 
Democratic voters to the Republican Party in the elections of 1952 and 1956.
The inability of the sociological approach to account for Eisenhower's presidential 
victories was acknowledged by a group of scholars at the University of Michigan 
who developed an alternative voting model (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954, 85). 
The research approach that they adopted reflected a growing orientation in 
political behaviour research towards psychology, which provided the theoretical 
basis for their social-psychological model of electoral behaviour. In addition to 
group loyalties, the Michigan scholars, in the first of their two major works The 
Voter Decides (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954), initially identified three 
psychological variables that influence the individual's vote: party identification, and 
issue and candidate orientation. Whilst formally acknowledging the influence of 
issues and candidates upon vote, it is the concept of party identification, defined as 
an affective orientation or psychological attachment to a political party irrespective 
of formal membership (Campbell et al 1960, 121), which represents the central 
defining feature of the model. The party is regarded as an important social 
grouping to the individual, imposing pressures to conform (ie to vote for the 
party's candidates) in the same manner as other social groupings imposed 
conforming pressures.
Additional research enabled the Michigan scholars to specify, in their landmark 
work The American Voter (Campbell et al 1960), the actual processes by which 
party identification was translated to vote. The scholars identified six items, 
termed partisan attitudes, highly correlated with vote, namely attitudes to the 
Democratic and Republican candidates, attitudes on domestic and foreign policy, 
attitude to group benefits, and attitudes to parties as managers of government 
(Campbell et al 1960, chapt 4; Stokes, Campbell and Miller 1958). Whilst these 
partisan attitudes are the most proximate influences upon vote in the social- 
psychological model, they are in turn influenced by a succession of causally prior 
factors, organised conceptually through the funnel of causality (Figure 1.2). In the 
long-term partisan attitudes are influenced by the individual's party identification, 
operating as a perceptual screen "through which the individual tends to see what is 
favourable to his partisan orientation" (Campbell et al 1960, 133). Also causally 
prior to vote and the six partisan attitudes, are the short-term influences of the 
campaign candidates, campaign issues, and perceptions of economic outlook. The 
inclusion of these short-term influences in the model enables party identification 
and vote to diverge occasionally; for example, in the elections of the 1950s in 
which Democratic identifiers were able to support the Republican candidate, on
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the basis of candidate and issue influences, whilst maintaining their long-term 
Democratic predisposition.
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Figure 1.2: The funnel of causality as described in Campbell et al (1960).
Reproduced from Budge and Farlie (1977, 32).
The social-psychological model thus incorporates long-term predispositions as well 
as factors relevant to a particular election, so as to explain both long-term political 
stability and short-term political change. It is important to note that the short­
term influences on the vote work independently of the influence of party 
identification, such that only in exceptionally rare circumstances is partisanship 
altered by current political events: "party identification is a durable attachment, not 
readily disturbed by passing events and personalities" (Campbell et al 1960, 151). 
The stabilising role of party identification ensures both that electoral swings 
between the major parties were limited and that the threat of new political parties 
diminished, and as such the model is consistent with interpretations of long-term 
party system stability (Campbell et al 1960, 552-4). Although the social- 
psychological model was a response to the inadequacies of the sociological 
approach, the former does acknowledge the role of social structure as an important 
antecedent influence. The rise in support for the social-psychological model did 
not diminish the role of social cleavages in structuring political alignments, but 
simply updated complementary voting theories to bring sociological explanations 
of party-system stability into line with contemporary electoral reality (Crewe 
1985).
The validity of the social-psychological model rests, in part, with the finding that 
party identification is more stable than, and thus conceptually distinct from, actual 
vote (Budge, Crewe and Farlie 1976b, 12). It is not surprising that as studies have 
shown a greater tendency, outside the United States, for party identification to 
change in response to a change in vote (Aitkin 1982, 41; Butler and Stokes 1974, 
43; Jenson 1975; Kaase 1976; LeDuc 1981; Thomassen 1976), that the social- 
psychological model has been subjected to sustained criticism (eg Budge, Crewe and 
Farlie 1976a; Niemi and Weisberg 1984). However, the short-term stability of 
party identification has also been questioned in the United States, with research 
suggesting that party identification is affected by short-term campaign influences
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(Page and Jones 1979; Brody and Rothenberg 1988). Of course the Michigan 
model notes that partisanship may change in response to dramatic events, and it 
may be hypothesised that events such as the Vietnam war, civil rights 
demonstrations and Watergate produced conditions conducive to such change. But, 
as Budge, Crewe and Farlie (1976a, 10) have argued, such an interpretation tends to 
render the theoretical framework tautological: "If electors change votes while 
maintaining their previous identification this proves the concept valid, but 
changing both together is simply evidence that an upheaval is taking place with 
concomitant shifts in the proportions of identifiers".
The theoretical inconsistencies of the social-psychological model, and its perceived 
over-emphasis upon long-term predispositions, contributed to the most recent 
paradigm shift in electoral behaviour research whereby economics replaced social- 
psychology as the dominant paradigm during the early 1980s (Wattenberg 1991, 
19). Although economics has long been an influence on political behaviour (eg 
Downs 1957, Olson 1965), it is only in recent years that the influence of the 
discipline has outweighed that of its major alternatives in regard to voting studies. 
The influence of economics is evident in the rise in popularity of rational-choice 
voting models, derived from classical micro-economic theory (eg Downs 1957; 
Enelow and Hinitch 1984; Fiorina 1981; Himmelweit, Humphreys and Jaeger 1985; 
Lewis-Beck 1988). Analogous to a shopper in a village market, the voter is 
perceived in the models as making decisions simply on the basis of maximising his 
or her own utility income, or net benefits. Unlike the sociological and social- 
psychological models, which stress the importance of long-term voter loyalties, 
rational-choice theory portrays the voter as an "economic" animal, devoid of any 
"brand loyalty", making decisions afresh at each election on the basis of rational 
cost-benefit analysis. In rejecting notions of long-term party loyalties, rational 
choice models provide a clear challenge to the sociological and social-psychological 
models and their interpretations of party system stability.
The major work on voting behaviour in the rational-choice tradition is Anthony 
Downs' (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. Whilst the landmark 
sociological and social-psychological studies developed their approaches inductively, 
beginning with observations and building up to assumptions and laws, Downs 
worked deductively, deriving twenty-five empirically testable propositions from 
two initial hypotheses, namely the party motivation hypothesis and the citizen- 
rationality hypothesis. It is the latter which forms the basis of Downs's (1957, 297) 
general model of voting stating that "every citizen rationally attempts to maximise 
his utility income, including that proportion derived from government activity". 
The utility income to which Downs refers are those benefits which citizens receive 
from the ongoing activities of the government, ranging from national defence to 
water purification. Citizens attempt to maximise their utility income by voting for 
the political party they believe, on the basis of the stated policies of the competing 
parties, will provide the greater net benefits in the future. Downs, in the first 
instance, assumes that citizens operate in conditions of perfect information, 
whereby all aspects of party policies are known and understood by individuals. 
However, once this assumption is relaxed to acknowledge the presence of 
uncertainty in decision-making and the costs of procuring information, Downs 
argues that citizens may prefer to use party ideologies, as a sample of issue stances, 
to calculate their expected utility incomes from the competing parties.
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One of the major criticisms of the Downsian general model is that it does not 
adequately account for the relatively high turnout rates in western democracies. 
Under the model's assumptions, citizens must weigh the costs of voting (eg 
information procurement costs, transportation costs incurred travelling to the 
polling booth, the opportunity cost of the time foregone by voting) against their 
expected utility income. However, as Downs (1957, 244) argues, the rational 
citizen must discount any expected benefits from voting by the infinitesimal 
possibility that the final result in the election will rest upon his or her single vote, 
otherwise there is no need for the citizen to vote as the outcome will not be 
altered. This renders as negligible any expected benefit from voting, and the 
expectation that very few voters will do so. Attempts by rational-choice theorists 
to explain this discrepancy on the basis of variables such as a "long-term 
participation variable" (Downs 1957, 261-3) or "citizen duty" (Riker and 
Ordeshook 1968) have simply been criticised for rendering the model tautological 
or theoretically inconsistent (Barry 1978, 18-23; Budge and Farlie 1977, 115-8; 
Himmelweit, Humphreys and Jaeger 1985, 115-7; McLean 1982, 70-76; Shaffer 
1972).6
In addition to Downs' general model, An Economic Theory of Democracy also 
presents a spatial model.7 This model develops from the additional assumption, 
derived from the work of Hotelling (1929) and Smithies (1941), that "political 
preferences can be ordered from left to right in a manner agreed upon by all 
voters" (Downs 1957, 115). In other words, there exists in society one underlying 
ideological dimension along which both parties and voters can be placed. The 
further assumption that "voters preferences are single peaked and slope downward 
monotonically" implies that voters will support the party closest to it along the 
ideological dimension.8 The great virtue of the spatial model is that it enables an 
analysis of party system dynamics, ie changes in the number of parties in the party- 
system and their relative electoral strength, through an understanding of the 
ideological positioning of voters and parties. Thus Figure 1.3 illustrates the impact 
of the introduction of franchise extensions on the British party system, with party 
competition initially dominated by the Conservative and Liberal parties. However, 
with the entrance into the electorate of the mass working-class clustered on the left 
of the ideological dimension, the Labour Party, already positioned towards the left 
extreme, was able to squeeze out the leftward moving Liberals, thereby establishing 
the modern British party system in which Labour and the Conservatives 
dominated electoral competition.
The Downsian spatial model has been criticised on the grounds that many 
important political issues are not simply position issues, as implied by Downs; that 
is, they do not involve the competing parties advocating alternative policy
6 The consumer model of voting behaviour (Himmelweit, Humphreys and Jaeger 1985) attempts to 
resolve the high turnout paradox by limiting the citizen's decision horizon at the actual moment of 
voting. But see Dunleavy (1982), Harrop and Miller (1987, 151-3).
7 The distinction is most clearly noted in Budge and Farlie (1977, chapts 3 and 4).
8 Although in certain circumstances it is rational for extremist voters to abstain in order to prevent 
their preferred party moving to the centre (Downs 1957, 119).
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positions (Stokes 1966).9 Rather much political debate focuses upon what may be 
termed valence issues, defined as issues "that merely involve the linking of the 
parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the 
electorate" (Stokes 1966, 170-1). Full employment represents a possible valance 
issue: whilst no party would actively campaign for a high rate of unemployment, 
one party may, as result of their record in office, become associated with such a 
situation. This is in contrast to a position issue, such as how is full employment to 
be achieved (through tax relief or higher government expenditure) on which parties 
may adopt clearly distinct positions (see also Carmines and Stimson 1980).
new
franchise old
franchise
Labour Liberal Conservative
Ideological Continuim
Figure 1.3: Ideological orientation of the British party system before and after 
the enactment of manhood suffrage. Source: Downs (1957,129)
Despite such criticisms, the impact of the Downsian voting models upon 
contemporary electoral behaviour research is widespread, to the point that Downs' 
work is now the most cited in political journals of the three landmark 
contributions to the sub-discipline (Wattenberg 1991, 19). Nevertheless, the 
implication for the long-term stability of party systems of voters acting in 
accordance with Downs's propositions, is unclear. On the one hand, voters are 
not constrained by the stabilising sociological and social-psychological 
predispositions, as citizens make each individual electoral decision independently of 
all prior decisions. However, under the spatial model, Downs (1957, 141) argues 
that "a basic determinant of the nation's political development is the distribution of 
voters along the political scale". Consequently, assuming no change occurs in the 
ideological distribution of citizens, his model predicts that the political system will 
tend towards a state of long-run equilibrium in which the number of parties (and 
by implication their relative strengths), is static. Furthermore, as Downs (1957, 
130-1) only describes significant distributional changes in terms of alterations to the 
franchise, or the occurrence of war or revolution, the model, whilst certainly 
dynamic, is not incompatible with the long-term persistence of party alternatives.
9 Although Stokes's criticisms were aimed specifically at the spatial model, this point applies equally 
to the general model (see also Fiorina 1981; Key 1966).
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Indeed, as Figure 1.3 illustrates, the spatial model actually operates as a rational- 
choice explanation for the freezing of party systems.
The period from the 1920s to the 1960s, as described by Lipset and Rokkan, was 
one of stable alignment, defined as a period of "constancy in party coalitions and 
aggregate partisan equilibrium" (Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 1984, 11). The three 
voting models cited above differ with regard to their interpretation of the factors 
upon which those stable alignments were based: the sociological approach identified 
social cleavages; the social-psychological model, partisan affiliations; and the 
rational-choice model, policy and/or ideological preferences. Nevertheless it is 
significant that all three models are in fact compatible with notions of the freezing 
of party alternatives, as stable alignments may be based on either sociological, 
social-psychological or rational-choice factors (van der Eijk et al 1992, 417). In 
other words, despite paradigm shifts in field of electoral behaviour, Lipset and 
Rokkan's freezing proposition has remained compatible with the dominant 
research paradigm of the period.
The Rise of New Politics
The left-right dimension specified by the Downsian spatial model concerns the 
percentage of the economy that citizens and parties want to remain in private 
hands (excluding minimal state operations). Thus the extreme right position 
represents a pure laissez-faire economy with virtually no government intervention 
and the extreme left position a total command economy with no private activity, 
with state involvement gradually increasing across the scale from right to left. 
Downs (1957, 116) recognises that the scale is arbitrary, as other equally valid 
variables may have been used, and unrealistic, given that parties adopt different 
positions on different policy issues. What the scale does reinforce is the 
importance of economic policy as the basis of party competition. Recent research 
into the electoral appeals of parties, as expressed in their election manifestos, has 
confirmed that the dominant area of party competition, in terms of the political 
agenda expressed by the parties, has centred around fundamental aspects of 
economic policy, which in turn reflect the owner versus worker cleavage of the 
industrial revolution (Budge and Robertson 1987).
In recent years a range of New Politics issues have gained increased prominence on 
western democratic political agendas (Dalton, Kuechler and Biirklin 1990). These 
issues have covered policy areas including environmentalism, racial and gender 
equality (extending to affirmative action), civil libertarianism, and citizen 
participation. Their significance is the potential to form a new dimension of 
political competition which cross-cuts the traditional left-right economic dimension 
(Inglehart and Rabier 1986; Lawson and Merkl 1988). Scholars have identified two 
possible consequences, namely a realignment, involving "a significant shift in the 
group bases of party coalitions, and usually in the distribution of support among 
the parties as a result", or a dealignment, "a period during which the party-affiliated 
portion of the electorate declines as the traditional party coalitions dissolve" 
(Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 1984, 13-4). Furthermore, as the rise of New Politics 
issues is generally linked to inexorable trends in advanced industrial societies, most 
notably value change (Inglehart 1977, 1990a) and changes in the social structure
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(Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 1984), it is argued they may eventually replace Old 
Politics issues as the basis of party competition (Hildebrandt and Dalton 1978; 
Miller and Levitin 1976). In the short-term the electoral consequences include 
increased electoral instability (Crewe and Denver 1985) and the emergence of 
alternative political organisations (Lawson and Merkl 1988).
One of the earliest studies which dealt with the impact of new political issues, and 
indeed the first study to use the term 'dealignment', was conducted by Inglehart 
and Hochstein (1972). The scholars argued that the aggregate level of party 
identification in a party system was dependent upon the degree of issue 
polarisation: providing political parties and partisans were polarised along the same 
issue dimension, the level of party identification would remain at, or increase to, 
an equilibrium level. The decline in partisanship in the United States during the 
1960s was therefore explained on the basis of a rise in the saliency of new issues, 
such as civil rights and the Vietnam war, which cross-cut traditional New Deal 
partisan alignments. Sundquist (1983, 403-8) argued that the weakening of partisan 
loyalties was particularly prevalent amongst those groups most affected by the new 
issues of the 1960s: southern segregationists were alienated by the Democratic 
Party's stand on the race issue; Catholics felt unable to support the Democrats 
increased emphasis on social liberalism; whilst northern WASP suburbanites were 
offended by the Republican Party's extremist position on race and law and order 
during the Goldwater campaign (see also Converse 1976; Weisberg and Rusk 1970).
Inglehart (1977, 1990a) developed this argument to encompass a detailed theory of 
value change. This theory focuses upon the rise of post-materialist values, with 
important implications for the freezing proposition. Inglehart's treatise was based 
upon a needs hierarchy (Maslow 1954) which he applied to the competing political 
goals in society. The most basic goals in society reflected survival and safety needs, 
including price stability, economic stability, economic growth, external security, 
prevention of crime, and maintenance of order. Emphasis on these needs was 
described as a materialist value priority and symptomatic of times of economic 
dislocation, civil unrest, and external threat. Inglehart argues that as the materialist 
goals in post-industrial society were satisfied value priorities would gradually shift 
to the higher order goals of belonging, love, esteem and self-actualisation. In 
political terms this represents a post-materialist value priority including concerns 
such as having more say in government and protecting freedom of speech 
(Inglehart 1977, 21-9).
Inglehart (1971) argues that overall changes in the value priorities of society would 
occur only as the result of generational replacement whereby successive generations 
are gradually born into the era of post-industrial society with its greater economic 
and physical security (see also Abramson and Inglehart 1986, 1992). However, as 
post-materialism gradually became the general value priority of society, Inglehart 
envisaged a materialist/post-materialist cleavage developing based on the conflict 
between the New Politics agenda of post-industrial society, which stressed quality 
of life issues, and the Old Politics agenda of industrial society, supportive of the 
status quo and sustained economic growth (Inglehart 1977, 182-4, 229-34). His 
research showed that although post-materialists were predominantly middle-class, 
their vote was skewed significantly towards parties of the Left, whilst materialists 
were both disproportionably working-class and supportive of parties on the Right
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(Inglehart 1971; 1990a, 164, 281). The materialist versus post-materialist cleavage of 
post-industrial society thus cross-cut the class cleavage of the industrial society, 
thereby creating the potential for a party system realignment along the new 
cleavage (Inglehart and Rabier 1986). Similarly, as parties were not divided on the 
materialist versus post-materialist cleavage, the rise of post-materialism also 
promoted dealignment, with parties no longer representing citizens on salient 
political issues (Inglehart and Hochstein 1972).
Alternative explanations for the rise of New Politics issues have focused upon 
social structure changes in advanced industrial democracies (Dalton, Beck, and 
Flanagan 1984a; Kitschelt 1988; cf Chandler and Siaroff 1986). These include, in 
particular, the widespread rise in educational attainment, the growth of public 
sector employment, and the expansion of the service industries in the economy 
(Mackie, Franklin et al 1992). One interpretation of these trends is the emergence 
of a new middle class of tertiary educated citizens, employed in bureaucratic 
organisations removed from the productive sectors of the economy (Dalton 1988). 
Located in an ambiguous class position, this new class lacks ownership or control 
over the means of production, yet experiences a bourgeois life-style and often the 
exercise of authority over others. It has been argued that the bureaucratic nature 
of their employment presents limited scope for rapid advancement, prompting 
concern for issues related to citizen participation and equality of opportunity 
which are fostered by the liberalising effects of higher education, whilst their 
distance from the imperatives of economic growth allows a concern for conflicting 
quality of life issues (Alber 1989).
Common to both value change and structural change explanations of the rise of 
New Politics issues is a deterministic framework for the analysis of party system 
change which views such change as the inevitable consequence of changes in 
society. However, an alternative "party adaptation" approach is to recognise the 
role of political parties as an independent actor influencing the structure of political 
alignments within the party system. The notion of party adaptation may be traced 
initially to the work of Sartori (1969, 90), who argued: "the 1920 freezing of party 
systems and alignments is intriguing only as long as we persist in understanding 
party systems as dependent variables. It is not intriguing, however, if we realise 
that a freezed party system is simply a party system that intervenes in the political 
process as an independent system of channelment, propelled and maintained by its 
own laws of inertia." In other words, parties are not simply structurally- 
determined entities but are in fact key players in influencing precisely what 
structures are to emerge from political conflict. Thus a frozen party system is one 
in which cleavages are produced by, not merely reflected in, the political system.
Mair (1983, 420) extended this argument to the notion of party control of the 
political agenda, arguing that "societal changes lead to political change to the extent 
that they become politically relevant". Then, to the extent that the party system 
can control the political agenda, the party system becomes a key actor in relation 
to the extent to which societal change leads to political change. If New Politics 
issues represent a threat to their long-term persistence, then they will act so as to 
prevent those issues from becoming politically relevant. Conversely, to the extent 
that a party is capable of accommodating particular New Politics concerns within 
their policy framework, and without alienating traditional supporters, then they
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may choose to politicise those issues in an attempt to expand the party's electoral 
base. Indeed, confronted with structural change and new value priorities in 
society, the emergence of New Politics issues provide parties with an opportunity 
to recruit new supporters from outside their traditional constituencies (Dalton 
1988, 148-9; Inglehart 1977, 215; McAllister 1992, 260-3). The central point is that 
as a potential political cleavage, the New Politics dimension represents but one of 
many cleavages which may be either emphasised or de-emphasised by parties for 
electoral gain (Sartori 1969). Irrespective of the strategy employed, under this 
approach, the persistence of party organisations and the freezing of party systems is 
in large part dependent upon the strategic decisions made by the parties themselves 
(Mackie and Rose 1988).
Testing the Freezing Proposition
Empirical studies designed to test the Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 50) freezing 
proposition have invariably focused upon the claim that a "crucial characteristic of 
western competitive politics ... [is that] the party alternatives, and in a remarkably 
many cases the party organisations, are older than the majorities of the national 
electorates". As a consequence, subsequent research has been concerned primarily 
with the stability of aggregate electoral support for those political parties 
established prior to the 1920s. The first major study in this field, providing 
empirical support for the freezing proposition, was conducted by Rose and Urwin 
(1970). The authors found that "the electoral strength of most parties in Western 
nations since the war had changed very little from election to election, from decade 
to decade, or within the lifespan of a generation ... In short, the first priority of 
social scientists concerned with the development of parties and party systems since 
1945 is to explain the absence of change in a far from static period in political 
history" (Rose and Urwin 1970, 295). Consequently, the Rose and Urwin study 
was universally recognised as providing empirical support for the Lipset and 
Rokkan thesis.10
A decade after the publication of the Rose and Urwin study, the freezing 
proposition was challenged by a new wave of research utilising aggregate electoral 
returns. Maguire (1983), in an update of Rose and Urwin, found that between 
1960 and 1979 the proportion of west European parties experiencing a significant 
electoral trend had increased, the most common direction of the trend being 
downward. Furthermore, and in direct contrast to her predecessors, she found that 
a downward trend was most likely among parties formed prior to 1914, as well as 
among major parties generally. The evidence of studies which investigated the 
level of electoral instability on the basis of the transfer of votes across the party 
system also challenged the freezing proposition. In particular, Pedersen (1983) 
found considerable variation in the overall level of electoral volatility (see Ascher 
and Tarrow 1975) across thirteen countries in Europe and Scandinavia, with seven 
countries showing a significant upward trend. Other studies which extended their
10 Rose and Urwin (1970, 296-7) actually tested three hypothesis derived specifically from the Lipset 
and Rokkan thesis, namely that old parties (established prior to 1914) are least likely to have their vote 
trend down, old parties are least likely to have their vote show a significant trend, and the older the 
party the steadier its vote should be. The data supported the first two hypotheses, but not the third.
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analysis to incorporate electoral results from the 1920s, the period in which Lipset 
and Rokkan claimed party systems had become frozen, found no evidence of a 
subsequent stabilisation of electoral patterns, with high levels of electoral volatility 
prevalent in western democracies during the 1930s, the late 1940s, and the early 
1970s. These studies claimed their findings not only challenged the freezing 
proposition with regard to the electoral instability of the 1970s, but also the notion 
that western party systems were ever actually frozen (Ersson and Lane 1982; 
Shamir 1984).11
All of the revisionist studies cited above used the political party, either individually 
or aggregated on a national basis, as their unit of analysis. However, this approach 
was challenged by Bartolini and Mair (1990) on the grounds that a test of the 
freezing proposition required an analysis of the persistence of cleavage structures in 
each party system, not the persistence of individual parties. The scholars argued 
that in the Lipset and Rokkan analysis individual parties were viewed as only one 
possible expression of a particular cleavage block. For example, along the class 
cleavage the interests of workers may be expressed by a range of socialist and 
communist parties whilst the interests of owners may be expressed by a range of 
liberal and conservative parties. The significance of the freezing proposition was 
that, irrespective of the electoral fortunes of individual party organisations, party 
competition in the 1960s was based upon the cleavage structures of the 1920s, in 
particular workers versus owners. This was the case even for those party systems 
in which the party organisations of the 1920s no longer existed, notably in 
Germany, France and Italy (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 53).
Bartolini and Mair made the distinction between total volatility (the total transfer 
of votes across the party system as a whole) and cleavage volatility (the transfer of 
votes between blocks of parties representing opposing sides of the class cleavage)12 
arguing that the latter measure was a more appropriate test of the Lipset and 
Rokkan freezing proposition. Examining national electoral results in 13 West 
European countries from 1885 to 1985 the authors found a "bias towards stability". 
Total volatility showed no secular trend over time, with the volatility of the 1960s 
and 1970s regarded as negligible in comparison to the volatility of the inter-war 
years. More importantly the scholars found a clear secular decline in cleavage 
volatility, with no significant upward trend in any of the countries. The 
conclusion was that cleavages, in so far that class was representative of other 
cleavages, had indeed remained frozen.
To test the freezing proposition in Australia, Britain and the United States an 
aggregate-level analysis of electoral returns for the respective national lower-house
11 Similar results have been found using the Rae fractionalisation index (Rae 1968, 1971) to measure 
party-system fragmentation, see Ersson and Lane (1982), Shamir (1984), and Wolinetz (1979).
12 Bartolini and Mair (1990, 65) acknowledge the shortcomings of utilising only the class cleavage to 
generalise their findings to the three other critical cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan, but defend 
their approach on the basis that the class cleavage is the "universalising conflict of modern mass politics 
in Western Europe", and has generally been the focus of studies reporting the demise of the old order of 
political alignments.
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legislatures is performed below.13 As Rose and Urwin (1970, 291-2) argued, the 
persistence of electoral support may be measured with regard to both the overall 
trend in party vote and the degree of fluctuation in vote. A trend refers to a 
consistent increase or decrease in vote over time, whilst fluctuation refers to the 
extent to which vote oscillates around that trend. Either a downward trend in 
party vote or an increase in vote fluctuation may be regarded as indication of an 
unfreezing of party support.14 A further distinction may be made between 
fluctuations in the vote for an individual party (eg Rose and Urwin 1970; Maguire 
1983), and aggregate vote fluctuations in the party system as a whole (eg Bartolini 
and Mair 1990; Pedersen 1983). The general freezing proposition can thus be tested 
by three hypotheses: Hypothesis 1, no meaningful downward trend in the 
aggregate vote for each of the major parties since the 1920s; Hypothesis 2, no 
increase in the fluctuation of the vote for each of the major parties since the 1920s; 
and Hypothesis 3, no increase in aggregate vote fluctuations across the party 
system as a whole since the 1920s.
With regard to Bartolini and Mair's argument regarding the distinction between 
cleavage blocks and individual parties, in this case the distinction is unnecessary for 
the British and United States party systems which are dominated by two parties 
each representing an opposing cleavage block. In Australia, however, party 
competition over the period has involved conflict between the Labor Party and a 
succession of various anti-Labor parties, including the current day Liberal Party. 
Whilst debate centres on the level of historical continuity among the anti-Labor 
parties (Aitkin 1982, 3; cf Goot 1994), clearly all of the incarnations of the Liberal 
Party have been part of the same cleavage block. In addition, the major anti-Labor 
party has operated almost continuously in coalition with the National (formerly 
Country) Party since 1923. Consequently results are presented for individual 
major parties in Britain and the United States, and for the Australian Labor 
Party,15 whilst the Liberal-National parties and their predecessors in Australia were 
treated in the analysis as a single entity.16
Figure 1.4 plots the aggregate national lower-house vote for the two major parties 
in Australia, Britain, and the United States from 1920 to the present. The trend 
lines, fitted to each major party's electoral vote, are estimated by means of LS) 
regression analysis, with time, measured in years, as the independent variable and 
aggregate vote, measured as a percentage of the total formal vote, the dependent 
variable. The figure shows a relatively flat trend line for the Australian Labor
13 Congressional vote was used in the United States in preference to presidential vote on the 
grounds that the former is the more comparable measure to parliamentary vote in the Anglo-American 
context (Dalton 1988, 143; Shamir 1984, 76).
14 Maguire (1983, 80) found that significant trends are generally associated with high volatility, and 
non-significant trends with low volatility.
15 Whilst Goot (1994) also distinguished Lang Labor, which contested elections between 1931 and 
1949, from the federal Labor Party in the calculation of electoral volatility, both parties again clearly 
represented the same cleavage block, namely workers against employers.
16 Research shows that the Liberal Democrats in Britain (and its predecessors) and the Australian 
Democrats are cross-class parties, with their electoral support lacking a distinct social base (eg Marks and 
Bean 1992; Rose and McAllister 1990, 144-52).
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Figure 1.4: Major-party vote in national lower-house elections, in Australia, 
Britain and the United States, 1920-1994. Sources: see Table 1.1.
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Party, but a downward trend for the Liberal-National parties, which has not won a 
federal election since 1980. In Britain, both aggregate vote trend lines are relatively 
flat, despite the weak electoral performance of Labour during the 1980s. Indeed an 
overall upward trend for Labour confirms the importance of a long-term 
perspective in evaluating electoral trends, with the figure identifying the high level 
of Labour support between 1940 and 1970, rather than the low level of support 
from 1970 to the present, as the atypical feature of electoral competition in 
universally enfranchised Britain. By contrast the United States demonstrates the 
largest electoral trends since 1920 among the three party systems, perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly given the country's history of two-party competition. This 
is in part a reflection of the impact of the New Deal realignment in the 1930s, 
during which congressional dominance switched from the Republicans to the 
Democrats (Key 1955; Sundquist 1983, 214-24), but also of the inability of the 
Republican Party to secure a House majority from 1954 to 1993.
Table 1.1 tests Hypothesis 1, that there is no meaningful downward trend in 
aggregate major-party vote. In the table the trend lines illustrated in Figure 1.4 are 
presented as regression equations, with the annual rate of electoral change for each 
party represented by the coefficient which precedes the variable T. Firstly a 
decision is required as to what represents a meaningful downward trend. In this 
case the threshold proposed by Rose and Urwin (1970, 291), and followed by 
Maguire (1983, 71), is appropriate, namely that only coefficients of 0.25 or greater 
(ie a change in vote of at least 1 percent over four years) indicate a meaningful 
trend. Table 1.1 shows that, although four of the six major parties have 
experienced a downward trend in their national lower-house vote (the Labour 
Party in Britain and the Democratic Party in the United States the only two 
exceptions) in each case the coefficient is well below 0.25. Furthermore, it may be 
noted that the largest negative coefficient, -0.1 for the Republican Party, represents 
a decline of only 1.0 percent each decade. Whilst this certainly has important 
consequences in terms of electoral competition, it by no means suggests that the 
party's long-term persistence is under threat. Indeed Figure 1.4 shows that in eight 
of the nine most recent elections, the Republican vote was above the trend line, 
whilst the party actually won control of the House in the 1994 elections. Table 
1.1 thus supports Hypothesis 1.
There is a second dimension to instability and the freezing proposition beyond 
linear trends, namely the extent of fluctuations around that trend. The most 
common index used in the literature to measure such instability is electoral 
volatility (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Crewe and Denver 1985; Pedersen 1984). At 
the level of the individual party, electoral volatility is equal to the absolute change 
in that party's aggregate vote between two as an successive elections.17 The 
concept of electoral volatility can also be used as an index of instability in the
17 Although the use of aggregate electoral results to measure electoral volatility raises problems with 
regard to the ecological fallacy (inferring individual-level relationships from aggregate-level data), 
research has confirmed that over-time the measure is a 'valid approximate measure' of individual 
volatility (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 34).
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Table 1.1: Annual Trend in Aggregate Vote for Major Parties in Australia, 
Britain, and the United States, 1920-1994
Regression equation Standard Error R squared
Australia (n = 29)
Labor Vote = 45.1 - 0.01 T (.03)ns .00
Liberal-National Vote = 49.4 - 0.07 T (,04)ns .12
Britain (n = 20)
Labour Vote = 38.3 + 0.03 T (.07)ns .01
Conservative Vote = 43.8 - 0.01 T (,05)ns .00
United States (n=38)
Democratic Vote = 45.8 + 0.13 T (.03) .31
Republican Vote = 51.0 - 0.10 T (.03) .21
Note: T = Year - 1920; Standard error, standard error of the coefficient T; ns, not 
statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed)
Sources: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (1991, 1993, 1995), Craig (1989),
Mackerras (1994), Mackie and Rose (1990), McAllister et al (1990), Sanders (1992).
party system as a whole. In this case it is termed total volatility and is equal to the 
sum of the party volatility measures for each party in the party system, divided by 
two. The final division by two prevents the problem of double counting, as one 
party's gain is by definition another party's loss, whilst it also provides a logical 
scale ranging from zero, no volatility, to 100, maximum volatility (Bartolini and 
Mair 1992, 20).18
Table 1.2, which presents the mean level of electoral volatility for the major parties 
in Australia, Britain, and the United States, shows that in the majority of cases the 
level of electoral volatility is in decline. The trend towards a lower rate of 
volatility is clearest in the United States where volatility in the Democratic vote 
fell from 4.3 between 1920 and 1944 to 3.0 between 1970 and 1993, whilst 
volatility in the Republican vote from 3.7 to 3.0 over the same periods. The mean 
level of electoral volatility in the Liberal-National vote in Australia also declined 
over time, from 4.7 to 2.9, as did the volatility in the Conservative Party vote in 
Britain, down from 7.6 between 1920 and 1944 to 3.5 between 1970 and 1993. The 
only exceptions to the general decline were the marginal increase in Labor vote 
volatility in Australia, from 3.5 to 3.8, and the decline and subsequent rise in 
Labour vote volatility in Britain. In terms of the instability in support for British 
Labour the results identify the years 1945 to 1969 as a unique period of stability in 
Britain, rather than the years 1970 to 1993 as a unique period of volatility. Overall
18 Only those parties which have secured at least 5% of the total formal vote and contested three 
consecutive elections are included in the index as a separate entity, all remaining parties have been 
included in a residual 'others' category (Rose and Urwin 1970, 290). This limits the impact upon the 
index of the periodic rise and decline of ephemeral parties which have no implications for the historical 
persistence of the major parties.
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the table generally supports Hypothesis 2, that there is no increase in the 
fluctuation of the vote for each of the major parties since the 1920s.
Table 1.2: Major-Party Aggregate Vote Volatility, in Australia, Britain, 
and the United States 1920-94
1920-44
Mean
1945-69 1970-94
Australia
Labor 3.5 3.6 3.8
Liberal-National 4.7 4.1 2.9
(N) (9) (10) (10)
B ritain
Conservative 7.6 3.7 3.5
Labour 4.7 3.4 4.6
(N) (6) (7) (7)
U nited States
Democratic 4.3 3.8 3.0
Republican 3.7 3.8 3.0
(N) (13) (12) (13)
Sources: As for Table 1.1
A third element of party system stability is the degree of aggregate vote fluctuation 
across the party system as a whole. Whilst no rise in volatility is evident among 
the support for the individual major parties, it is possible that various minor 
parties have increasingly experienced surges and declines indicative of a thawing of 
the party system. Table 1.3, which shows the mean level of total volatility in 
Australia, Britain, and the United States, confirms the findings of Bartolini and 
Mair that, once the electoral results of the past two decades are placed in historical 
perspective, there is no evidence to support the proposition of a general rise in 
electoral volatility over time (cf Aitkin 1985; Goot 1994). In Australia the mean 
level of total volatility was constant at 5.5 across the three periods. In Britain, 
although total volatility between 1970 and 1993 was higher than between 1945 and 
1969, at 7.3 it was still well below the figure of 10.3 for the years 1920 to 1944, 
further suggesting not that the most recent period was unique for its volatility, but 
rather that the second period was unique for its stability (cf Crewe 1985b). The 
trend toward stability was again clearest in the United States with the mean level 
of total volatility showing a secular decline over time, from 4.3 between 1920 and 
1944 to 3.3 between 1970 and 1993 (see also Flanagan and Zingale 1985).
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Table 1.3: Total Aggregate Vote Volatility in Australia, Britain, 
and the United States 1920-94
1920-44
Mean
1945-69 1970-94
Australia
Total Volatility 5.5 5.5 5.5
(N) (9) (10) (10)
B ritain
Total Volatility 10.3 5.6 7.3
(N) (6) (7) (7)
U nited States
Total Volatility 4.3 3.9 3.3
(N) (13) (12) (13)
Sources: As for Table 1.1
Conclusion
The results from Tables 1.1-3 confirm the three hypotheses derived from the 
freezing proposition: there is no evidence of a substantive downward trend in 
aggregate vote for any of the six parties; no evidence of a rise in individual party 
vote volatility; and no evidence of a rise in overall party system instability. 
Although there was evidence of a rise in electoral volatility in Britain between 1970 
and 1993, overall party-system volatility remained well below the levels of the 1920 
to 1944 period, whilst the electoral gains of the Labour Party in the 1987 and 1992 
elections suggests that the party is likely to remain the main opposition to the 
Conservative Party. Similarly, although Table 1.2 showed a minimal rise in 
volatility in the electoral support for the Australian Labor Party, the largest 
component of the rise was the 1990 election in which the party's primary vote fell 
by 6.4 percent but, through the country's preferential electoral system, the party 
won an unprecedented proportion of minor party preferences and was re-elected. 
The party systems of Australia, Britain, and the United States, in line with the 
European findings of Bartolini and Mair, indeed remain frozen.
Evidence of party-system stability prompts the question as to how these party 
systems have remained stable during an era of rapid change in the social 
composition of national electorates (Mackie, Franklin et al 1992) and, according to 
some scholars, an era in which New Politics issues have gained saliency on national 
political agendas (Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Dalton 1988; Inglehart 1990a)? The 
most immediate response, in line with the Lipset and Rokkan analysis and the 
sociological approach to electoral behaviour, would be to argue that the social 
cleavages which structured the vote during the 1920s remain the basis of voting 
loyalties today, and thus continue to operate as a constraint to electoral instability 
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, 315). An alternative explanation would 
posit that, rather than social cleavages, it is the pervasive role of stable partisan 
orientations in structuring electoral choice that has provided for aggregate electoral 
stability (Campbell et al 1960, 552-3). A third explanation, from the rational-
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choice model, suggests that party-systems tend toward a state of static equilibrium 
during which the number of political parties and their electoral strengths remain 
constant, with electoral choice predominantly structured by attitudinal (issue and 
ideological) preferences (Downs 1957, 123).
The tendency of electoral behaviour research over recent decades has been to 
identify short-term campaign-specific factors as the primary determinants of 
electoral choice. This has occurred from reformulations of both the social- 
psychological model, which have placed greater emphasis upon issue and candidate 
effects (eg Jackson 1975; Page and Jones 1979), and the rational-choice model, 
emphasising the electoral impact of economic conditions at the expense of spatial 
dynamics (eg Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988). As there is less potential for
directional consistency in these short-term cues (the economy expands and 
contracts, parties change their leaders, campaign issues emerge and disappear), if 
they are indeed exerting a greater impact upon electoral choice the potential for 
electoral change is increased. Although the aggregate electoral analysis suggests that 
party system instability is not on the rise, it is also possible that party systems have 
undergone a process of stable dealignment, whereby the greater impact of short­
term factors have been self-cancelling (Crewe 1985, 17). Thus whilst the
structuring properties of long-term predispositions have declined, aggregate electoral 
stability remains a coincidence of circumstance, possibly to be eroded at any time.
A final explanation, representing the central thesis of this study, is that aggregate 
electoral stability is a result of the adaptive strategies adopted by political parties in 
response to trends that undermine their historical persistence (Mair 1983; Sartori 
1969). This interpretation recognises the role of the political party, in addition to 
that of the voter, in influencing party system dynamics. Thus in the face of 
withering party predispositions, structural changes in society, and the emergence of 
New Politics issues, political parties are capable of adapting to these changes and 
indeed shaping the political environment in which they compete. Consequently 
the long-term persistence of parties, as well as their short-term electoral success, 
rest, in large part, with the adaptive strategies that they adopt (Mackie and Rose 
1988). In this context persistence or decline, success or failure, is an outcome of 
the decisions made by political parties themselves, rather than an outcome of 
voters operating in a fixed political environment.
The following chapters examine each of these alternative hypotheses. Part one 
deals exclusively with the changing electoral behaviour of citizens. Chapter two 
does this from the perspective of the sociological approach, examining the role of 
the four critical cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan in structuring electoral 
choice in modern party systems. Chapter three considers the role of party 
identification in providing aggregate electoral stability, and the implications of 
partisan change. Chapter four examines the impact of political attitudes upon 
electoral behaviour, and the degree of consistency in the attitudinal dimensions of 
party choice. Chapter five then investigates the impact of short-term factors, 
namely economic conditions, campaign issues, and party leaders and presidential 
candidates. Part two extends the analysis to consider the role of political parties in 
influencing electoral outcomes. Chapter six considers the impact of party 
adaptation upon the electoral strengths of the competing parties. Chapter seven 
uses the policy speeches of the Australian Labor Party as a case study of the
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agenda-setting cues provided by political parties, and the role of those appeals in 
extending the broad constituency of the party during a period of prolonged 
electoral success.
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PART ONE
ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR
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CHAPTER TWO
SOCIAL CLEAVAGES
The sociological approach to electoral behaviour views the relationship between 
social structure and political parties as the basis for party system stability (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, 315-6). It is argued that political parties initially seek 
to mobilise social groups on issues which are salient to them, with group loyalties 
maintained through predominantly within-group social interaction and continued 
social differentiation (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, 73-5). As discussed in 
the previous chapter, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) described the political alignments 
of the 1960s as the outcome of processes of historical conflict between, on the one 
hand, ruling national elites and, on the other, newly emerging groups mobilised in 
response to a critical historical juncture, namely the national revolution or the 
industrial revolution. Whether the new movements represented peripheral 
communities, religious groups, urban industrialists, or industrialised workers, in 
each case they represented a dissenting group within society opposed to the 
privileges of the dominant group.
The landmark study of group voting behaviour, conducted by Lazarsfeld, Berelson 
and Gaudet (1948), found that within identifiable social groups, parties maintained 
relatively constant rates of electoral support over an average election campaign. 
The variables used to measure the group voting phenomenon reflected the critical 
social cleavages later identified by Lipset and Rokkan: owner versus worker (socio­
economic status), church versus state (catholics versus protestants), and land versus 
industry (rural versus urban). Indeed, if a parallel study had been conducted in one 
of the states of the old confederacy a fourth cleavage would also have been 
identified, namely centre versus periphery (north versus south) (Alford 1963, 232- 
41). From an alternative perspective, Rose and Urwin (1969) later investigated the 
social cohesion of party voters across 17 western democracies to determine the 
extent to which parties were socially cohesive with respect to the four critical 
cleavages. Defining social cohesion on the basis of two-thirds of the party's vote 
being drawn from the same social group, they found that three-quarters of the 
parties examined were socially cohesive with regard to at least one of the four 
cleavages, religion and class the most frequent bases of cohesion.
The significance of social group memberships in providing for party-system 
stability is that they do not change rapidly, if at all. Many individuals throughout 
life remain within the same occupational grouping, the same religious 
denomination, and the same general locality. For those individuals who, through 
social and geographic mobility or religious conversion, do change their social group 
affiliations, such change is generally infrequent. However, one possible source of 
destabilisation is a change to the political predispositions of social group 
membership; for example, group voting patterns may change in response to altered 
party appeals, such as occurred during the New Deal era in the United States when 
the Democratic Party gained the electoral support of the majority of working-class 
voters on the basis of Roosevelt's interventionist economic agenda (Key 1955; Ladd 
with Hadley 1978, 64-74; Sundquist 1983, 208-39). Nevertheless, whether changes
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in group voting behaviour are explained on the basis of a critical election (Key 
1955), or a key historical juncture (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), it is apparent that 
these events are indeed very rare moments of severe social change (Bartolini and 
Mair 1990, 68-72).
An alternative mechanism for change is the concept of a secular realignment. In 
this model change is gradual across a number of election campaigns, not marked by 
any particular historical event. Instead the forces behind the secular change operate 
"inexorably, and almost imperceptibly, election after election, to form new party 
alignments and to build new party groupings" (Key 1955; see also Carmines and 
Stimson 1984). However, whilst many studies have identified a withering of the 
dominant social cleavages throughout the western democracies (eg Franklin et al 
1992; Kemp 1978; Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976; Sarlvik and Crewe 1983), there is 
little widespread evidence of any new basis of social group alignment (Franklin 
1992b). Indeed the lack of an apparent new social basis of party competition (cf 
Allardt 1968; Bell 1973; Dunleavy 1979, 1980a, 1980b) suggests a third mechanism 
for change, namely group dealignment, whereby the political homogeneity of 
group membership gradually weakens, but is not replaced by any new social 
cleavages (Burnham 1970; Ladd with Hadley 1978, 375-88; Sarlvik and Crewe 1983, 
110-3). The implications of such change for sociological explanations of aggregate 
electoral stability, predicated on the proposition that party system stability is an 
outcome of the structuring properties of critical social cleavages, are severe.
This chapter examines the continued role of the four critical lines of cleavage 
identified by Lipset and Rokkan in structuring party support from the mid 1960s 
to the early 1990s in Australia, Britain, and the United States. The first section 
examines the relationship between social class and electoral choice, including the 
debate regarding how class should be measured. Section two expands the notion of 
owner versus worker conflict to include aspects of economic lifestyle, namely trade 
union membership, housing, and class self-image. Section three examines the 
church versus state cleavage as it relates to political alignments based on religious 
denomination and religiosity. Section four considers urban and rural voting 
patterns as the basis of land versus industry social conflict. Section five investigates 
the electoral impact of the centre versus periphery conflict on the basis of unique 
regional political alignments in the three countries. Finally, in section six, a 
multivariate analysis is presented to measure, across time, the independent electoral 
impact of each of these various social group characteristics upon electoral choice.
Owner versus Worker (1): Social Class
Lipset and Rokkan viewed the fourth and final of the critical lines of cleavage, that 
between, on the one hand, owners and employers, and, on the other, tenants, 
labourers and workers, to be the most universally divisive and, in terms of 
explaining contemporary political alignments, the most significant of the critical 
cleavages. An outcome of the industrial revolution, the cleavage was symbolised 
by the rapid growth of the labour union as a vehicle for collective action, and its 
eventual political expression, the mass workers party. In the first major cross­
national study of class voting in the Anglo-American democracies, Robert Alford 
(1963, 11) argued that as each of these countries tended towards a two-party
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system, based upon conflict on left-right economic issues of wealth redistribution 
and state economic intervention, they were particularly conducive to an association 
existing between class and voting.
Alford identified substantial cross-national differences in the level of class voting. 
He found that the relationship between occupational class and party vote over time 
was consistently stronger in Britain and Australia than in either the United States 
and Canada. Alford (1963, 107) speculated that these cross-national differences 
were due to the fact that the Labo(u)r parties in Australia and Britain were "more 
likely both to appeal to and represent working-class interests", evidenced by an 
explicit relationship with the trade union movement, "than the Left parties in the 
United States and Canada". Although the level of class voting in the United States 
was much lower than in either Britain or Australia, the class-party relationship in 
that country was stronger than that found in Canada. Alford argued that despite 
the absence of explicit links between class organisations and parties in the United 
States, the Republican and Democratic parties, unlike the major parties in Canada, 
were generally viewed as at least representing distinctive class interests.
By contrast, Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 22) argued that the ideological tensions and 
related conflict of the owner-worker cleavage had become diffused in the years 
following the Second World War (see also Bell 1960). In recent years a range of 
cross-national studies have questioned the continued strength of the class cleavage 
as a basis of political alignment (eg Abramson 1971; Borre 1984; Inglehart 1977, 
1990a; Franklin et al 1992; Lipset 1981a; Dalton 1988). A common theme in 
studies of class dealignment is the increased complexity of the class structure in 
advanced industrial societies whereby the extent of class polarisation has declined 
(Aitkin 1982, 318-325; Baker, Dalton, Hildebrandt 1981, chapt 8; Dalton, Beck and 
Flanagan 1984, 20-4; Kemp 1978, 2-12). In other words, the dichotomy between 
owner and worker is a less appropriate description of social conflict, as it is 
translated into political alignments, in advanced capitalist society than was the case 
during the early to mid twentieth century.
The historical view of class voting in Britain was summarised by Pulzer (1967, 98) 
in the claim that "class is the basis of British party politics; all else is embellishment 
and detail". While Butler and Stokes (1974, 77) found a strong link between class 
and party in the 1960s, they cautioned that "the declining strength of association 
between class and party is one of the most important aspects of political change 
during this decade" (1974, 203). In subsequent analyses of British elections the class 
dealignment thesis became dominant. Particularly influential in this development 
was the work of Sarlvik and Crewe (1983, 86) who reported, after the 1979 
election, that "only a bare majority of voters have voted along class lines in the last 
three elections. There remains a class basis to the vote but clearly it is not as 
important as it once was".1 Although a revisionist position has recently emerged 
from work conducted by Anthony Heath and colleagues (Heath, Jo well and 
Curtice 1985; Heath et al 1991), which claims that only a small decline in class
1 See also Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt (1977), Denver (1989), Franklin (1985), Franklin and Mughan 
(1978), Miller et al (1990), Robertson (1984), and Rose and McAllister (1986, 1990)
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voting has occurred since the early 1960s (reflecting a "trendless fluctuation"),* 12 this 
view has been rebutted on the grounds that the methods and measures used by the 
revisionists are flawed (Crewe 1986; Dunleavy 1987; cf Heath, Jowell and Curtice 
1986, 1987).3
Australia has also been characterised as a party system in which the class cleavage 
has traditionally been the dominant basis of political alignment (Alford 1963; 
Aitkin and Kahan 1974), extending to the claim that the relationship between class 
and party is so close "that the two may be regarded as largely alternative measures 
of the same general social outlook" (Encel 1970, 96-7). However, as in Britain, the 
new orthodoxy is one of a weakened class-party relationship. The phenomenon of 
class dealignment was initially identified in Australia by David Kemp (1978) who 
found that the relationship between class and party, as reported in public opinion 
polls conducted between 1946 and 1975, had declined steeply.4 Aitkin (1982) 
subsequently found the decline in class voting continued throughout the remainder 
of the 1970s, although he did so from the perspective that class had never been a 
"very good explanation of Australian partisanship" (1982, 313). Whilst further 
research has suggested that the decline in class voting is not as great as Kemp 
initially identified, occurring mostly after the mid-1960s, the dealignment thesis is 
generally supported (Jones and McAllister 1989; McAllister 1992a, 1992b). Indeed 
the only dissenting opinions, as in Britain, are based upon alternative methods and 
measures of class voting (Connell and Goot 1979; Connell and Irving 1992; Goot 
1994).
In the United States research on the impact of social class upon electoral choice, as 
indeed with most aspects of voting behaviour, has focused primarily upon voting 
in presidential rather than congressional elections. While the major electoral 
studies of the 1960s and 1970s found that the level of class voting in presidential 
elections had declined over the post-war period (Campbell et al 1960, 347-349; Nie, 
Verba and Petrocik 1976, 224-6), the extent to which this represented a consistent 
downward trend rather than short-term responses to particular presidential 
candidates was a matter of debate (Abramson 1975, 1978; cf Knoke 1975).5 The 
former view was buttressed by an analysis of congressional voting patterns, 
conducted by Ladd and Hadley (1978, 286), which showed a significant decline in 
class voting had also occurred in congressional elections between 1948 and 1976, 
particularly among the young.6 More recent evidence suggests that the overall
: It should be noted that whilst Heath et al reject the class dealignment thesis, neither are they 
strong proponents of the class voting concept, claiming that "occupation has never determined vote to 
any great extent" (Heath 1986, 30).
1 The weight of scholarly opinion supports the dealignment thesis (eg Denver 1989, 65; Denver and
Hands 1992, 52; Franklin 1985; Miller 1990, 8; Robertson 1984; Rose and McAllister 1986, 1990),
although Heath et al have received some support (Marshall et al 1988; Weakliem 1989).
4 Although, as a result of somewhat contradictory statements, it is not clear whether Alford (1963), 
some fifteen years prior to Kemp, also ascribed to the class dealignment thesis (see Goot 1994; Jones and 
McAllister 1989).
5 Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1976, 221-3), however, argued that the class cleavage actually 
strengthened in the South between 1952 and 1972.
6 Although the level of class-voting in the South in House elections had increased over the same 
period (Ladd with Hadley 1978, 159-62).
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downward trend in class voting in the United States continued into the 1980s, with 
the trend applying both to Presidential and congressional elections (Abramson, 
Aldrich and Rhode 1990, 139-41; Dalton 1988, 155-60).
As the debates regarding class dealignment demonstrate, the actual level of class 
voting identified in any study is dependent upon how class is measured. The most 
common measure of class is the occupational distinction between white-collar 
workers (the middle class), and blue-collar workers (the working class), measured 
by the non-manual versus manual dichotomy. Reflecting the dominant view 
among political scientists during the 1960s, Alford (1963, 75-9) argued that the 
categorical distinction between white-collar and blue-collar workers was the best 
predictor of vote, and of other socio-economic variables, and particularly conducive 
to comparative research when represented by the manual versus non-manual 
distinction. Similarly Butler and Stokes (1969, 1974) found that occupation was the 
primary attribute most respondents used to characterise social class and that when 
examining party preferences on the basis of social grade groupings, the greatest 
differences in party preferences between adjoining strata occurred between the 
lower non-manual and the skilled manual groups (see also Aitkin 1982, 124-6).7
Although the primary impetus for the use of the categorical approach has been its 
simplicity and strong association with party vote, more detailed justifications have 
also been presented. An early study of social mobility by Lipset and Bendix (1959, 
15-16) defended the manual/non-manual distinction on the grounds that non- 
manual occupations have more prestige, lead to higher incomes, require more 
education, and were more likely to promote middle-class lifestyles and self-images 
than manual occupations. In addition "low-level non-manual workers are more 
likely to have political attitudes which resemble those of the upper middle class 
than those of the manual working class" (see also Graetz 1983). Nevertheless 
critiques of the categorical approach adopted by political scientists have been 
widespread, especially within the Marxist and Weberian theoretical traditions.8
Marxist: The Lipset and Rokkan notion of conflict in the labour market between 
owners and workers suggests a simple dichotomous schema for measuring social 
class similar to the Marxist structural account of class polarisation under the 
capitalist mode of production. Although much of Marx's political analysis 
acknowledged the presence of a wide range of social actors, he conceptualised an 
increasing polarisation of class relations to the point of irreconcilable conflict 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (Wright 1985, 7-8). The former class 
comprised workers, those who lack ownership of the means of production and
7 Initially Butler and Stokes (1969) classified the lower non-manual group as working-class on the 
grounds that the majority of the group considered themselves as "working class". However the lower 
non-manual group were later re-categorised as middle-class on the basis of their Conservative Party 
leanings which were much closer to that of the other non-manual workers than to manual workers 
(1974, 75).
8 A fourth approach is based on the liberal tradition which sees class systems as "gradational and 
fluid socio-economic hierarchies" (Marshall et al 1988, 270). The rate of social mobility is assumed to be 
sufficiently high so as to render notions of class or group conflict as implausible (Blau and Duncan 
1967). As such the traditional dichotomy is blurred by a continuum which possesses no absolute 
divisions. However studies have shown that measures adopted from the liberal approach have little 
impact upon political behaviour (Kelley and McAllister 1985)
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must sell their labour power, the latter class comprised capitalists, owners of the 
means of production. Beyond the simple dichotomy lies only the petty 
bourgeoisie, owners of the means of production but not purchasers of labour 
power, seen merely as a small transitional class. One difficulty under this approach 
is the treatment of company managers who exercise the day-to-day control over 
their enterprise but often lack significant ownership of the means of production. 
Consequently many neo-Marxists choose to include as capitalists company 
employees at top management level (eg Domhoff 1980, 59-80; Kolko 1962, 65-69; 
Nichols 1969, 134-42).
A more general criticism of the strict Marxist approach is that the capitalist- 
worker dichotomy is inadequate in advanced capitalist economies in which only a 
very small proportion of persons are owners (or controllers) of the means of 
production. Marxist attempts to resolve the ambiguous class position of the non­
working class wage and salary earner have varied (Wright 1985, 37-42). One 
prominent example is the work of Ralph Dahrendorf (1959) whose concept of class 
relations is based on authority relations. Dahrendorf distinguishes between those 
in society who exercise authority and those who are subject to authority but 
exercise none themselves, in addition to a residual group who neither exercise 
authority nor are subjected to it. In terms of measuring social class the 
Dahrendorf approach differs from the strict Marxist approach by including 
management level non-manual workers and supervisory manual workers as part of 
the advantaged or supervisory class, thereby dramatically reducing the size of the 
disadvantaged or non-supervisory class.
Another prominent Marxist, Eric Wright, rejected Dahrendorf for his reliance on 
the concept of domination, arguing that a Marxian conception of class requires an 
incorporation of both domination relations and exploitation relations (Wright 
1985, 56-7). Consequently Wright introduced three dimensions of exploitation in 
order to define a number of contradictory class locations.9 In addition to the 
ownership of capital, Wright argued that workers may either be exploited or 
exploit others with respect to organisational assets (making policy decisions or in a 
supervisory role) and skill/talent assets (education credentials and job autonomy). 
The result of the analysis is the identification of twelve class locations (Wright 
1985, 86-92). The bourgeoisie remained a pure class (owning sufficient capital to 
hire workers and not work) as did the proletariat (wage labourer with no 
supervisory role, no educational credentials and no job autonomy). Small 
employers and the petty bourgeoisie (owners of capital yet neither exploiter nor 
exploited in regard to organisational or skills/talent assets) represented the old 
middle class. The remaining eight contradictory locations (non-capital owners, 
exploiter along at least one of the other two dimensions) represent what was 
broadly defined as the new middle class.
A final approach from a Marxist tradition is the theory of production sectors, 
developed by Patrick Dunleavy (1980a, 1980b), which distinguishes between public 
and private sector workers. Dunleavy argues that the sectoral cleavage is related to
} The Wright framework presented here is from his 1985 work Classes, which differs from earlier 
formulations of his class schema. See in particular Wright (1978).
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the growth of the state in the post-war years and the expansion of personal direct 
taxation to include the vast majority of the working population. The low levels of 
productivity improvement, high levels of unionisation, and the political 
determination of wage levels in the public sector, in contrast to high productivity 
and low unionisation in the private sector, foster a concern with state bureaucratic 
waste and inefficiency among private sector workers who have a material interest 
in lower taxation rates. Opposed are public sector workers who are reliant upon 
continued, or indeed expanded, private sector extraction to finance the state 
structure. Whilst such conflict cannot explain political alignments in the 1920s, 
when state employment represented a small fraction of the working population, 
Dunleavy argues the sectoral cleavage is more appropriate in advanced 
industrialised economies in which party conflict is directly linked to issues such as 
social service provision and nationalisation.
Weberian: From a strictly theoretical perspective the major alternative to Marxist 
approaches are those in the Weberian tradition. Although attempts to pin down 
differences between the two vary on the specifics, the fundamental difference is in 
relation to the prominence which the Weberian theory places on the role of the 
market. It is the market exchanges between capital, skills, and labour which lead 
to the differential life-chances of the Weberian classes (Marshall et al 1988, 13-18). 
The recent impetus for the Weberian approach is derived from a series of social 
mobility studies conducted by a group of Oxford sociologists (Goldthorpe et al 
1968). The work led to the Hope-Goldthorpe (H-G) scale of the social desirability 
of occupations which was unique for differentiating occupations on the basis of 
both their function and employment status (Goldthorpe and Hope 1974). Whilst 
the former criterion was measured in terms of income, conditions of employment 
and economic security, and opportunities for advancement, the latter was judged 
on the basis of the job's location within its respective system of organisational 
authority. For example, the scale differentiated self-employed plumbers from 
foreman plumbers, who in turn were differentiated from rank and file employee 
plumbers. In deriving his class schema from the collapsed version of the Hope- 
Goldthorpe (H-G) scale, Goldthorpe (1980, 1987), in the tradition of Max Weber, 
was then able to group occupations into categories which essentially shared 
common market and work situations.
In 1983 responsibility for the British Election Studies (BES) was transferred to the 
Oxford-based academic Anthony Heath, and his collaborators Roger Jo well and 
John Curtice. The authors were highly critical of the occupational grade system 
used in previous BES studies (Butler and Stokes 1969, 1974; Sarlvik and Crewe 
1983) arguing that whilst the schema may be pertinent to analysis of consumer 
choice, focusing as it does on income and life-style, its relevance to political 
analysis was highly questionable (Heath Jowell and Curtice 1985, 13-6). In their 
report on the 1983 British Election Study, the authors introduced the Heath- 
Jowell-Curtice (HJC) five class schema, a collapsed version of Goldthorpe's seven 
class Weberian schema (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985). The most advantaged 
group in the schema is the salariat. Characterised by high incomes, secure 
employment, and the exercise of authority and autonomy, this group includes the 
professions, administrators and officials, managers, high grade technicians, and 
supervisors of non-manual work. The least advantaged group, with generally low 
incomes and entirely in subordinate roles, is the working class, comprised of
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manual workers in industry and agriculture. Between the salariat and the working 
class in the HJC schema are three intermediate classes, namely the routine non- 
manual, petty bourgeois, and foreman and technician classes, differentiated by 
varying degrees of employment security, autonomy and authority.
In assessing the merits of alternative conceptions of social class it should be noted 
that there is extensive ongoing debate regarding their respective theoretical merits, 
and significant diversity exists within each approach (Baxter, Emmison and 
Western 1991; Marshall et al 1988). In this study the concern is primarily with the 
ability to measure social class as a basis of political alignment in contemporary 
party systems. Table 2.1 shows that, in Australia, Britain and the United States, 
the strongest relationship between class and party is found by measuring class on 
the basis of the distinction between manual and non-manual workers. Although 
other class measures, notably the Weberian schema adopted by Heath et al and the 
Marxian approach adopted by Wright, identified a class-party relationship of 
similar strength, in each case it was below that identified by the simple categorical 
distinction. Further weight is given to the use of the categorical approach on the 
grounds that it provides a simple and relatively unambiguous measure for the 
purposes of cross-national research. Consequently, throughout the remainder of 
this study, class is measured on the basis of the categorical distinction between 
manual and non-manual workers. Table 2.1 also serves to confirm that a 
statistically significant relationship continues to exist between social class and party 
vote, irrespective of how class is measured.
Table 2.1: Correlation Between Vote and Alternative Class Measures in Australia, 
Britain, and the United Statesab
Schema Classes Identified Australia
Pearson's r 
Britain United
States
M arxian
Marx Capitalist - Worker .14* .12* .08*
Wright Old Middle - New Middle 
- Working
.09* .21* .08*
Dahrendorf Supervisory - Working .09* .17* na
Dunleavy Private - Public .09* .07* .03
Categorical Manual - Non-Manual .16* .28* .10*
Weberian Salariat - Intermediate 
- Working
.13* .26* .08*
a - See text for class definitions.
- Vote in all tables and figures refers to national lower-house party vote. 
Sources: 1993 AES; 1992 BES; 1992 CPS NES.
The continued existence of a class-party relationship is also evident in Table 2.2 
which shows the national lower-house vote among manual and non-manual 
workers in Australia, Britain, and the United States. In each country the major 
right-wing party is supported by a plurality of non-manual workers, the major left- 
wing party by a plurality of manual workers. The differences in party vote 
between the two occupational classes is greatest in Britain, where the Conservative
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vote is 24 percent higher among non-manual workers than among manual workers, 
compared to Australia where the electoral advantage of the Liberal-National parties 
among non-manuals is only 11 percent, and the United States where comparable 
figure for the Republican Party is only 9 percent. Nevertheless, even in Britain 
over 40 percent of voters in each category defy their respective class cues by voting 
for either their class opponents or a minor party. Thus, although the social bases 
of electoral support continue to contain a class element, the influence of social class 
upon electoral behaviour is only limited.
Table 2.2: Vote by Occupational Class in Australia, Britain, and 
the United States3
Percent
Non-Manual Manual
Australia, 1993
Labor 43 58
Liberal-National 47 36
Other 10 5
Total 100 100
(N) (474) (455)
Britain, 1992
Labour 28 57
Conservative 50 26
Liberal Democrat 19 14
Other 3 4
Total 100 100
(N) (344) (478)
U nited States, 1992
Democratic 49 58
Republican 51 42
Total 100 100
(N) (315) (214)
3 - Head of Household 
Sources: As for Table 2.1.
The table provides no information regarding the influence of class upon party vote 
across time. Whilst the literature would suggest that the results presented in Table 
2.2 represent the tail-end of a process of class dealignment, a summary statistical 
measure is required to provide a simple longitudinal indication of class voting 
trends. The measure chosen here is ordinary least squares bivariate regression
analysis with missing data treated by pairwise deletion. Regression analysis 
provides an estimate of the impact of an independent variable (eg occupational 
class) upon a dependent variable (eg party vote), known as the regression 
coefficient. Figure 2.1 reports the bivariate regression coefficient (b), as estimated 
in each of the electoral surveys examined over time, multiplied by 100. As the 
independent variable in this case is scored either 0 (manual worker) or 1 (non- 
manual worker), this enables the coefficient to be interpreted as the probability of
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a non-manual worker, relative to a manual worker, voting for the major right-wing 
party.
..Britain
Australia " O - .........
United States
Figure 2.1: The impact of occupational class upon party vote in Australia, Britain, and the 
United States, 1964-93 (bivariate OLS regression). All values are significant at 
p<.05. See text and appendix for details of variables. Sources: 1967 and 1979 
ANPAS; 1990 and 1993 AES; 1964, 1979, 1987 and 1992 BES; 1964, 1980,
1988 and 1992 SRC-CPS NES.
The figure confirms the relative impact of occupational vote across the three 
countries, strongest in Britain and generally stronger in Australia than in the 
United States. The figure also supports the class dealignment thesis, namely that 
the electoral impact of occupational class upon electoral choice has declined across 
the past three decades. In Britain the greater probability of a non-manual worker 
rather than a manual worker voting Conservative fell from 37 percent in 1964 to 
24 percent in 1993. Similarly in Australia and the United States the greater 
probability of a non-manual worker voting for the major right-wing party fell, 
between the mid 1960s and early 1990s, from 28 percent to 16 percent and from 21 
percent to 10 percent respectively. The findings also suggest that the secular 
decline in the electoral impact of class ceased during the 1980s, with the regression 
coefficients in each country varying within a relatively narrow range over the past 
decade and a half. In Australia and Britain the rise in class voting in the early 
1990s reflects, in part, a resurgence in the major party vote following significant 
gains made by minor parties (the Australian Democrats and the Alliance 
respectively) in earlier elections, although no comparable explanation is available 
for the United States. Overall, however, the figure shows that, relative to earlier 
periods, occupational class is a diminished influence upon party vote in the 1990s.
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Owner versus Worker (2): Aspects of Economic Lifestyle
Whilst occupation is the most widely examined single indicator of social class, 
voting studies examining the electoral impact of sociological influences have also 
acknowledged the greater explanatory power obtained by expanding the concept of 
social structure beyond occupation, to recognise the additional effects of economic 
lifestyle variables (Rose 1974; Rose and McAllister 1986, 56-66). Implicit in this 
approach is the view that social class, as a measure of material differences between 
citizens, extends to variables beyond occupational classification (Rose 1974). An 
alternative approach is to view economic lifestyle attributes as alterative political 
cleavages to the traditional class cleavage. Rather than providing a complementary 
role these attributes are seen as cross-cutting the traditional manual versus non- 
manual cleavage fundamentally altering the nature of political alignments 
(Dunleavy 1980a, 1980b). Both approaches recognise the importance of including 
economic lifestyle variables in any voting model derived from the sociological 
approach to adequately account for contemporary group voting patterns. The 
electoral impact of three aspects of economic lifestyle are considered below, namely 
trade union membership, housing and class self-image.10
Trade Union Membership: There are strong ties between the major left-wing party 
in Australia, Britain, and the United States and their respective national union 
movements. In Australia and Britain the Labo(u)r Party was founded by the union 
movement to represent and promote the interests of unionists at the legislative 
level. The British Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Australian Council of 
Trades Unions (ACTU) through direct affiliation remain important sources of 
Labo(u)r Party funding, membership, and general support, in addition to exerting a 
degree of input to policy decisions through representation at the party conference 
and executive levels (Minkin 1992; Jaensch 1993).* 11 In the United States, although 
union membership is much lower and "formal affiliation has always been avoided", 
the largest peak union body, the AFL-CIO, is traditionally a key supporter of the 
Democratic Party, extending to granting endorsement of the party's Presidential 
candidate and many congressional candidates (McKay 1989, 226-8).
An overall decline in union membership during the 1980s, together with an 
expansion of white-collar unionism, has significantly altered the character of the 
trade union movement in advanced industrial society (Dunleavy 1980a, 1980b).12 
Nevertheless, if anything, the broadening of union membership outside traditional 
blue-collar industries has increased the potential for unionism to exert an electoral 
influence independent of occupational class, promoted also by the strong anti-union 
stance adopted by right-wing parties in recent years. In Britain, for example, the
10 An additional aspect of economic lifestyle is income. However it is not considered here due to 
the absence of an income variable in recent Australian studies in addition to the difficulties of 
operationalizing income both over time and cross-nationally.
11 Since the late 1980s a range of organisational and structural reforms have been carried out in the 
British Labour Party which seek to lessen the influence of the union movement (Seyd 1992)
12 As a proportion of total employees trade union membership declined in Australia from 50% in 
1982 to 40% in 1992 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1993, 209), in Britain from 50% in 1979 to 38% in 
1991 (Central Statistical Office 1993, 425), and in the United States from 20% in 1983 to 16% in 1992 
(Bureau of the Census 1993, 436).
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Thatcher Conservative government introduced a series of legislative reforms which 
sought to curtail the power of union leaders relative to both individual employees 
and employers (Letwin 1992, 145-9). Similar policies have been proposed by the 
Liberal-National parties in opposition in Australia (Fightback! 1991, 38), whilst the 
Reagan administration was also viewed as hostile to the union movement 
(Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 1990, 128). Although there is an important 
distinction to be made between the interests of union leaders and ordinary rank 
and file union members,13 major electoral studies in Australia (Aitkin 1982, 140; 
McAllister 1992a, 166; 1992b), Britain (Franklin 1992; Heath et al 1991, 97, 144; 
Rose 1974, 507; Rose and McAllister 1990, 75), and the United States (Abramson, 
Aldrich and Rhode 1990, 138; Miller and Lockerbie 1992: Sousa 1993) have found a 
significant relationship between union membership and left-wing party support.
Table 2.3 confirms the continuing association between trade union membership 
and party vote with the major left-wing party supported by a plurality of union 
members in each country. Nevertheless important cross-national differences are 
apparent. The Labor Party in Australia and the Democratic Party in the United 
States gained over 60 percent of the unionist vote, but the British Labor Party won 
the support of fewer than half of all trade union members in the 1992 election. 
This may be surprising given the explicit links between the trade union movement 
and the Labour Party in Britain, but again reinforces the importance of the 
distinction between union leaders and ordinary rank and file members. Conversely 
the table shows that of the three major right-wing parties the Republican Party has 
been the most successful in attracting the union vote, gaining 37 percent in 1992 
compared to the Liberal-National and Conservatives who both won only slightly 
more than a quarter of the vote among union members.
Examining the electoral impact of trade union membership upon party vote across 
time (Figure 2.2, the probability of a union member, relative to a non-member, 
voting for the major left-wing party) shows that, consistent with the class voting 
evidence, the influence of unionism declined in all countries between the mid 1960s 
and the late 1980s. However, whilst this decline extended into the 1990s in the 
United Sates, the impact of union membership actually increased in both Australia 
and Britain. In addition to the overall rise in the major party vote, two possible 
explanations would appear likely. Firstly, it is likely that the decline in union 
membership has been greatest among those who reject the political stances of the 
union movement, thereby strengthening the movements partisan homogeneity. A 
second explanation is the continued strong anti-union policies of the Liberal- 
National and Conservative parties. In the 1993 Australian election in particular, 
the Liberal-National parties campaigned on a program of radical structural reform 
of the country's centralised wage-fixing apparatus which was strongly opposed by 
the ACTU. Nevertheless in both countries the electoral impact of unionism 
remained below the level of the mid 1960s.
13 This may be the case particularly when workers, through explicit or implicit coercion, are forced 
to join a union, or do so willingly but reject the union’s involvement in party politics (Aitkin 1982, 
141-2; Butler and Stokes 1974, 199). Indeed one of the justifications of the reform legislation advocated 
by right-wing parties is that it aims to empower rank and file union members at the expense of the 
entrenched power and privileges of the union elite.
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Table 2.3: Vote by Union Membership in Australia, Britain, 
and the United States
Percent
Union Member Non-Member
Australia, 1993
Labor 61 40
Liberal-National 28 49
Other 11 11
Total 100 100
(N) (523) (1787)
Britain, 1992
Labour 48 32
Conservative 27 47
Liberal Democrat 20 18
Other 5 4
Total 100 100
(N) (498) (1919)
U nited States, 1992
Democratic 63 51
Republican 37 49
Total 100 100
(N) (164) (1204)
Sources: As for Table 2.1.
United States
Britain
Australia
Figure 2.2: The impact of union membership upon party vote in Australia, Britain, and 
the United States, 1964-93 (bivariate OLS regression). All values are 
significant at p<.05. See text and appendix for details of variables. Sources: 
As for Figure 2.1.
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Housing: A further aspect of economic lifestyle, as it relates to the material
conditions of citizens, is that of housing tenure. Various studies in Britain have 
identified a strong relationship between owner occupancy and Conservative 
support, and council tenancy and Labour support, to the extent that, in terms of 
explaining voting behaviour, housing tenure is one of the country's most 
important social cleavages (Dunleavy 1979; Franklin 1992a, 115; Rose and 
McAllister 1990, 87). This reflects, in large part, the economic interests of voters 
in response to the alternative housing policies. Thus while Labour generally 
supports the extension of council housing, it is Conservative Party policy to reduce 
the stock of state housing by encouraging council tenants to purchase their 
residences (Letwin 1992, 179-80). From a comparative perspective the housing 
market in Britain differs from the housing markets in Australia and the United 
States with regard to the high proportion of Britons renting their premises from 
the local government authority (Table 2.4). Although Conservative policy has 
succeeded in reducing the public housing stock from over 30 percent of the market 
during the 1970s (Heath et al 1991, 207), Britain remains unique with over one-fifth 
of all households residing in public tenancies, compared to only 6 percent in 
Australia and 2 percent in the United States.
Table 2.4: Housing Tenure in Australia, Britain, and the United States
Australia
Percent o f  households 
Britain U nited States
O w ner Occupier 72 68 68
Private Tenant 17 7 28
Public Tenant 6 22 2
O ther 6 3 2
Total 100 100 100
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics (1994); Central Statistical Office (1993); 
U.S. Bureau Status of the Census (1993).
In an earlier study of housing tenure and party choice in Australia, Britain, and the 
United States, McAllister (1984) found that, net of the influence of intervening 
variables, large and consistent differences in partisanship emerged only between 
council tenants and other householders in Britain, differences which were not 
applicable to Australia and the United States with their small public housing 
sectors. It was concluded that the political impact of housing tenure in Britain was 
due to its large public housing sector, the consistency of housing as an election 
issue on which the Conservatives and Labour had taken clearly distinct positions, 
and the role of housing in the process of political socialisation. As Britain is the 
only country of the three in which housing tenure may be adequately 
operationalised on the basis of the conflict between public and private sectors 
dwellers (housing tenure is no longer ascertained in the Australian electoral 
studies), it is in Britain alone that the electoral impact of housing is considered.
Table 2.5 confirms the importance of housing tenure as an influence upon electoral 
choice in Britain, with Labour gaining the support of almost two-thirds of those 
voters holding a local authority tenancy, whilst the Conservatives won majority
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support among owner-occupiers. Indeed Labour's vote of 65 percent among 
council tenants was higher than the party's vote among either manual workers or 
trade union members, and compared to a level of Conservative support of less than 
one in five of public-sector renters. As McAllister (1984) argued, it is likely that 
the importance of housing occupancy as a basis of political alignment in Britain is 
directly related to the clear and contrasting housing policy positions the major 
parties continue to adopt, and in particular the Conservative government's 
continuing program of council house sales (see also McAllister and Studier 1989; 
Studier, McAllister and Ascui 1990; cf Heath with Garrett 1991; Garrett 1994). 
Figure 2.3, which plots the percentage probability of an owner-occupier, relative to 
a council tenant, voting for the Conservative Party, shows that the electoral impact 
of housing has remained high and relatively stable over the past three decades, 
although showing a slight decline between 1964 and 1979 before rising again during 
the 1980s and 1990s. As with trade union membership, it would appear that 
political parties have politicised the social division between owner occupiers and 
council tenants by adopting clearly opposed policy positions, thereby halting the 
decline in the electoral impact of the variable.
Table 2.5: Vote by Housing Occupancy in Britain, 1992
Owner
Percent
Private Tenant Local Authority
Labour 27 42 65
Conservative 50 36 17
Liberal Democrat ■ 20 17 14
Other 3 5 5
Total 100 100 100
(N) (1789) (185) (436)
Source: 1993 British Election Study.
o3
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Figure 2.3: The impact of housing tenure upon party vote in Britain, 1964-92
(bivariate OLS regression). All values are significant at p<.05. See text 
and appendix for details of variables. Sources: 1964,1979,1987 and 
1992 BES.
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Subjective Class: A further aspect of economic lifestyle is class self-image; that is, 
whether individuals consider themselves to be a member of the working class or 
the middle class. The advantage of a variable which allows respondents to asses 
their own class location is that such an assessment is based upon the individual's 
own evaluation of the importance, or relative weight, of other sociological variables 
such as occupation, education and income, rather than the weights assigned by a 
social researcher or political scientist (Graetz and Mcallister 1988, 225-7).14 
Research has demonstrated that, depending on question wording and survey 
format, the majority of persons readily accept descriptions of themselves as 
belonging to a social class (Aitkin 1982, 123; Butler and Stokes 1974, 68). Studies 
have confirmed that assessments of class self-image have important behavioural 
consequences, independent of social background characteristics, extending to the 
area of electoral choice (Graetz and McAllister 1988, 228-30). The arbitrariness of 
subjective class identities was highlighted by Aitkin (1982, 128), who showed that, 
over a period of just two years, 32 percent of respondents had altered their class 
self-image, with such changes unrelated to changes in either income or occupation.
Table 2.6 shows the party vote of electors by their class self-image.13 With the 
exception of the British Labour Party (which again performed badly among a key 
grouping), each of the major parties gained a majority of the vote among their 
natural class constituency. However, in no instance did this level of class support 
reach 60 percent, indicating a notable yet modest association between class self- 
image and vote. The impact of class self-image upon party vote across time is 
shown in Figure 2.4, which reports the probability of a middle-class identifier, 
relative to a working-class identifier, voting for the major right-wing party. The 
figure shows that, in each country, the electoral impact of class self-image in the 
early 1990s was well below that reported for the mid 1960s, adding further weight 
to the class dealignment thesis. In Britain the decline occurred primarily between 
1964 and 1979, continuing to 1987 prior to a slight rise in 1992. In Australia the 
declining electoral impact of class self-image was consistent across the period, whilst 
in the United States the largest decline occurred in 1992, following a slight rise 
between 1980 and 1988. Thus, despite national variations in the level of subjective 
class voting, highest in Britain and lowest in the United States, the declining 
electoral influence of the variable was a common characteristic.
14 The disadvantage is that political leanings may also be an influence upon subjective class (Aitkin 
1982, 136; Sartori 1969, 84).
15 To maximise cross-national and over-time comparability class self-image is measured through 
forced responses rather than through open-ended questions, which were not used in all surveys.
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Table 2.6: Vote by Class Self-Image in Australia, Britain, and the
United States
Middle Class
Percent
Working Class
Australia, 1993
Labor 35 55
Liberal-National 53 37
Other 13 9
Total 100 100
(N) (997) (1085)
Britain, 1992
Labour 18 47
Conservative 58 32
Liberal Democrat 22 16
Other 2 5
Total 100 100
(N) (833) (1362)
United, States, 1992
Democratic 49 58
Republican 52 42
Total 100 100
(N) (568) (417)
Sources: As for Table 2.1.
Britain
Australia
United States
Figure 2.4: The impact of class self-image upon party vote in Australia, Britain, and the 
United States, 1964-93 (bivariate OLS regression). All values are significant 
at p<.05. See text and appendix for details of variables. Sources: As for 
Figure 2.1.
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Church versus State
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identified the conflict between Church and State as an 
outcome of the rise of secular movements in response to the French Revolution. 
Although the cleavage was regarded as particularly divisive in the Catholic and 
religiously mixed countries of continental Europe, in the Anglo-American 
democracies two potential religious cleavages have emerged as a basis of political 
alignment. Firstly, there is the denominational cleavage, based upon access to 
power and privilege, between the various advantaged and disadvantaged religions. 
Historically the Church of England is the advantaged denomination in Britain 
(Wald 1983, 60-5), while, in the absence of a state church, it is the Protestant 
religions in general in both Australia (Aitkin 1982, 162-6) and the United States 
(Knoke 1976, 18-20). Secondly, there is a religiosity cleavage between, on the one 
hand, those who regularly attend church services, and, on the other hand, those 
who rarely or never attend church, reflecting conservative and liberal views, 
respectively, regarding the role of religion in society extending to the enforcement 
of moral codes.16
With regard to the role of the denominational cleavage resulting from political 
movements committed to the abolition of religious discrimination, the history of 
the British Liberal Party is particularly relevant. During the nineteenth century 
the dissenting views of the non-conformists were closely allied to the anti­
establishment stance of the early Whigs, opposed to the Tories as the 
representatives of Anglican defence (Wald 1983, 53-66). The Whigs and their 
Liberal Party successors were committed to the removal of discrimination against 
non-conformists in areas such as holding public office and the legal recognition of 
non-Church marriages. By contrast the position of Catholics in Britain during this 
period was ambiguous, opposed to the religious puritanism of the Liberal Party but 
also opposed to the Conservatives on the question of Irish Home Rule (Wald 1983, 
193-5). The rise of the Labour Party provided an outlet for Catholics subjected to 
those internal cross-pressures. The denominational cleavage weakened, however, in 
response to the secularisation of the education system during the decades of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century (Wald 1983, 228-34). Although Butler and 
Stokes (1974, 167) found a continued relationship throughout the 1960s, the 
relationship was strongest amongst the older age-cohorts and had fallen consistently 
through successive generations. Nevertheless, studies continue to find an 
independent link between religion and party, particularly in regard to the high 
level of Conservative support among Anglicans (Heath et al 1991, 86; Rose and 
McAllister 1990, 49).
In Australia the primary religious cleavage is between Catholics and Protestants, 
the former favouring Labor, the latter the Liberal-National parties. Although 
historical ethnic and class factors partly explain this phenomenon, in particular the 
early Catholic Church comprised predominantly of Irish immigrants from lower 
strata occupations, federation-era issues such as social temperance, linked to 
political conservatism and conflicting with the social norms of the Catholic
16 A third potential religious cleavage is based upon the specific doctrinal beliefs of the population. 
However, as national electoral surveys rarely ascertain detailed information regarding the religious 
beliefs of the respondent, this section examines only denominational and religiosity divisions.
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community, harnessed the Catholic-Labor relationship (Aitkin 1982, 161-6; Alford 
1963, 191-4). The relationship was further strengthened during the First World 
War when the Labor Party split on the conscription issue, bitterly opposed by 
Irish immigrants, with the remaining Labor rump dominated by Catholics. During 
the 1950s Labor again split, largely the result of Catholic concerns about the 
influence of communism in the trade union movement, but on this occasion the 
effect was to weaken the impact of religion on political alignments (Alford 1963, 
194-202). Although the resultant Democratic Labor Party was dominated by 
Catholics, the majority of Catholics remained loyal to the Labor Party (Aitkin 
1982: 164-6; Aitkin and Kahan 1974: 438).
In the United States the principal religious divide, in terms of group voting 
patterns, is also between Protestants and Catholics, the former predisposed to the 
Republican Party the latter to the Democratic Party (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and 
McPhee 1954, 61-73; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948, 21-5; Nie, Verba and 
Petrocik 1976, Chapt 13; Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 1990, 141-4).17 The
Catholic-Democratic Party connection was initially established during the mid 
nineteenth century when newly arriving Irish-Catholic immigrants were attracted 
to the culturally diverse image of the Jacksonian Democrats, which contrasted with 
the northern establishment, and on occasion anti-Catholic, image of the Whigs and 
early Republicans (Jensen 1981; Phillips 1970, 140-78).18 Divisions, however, did 
exist within the Protestant denominations, related in particular to issues such as 
prohibition and slavery, with pietist Protestant denominations (eg
Congregationalists, Methodists, Presbyterians and Quakers) generally favouring the 
Republicans and ritualist Protestant denominations (eg Lutherans and the Reformed 
Churches) favouring the Democrats (Benson 1961, chapts 8 and 9; Kleppner 1970, 
73-91). To the extent that divisions within the Protestant religions persist, they 
largely reflect the intervening role of regional, class and racial influences, with 
research indicating that once other social structure variables are controlled for, the 
partisan differences between the major Protestant denominations are merely in 
terms of the strength of the independent pro-Republican effect (Knoke 1976, 18- 
29).19
17 Jews, although representing a small minority of the population, have also disproportionately 
supported the Democratic Party historically. Interpretations of the link have focused upon the 
importance of the New Deal and Roosevelt's foreign policy in addition to the liberal orientations of the 
Jewish faith (Ladd with Hadley 1978, 60-64).
18 Divisions did exist, however, within the Catholic vote. Phillips (1970, 144) argues that German 
Catholics generally supported their Irish counterparts in the Democratic Party, whilst Italian, Polish and 
French Catholics often tended towards the Republican Party in reaction to the perceived Irish 
dominance within the Democratic Party.
19 The major concern in grouping all the Protestant religions together is the electoral behaviour of 
Baptists, who generally lean towards the Democratic Party (Knoke 1976). However preliminary research 
showed that, after controlling for other social structure variables (see Table 2.14) in the 1992 House 
elections Baptists were in fact 5% more likely to vote Republican than were non-Baptists, a figure 
comparable with Protestants generally.
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One trend affecting the role of the denominational cleavage as a basis for political 
alignment is secularisation in each country (Table 2.7).20 Whilst the proportion of 
Catholics has remained relatively stable in each country, the secular trend has 
occurred almost exclusively among Protestant religions. Studies investigating the 
ability of Catholic and some fundamentalist Protestant denominations to withstand 
the widespread rise of secularism was due to their focus upon worship and religious 
instruction compared to mainstream Protestant churches which were relaxing their 
demands upon members, and tended to focus upon more general social and 
community functions (Kelly 1978). In addition, Catholic and fundamentalist 
Protestant religions have also been aided by higher birth rates among members 
(Bibby 1978) and the effects of migration, in Australia from southern Europe, in 
Britain from Ireland, and in the United States from Latin America. Nevertheless, a
Table 2.7: Religious Affiliation in Australia, Britain, and the United States,
mid 1960s - early 1990s
Mid 1960s
Percent
Early 1990s Change
A ustralia
Protestant3 59 49 -10
Catholic 25 26 + 1
Other 13 11 -2
No Religion 3 15 + 12
Total 100 100
(N) (2032) (2949)
B ritain
Anglican 65 34 -31
O ther Protestant 24 20 -4
Catholic 8 11 + 3
Other 1 6 + 5
No Religion 3 30 + 27
Total 100 100
(N) (1748) (3521)
U nited  States
Protestant 68 60 -8
Catholic 22 24 + 2
Other 6 3 -3
No Religion 4 14 + 10
Total 100 100
(N) (1830) (2472)
3 - Due to coding procedures includes only the Church of England, 
Presbyterian, Methodist, and Uniting Churches.
Sources: As for Table 2.1.
Although some of the rise in secularism is due to changes in the questions used in the election 
studies to measure religious affiliation (see Appendix), comparable trends in church membership in 
Britain (Heath et al 1991) and census figures in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1994) and the 
United States (US Bureau of the Census, 1993) tend to confirm the findings reported here.
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majority of citizens in each country continue to regard themselves as belonging to 
a religious denomination, the Protestant denominations remaining the largest 
religious groupings.
Historical patterns of party support among religious denominations continue to be 
reflected in national elections (Table 2.8). In Britain, the Conservative Party vote 
is significantly higher among Anglicans than among non-conformists; Labor is still 
supported by a majority of Catholics, in addition to a majority of voters of other 
religious groups. However, against historical precedents, the Liberal Democrats no 
longer enjoy an electoral advantage among dissenting Protestants, the high "other" 
vote in this group predominantly going to the nationalist parties in Scotland and 
Wales. In Australia, the Protestant-Catholic divide is also still evident, the Liberal- 
National parties supported by a majority of Protestants, although by a lower 
percentage of Anglicans, while Labor maintains the support of a majority of 
Catholic voters. In the United States, the Protestant vote is much less distinct than 
in the other two countries, but still slightly favours the Republican Party, while a 
majority of Catholics, and voters from the small "other religion" group (mostly of
Table 2.8: Vote by Religious Denomination in Australia, Britain, and the United States
Anglican Other
Protestant
Percent
Catholic Other No
Religion
Australia*
Labor 41 34 55 43 49
Liberal-National 50 56 37 42 34
Other 10 10 8 15 17
Total 100 100 100 100 100
(N) (652) (412) (603) (257) (336)
Britain
Labour 29 34 51 51 39
Conservative 52 40 30 38 37
Liberal Democrat 19 15 15 12 21
Other 1 10 3 0 4
Total 100 100 100 100 100
(N) (997) (304) (247) (59) (732)
United, Statesb
Democrat 49 56 67 60
Republican 51 45 33 40
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (735) (345) (46) (153)
a - "Other Protestant" in Australia, due to coding procedures, includes only the Presbyterian, 
Methodist, and Uniting churches.
b - The small number of Episcopalians in the United States are included in the "Other 
Protestant" category.
Sources: As for Table 2.1.
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the Jewish faith), support the Democratic Party. Finally, note should also be taken 
of the rising proportion of secularists in each country, with this group showing 
disproportionate support for minor parties in Australia and Britain, consistent with 
theories of secularism and the rejection of class-based politics (Inglehart 1990a, 185- 
7) and support for the Democrats in the United States.
The trend in the electoral impact of religious denomination is shown in Figure 2.5. 
The figures are the probability of Anglicans in Britain, and Protestants in Australia 
and the United States, relative to all other voters, voting for the major right-wing 
party.21 In Australia, the figures show that religion has retained a modest impact 
upon vote over time. A possible explanation for religion's higher influence in the 
1993 election is the role of the republican issue, re-ignited by the Labor Party in 
1991, with studies showing a significant link between Protestantism and support 
for the continuance of a constitutional monarchy (Bean 1993). In Britain, religion 
has also maintained a modest but consistent influence upon party vote, the low 
impact in 1964 being due to the lack of a screening question in that year. In the 
United States, after a fall between 1964 and 1980, the electoral impact of religion 
increased between 1980 and 1988, consistent with interpretations regarding the rise 
of the religious right (Dionne 1991, chapt 8) which also served to increase religious
Britain
11
Australia
United States
Figure 2.5: The impact of religious denomination upon party vote in Australia,
Britain, and the United States, 1964-93 (bivariate OLS regression). All 
values >5 are significant at p<.05. See text and appendix for details of 
variables. Sources: As for Figure 2.1.
21 Due to variations in questioning techniques however some caution must be used when 
interpreting the results. In some of the surveys the standard denominational question, eg "what is your 
religion or faith?", is preceded by a screening question, eg "do you regard yourself as belonging to any 
particular religion?". The likely, though speculative, effect of the initial screening question is to increase 
the percentage of secularists reported in the study, in addition to raising the impact of the 
denominational cleavage upon party vote as those who continue to report religious affiliation will tend 
to be more committed denominational adherents. The screening questions have been used in all British 
election studies since 1970, in addition to the 1979 Australian study and the 1992 United States study.
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voting in presidential elections during the 1980s (Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 
1990, 141-4). The influence of religious affiliation upon congressional voting in the 
1990s also remains modest and indeed, if anything, weaker than during the mid 
1960s. Overall religion remains a basis of political alignment in each country, but 
its electoral impact is still generally weaker than (in Australia and Britain) or only 
equal to (in the United States) the impact of the eroding class related variables.
The link between Catholic voters and left-wing parties and Protestant voters and 
right-wing parties in the Anglo-American democracies is against the European 
norm whereby the vast majority of the nation's population claim membership of 
the same religious denomination, such that the principal religious divide is between 
regular churchgoers and infrequent churchgoers; that is between those who 
demonstrate a consistent commitment to the church, and those for whom the 
church assumes a lesser or non-existent role. It may be argued that in the Anglo- 
American democracies, where religious tolerance is the norm and sectarian conflict 
largely absent, the religiosity cleavage will become more significant as religious 
issues on the political agenda focus upon non-denominational concerns, in 
particular moral questions such as abortion and censorship, which place committed 
adherents of most religions against those for whom religious belief is socially 
irrelevant. Indeed evidence of a link between religiosity and right-wing support has 
been found in both Australia (Aitkin 1982, 170-3; McAllister 1992a, 142) and 
Britain (Butler and Stokes 1974, 157; cf Franklin 1992a), although results from the 
United States are mixed (Knoke 1976; Lenski 1963; Miller and Lockerbie 1992).
Table 2.9 shows that among virtually all the major religious groupings in Australia, 
Britain, and the United States frequency of church attendance is related to party 
vote. With the exception of Catholics in Britain, within each religious group 
voters who attend church at least once a month are more likely to support the 
major right-wing party than are voters who attend church less often or not at all. 
Although the small number of respondents in some cells, and the modest 
differences in the party vote among each group, caution against inferring too much 
from the findings, the table suggests that the higher the overall level of right-wing 
support among each group, the stronger the relationship between religiosity and 
vote. Thus the highest levels of right-wing support are found among the church­
going Protestant groups in Australia and the United States and among church-going 
Anglicans in Britain. This was in contrast to the finding for British Catholics, a 
strong Labor group (Table 2.8), among whom religiosity operated, if anything, as 
an additional influence against voting for the Conservative Party.
To test the impact of religious attendance upon vote over-time, Figure 2.6 shows 
the probability of a regular (at least once a month) church-goer, relative to all 
other respondents, voting for the major right wing party. In Britain the electoral 
impact of religiosity declined steadily across the period, from an already modest 
level of 10 percent in 1964 to a non-statistically significant level by 1992. In the 
United States religiosity has also exerted only a very minor influence across the 
entire period. In Australia, however, the electoral impact of religious attendance 
was relatively high in both the 1977 and 1990 elections. A tentative explanation 
for these findings would be the expansion of the political agenda in Australia,
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Table 2.9: Major Right-Wing Party Vote by Church Attendance and Religious 
Denomination in Australia, Britain, and the United States*
At least once 
month
Percent
a Less than once
a month
Australia, 1993
Anglican 55 (77) 49 (574)
O ther Protestant 61 (734) 54 (339)
Catholic 40 (233) 35 (368)
Britain, 1992
Anglican 59 (169) 50 (819)
Other Protestant 46 (117) 39 (174)
Catholic 28 (124) 31 (122)
U nited  States, 1992
Protestant 52 (460) 46 (275)
Catholic 46 (223) 42 (121)
a - Figures in brackets are number of respondents upon which percentages are 
based.
Sources: As for Table 2.1.
Australia
Britain
United States
Figure 2.6: The impact of religious attendance upon party vote in Australia, Britain, and 
die United States, 1964-93 (bivariate OLS regression). All values >5 are 
significant at p<.05. See text and appendix for details of variables. Sources: 
As for Table 2.1.
promoted by the Labor Party since the early 1970s, to include a range of New 
Politics quality of life and environmental issues (Crisp 1973, 225; Papadakis 1993, 
186-96). In particular, it has been argued that the rise of Labor's New Politics 
agenda in the areas of education and social justice perhaps rested with the policy
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priorities of the Whitlam government . Inglehart (1990a, 185-7) has argued that a 
relationship exists between concern for New Politics ssues and weaker support for 
traditional religious norms. Consequently it is possible that religiosity has operated 
in these instances as a surrogate, albeit flawed, indicator of the electoral impact of 
the New Politics. This would also be consistent with findings that the 
environment was less of an influence in the 1993 election than in 1990 (Bean 1994). 
Nevertheless these conjectures should not obscure the basic finding that in the 
early 1990s, in each country, religiosity is, if anything, only a minor influence on 
voting behaviour.
Centre versus Periphery
In addition to the conflict between church and state, Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 14) 
also identified as a product of the National Revolution, the regional conflict 
"between the central nation-building culture and the increasing resistance of the 
ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces 
and peripheries". In this regard Britain is unique among the Anglo-American 
democracies for encompassing four separate nations, with national separatism in 
Scotland and Wales expressed in political terms through the periodic electoral gains 
(and losses) of Plaid Cymru and the Scottish Nationalist Party respectively, in a 
addition to a historical left-wing bias (Miller 1977, 1983).22 Nevertheless as the 
British population is overwhelmingly concentrated in England, of greater potential 
electoral significance is the increased divergence of parliamentary representation 
between the north and south of England (Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp 1988; see 
also Johnston 1987; Johnston and Pattie 1989). In terms of explaining regional 
variations Johnston and colleagues have emphasised the importance of economic 
prosperity in formulating the attitudes which they argue foster regional political 
cultures (cf Curtice and Steed 1982), although studies controlling for regional 
variations in social composition and political attitudes have found only limited 
regional effects on British voting behaviour (McAllister 1987a, 1987b; Studier and 
McAllister 1992).
Historically, the principal regional divide in the United States was between the 
southern states of the old confederacy and the remainder of the union. The origins 
of the divide extend back to the original cultural uniqueness of the South, namely 
its agrarian-based economy and reliance upon slave-labour, which encouraged 
support for the traditionalist Jacksonian Democrats of the mid nineteenth century, 
galvanised by the effects of Civil War (Burnham 1974). The South then became a 
virtual one-party region largely in response to the Reconstruction Act of 1867, 
instigated by the Republican Party, and more generally as a means of conservative 
southerners maintaining a form of regional defence against challenges to their 
authority (Key 1950, chapt. 25). Although the South was initially a key 
component of the Democratic Party's New Deal coalition (Ladd with Hadley 1978, 
42-6), block southern support for Democratic presidential candidates began to
Historically the primary form of centre-periphery conflict in the United Kingdom was the 
conflict over Home Rule for Ireland, and, in subsequent years, the continuing conflict in Northern 
Ireland. However as Northern Ireland has developed its own party system it is not considered in the 
context of this study.
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disintegrate in the election of 1948, and continued to erode through successive
decades under the weight of the party's "New Liberal" themes of civil rights,
quality of life, and affirmative action, as the region swung toward the Republican
Party (Ladd 1981; Ladd with Hadley, chapt 3). Indeed, with the exception of
Georgia in 1980, the Republican candidacies of Nixon in 1972, Reagan in 1980 and 
1984, and Bush in 1988, each carried all eleven southern states, whilst House 
Republicans have also increased their representation in the South over the period.
In regional terms, Australia is often regarded as a more homogeneous country than 
either Britain or the United States, with the limited amount of inter-state conflict 
the result of economic interest rather than cultural differences (Aitkin 1982, 183-5; 
Alford 1963, 178-89; Bean and Mughan 1988). Although, on occasion, the Labor, 
Liberal, and National parties have all enjoyed periods of prolonged electoral 
supremacy in particular states, there is little consistency in the relative state 
strengths of the major parties in federal elections, with the most significant inter­
state differences concerning the balance of the conservative support between the 
Liberal Party and the National Party. Although in recent decades the theme of 
significant state differences has gained some support (eg Holmes and Sharman 1978; 
Sharman 1991) the weight of scholarly evidence remains that the lack of any 
consistent variation in the federal division of the party vote between the states, in 
addition to the weak electoral impact of statehood when controlling for other 
social background influences, belies the notion of an Australian state-based regional 
cleavage (Bean and Butler 1991a, 1991b; McAllister 1992a, 148-51).
Table 2.10 shows the party division of the vote across the various states of 
Australia and regions of Britain and the United States. In Australia, neither of the 
major parties gain a majority of the vote in any one state, supporting claims 
regarding a lack of any clear regional cleavage. The vote for both major parties 
varies within a relatively narrow range, between 39 percent and 48 percent for 
Labor, and between 42 percent and 49 percent for the Liberal-National parties. In 
the United States the consistency of the party vote across the regions is a feature of 
the 1992 congressional election results, the Republican vote ranging from 44 
percent to 47 percent, the Democratic vote from 49 percent to 56 percent. Note, 
however, that the South is one of the strongest regions for the Republican Party in 
congressional elections: almost a quarter of all House Republicans now represent 
Southern congressional districts, compared to less than 4 percent in 1960 (Ornstein, 
Mann and Malbin 1992, 12).
By contrast, Britain shows strong evidence of regional variation in the party vote. 
For example, a majority of electors in the south of England voted Conservative 
compared to less than one in three in the north. Labor, on the other hand, 
received strong support in the north, and also in Wales, but finished third, behind 
both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, in the south. The results caution 
against any simple notion of a north-south divide for two reasons. First, there is a 
clear middle ground, both geographically and politically, represented by the 
midlands, which dispels any myth regarding a precise locational divide. Secondly 
there is the exceptionalism of London which must be included, together with the 
rest of the south, as part of the centre in any meaningful description of the centre- 
periphery cleavage, but is closer to the north than to the south in terms of party 
support.
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Table 2.10: Vote by State/Region in Australia, Britain, and the United States
Percent
Australia, 1993 N SW Vic Qld WAust SAust Tas
Labor 48 47 41 39 39 47
Liberal-National 42 45 46 49 46 42
Other 11 8 14 11 15 11
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
(% of elect) (34) (26) (17) (9) (9) (3)
Britain, 1992 London South Midlands North Wales Scotland
Labour 37 20 38 46 51 39
Conservative 45 52 46 33 33 36
Liberal Democrat 15 25 15 16 16 22
Other 3 3 1 5 10 13
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
(% of voters) (12) (31) (17) (26) (5) (9)
United States, 1992 East Midwest West South Border
Democratic 49 50 51 51 56
Republican 46 47 44 47 43
O ther 5 3 5 2 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100
(% of voters) (21) (25) (21) (26) (8)
Sources: Congressional Quarterly (1993); Mackerras (1994); Sanders (1993).
Figure 2.7 shows the electoral impact of the regional cleavage in each country over 
time.23 The figure confirms that regionalism lacks a strong and consistent electoral 
impact in Australia, the influence of New South Wales residence showing a 
minimal Liberal-National parties bias in 1966 and 1977 and a slightly larger, 
although still not statistically significant, Labor bias in the 1990s. Similarly in the 
United Sates the results show a large swing to the Republican Party in the South 
between 1964 and 1980, but a slight weakening of the pro-Republican bias after 
1980 to the extent that the region is now largely a reflection of the national 
political balance.24 The British the centre-periphery division shows a greater impact 
than in either of the other two countries, increasing steadily in its electoral impact 
between 1964 and 1987. The findings indicate that the so-called "emerging North- 
South divide" has already begun to dissipate, with a decline in the impact of the 
variable in the 1992 election. In sum, regionalism, as a critical social cleavage, is 
politically significant only in Britain, and even there it is, if anything, in decline.
23 The dichotomous independent variable in the regression analysis, ie region, is scored 1 for 
residents of New South Wales, the largest and strongest Labor state since 1961 (Bean and Butler 1991a) 
in Australia, for residents of London and the South of England in Britain, and for residents of the South 
in the United States.
24 A substantial decrease in the proportion of uncontested seats is partly responsible for the 
transformation of the South, although the Republican Party is still hampered by a particularly large 
discrepancy between the proportion of votes and seats won in the South (Congressional Quarterly 1993).
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Figure 2.7: The impact of region upon party vote in Australia, Britain, and the United
States, 1964-93 (bivariate OLS regression). All values >161 are significant at 
p<.05. See text and appendix for details of variables. Sources: As for Figure 2.1
Rural versus Urban
Lipset and Rokkan identified the initial social division of the industrial revolution 
to be the conflict between landed and industrial interests. A response among 
agricultural interests to the rapid transfer of economic resources from primary to 
secondary industries, the ensuing rural versus urban cleavage focused upon the 
imposition of tariffs on imported agricultural goods in addition to other forms of 
protection for local farm produce. Whilst protectionism guaranteed high prices for 
domestic farmers, this merely represented higher wage costs, resulting from 
employee wage demands, for industrial employers. Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 19- 
20) viewed the cleavage to be largely transitional, diffused in the early years of the 
twentieth century through a process of reconciliation whereby, through 
intermarriage and social mobility, the rising urban elite was incorporated into the 
established hierarchy of the landed elite.
Britain was one of earliest party systems in which the land versus industry conflict 
found expression in parliamentary alignment, specifically through the Conservative 
and Liberal parties respectively. Certainly the system was conducive for such an 
alignment with many of the new industrial entrepreneurs already opposed to 
established interests on the basis of religious non-conformity (Evans 1983, 300-2). 
By challenging the dominant system of elite patronage upon which much of British 
social relations had been based, the lines of conflict were clearly drawn (Evans 
1983, 352-9; Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 11-19). The extent of social change in the 
many decades since the industrial revolution has blurred the distinction between 
rural and urban areas, including greater access to transport facilities enabling city
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workers to commute to their place of work from rural residences. Studies 
continue to find a persistent divide in the political alignments of urban and rural 
residents in Britain, with Labour now the party of the larger cities, albeit to a very 
limited extent (Rose 1974, Rose and McAllister 1990).
By contrast, rural interests have been represented in the Australian party system 
since 1920 by a specific rural-based political party. Although the National
(formerly Country) Party has traditionally been aligned with the dominant non- 
Labor party at the federal level, and in many of the states, it has retained its own 
party structure and unique identity, despite talks of a merger into a single 
conservative party (Costar 1994). A steady movement of the Australian population 
toward urban and coastal centres threatens support for the National Party, but 
with a high concentration of support in rural electorates has enabled the party to 
maintain its parliamentary representation (cf Leithner 1993). Although in some 
rural areas it is the Liberal Party, and not the National Party, which is main 
representative of rural interests, particularly in Western Australia, South Australia, 
Tasmania, and parts of Victoria, the preferential voting system and maintenance of 
a federal coalition has enabled the two conservative parties to share the rural vote.
In the United States rural areas have been more volatile in their political 
alignments, particularly during periods of rural economic hardship. Further 
difficulty is encountered when attempting to assess the nature of the rural vote 
with electoral pressures often directing farmers towards different parties on the 
basis of divergent economic interests related to the size of the farm, region, and the 
price trends for local crops (Campbell et al 1960, chapt 15). Early electoral studies 
identified the rural-urban cleavage as one of only three significant influences upon 
the presidential vote, with rural residents predisposed towards the Republican Party 
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948, 25-7). However under conditions of 
economic stress farming interests have, on a number of occasions throughout 
American history, been transformed into radical protest movements, including the 
Populists in the 1890s and the Progressives in the 1920s, which have forced the 
major parties to readjust their electoral strategies (Sundquist 1983). Rural support 
for economic intervention during the Great Depression led many smaller farmers 
into Democratic New Deal coalition (Ladd with Hadley 1978, 69). While 
acknowledging the potential variability and diversity of the rural vote, rural 
support was an important component of Republican presidential victories in the 
1980s (Pomper 1990, 134).
In the early 1990s the predisposition of rural voters to the major right-wing 
political party continues to be a feature of the Australian, British, and United 
States party systems (Table 2.11). Whilst caution must be used in the 
interpretation of the results, given differing methods of measuring rural residence, 
in each country the right was supported by at least half of all rural voters. 
However, given the presence of a separate rural party, the division of the vote 
between rural and urban areas in Australia was perhaps less than may have been 
expected, the Liberal-National vote being only 8 percent higher outside the urban 
centres. This figure was at least comparable to the results from Britain and the 
United States where the vote for the Conservatives and Republicans, respectively, 
was around 10 percent higher in rural areas. In both Australia and Britain the 
urban vote was much less distinctive, marginally favouring Labor in Australia and
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the Conservatives in Britain. This finding again highlights the electoral difficulties 
of the British Labour Party in failing to gain a plurality, let alone majority, of the 
vote in a so-called natural constituency. Conversely, the Democratic Party gained 
a clear majority of the urban vote in the United States, indicating that the party 
continues to hold an electoral advantage in the nation's major centres.
Table 2.11: Vote by Urban-Rural Division in Australia, Britain, and the
United States
Urban
Percent
Rural
Australia, 1993
Labor 46 42
Liberal-National 42 50
Other 12 8
Total 100 100
(N) (1567) (727)
Britain, 1992
Labour 38 25
Conservative 41 52
Liberal Democrat 18 21
Other 3 3
Total 100 100
(N) (1980) (444)
U nited States, 1992
Democratic 56 46
Republican 44 54
Total 100 100
(N) (925) (445)
Sources: As for Table 2.1.
Figure 2.8 shows that urban-rural residence has exerted a modest, but relatively 
consistent, electoral impact over-time in both Australia and Britain. In Australia 
rural electors were 6 percent more likely to vote Liberal-National than urban 
residents in 1966, the same percentage probability as in the 1993 election. 
Similarly in Britain the influence of the rural-urban cleavage has varied within a 
relatively narrow range, ending the period in 1992 only one point higher than in 
1964. In the United States the influence of residential location has been 
considerably more volatile, with rural residents disproportionably favouring the 
Democratic Party in the 1964 elections, but the Republican Party in the three 
other election years investigated. This finding is consistent with evidence of a 
substantial swing to the Democratic Party among non-southern farmers in the 1964 
presidential elections, followed by an equally large swing back to the Republicans 
in 1968 (Burnham 1974), underlying the potential volatility in the rural vote. 
During the 1980s and 1990s however the rural vote remained favourable to the 
Republican Party, although its impact declined in the 1992 elections. Overall the
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figure shows that the rural-urban cleavage is a continuing, although modest, 
influence upon party alignments across the three countries.
\  12Britain
•9" ' to 10
Australi;
United States
Figure 2.8: The impact of rural-urban cleavage upon party vote in Australia, Britain, and 
the United States, 1964-93 (bivariate OLS regression). See text and 
appendix for details of variables. All values >151 are significant at p<.05. 
Sources: As for Figure 2.1.
Multivariate Analysis
The results from the preceding sections lead to two conclusions regarding trends in 
the electoral impact of sociological variables. Firstly, there was a general decline in 
the electoral impact of class-related measures derived from the owner versus worker 
cleavage, from generally high levels (percentage probabilities in the range 30 
percent to 40 percent) during the mid 1960s down to more moderate levels (10 
percent to 20 percent) in the early 1990s. One notable exception was housing 
tenure in Britain, which maintained a high electoral impact over the period, whilst 
trade union membership in both Australia and Britain also showed a slight rise in 
influence during the early 1990s. Secondly, measures derived from the three other 
critical cleavages, namely church-state, centre-periphery, and rural-urban, generally 
showed only a moderate to low impact (15 percent to 0) upon party vote which 
lacked any consistent trend over the period, although the electoral impact of 
religiosity in Britain and region in the United States both showed a secular decline.
These findings, however, are based upon simple bivariate relationships which 
measure the total impact of single social background characteristic upon vote. In 
reality the sociological factors which influence electoral choice do not operate in 
total isolation from one another. For example, although a relationship was 
identified between Protestantism and right-wing party support it is possible that the
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observed relationship was an outcome of the link between social class and vote, 
given that Protestants are disproportionably employed in middle class occupations. 
To overcome these problems ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis was 
used to measure the direct impact of each of the social structure variables upon 
vote, that is independent of the contributing effect of intervening variables. For 
example, this provides a measure of the direct impact of Protestantism upon party, 
controlling for the confounding effect of occupation and other sociological 
influences. All variables were entered into the model as a single block, with the 
exception of class self-image which, as a subjective assessment influenced by other 
social background characteristics, was entered into the model at a stage subsequent 
to all other variables.
Table 2.12 reports the results of the regression analysis for Australia over the 
period. The table shows that the total variance explained by all social structure 
variables has declined over the period, from 25.8 in 1966 to 18.8 in 1993. Thus, 
despite a small rise between 1990 and 1993, which is likely to be the result of a 
resurgence of the major-party vote in 1993, voting behaviour in Australia during 
the 1990s is less structured by sociological influences than was the case during the 
1960s. However, in terms of changes in the electoral impact of individual 
variables, the decline was limited to just two class-related measures, namely 
occupational class and class self-image. These social characteristics were the two 
most important variables in 1966 in terms of their electoral impact, and, as the 
impact of each had approximately halved by 1993, this represented a significant 
erosion of societal-party ties in Australia between those years. The influence of 
three other variables, namely religiosity, rural residence, and statehood, did not 
reach an acceptable level of statistical significance in 1993.
Trade union membership and religious denomination were notable for showing a 
slightly greater (and statistically significant) impact upon party choice in 1993 than 
in 1966. The continuing influence of union membership is likely to be the result 
of the importance of unionism and industrial relations in the Australian political 
system, particularly in an era of widespread structural reform in the Australian 
economy which has recently extended to the labour market. Similarly, religious 
affiliation is also currently related to a contentious political debate which has 
become highly politicised in the early 1990s, namely republicanism. However it 
may also be noted that the impact of the denominational variable remained 
relatively stable across the entire period, possibly aided by the declining influence 
of confounding class-related influences. In other words, as the influence of class 
declines, the opportunity is created for other variables associated with class, such as 
religion, to exert a greater electoral impact. Nevertheless the continuing impact of 
both unionism and religious affiliation was insufficient to prevent the overall 
weakening in the importance of social background factors in Australia.
In Britain, although the electoral influence of social structure was consistently 
higher than in Australia, it also showed a decline over the period, from 33.6 
percent in 1964 to 28.6 percent in 1992, despite a small rise between 1987 and 1992 
(Table 2.13). As in Australia, the decline in the influence of individual variables 
was confined to the measures of occupational class and class self-image, once again 
the two variables with the strongest electoral impact during the 1960s. By contrast
- 59-
le 
2.
12
: 
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
So
ci
al
 C
le
av
ag
es
 o
n 
P
ar
ty
 V
ot
e 
in
 A
us
i
3
H
2qj
G
*</5</50>
&)<uVh
<U
3cr
0/5
Cljy
.s•g
ON
K.NOON
.2
c^S
2
J D
§
2
-Q
r\
2cu
nDnO
ON
J8-a 
• S
js?
s
Cj
*  *  *
2  2  2  8  8  8
On vO O Nj- rl
O  T-H T—I O  O  O
* * *
S  2  S  2  8  S
Tt- o  oo cn m  TfO  rH o  r-H O  O
* * * * ** * * * *
£  2  £  s  2  S
2  2  h  S  o  O
m  OO nD  CN  < N
r-t O  O  O  O
■tsss
g
«2
13
01
9
a
Öo
§
sa,
S  a
K*N
Ö 13O Vh 
51 0l
„ *  
b  Ü
’ C/5
• 2 .2 SbJD bJD ^3 
^  ^  •«q> qj qj
00qj
13
_s
£
g z
Ü
sC/3
K.
I" r<-) f \  O  O  n  hs
tH rH CD rH rH CD rH
00 no" 
<N 0 0  2
S 5  s’ -H _h
g
6
■1-S"
1/3
OO CN 
■ OO 
LO \D
c£
130J
.a
23O,x
w
-^>
# W)
0  ^
O S £
'"o
<U
00
010 
£  
bS)
*y 
qj
o,
00 nj
QJ
£^,
2 
~d 
-0qj
« -S
s -3  3
§ I  b
1 -s s
1  §
"3 Ü 1
C/5 L , **
« Ö 
<u  ^ .2
:s "s §
m -h y
M-h 00 3
o ^  ~o 
8 2  "
0  -S « w
.2 k « <
S -  5,-SJ
>d 2
U T )  C  _  i-t 0  tu 13 _. <u txo c g a, „ «
§ 3  ^ g o
Ä13 ^  2  Ö “52 3 ^ w*
^  8 c2<
d (u 0  ^
.2 8 5 ^
2J s « S
"  s |  ^
° S §  S s
V «2 8 S. aCX, 3  CX 1 ’ o* rt Po JO C/^
V
*  *  ** * *"t (N N■<—i t-h <N
8
V j
***^
~3
G
ss
G
o
£
§
s
O h
g
o
0
2  o  q  §
(<i (fi m oo h  +  in
(N O O O O
*  *  *  *  ■* *
* * * * , _ _ _ *  *
T - H ^ H T - H O O O f Q c s l  O
-—I -H <N O °  °  r-l
* * * *
*  *  *  *—-i On nO On
<N O *—I O S  S  S  °°
o  o  oo on ro m <n on
CNj T—< T-H O O O O t- 4
£
On t-h <N I\ O  rO O  On CnJ t \  r\
O t-h ( N O O O ^ —< O  ^  vD
■ ............................................................... ^
* * * * * * * * * * *
^  ^  o  S  ^  2
f O  nO lO  v£> vO  C\1 _ i _ O N f >
t_I t^ ^ c? c! c ! cJ '"I <n in ^
öJO
a >
3
S
H
o
1>jo
G
<
o
. . 4—*
w> G -3
.S .2 .2
^  ÖJ O M
O ^  ^
£  p4 ed
_G
3
OC/5
£
G
o
13ao
h4
G G<u g
12 -2 
c o  CxO <U <D
<*S ed
- 8
-Si
58
6
-  >N £  
° .  < ?  -*-
1 3  
< u  
G  
'  r t
’a,
x
W
2
G
O
U
2
~ 0
CD
g
# W)
* 5
o
s
6
o
U
>-g
<Uoo
G
O
£
• g
<u
a,
CO
C3
CJ
e
os
s
13
13ajCO
•~d
13
Go
1 3<u
«
u
2 jG
S g
•3 S 
tfi ^
JG
tS
12
<-g
b
G
O
a
I
8 3 ^
C
#o* CO CO<u
CxO<U
V
g
"g  03rt rt 
cu
s  - s
: M
its ö(U *15
o OhO 0_
G ^
.2 "o
8  S
go S
<Ucu
CO
<u
ÖJD
<u
~0
c /TCOr3
CO
Ö_c
<h-h
U3 ^
q  -g
v £
a ,
rs
c o  
CL,
c o  ^
<L>g
> -D
U, COCTJ <D
G
'64
, 
19
79
, 
19
87
 a
nd
 1
99
0 
BE
S.
the impact of housing tenure upon party vote, after an initial decline between 1964 
and 1979, showed a consistent rise over the period, to the point that in 1992 an 
owner occupier was 25 percent more likely to vote Conservative, net of other 
variables. This was greater than the effect of occupation upon vote in the 1964 
election. In addition, union membership and religious affiliation also maintained a 
relatively consistent electoral influence across the period, and by 1992 their impact 
was comparable to that of occupation and class self-image, although religion was 
marginally weaker.
However, Table 2.13 also confirms the findings of other studies that, after 
controlling for other social structure variables, the electoral impact of region upon 
party in Britain is only modest. Furthermore, to the extent that region was 
becoming more important as a basis of political alignment during the 1970s and 
1980s, this trend has been reversed in the 1992 election in which voters from the 
south and London were only 5 percent more likely to vote Conservative than 
other Britons, net of other influences. Similarly, the importance of the rural- 
urban division was also modest, reaching statistical significance in only the 1979 
elections, whilst religiosity was not a significant influence in any of the elections 
considered. Thus, despite the increased electoral influence of housing tenure, the 
downward or nil trends in the electoral impact of other variables has ensured that, 
in the 1990s, party vote is less structured by sociological influences than was the 
case in the 1960s.
In the United States, the declining electoral importance of social structure is again 
evident, with the total variance of the vote explained by the sociological variables 
falling from 22.9 percent in 1964 to 13.1 percent in 1992 (Table 2.14). The results 
also confirm that social structure is a relatively weak influence on American 
national lower-house voting patterns compared to both Britain and Australia. 
With regard to individual variables, all three measures related to the owner-worker 
cleavage, namely occupation, union membership, and class self-image, declined in 
their electoral impact over the period, union membership the only one of the three 
variables to achieve statistical significance throughout. Similarly, the impact of 
religion and region also declined over the period; the influence of religion receding 
after a slight rise during the 1980s whilst southern residence in the 1990s is no 
longer an anti-Republican influence. The only two variables to maintain their 
impact over time were religiosity and rural residence, however these items were 
already two of the weakest influences in 1964. By 1992 not one of the sociological 
variables had an impact upon congressional vote of greater than 10 percent, 
compared to 1964 when union membership, religion, and region all achieved that 
level of influence.
Overall the evidence from Tables 2.12 to 2.14 is that in Australia, Britain, and the 
United States the combined electoral importance of the four critical cleavages, 
namely centre-periphery, church-state, land-industry, and owner-worker, has 
declined over the past three decades. In other words, party vote in the early 1990s 
is less structured by social cleavages than was the case during the mid 1960s. There 
was a rise in the electoral impact of some variables, notably union membership in 
Australia and union membership and housing in Britain. However the significance 
of these social divisions is that they have been politicised by the major parties in
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recent years, and thus, as potentially emerging social cleavages, their impetus has 
come from conflicting party policies rather than through a process of social 
determinism. The corollary to this argument is that other social cleavages have not 
been politicised to the same extent, hence their declining (or consistently low) 
electoral impact, and the weaker overall structuring properties of the sociological 
variables generally. In sum, the role of social cleavages in structuring electoral 
choice in the 1990s is diminished, and the sociological hypothesis that the 
structuring properties of the critical cleavages are responsible for aggregate electoral 
stability must be rejected.
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CHAPTER THREE
PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Party identification is the central concept of the social-psychological voting model 
developed by scholars from the University of Michigan (Campbell, Gurin and 
Miller 1954; Campbell et al 1960, 1966). The model, described in chapter one, 
acknowledges both the short-term influence of campaign candidate and issue effects 
upon vote, in addition to the long-term influence of party identification. Defined 
as an affective orientation, or psychological sense of belonging, to a political party, 
party identification is an attachment requiring neither a history of party member­
ship nor a record of consistent party support (Campbell et al 1960, 121). As a 
model of electoral choice, the social-psychological model is viewed by its 
proponents as unique for its ability to account both for large electoral swings, on 
the basis of the effect of short-term campaign influences, whilst also highlighting 
long-term party system stability, an outcome of the pervasiveness of party 
identification. In contrast to the sociological approach, in which the relationship 
between voter and party is mediated by the influence of social group memberships, 
the social-psychological model views political parties as another grouping in society 
with which individuals may directly identify.
The research findings of the Michigan scholars confirmed the importance of party 
identification as a mechanism for aggregate electoral stability. Over three quarters 
of respondents in their national surveys acknowledged a degree of psychological 
identification to one of the major parties, with a high rate of consistency in 
partisan preference between parents and offspring confirming the importance of 
parental socialisation in the development of party identification (Campbell et al 
1960, 124, 146-9). Furthermore, on the basis of recall data, it was argued that 
identification was a durable attachment that, once established, was not easily 
changed, and that, in terms of the strength of the psychological attachment, party 
identification was self-reinforcing over time, strengthening the longer it was held 
(Campbell et al 1960, 148-9, 161-5). Finally, party identification acted as an 
important force, through the intervening role of partisan attitudes, influencing 
political behaviour (Campbell et al 1960, 128-42). It was concluded by the 
Michigan scholars that the persistence of the two major parties in the United States 
was due, in part, to the electorate's profound loyalty to the parties which made it 
extremely difficult for a third party to establish itself as a credible electoral force 
(Campbell et al 1960, 552-8).1 If vote was only influenced by the campaign issues 
and candidates of the particular election the task for minor parties would be much 
easier, but the presence of established attachments ensured a degree of electoral 
consistency over-time.
Whilst recognising the effect of short-term campaign influences in the social- 
psychological model, the contrast between the instability of electoral results and
1 Other contributing factors to aggregate electoral stability included legal and institutional 
arrangements, in particular the presidential "winner takes all" system of government which encouraged 
the formation of two great coalitions (Campbell et al 1960, 552).
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the stability of the party identification measure is seen as confirmation of the 
importance of party identification in the electorate as a force for long-term party- 
system stability. Indeed, even in elections in which short-term forces are 
influential, the balance of party identification is still held to be the main 
determinant of electoral outcomes (Converse 1966). Under such an interpretation, 
long-term party system stability is dependent upon the aggregate level and strength 
of party identification; the greater the pool of non-identifiers and weak partisans, 
the greater the potential for aggregate electoral instability (Campbell et al 1960, 
553). Thus Anglo-American party-systems were regarded as stable largely as a 
result of their high and consistent levels of partisanship (Aitkin 1982, 42). 
Furthermore, aggregate shifts in the balance of party identification were viewed 
primarily as a zero-sum game in which the party balance is fundamentally altered 
only on occasions of extreme national dislocation (Campbell 1966).
In recent years the underlying assumptions of the social-psychological model have 
been challenged, both by scholars opposed to the theoretical approach of the model 
and by empirical findings which contradict the stabilising role of party 
identification envisaged by the Michigan scholars (eg Budge, Crewe and Farlie 
1976a; Niemi and Weisberg 1984). This chapter examines five of the major
challenges faced by the social-psychological interpretation of electoral stability. 
Section one considers the validity of party identification as an operational measure 
of partisan attachment, including the use of the measure outside the United States 
and the assumption that it taps an enduring long-term psychological bond. Section 
two examines changes in the level of major-party identification over-time and, in 
particular, whether the dominant mode of partisan change is one of a realignment 
or dealignment in the distribution of partisan loyalties. Section three examines the 
strength of party identification over time and the extent to which new electors 
have contributed to the aggregate weakening of partisanship. Section four 
considers the role of the generational transmission of party identification, from 
parent to child, as the basis for continuing high aggregate levels of partisanship. 
Finally, in section five, the electoral impact of party identification is tested through 
the use of multivariate regression.
Party Identification as an Operational Measure
In the National Election Studies series conducted in the United States the direction 
of party identification, or the presence of a psychological attachment to a political 
party, is measured through the question "Generally speaking do you usually think of 
yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? To measure the 
strength of the psychological attachment, all respondents answering the directional 
question either Republican or Democrat are asked a further intensity question, 
namely " Would you call yourself a strong (Republican/Democrat) or a not very strong 
(Republican/Democrat)? The significance of responses to these questions rests with
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their strong correlation with those partisan attitudes which ultimately determine 
Presidential vote in the social-psychological model.2
There is a clear and consistent relationship between the direction and strength of 
party identification and the rating of Presidential candidates. The presence of a 
psychological attachment to one of the major parties acts as a perceptual screen 
whereby party identifiers are encouraged to look favourably upon their own 
party's candidate and unfavourably upon the opposing party's candidate; the 
stronger the intensity of identification the greater the extent of perceptual 
distortion (Campbell et al 1960, 128-36). Thus the mean rating of Bush in the 1992 
presidential election ranged from 6.7 among strong Republicans to 2.9 among 
strong Democrats, whilst the ratings for Clinton ranged from 7.2 among strong 
Democrats to 3.2 among strong Republicans (Table 3.1). Independents, however, 
evaluate each candidate in the absence of a partisan predisposition, hence their 
moderate rating of Bush and Clinton which fell between the two partisan extremes. 
Independents also generally rated Perot higher than did partisans, although the 
differences across the scale were minimal compared to those for the major-party 
candidates.
Table 3.1: Mean Rating of 1992 United States Presidential Candidates by
Party Identification3
Party Identification
Mean Rating (0 -10)
Bush Perot Clinton (N)
Strong Democrats 2.9 4.6 7.2 (444)
Weak Democrats 3.7 4.9 6.3 (432)
Independents 4.3 5.1 5.3 (987)
Weak Republicans 5.7 5.1 4.2 (349)
Strong Republicans 6.7 4.8 3.2 (275)
3 - Rating calculated for each respondent as the number of likes minus the 
number of dislikes of candidate, plus five.
Source: 1992 CPS National Election Study
As a result of the strong impact of party identification upon those partisan 
attitudes which determine vote, including attitudes to the presidential candidates, 
party identification exerts a strong indirect influence upon presidential vote 
(Campbell et al 1960, 136-142). Thus, among voters in the 1992 election (Table 
3.2), 94 percent of strong Democrats voted for Clinton, whilst 86 percent of strong 
Republicans voted for Bush. However among weak party identifiers the 
proportion voting in accordance with their identification was much lower - 69 
percent among weak Democrats and 62 percent among weak Republicans. It is the 
ability of party identifiers, in particular weak partisans, to make the psychological
" In addition to the direction and intensity questions, a follow up question is also asked of 
Independents, namely "Do you think o f yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?' thereby 
enabling Independents to be divided among Independent Republicans, Pure Independents, and 
Independent Democrats (see below), and expanding the five point scale to a seven point scale.
- 67-
distinction between their long-term partisan attachment and their short-term 
presidential vote, despite the strong aggregate-level relationship between the two, 
which provides the theoretical justification for party identification. The tendency 
of party identification to withstand the effect of short-term defections which result 
from the influence of short-term campaign influences is evidence that the measure 
is indeed causally prior to, more stable than, and thus conceptually distinct from, 
voting preference.
Table 3.2: 1992 Presidential Vote by Party Identification
Party Identification
Presidential Vote (Percent) 
Clinto Perot Bush Tota (N)
Strong Democrats 94 4 3 100 (337)
Weak Democrats 69 17 15 100 (276)
Independents 43 27 30 100 (581)
Weak Republicans 14 25 62 100 (244)
Strong Republicans 3 11 86 100 (220)
Source: As for Table 3.1.
Similar survey questions have been used to measure party identification in 
countries outside the United States. Whilst difficulties have been experienced in 
some European countries with regard to the foreign translation of the party 
identification questions in a manner which elicits a sense of attachment other than 
formal membership (Kaase 1976; Norpoth 1978), in addition to the problem of 
listing all possible party alternatives in some multi-party countries (Thomassen 
1976), the questions have been readily adopted in the other Anglo-American 
nations. In the 1992 British Election Study, for example, respondents were asked 
"Generally speaking do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal 
Democrat, or what?", whilst in the 1993 Australian Election Study the question was 
"Generally speaking do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, Labor, National, or 
what?" The exclusion of the prompted label "Independent" in the British and 
Australian surveys is done on the grounds that the term lacks a functional meaning 
in either country equivalent to the positive dissociation from the major political 
parties which is widespread in the United States (Butler and Stokes 1974, 44). In 
addition, in the British and Australian surveys the intensity of identification is 
divided between three categories of strength, namely very strong, fairly strong, or 
not very strong, rather than the two category distinction, between strong and not 
very strong (or weak) identifiers, in the United States.
In early electoral studies conducted in Australia and Britain the social-psychological 
model and the concept of party identification were strongly supported by 
sympathetic scholars, notably Aitkin (1977, 1982) and Butler and Stokes (1969, 
1974) respectively. These studies found that the vast majority of Australians and 
Britons acknowledged a partisan attachment and that such attachments were indeed 
more durable than voting preferences (Aitkin 1982, 38-41; Butler and Stokes 1974, 
39-47). However, evidence from both Australia and Britain, in addition to several 
overseas countries, suggests that, as a measure of long-term partisan predisposition
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distinct from current voting intention, the party identification concept is less useful 
as an analytical tool outside the United States (Aitkin 1982, 41; Butler and Stokes 
1974, 43; Kaase 1976; LeDuc 1981; Richardson 1991; Thomassen 1976). In 
particular, the pattern of stable party identification and variable voting preference 
is common only among electors in the United States. In other countries, by 
contrast, there is a greater tendency for party identification to change directly in 
response to a change in voting behaviour, thereby blurring the identification/vote 
distinction and indeed questioning whether party identification is in fact an 
independent variable.3
To illustrate, Table 3.3 shows that 22 percent of respondents in the 1976-80 United 
States panel study displayed the classic behavioural trait of maintaining their 
original party identification while casting a ballot for the opposition party. This 
was by far the most common form of electoral change in the United States over 
the period. Among all voters who changed the direction of their vote, the vast 
majority maintained the original direction of their party identification over the 
same period (22 percent of the total 25 percent). By comparison, in Australia and 
Britain only 10 percent of respondents were characterised by a variable vote and a 
stable party identification, whilst an equal proportion changed both their party 
vote and the direction of their party identification. Among all respondents who 
changed their party vote between the two surveys, approximately half responded to 
the defection from their original partisanship by also changing the direction of 
their party identification.4
Table 3.3: The Relative Stability of Vote and Party Identification in Two- 
Wave Panels in Australia, Britain, and the United States
Change T1 - T2 Percent
Vote
Party
Identification
Australia
(1967-69)
Britain
(1970-74)
United 
States (1972- 
76)
Stable Stable 77 75 71
Variable Stable 10 10 22
Stable Variable 4 5 4
Variable Variable 9 m
Total 100 100 100
(N) (1150) (795) (539)
Sources: Aitkin (1982, 41) and LeDuc (1981)
Institutional features of the varying electoral systems are an explanation for the 
national differences in the stability of party identification relative to vote. In the 
United States, where voters are able to cast a ballot for a wide range of public
3 In the Netherlands and (West) Germany party identification is actually less stable than voting 
preference (Kaase 1976; Richardson 1976; Thomassen 1976)
4 For Britain, Cain and Ferejohn (1981) argue these results are a function of the treatment of Liberal 
partisans, who are excluded, whilst Fleath and Pierce (1992) argue they are a function of the location of 
the party identification questions in the British electoral studies (cf McAllister and Wattenberg 1994).
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offices at the one election, the distinction that party identification allowed between 
long-term loyalty and short-term evaluation becomes a useful psychological tool. 
In contrast, the notion of party identification is perhaps less useful in the parlia­
mentary systems of Australia and Britain where there is less opportunity for voters 
to defect from their long-term partisan loyalties on the basis of short-term electoral 
pressures (Butler and Stokes 1974, 43-4). Under these circumstances some scholars 
have argued that, to the extent that psychological predispositions do exist among 
voters, these predispositions are best measured directly from social background 
factors, rather than through survey questions which attempt to elicit psychological 
attachments and which may or may not be conceptually distinct from current 
voting preference (Budge and Farlie 1976; McAllister and Mughan 1987a; 
Thomassen 1976). Thus the advantage of using aspects of social background to 
measure partisan predispositions is that they are unambiguously causally prior to 
party vote in a sense that party identification is not. Alternatively, long-term 
predispositions simply may be measured on the basis of the respondents past voting 
history (Richardson 1991).
Despite the stronger empirical support in the United States for the notion of party 
identification as a long-term predisposition causally prior to the effect of campaign 
influences, the short-term stability of party identification has also been questioned. 
For example, in contrast to the original social-psychological model, Jackson (1975) 
identified a reciprocal relationship between party identification and the policies of 
the parties and their candidates whereby partisanship was influenced by perceptions 
of policy positions (see also Franklin 1984; Franklin and Jackson 1983). Similarly, 
Page and Jones (1979) identified reciprocal causal links between policy preferences, 
candidate evaluations, and party identification such that party identification was 
affected by short-term factors. The scholars concluded that, "even short of major 
realignments, party affiliations are effects as well as causes in the electoral process" 
(Page and Jones 1979, 1088). On the other hand Fiorina (1981) argues that current 
party identification is influenced both by past party identification and the 
individual's retrospective evaluation of the contending parties in the past electoral 
period, in particular the government's economic performance. Thus party 
identification is open to constant revision, to the extent that it represents a running 
tally of retrospective evaluations. Other studies have found that party 
identification is a function of past voting behaviour, also suggesting a running tally 
type of explanation, whereby current short-term forces influence current vote 
which in turn influences partisanship in the future (Howell 1980; Kessel 1968; 
Markus and Converse 1979).
The Michigan scholars noted that partisanship may change in response to dramatic 
social and political events. Indeed, the Civil War and the economic distress of the 
1890s and 1930s were identified as great national crises during which the country 
underwent substantial change in party alignments (Campbell et al 1960, 150-63). 
Thus it may be hypothesised that the turbulent political events of the 1960s and 
1970s in the United States, including the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights movement 
and Watergate, produced conditions conducive to a period of partisan instability in 
which long-term predispositions were affected by the political environment of the 
time (Converse 1976, 103-11). But, as noted by Budge, Crewe and Farlie (1976b, 
10), such an argument tends to render the theoretical framework of the social- 
psychological model tautological: "If electors change votes while maintaining their
- 70-
previous identification this proves the concept valid, but changing both together is 
simply evidence that an upheaval is taking place with concomitant shifts in the 
proportions of identifiers".
The notion of party identification as a long-term predisposition has also been 
challenged in the United States by studies which have found a degree of short-term 
volatility in partisanship at both the individual and aggregate level. For example, 
Brody and Rothenberg's (1988) analysis of the three-wave 1980 National Election 
Study panel study found that 21 percent of respondents altered the direction of 
their party identification over the period, whilst 52 percent of respondents altered 
their position on the seven point party identification scale. Furthermore, the 
scholars argued that the changes in partisanship across time were not random, but 
reflected short-term electoral forces. At the aggregate level, Allsop and Weisberg 
(1987, 1013) found that significant change in party identification occurred during 
the 1984 presidential campaign and that aggregate partisan change was, in part, 
related to changes in voting intention. Similarly, Weisberg and Smith (1991) and 
Clarke and Suzuki (1994) found that partisan change at the aggregate level is 
influenced by economic conditions, whilst MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson (1989, 
1992) found that, in addition to perceptions of the economy, the partisan balance is 
also influenced by presidential approval ratings.
These findings have been challenged by scholars sympathetic to the original 
Michigan model. At the aggregate level, Abramson and Ostrom (1991, 1992) argue 
that short-term volatility in partisanship found by scholars in regular opinion polls 
is a function of question wording in those polls which ask about partisanship "as of 
today", rather than "generally speaking" as in the National Election Study series 
(see also Converse and Pierce 1985). Also Miller (1991) argues that reports of 
aggregate partisan volatility neglects evidence that the partisan balance of northern 
white voters, who comprise over three-quarters of the voting electorate, was 
remarkably stable between 1952 and 1980. At the individual level, Green and 
Palmquist (1990) argue that changes in reported party identification in the short­
term are an artefact of measurement error and the imprecision of the traditional 
seven-point scale (see also Dreyer 1973; cf Franklin 1992).
Other operational aspects of partisanship have also been challenged, including the 
assumption that party identification represents a positive sense of attachment to a 
political party (Maggiotto and Piereson 1977). Crewe (1976, 52), for example, 
argues that a party identification may have any one of a number of different 
meanings, ranging from "positive and enthusiastic support" for a respondent's 
preferred party to "an entrenched and intense hostility" to the rival party. Thus 
the basis for a sense of attachment toward a party may be a negative feeling toward 
one's opponents rather than a positive feeling toward one's own party. Similarly 
Wattenberg (1982) argues that respondents may have either positive, neutral, or 
negative feelings toward each of the alternative parties in a party system, and that 
electoral change can only be explained on the basis of an understanding of how 
respondents perceive each party. Whilst he argues that electors in two-party 
systems are more likely than those in a multi-party system to be "negative 
identifiers", ie. identify with a party despite feeling negatively disposed towards it, 
he has detected a trend in the United States for citizens to feel increasingly neutral 
towards both parties (Wattenberg 1990; 1984, 50-72).
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More generally, the proposition that the traditional party identification scale is 
unidimensional has been challenged on the grounds that the subjective nature of 
the questions provides no point of reference upon which the respondent may 
evaluate their own sense of attachment (Crewe 1974, 70-4). One possible outcome 
is the inclusion in the same strength category of partisans for whom the term 
strong and not very strong identification may have different connotations. For 
example, "if strong partisanship represents a need or a desire to identify oneself 
with a party, there is no reason to think this need would be modified by a change 
in political preferences", hence evidence that strong identifiers who alter the 
direction of their partisanship tend to adopt a strong identification with the new 
party rather than an independent position (Katz 1979, 158). This finding also 
contradicts the Michigan assumption that strength of party identification is a 
function of the time the identification is held (Campbell et al 1960, 161-5).
An additional consideration in the United States is the operational treatment of 
self-described independents and, in particular, whether those independents who 
think of themselves as "closer" to either of the parties should be categorised as 
partisans or independents. The Michigan scholars generally ignored the possible 
sub-division of independents, choosing in most cases to present findings on the five- 
point scale presented in the above tables. However, perhaps explaining the 
Michigan scholars approach, studies have shown that the so-called Independent 
leaners are often more partisan, ie. favourably predisposed to the party, than weak 
identifiers with respect to their partisan attitudes and voting behaviour (Keith et al 
1986, 1992; see also Dennis 1992; Petrocik 1974). These issues have led some 
scholars to suggest that a multidimensional scale of partisanship is more appropriate 
than the traditional unidimensional continuum (Dennis 1988, 1992; Katz 1979; 
Weisberg 1980; Valentine and Van Wingen 1980). This would enable independence 
to be scored on a separate continuum to party identification on the grounds that 
the former represents a particular self-image which assigns a positive value to 
individuality and autonomy, rather than a position which represents a lack of 
partisan tendencies, a characteristic which the majority of independents do in fact 
possess (Keith et al 1986, 1992).
Nevertheless, while acknowledging the shortcomings of party identification as an 
operational measure, it may still be argued that the level and strength of 
partisanship, the intergenerational transmission rate of partisanship, and the 
relationship between party identification and vote have important implications for 
electoral stability. In particular, voting studies confirm that, even after controlling 
for the influence of long-term social and attitudinal predispositions and short-term 
campaign factors, party identification still exerts a strong impact upon electoral 
choice (Bean 1994b; Rose and McAllister 1990, 163; Shanks and Miller 1991, 162). 
Furthermore, the stronger partisan attachments are held the more likely it is that 
vote will correspond to those partisan cues, whilst party identifiers in general are 
less likely than independents and non-identifiers to support third-party candidates 
and minor parties (Charnock 1992; Crewe, Day and Fox 1991, 15-18; Miller and 
Traugott 1989, 317, 334; Pomper 1993, 138; Stanley and Niemi 1990, 98-101). This 
is not to deny the range of conceptual and empirical weaknesses of the measure 
outlined above, but rather to acknowledge that party identification, if nothing else, 
remains a useful indicator of the potential for electoral change in terms of the 
freezing of the party-system and the persistence of the major party alternatives.
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Consequently the following sections investigate the nature of party identification as 
a continuing force for electoral stability.
The Level & Direction of Party Identification
The advantage of the social-psychological model over the sociological model is the 
former's explicit acknowledgment of the influence of short-term campaign factors 
upon vote (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954; Campbell et al 1960, chapt 4; Stokes 
1966; Stokes, Campbell and Miller 1958). However, in terms of the dynamics of 
party competition, the emphasis of the Michigan scholars upon the phenomenon of 
long-term aggregate electoral stability was equal to that of Berelson, Lazarsfeld and 
colleagues. Of course, while the sociological approach focuses upon the stability of 
group-party alignments, the social-psychological model assigns the stabilising role to 
the presence of psychological predispositions to the parties, measured by party 
identification. Thus Campbell and colleagues argued that the persistence of the 
two major parties in the United States was due, in part, to the electorate's 
profound loyalty to the parties, confirmed by the finding that over three quarters 
of respondents acknowledged a degree of psychological identification to one of the 
parties. Although such partisan attachments were not the direct determinant of 
vote, they were found to be such a strong influence on those partisan attitudes 
which were, that even in the event of a "landslide" result the popular vote of the 
defeated party remains relatively high (Campbell et al 1960, 552-6).
Such a pervasive stabilising force as party identification, it was argued, made it 
extremely difficult for a third party to establish itself as a credible electoral force, 
particularly at the Presidential level where the prize is "winner take all". Were 
partisan attitudes solely influenced by the campaign issues and candidates of the 
particular election, the task would be much easier. The presence of established 
attachments, however, ensured a link with the continuities of the past (Campbell et 
al 1960, 553). This was confirmed by a comparative study, conducted by Converse 
and Dupeux (1962), which examined partisan attachments in France and the United 
States. They argued that the volatility of the French party system was largely due 
to the low level of party identification in that country, with less than half of the 
French electorate identifying with a party. In direct contrast was the stable 
American party system with its high and consistent levels of partisanship.
On the basis of the strength of short-term factors influencing electoral choice and 
the outcome of the election, Campbell (1966) undertook a classification of 
Presidential elections which provides a useful insight into the possible dynamics of 
partisan change. The most common type is the maintaining election, defined as an 
election in which the candidate of the majority party, that is the party with the 
greater proportion of party identifiers, is successfully elected. With regard to the 
influence of short-term forces, these either operate in favour of the majority party, 
such that its candidate wins by a greater margin than its partisan advantage would 
suggest, or the short-term forces operate in favour of the minority party candidate, 
but are sufficiently weak so as not to completely overcome the partisan advantage 
of the majority party. In either case an important feature of maintaining elections 
is that there is little or no alteration to the underlying partisan balance in the
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electorate, so that after the election the majority party retains its majority status, 
even under circumstances in which short-term forces ware operating against it.
Two other types of election were also identified by Campbell. The second most 
common is the deviating election, defined as an election in which the influence of 
short-term forces are sufficiently strong and disadvantageous to the majority party 
that the candidate of the minority party wins the election. However, as in a 
maintaining election, the short-term forces operate only as a temporary influence 
such that the underlying partisan balance is again unchanged and the majority 
party retains its majority status. In other words, the success of the minority party 
is only a temporary phenomenon over a period in which the majority party 
continues to hold an underlying electoral advantage. By contrast the third type of 
election, the realigning election, occurs when the impact of events surrounding the 
current political environment are sufficiently intense that change occurs in the 
party identification of a large proportion of the electorate to the extent that a new 
partisan balance is established. Generally, however, realignments are viewed as rare 
moments of national crises, with the typical pattern being one of aggregate stability 
in the partisan balance of the electorate promoting either maintaining or, on 
occasion, deviating elections.
Partisan change was thus conceived by the Michigan scholars primarily as a zero- 
sum game. As the party system reached a period of equilibrium in which a 
consistently high level of partisanship was established (Converse 1969), aggregate 
levels of party identification were only rarely disturbed by national crises, and, 
even on those occasions, the principle dynamic of change was a shift in the 
partisan balance whereby one party would replace the other as the majority party 
(see also Campbell et al 1960, 150-3). In Britain, where Butler and Stokes (1974, 
47) found that between 85 and 90 percent of respondents accepted a partisan 
designation, the importance of party identification as a force for aggregate 
electorate stability was also emphasised by the scholars on the grounds that 
"millions of British electors remain anchored to one of the parties for very long 
periods of time". In Australia, Aitkin (1982, 353) found that between 86 percent 
and 89 percent of the population accepted a partisan label, and concluded that 
"there can be no doubt that partisanship, stable, predictable partisanship, is the 
basis of the party system".
However, the dominant pattern of partisan change in the United States since 1964 
is no longer one of realignment, as shown in Figure 3.1, but rather dealignment, 
defined in this context as a decline in the aggregate level of party identification.5 
Whilst the proportion of the electorate identifying with the Democratic Party fell 
17 percent between 1964 and 1992, in contrast to what may have been expected 
given Campbell's zero-sum analysis of the dynamics of partisan change, there have 
been no corresponding Republican gains over the period. Despite a slight rise
5 In the context of the social-psychological model a realignment is defined here as a shift in the 
underlying partisan balance between the major parties whereby one party replaces the other as the 
majority party (cf Sundquist 1983, 2-14). In the same context dealignment refers to a decline in the 
aggregate level of major-party identification. Thus neither process makes assumptions regarding changes 
in the structure of group-party alignments.
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Figure 3.1: Major-party identification in Australia, Britain and the United
States, 1964-93. Sources: 1967 and 1979 ANPAS, 1987, 1990 
and 1993 AES; 1964-92 BES; Miller andTaugott (1989) and 1992 
CPS NES.
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during the 1980s, the level of identification with the Republican Party in 1992 was 
the same as in 1964, representing only a quarter of the total electorate, despite the 
opportunity provided by the decline in Democratic identification for Republicans 
to become established as the new majority party. As a consequence the most 
common type of election in the United States is now, somewhat curiously, the 
deviating election whereby the Republican candidate, as the minority party 
candidate, has won five of the seven Presidential elections held between 1968 and 
1992.6
A similar, although weaker, pattern of partisan change is evident in Britain where 
the proportion of Labour Party identifiers fell from 42 percent in 1964 to 32 
percent in 1992, including two slight increases in Labour partisanship during the 
periods 1964-66 and 1987-92. However, as in the United States, the decline in the 
proportion of electors identifying with the major party of the left has not been 
matched by corresponding gains by its major right-wing opponent.7 Thus the net 
increase in the level of Conservative Party identification between 1964 and 1992 
was just 3 percent, despite an increase of 5 percent in Conservative identification 
after 1987. In other words, despite a decline in Labour identification of 10 percent 
between 1964 and 1992, the net gains of the Conservative Party represented less 
than one third of the net Labour loss. Furthermore, unlike the realignment of the 
inter-war years, no inroad in identification was made by an emerging third political 
party with the level of Liberal Democrat identification in 1992 (12 percent) equal 
to the level of Liberal Party identification in 1964.
In Australia, however, the evidence regarding realignment versus dealignment is 
somewhat mixed, and indeed further complicated by concerns regarding reported 
changes in the aggregate level of party identification due to various 
method and questionnaire changes over the period (Charnock 1992, Bean 1994b). 
On the one hand, realignment appears the dominant mode of partisan change 
between 1967 and 1993, as the net rise in Labor identification of 6percent almost 
matched the net fall in Liberal-National identification of 7 percent.8 On the other 
hand, the period since 1987 is predominantly one of dealignment, Labor Party 
identification falling from 49 percent to 44 percent in 1993 whilst the Liberal- 
National parties made no substantive gain in the proportion of their own 
identifiers. Consequently although the results are inconclusive, requiring further 
analysis in subsequent Australian Election Studies, recent results also point towards 
dealignment rather than realignment.
6 Research suggests the decline in Democratic identification between 1964 and 1972 was 
predominantly an outcome of a defection among white southerners (Miller 1991; Nie, Verba and 
Petrocik 1976, 217-23; Wattenberg 1991), whilst the decline between 1980 and 1988 was caused by 
defections from both northern and southern conservatives (Carmines and Stanley 1990, 1992; cf Miller 
1986).
7 Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt (1977, 152) argue that "the decay in Labour partisanship ... had its origins 
in a growing rejection of the Labour party's basic tenets on the part of its own rank and file during the 
late 1960s, in particular in a rising hostility to the disruptive powers of trade unions and to their close 
involvement in the party."
8 Aitkin (1982, chapt 22) identified three factors which contributed the decline of the coalition 
parties between 1967 and 1979, namely the declining political conservatism of women, the 
politicalisation of immigrants (into the Labor Party), and the weakening hold of organised religion.
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At the aggregate level, the changes in identification among the individual parties 
has led to a decline in the level of majority party identification in each country 
(Figure 3.2). In the United States there was a steep decline in the aggregate level of 
party identification between 1964 and 1972, from 77 to 64 percent, which 
prompted the initial writings on the partisan dealignment phenomenon. In 
general, explanations on dealignment focused upon the rise of new political issues, 
including Vietnam and race, which cross-cut traditional partisan allegiances, 
inherited from the 1930s, based on economic issues of the New Deal (Inglehart and 
Hochstein 1972; Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976, 348-50). For example, Sundquist 
(1983, 408) argues that "a strikingly close relationship can also be discerned 
between the groups showing the strongest movement toward independence and the 
cross-cutting issues of the 1960s." He cites the young, alienated by Vietnam, 
traditional Democrats (mainly southerners and Catholics), who rejected the party's 
new social liberalism, and northern suburbanite Protestants, who abandoned the 
Republican Party in response to the party's position on racial and law and order 
issues under Goldwater.
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Figure 3.2: The aggregate level o f major-party identification in Australia, Britain, and the 
United States, 1964-93. Sources: As for Figure 3.1.
As the decline in party identification halted during the late 1970s and early 1980s a 
revisionist literature arose which characterised dealignment as a unique period 
effect of the turbulent late 1960s and early 1970s; a period which was likely to be 
replaced by a new era of partisan stability (Converse 1976, 111-116; Keith et al 
1986, 1992). As the issues of the late 1960s and the early 1970s left the political 
agenda, the cross-cutting pressures which encouraged the adoption of the 
Independent position also disappeared, whilst economic issues, such as inflation and 
unemployment, once again became the main focus of party competition 
(Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 1990, 156-8). Importantly, however, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the level of party identification in the United States is set 
to return to the high levels of the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed the results show, if
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anything, that party identification is again in decline with only 60 percent of the 
electorate in 1992 either Democratic or Republican partisans.9
In Britain, the aggregate level of major party identification has also declined over 
the period, from a high of 83 percent in 1970 to a low of 67 percent in both 1983 
and 1987. However the decline was limited to just two distinct periods, between 
1970 and October 1974 and between 1979 and 1983 (Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt 1977, 
Crewe 1984), whilst the most recent trend is a slight rise in the combined level of 
Conservative and Labour identification between 1987 and 1993. Nevertheless, in 
1992 over a quarter of Britons eschewed an identification with one of the two 
major parties. In Australia, as argued above, the results are largely inconclusive. 
Although no secular dealignment trend is evident over the period, major-party 
identification in 1993 down only 1 percent on the 1967 level,10 there is evidence to 
suggest that in recent years the combined level of Labor and Liberal-National 
identification is in decline.
The first point highlighted by scholars writing from the social-psychological 
perspective is invariably the high level of identification that the vast majority of 
the electorate adopt towards the major parties. However, in the United States, and 
to a lesser extent in Britain, the pattern of partisan change between the mid 1960s 
and early 1990s is predominantly one of dealignment, a process not originally 
envisaged by the Michigan scholars, rather than realignment. Thus the proportion 
of major-party identifiers clearly has declined over specific electoral periods since 
the mid 1960s. The results are less conclusive for Australia, although recent results 
are consistent with these overseas trends. The main implications of a decline in the 
aggregate level of major-party identification include greater support for minor party 
candidates and greater aggregate electoral instability. Whilst a subjective assessment 
is required regarding whether a level of major-party identification around 60 
percent, 75 percent, or 85 percent is sufficient to provide party system stability, it 
is clear that in the 1990s parties are less able simply to rely upon high rates of 
party identification in the electorate to maintain their aggregate vote.
9 Keith and colleagues (1986, 1992) argue that Independent leaners are really closet partisans and 
therefore should be included as partisans rather than independents. Adopting this approach the decline 
in the level of major party identification is only marginal, falling from 91 percent in 1964 to 84 percent 
in 1972, and remaining at a similar level throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1992 the figure again 
equalled 84 percent. However, Wattenberg (1994, 176) argues that "if increased independence does 
indicate a movement of partisans into the closet, the question arises what is now so attractive about the 
close?t" He cites evidence, consistent with the traditional notion of party identification, which shows 
that the primary reasons for persons rejecting a partisan label in response to the initial party 
identification are normative values, namely "the belief that one should decide on the person and the 
issues rather than strictly on the party" (Wattenberg 1994, 175).
10 Explanations for the higher level of party identification in Australia, relative to other countries, 
whilst speculative, tend to focus upon the influence of the Australian election system, whereby voting is 
compulsory and House elections are held at least once every three years (Aitkin 1982, 351; McAllister 
1992a, 39). Such institutional influences repeatedly force citizens into the electoral process and, through 
the preferential voting system, to make an ultimate choice between one of the two major parties.
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The Strength of Party Identification
In addition to the direction of partisanship, the standard party identification 
questions also measure the intensity of the partisan attachment. In terms of the 
implications of the strength component for aggregate electoral stability, research 
shows that the stronger the sense of attachment the greater the likelihood that 
electors will vote in accordance with their partisan cues, and the lower the 
likelihood that a vote will be cast for a minor party or third party candidate 
(Charnock 1992; Crewe, Day and Fox 1991, 15-18; Miller and Traugott 1989, 317, 
334; Pomper 1993, 138; Stanley and Niemi 1990, 98-101). In other words, an 
overall weakening in the strength of partisan attachments increases the potential for 
electoral instability. Although the Michigan scholars identified a relationship 
between age and strength of identification among partisans during the 1950s, 
whereby the young were more likely than the elderly to be weak rather than 
strong partisans, the scholars were confident that this relationship was the effect of 
life-cycle effects rather than generational factors (Campbell et al 1960, 161-5). In 
particular, party identification was regarded as a self-reinforcing attribute that 
strengthened through behavioural observance. Consequently, as older cohorts of 
stronger identifiers died out it was expected that they would be replaced by 
younger cohorts whose partisanship would strengthen over-time so as to 
compensate for the loss of their elders. Through this process of generational 
replacement the aggregate strength of partisanship in the electorate would remain 
stable over-time (see also Butler and Stokes 1974, 58-61).
Figure 3.3 shows that the percentage of very strong major-party identifiers in 
Australia and Britain, and strong party identifiers in the United States, as a 
proportion of the total electorate, has in fact declined in each country since the 
mid 1960s. The decline was greatest in Britain, where the proportion of electors 
with a very strong Conservative or Labor party identification fell from 38 percent 
in 1964 to 17 percent in 1992, with most of the decline occurring between 1970 
and 1979, but no subsequent sign of recovery thereafter. In the United States a 
sharp decline in the proportion of strong Democrats and Republicans occurred 
between 1964 and 1972, down from 38 to 25 percent, although partisan ties did 
strengthen somewhat during the Reagan years. However a further decline in 1992 
arrested what now appears to have been only a temporary resurgence. Finally, in 
Australia the proportion of electors holding a very strong Liberal-National or 
Labor party identification also fell across the period, in particular between 1979 
and 1987, to the extent that only 16 percent of Australians now hold a very strong 
identification with one of the major parties.
These findings challenge the expectation of the initial social-psychological studies 
that the relatively weak party identification of the younger age cohorts during the 
1950s and 1960s would strengthen in subsequent decades to compensate for the loss 
of older generations of stronger partisans. To test for the presence of life-cycle 
gains in party identification a long-term panel study would ideally be used to ask 
the same respondents, over a number of years, the direction and strength of their 
party identification. However, the number of panel studies conducted in each of 
the countries is small and of insufficient duration to test adequately the 
strengthening hypothesis. An alternative approach is to examine the strength of
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party identification among a number of age cohorts across a succession of cross- 
sectional studies. Of course, it must be borne in mind that different respondents 
are selected in each survey to represent each cohort, and consequently results by 
this method are subject to additional sampling error. Nonetheless the method does 
provide an approximation of movements in partisan strength over-time, and given 
large age-cohort differences in the strength of identification found in the initial 
studies, definite trends should be readily apparent if the pattern is indeed one of 
strengthening party identification within each cohort over-time (cf Converse 1976, 
16-26).
Table 3.4 shows that, contrary to the life-cycle hypothesis, there is little evidence 
of a net increase in the proportion of strong or very strong identifiers among those 
cohorts present in their respective electorates across the survey period. In Australia 
and Britain the proportion of very strong major party identifiers in two of the 
three oldest cohorts showed a statistically significant decrease between the mid 
1960s and the early 1990s, whilst, if anything, the partisan strength of the 
remaining cohort present in both years also weakened over the period. In the 
United States there was only a negligible increase in the proportion of strong 
Democrats and Republicans among cohorts I and III, and, although the increase 
was larger among cohort II, in each case the changes were within the range of 
sampling error (see also Abramson 1975, 1976, 1979; Glenn and Hefner 1972; 
Jennings and Niemi 1975; cf Converse 1976, chapt 4). This is not to deny that life- 
cycle effects may have operated prior to the mid 1960s, nor the possibility that the 
presence of life-cycle effects may have been merely obscured over the period by the 
stronger impact of short-term political shocks (Claggett 1981; Converse 1976, 81- 
111; Norpoth and Rusk 1982; Shively 1979a). However it may be further noted 
that by the early 1990s no cohort had achieved a strength of partisanship to even 
match that held by their immediate elders during the mid 1960s. Consequently, in 
the absence of strong life-cycle gains, it is likely that the proportion of very 
strong/strong identifiers in each electorate will, at the very least, remain well 
below the levels of the mid 1960s (Converse 1976, 111-6).
Table 3.4 also provides information pertinent to debates in Britain and the United 
States regarding whether the weakening of partisan attachments in each country are 
an outcome of period or generational effects.11 A period effect occurs when a 
social, economic, or political event, alters the partisan attachments of all age groups 
simultaneously, whilst a generational effect occurs when such an event disturbs the 
partisan attachments of particular generations of electors, most commonly those 
generations who, at that point, are in their formative years of political socialisation, 
ie adolescence and early adulthood. However the two effects are, in practice, 
notoriously difficult to disentangle as period effects are likely to have a greater 
impact on younger cohorts who tend to hold weaker attachments, thereby also 
suggesting a generational effect, (Converse 1976, 79-80; Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt 
1977). Consequently a more robust inquiry is to estimate the extent to which 
partisan change is an outcome of the behaviour of new electors, ie generational 
replacement, compared to the extent to which partisan change is an outcome
11 For Britain see Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt (1977, 1978) for a period effect explanation and Abramson 
(1978a, 1992) for a generational effect explanation. For the United States see Converse (1976) and 
Abramson (1975, 1976) respectively.
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predominantly of the behaviour of persons previously in the electorate (Abramson 
1978a). The greater the contribution of generational replacement to the weakening 
of partisan ties, the more likely it is, again in the absence of life-cycle gains, that 
the aggregate strength of partisan ties will continue to weaken, as affected cohorts 
maintain their relatively weak partisanship throughout life.
Table 3.4: Percentage of Very Strong Major-Party Identifiers in Australia and Britain, 
and Strong Party Identifiers in the United States, as a Proportion of the Total
Electorate, by Cohort
Cohort: Year of Birth Percentage Very Strong Change
Australia 1966 1993
I Before 1915 34 (620) 33 (106) -1
II 1915-29 28 (656) 21 (546) -1*
III 1930-45 24 (648) 17 (805) -7*
IV 1946-60 - 14 (838)
V After 1960 - 11 (500)
Total 29 16
No Generational Replacement 25
B ritain 1964 1992
I Before 1915 49 (800) 37 (150) -12*
II 1915-29 37 (547) 25 (614) -12*
III 1930-45 29 (402) 22 (824) -7
IV 1946-60 - 12 (944)
v After 1960 - 10 (902)
Total 40 17
No Generational Replacement 30
U nited States 1964 1992
I Before 1915 45 (631) 46 (144) + 1
II 1915-29 34 (487) 40 (405) + 6
III 1930-45 31 (448) 32 (482) + 1
IV 1946-60 - 29 (763)
V After 1960 - 17 (692)
Total 38 25
No Generational Replacement 39
* - significant difference at p < .05.
Note: Figures in brackets are the N 's upon which the percentages are based.
Sources: 1967 ANPAS and 1993 AES; 1964 and 1992 BES; 1964 and 1992 SRC-CPS NES.
In Australia the decline in the proportion of very strong Liberal-National and 
Labor identifiers is an outcome of both the weak partisanship of those cohorts 
which have entered the electorate since the late 1960s, and a weakening of 
partisanship among those cohorts present in the electorate throughout the period. 
As a first step to estimating the balance between these two effects, one can estimate 
what the proportion of very strong identifiers would have been in 1992 had the 
composition of the electorate remained identical to that in 1967. This calculation 
shows that the proportion of very strong identifiers would have fallen from 29
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percent in 1967 to 25 percent in 1993, rather than to the actual level of 16 percent, 
had there been no generational replacement over the period. In other words 31 
percent of the decline in strong partisans occurred from period effects which 
affected the partisanship of older cohorts, whilst the remainder, that is 69 percent 
of the net decline, is due to generational replacement.
Both generation replacement and period effects have also contributed to the decline 
in the proportion of very strong Conservative and Labor party identification in 
Britain, although the erosion of strong identification among older cohorts made a 
much larger contribution than in Australia. Indeed Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt (1977, 
182-3) argue the weakening of partisanship between 1964 and 1974 was an outcome 
of period effects whereby the partisan strength of all age cohorts had weakened in 
response to three inter-related factors. These were the "extraordinary events 
preceding the February 1974 election", including the miners strike and rising 
inflation, "a growing rejection of the Labour party's basic tenets on the part of its 
own rank and file", and "a continuing erosion of the class party tie". However, as 
a consequence of a slight rise in the proportion of very strong identifiers among 
older cohorts between the 1987 and 1992 elections, the relative contribution of 
generational replacement to the weakening of partisan ties is now greater than 
other studies had earlier indicated (cf Abramson 1978a, 1992). Indeed in the 
absence of generational replacement the proportion of very strong identifiers would 
have declined from 40 percent in 1964 to 30 percent in 1992, rather than to the 
actual figure of 17 percent. Thus approximately 57 percent of the net decline in 
very strong partisans is currently due to the entry of new cohorts into the British 
electorate since 1964.
Finally, in the United States, the net decline in the proportion of strong Democrats 
and Republicans between 1964 and 1992 is purely an outcome of the lower 
proportion of strong partisans among those cohorts born exclusively in the post­
war period, that is an outcome of pure generational replacement (Abramson 1975, 
1976; cf Converse 1976; Norpoth and Rusk 1982). In particular, among persons 
born after 1960, ie those who have entered the electorate since 1978, approximately 
only one in six are strong partisans. One explanation for this phenomenon in the 
United States is that partisan ties will inevitably weaken as the issues surrounding 
the critical realignment of the 1930s become increasingly removed from the 
political experiences of successive generations (Beck 1974). However these net 
figures do conceal the influence of two slight period effects, namely a general 
weakening of partisanship between 1964 and 1966, in response to the issues of 
Vietnam and race (Converse 1976, 103-11), and a general strengthening of 
partisanship of approximately equal strength between 1980 and 1988, a result of 
polarised attitudes toward the Reagan presidency (Miller 1986). Nevertheless, 
although the proportion of strong partisans did increase during the 1980s, the 
particularly large gap in the strength of partisanship between the youngest and 
oldest cohorts suggests that the aggregate strength of party identification in the 
United States is unlikely to return to the levels of the 1950s and early 1960s, and 
indeed may continue to decline in the 1990s.
The dual conclusions from Table 3.4 suggest a pessimistic outlook upon the future 
strength of partisanship in each country. Firstly, there is no evidence to suggest 
that life-cycle gains are strengthening partisan ties over-time within specific age-
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cohorts. Secondly, the decline in proportion of very strong partisans in Australia 
and Britain was in large part due to the weak strength of partisanship among new 
electors, whilst in the United States the decline in the proportion of strong 
partisans was entirely due to the weak partisanship of new electors. The likely 
consequence of these outcomes is that as older cohorts die out, the aggregate 
strength of party identification in each electorate will continue to decline, with 
younger cohorts failing to compensate for the loss of the relatively stronger 
partisanship of their elders. Of course, it is possible that period effects may 
operate at any time in the future to increase the proportion of strong partisans in 
any of the electorates, as indeed occurred in the United States during the 1980s. 
Nevertheless, the fact that even this partisan recovery is now in decline, and given 
the magnitude of the differences in partisan strength which exist between the 
younger and older cohorts, it is unlikely that the proportion of very strong and 
strong partisans will soon return to the levels identified in the initial social- 
psychological studies.
The Transmission of Party Loyalties
In The American Voter, Campbell and colleagues identified the political orientation 
of one's parents as the dominant factor which influenced the development of party 
identification for the individual. It was argued that a voter will typically form an 
orientation toward political affairs by the time voting age is reached, and that 
orientation "strongly reflects his immediate social milieu, in particular his family" 
(Campbell et al 1960, 147). The scholars found that in families in which both 
parents generally supported the same political party (ie consensual partisan families) 
between 70 percent and 80 percent of their offspring identified with the same party 
as their parents. Furthermore, among electors whose parents had no consistent 
partisanship the proportion of independents and weak partisans was much greater 
than it was among electors from families in both parents supported the same party. 
Indeed in the model of partisan equilibrium later developed by Converse (1969), 
the high level of partisan loyalty transmission from father to child, estimated at 
approximately 80 percent, was sufficient to ensure that a party system reached a 
point of "mature equilibrium", with between 70 percent and 80 percent of the 
electorate identifying with a party, after approximately two and one-half 
generations of electoral participation. Thus the strength of the inter-generational 
transmission of partisan loyalties represented an important force for the persistence 
of the major party alternatives.
In Britain, Butler and Stokes (1974, 49-54) also found that the party preferences of 
one's parents represented the dominant influence on the respondent's own party 
identification. Approximately 90 percent of respondents from families in which 
both parents were either Conservative or Labour recalled as their earliest party 
preference the party of their parents. Although subsequent adult experiences 
inevitably weakened the parent-child bond throughout later years, approximately 
80 percent of offspring from consensual partisan families still reported a party 
identification in agreement with that of their parents in the 1963 cross-sectional 
survey. Similarly in Australia, Aitkin (1982, 94) found that, after a slight 
weakening in partisan transference as respondents entered adulthood, 78 percent of 
respondents from families in which both parents were Liberal identified with the
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Liberal Party whilst the corresponding figure among respondents from Labor 
families was 66 percent. Furthermore, respondents from families in which neither 
parent had a party preference were twice as likely as other respondents to report 
no party identification themselves. Despite the relatively low rate of inter- 
generational transmission in Labor families, Aitkin (1982, 95) concluded that "the 
source of much of the stability in the Australian party system is thus the 
transmission of loyalties and interest from parents to child".
In recent years, however, studies in the United States have found that the inter- 
generational transmission rate of partisanship among persons from consensual 
partisan families has dramatically declined over past decades (Carmines, Mclver and 
Stimson 1987; Mattei and Niemi 1991). A common explanation for this 
phenomenon relates to the role of changing issue priorities among new electors. 
Thus, as discussed above, Beck (1974) argues that as the divisions which sparked 
the realignment of 1930s become increasingly remote from the political concerns of 
new electors, the transmission rate of partisanship from parent to child will 
correspondingly decline. In addition, Carmines, Mclver and Stimson (1987) argue 
that the broadening of the political agenda in the United States since the mid 
1960s, beyond the divisions of the New Deal to initially include issues such as 
Vietnam and race, has contributed further to this process (cf Mattei and Niemi 
1991). In particular, as the parties tend to adopt clear and conflicting positions on 
some of the new issues, the likelihood that conflict will arise between a person's 
own political attitudes and the partisanship of his or her parents is also increased.
Table 3.5 shows the relationship between the respondent's party identification and 
the recalled party preference of his or her parents when the respondent was 
"growing up".12 The first point to note is the importance of parental partisanship 
in forming a major party identification.13 In particular, a relatively high 
proportion of respondents from mixed or minor party partisan families, and 
respondents from families in which neither parent held a partisan preference, 
report either a minor-party identification or no party identification at all. Indeed 
in the United States two thirds of respondents from non-partisan families were 
independents. The second important finding is the strength of relationship
between parental and offspring party identification, with a majority of voters from 
consensual partisan families identifying with the same party as their parents. 
However, there is also evidence, based on the findings reported in the studies cited
12 The 1993 AES study asked "Did your father (mother) have any particular preference for one of the 
political parties when you were young, say about 14 years old?" The 1992 BES study asked "Do you 
remember which party your father (mother) usually voted for when you were growing up?". The 1992 CPS 
NES study asked " When you were growing up, did your father (mother) or stepfather (stepmother) think of 
herself as a Democrat, as a Republican, as an independent, or what?"
13 However the reliability of recalled parental partisanship is questionable. In particular Katz, Niemi 
and Newman (1980) found a tendency in Britain for some respondents to alter the recall of their parents 
partisanship when their own identification changed so as to bring the two into alignment. Furthermore 
there are difficulties regarding the inaccuracy of recall measures generally (Niemi, Katz and Newman 
1980) and the inaccuracy of adolescent reports of the partisanship of their parents (Niemi 1974, 59-62). 
Nevertheless no alternative is readily available and there is nothing to suggest that respondents today are 
any more or less likely to readjust the partisan leanings of their parents than they were in previous 
generations.
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above, of a weakening in the rate of inter-generational transmission, particularly in 
Britain and the United States.
Table 3.5: Party Identification by Parental Partisanship in Australia, Britain,
and the United States
Respondents' Party 
Identification
Parental Partisanship (Percent)
Australia, 1993 Both Labor Both L ib-N at O ther/M ixed N one
Labor 68 15 39 38
Liberal-National 22 72 43 41
Other 2 3 5 4
No Identification 9 m 14 17
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1068) (819) (457) (641)
(percent of elect) (36) (28) (15) (22)
Britain, 1992 Both Lab Both Con O ther/M ixed N one
Labour 53 8 41 37
Conservative 21 72 25 25
Liberal Democrat 9 9 15 12
Other 7 3 8 19
No Identification 9 8 19 7
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1308) (720) (862) (586)
(percent of voters) (38) (21) (25) (17)
U nited States, 1992 Both D em Both Rep O ther/M ixed None
Democratic 58 12 32 17
Republican 13 59 24 18
Independent/Apol. 99 79 4S AA
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (889) (436) (753) (383)
(percent of voters) (36) (18) (31) (16)
Sources: 1993 AES, 1992 BES, 1992 CPS NES.
The lowest rate of transmission found in Table 3.5 is among respondents from 
Labour party families in Britain. Indeed among this group only 53 percent 
inherited the Labour identification of their parents, well below the figure of 81 
percent found by Butler and Stokes for 1963 (1974, 52). Similarly, in the United 
States, the rate of partisan inheritance among respondents from Democrat and 
Republican families, 58 percent and 59 percent respectively, were well below the 
figures of 78 percent and 69 percent reported in The American Voter (Campbell et 
al 1960, 147). Furthermore, among those partisan families in which the overall 
rate of partisan inheritance remained over 70 percent, namely Liberal-National 
families in Australia and Conservative families in Britain, the relevant figure was 
still, if anything, below that reported in the initial studies of partisanship cited 
above.
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The overall trend in the rate of partisan inheritance is shown for each country in 
Figure 3.4 which reports the percentage of respondents from homogenous partisan 
families identifying with the party of their parents. The decline in inter- 
generational transmission is most consistent in the United States where the rate of 
partisan inheritance declined from 71 percent in 1964 to 58 percent in 1992, 
including a decline between each of the four surveys reported. In Britain there has 
also been a substantial decline, from 75 percent in 1964 down to 60 percent in 
1992, although there was a slight rise in the rate of partisan inheritance among 
Britons between 1987 and 1992 when the overall level of party identification 
marginally recovered. In Australia, the rate of generational transmission showed a 
less consistent trend, but nevertheless also fell over the period, from 74 percent in 
1967 to 69 percent in 1993. Overall, in each country, the rate with which electors 
adopt and/or maintain the partisan affiliations of their parents has declined since 
the mid 1960s. The role of intergenerational transmission of partisanship as a basis 
for aggregate electoral stability in the 1990s has clearly diminished.
Britain Australia
United States
\  57
Figure 3.4: The decline in partisan inheritance in Australia, Britain, and the United States, 
1964-93. Figure shows the proportion of respondents identifying with the 
same party as their parents among those from families in which both parents 
supported the same major party. Sources: 1967,1979 ANPAS; 1990, 1993 
AES. 1964, 1979, 1987, 1992 BES; 1964, 1980, 1988, 1982 SRC-CPS 
NES.
Party Identification and Voting Behaviour
In the social-psychological model of voting behaviour the size of electoral swings 
from election to election are minimised by the central role of party identification 
in influencing the partisan attitudes which in turn determine vote. Although each 
election campaign exerts its own unique effects upon voting behaviour, with some 
campaigns exerting large short-term effects and others only small effects, the actual 
vote in any election is still largely determined by the distribution of party 
identification in the electorate (Campbell 1966). In the Presidential elections of the 
1950s, in which very strong campaign effects operated in favour of the Republican
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Party candidate Dwight Eisenhower, approximately 85 percent of strong 
Democratic identifiers and 63 percent of weak Democratic identifiers who voted in 
those elections still cast a ballot for the Democratic Party candidate Adlai 
Stevenson (Campbell et al 1960, 139). Overall, approximately 85 percent of party 
identifiers who voted in those elections did so in accordance with their party 
identification, whilst a slightly higher percentage of voting identifiers, 87 percent, 
voted for the party with which they identified in the House elections (Campbell, 
Gurin and Miller 1954, 110).
The Michigan scholars argued the close association between party identification and 
vote, together with high levels of identification, had important implications for 
aggregate electoral stability and the maintenance of the two-party system, as it 
narrowed the opportunity for third-party candidates to rapidly mobilise large 
sections of the electorate (Campbell et al 1960, 552-5). However in the 
parliamentary systems of Australia and Britain, where there are fewer opportunities 
for short-term electoral defections from party identification, scholars have found 
the association between party identification and vote was, if anything, slightly 
stronger than that found in the United States. For example in Britain Sarlvik and 
Crewe (1983, 297) found that 91 percent of major party identifiers who voted in 
the 1979 general elections voted in accordance with their party identification, while 
in Australia Aitkin (1982, 289) found that 94 percent of major party identifiers 
voted for the party with which they identified in the 1977 federal election.
Nevertheless some scholars argue there has been a long-term decline in the 
importance of party identification as an influence upon voting behaviour. For 
example, Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976, 51) found that the proportion of party 
identifiers defecting from their party in presidential elections had approximately 
doubled between 1960 and 1972, and had likewise doubled in House elections 
between 1956 and 1972. Furthermore, given that the actual proportion of party 
identifiers had declined over the same period, the scholars argued that "one would 
think that those who remain attached to one or other of the parties would be 
those whose commitment is stronger ... Yet even among the increasingly smaller 
group of Party identifiers one finds party affiliation playing a smaller role in 
determining vote" (Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976, 53). More recently Wattenberg 
(1990, 27) argues that partisans increasingly use "their identifications less and less as 
a cue in voting behaviour. One possible explanation for such a pattern is that 
perhaps party identification simply means less to people across all levels than in the 
past".
Similar arguments have also been advanced in other countries regarding a decline in 
the electoral impact of party identification, irrespective of changes in the aggregate 
level of party identification. For example, in Britain Rose and McAllister (1990, 
163) found that, between 1964 and 1987, "the probability of a person with a 
Conservative identification voting Conservative, net of all other influences, has 
fallen by 33 percent". Similarly in Australia, Marks (1993) found that the influence 
of party identification on party vote, adjusted for reciprocal effects between party 
identification and short-term campaign effects, had declined between 1967 and 
1990, despite relatively stable aggregate levels of partisanship. A key variable in 
both Australia and Britain is, of course, the weakening of partisan attachments over
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time, with weak partisans less likely to vote for their party than strong partisans 
(see above).
Nevertheless, evidence that a strong relationship between party identification and 
party vote continues to exist is provided by Table 3.6. In both Australia and 
Britain, irrespective of the party identified with, approximately 90 percent of major 
party identifiers vote in accordance with their partisanship. Furthermore the 
importance of high levels of party identification is again highlighted, particularly in 
Britain, with a relatively low major party vote among minor-party identifiers and 
respondents with no party identification. In the United States, although the 
relationship between vote and party identification is slightly weaker than in the 
other two countries, approximately 80 percent of identifiers still vote in accordance 
with their partisanship. However such a strong relationship between the two 
variables is what has led some scholars to claim that the party identification-vote 
link is a tautology, with vote and partisanship essentially two measures of the same 
phenomenon (Budge, Crewe and Farbe 1976b, 10-11; Rose and McAllister 1990, 
155-6). Consequently it is important to control for those variables which are 
causally prior to party identification when assessing its electoral impact.
Table 3.6: National Lower-House Vote by Party Identification in 
Australia, Britain, and the United States (per cent)
Vote Party Identification
Australia, 1993 Labor Lib-Nat Other-None
Labor 89 5 33
Liberal-National 4 91 30
Other 7 4 37
Total 100 100 100
(N) (972) (956) (372)
Britain, 1992 Labour Conservative Other-None
Labour 89 3 19
Conservative 2 90 16
Liberal Democrat 9 7 54
Other 11
Total 100 100 100
(N) (783) (968) (571)
United. States, 1992 Democrat Republican Independent
Democratic 82 22 51
Republican 18 78 49
Total 100 100 100
(N) (475) (435) (460)
Sources: As for Table 3.5.
Scholars have recently argued that, in addition to social background factors, 
political attitudes also influence the development of party identification. In 
particular, research has shown a tendency for party identification to diverge from 
parental partisanship under conditions in which a person's stance on political
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attitudes is in conflict with the partisan loyalties of his or her parents (Abramowitz 
1994; Carmines, Mclver and Stimson 1987; Niemi and Jennings 1991). This is not 
to deny the formative role of parental partisanship in structuring party 
identification, but to acknowledge that the intergenerational transmission of 
partisanship is mediated by the offspring's stance on salient political attitudes. 
Furthermore, rather than social forces providing the basis for a partisan 
realignment, the case has been made that, in an era of weakened group-party ties, 
political attitudes are likely to be the catalyst for partisan change (Carmines and 
Stimson 1989; Flanagan and Dalton 1984). Consequently political attitudes are 
specified here as causally prior to the influence of party identification. To do 
otherwise risks underestimating the electoral influence of political attitudes, given 
the very strong and potentially tautological relationship between partisanship and 
vote, whilst the inclusion of parental partisanship as a control social background 
variable provides insurance against fears that political attitudes are an outcome of 
political socialisation.
Finally, revisionist findings that party identification is affected by short-term 
campaign evaluations suggests a relationship of reciprocal causation, rather than the 
recursive model specified by the Michigan scholars, between these influences. 
Although such findings remain a matter of controversy, once again the potential 
tautological relationship between partisanship and vote cautions against the use of 
party identification as a variable which is causally prior to campaign specific 
influences, such as issue, economic, and leader-based evaluations. Consequently the 
voting model adopted to test the electoral impact of party identification overtime, a 
composite model of the sociological, social-psychological, and rational-choice 
models, specifies that party identification is reciprocally linked to short-term 
campaign influences, such as party candidates/leaders, campaign issues, and the 
state of the economy, whilst social background factors and political attitudes are 
causally prior to party identification.
Social Background Factors 
Political Attitudes
4-
Party Identification <— > Campaign Evaluations
X
Vote
Figure 3.5: The composite voting model derived from the sociological, social-psychological 
and rational-choice voting models (see text for details).
Figure 3.6 and Table 3.7 show the percentage probability, net of the influence of 
social background factors, political attitudes and campaign evaluations, of a person 
with a identification with the major-right party voting for that party relative to a 
left-wing party identifier, estimated through OLS multiple regression analysis. 
Clearly the impact of party identification is much greater in Australia and Britain 
than in the United States, again reinforcing the greater tendency of Americans to 
diverge from their partisan affiliations. It should also be noted that, due to
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possible variations in the impact of short-term campaign effects upon vote, some 
variation in the electoral impact of party identification is to be expected over-time. 
Thus the results suggest that, in addition to any general trends, short-term 
influences were particularly strong in the 1987 British elections and the 1980 
United States elections.
Australia...... ri...
Britain
United States
Figure 3.6: The impact of party identitification upon party vote in Australia, Britain, and 
the United States, 1964-93 (b). Note OLS regression controling for the 
influence of social background, political attitudes and campaign evaluations. 
See text and Figure 3.5 for details. Sources: As for Figure 3.4
Overall, however, the results show that the electoral impact of party identification 
has declined over-time in each country. In Australia the downward trend 
accelerated over the period, with the probability of a Liberal-National identifier, 
relative to a Labor identifier, voting for the Coalition, net of sociological, 
attitudinal and campaign influences, falling from 77 percent in the mid 1960s to 57 
percent in 1993. Similarly in Britain the probability of person identifying with the 
Conservative Party, relative to a Labour identifier, voting Conservative fell from 
81 percent in 1964 to 64 percent in 1992, although the electoral influence of party 
identification rose between 1987 and 1992 in response to the electoral decline of 
the Liberal Democrats relative to the Alliance. In the United States, although the 
decline was less substantial, the probability of Republican partisans, relative to 
Democrat partisans, voting for the Republican House candidate also fell over 
period, from 36 percent in 1966 to 28 percent in 1992. Thus the impact of party 
identification upon party vote, net of the influence of causally prior variables, has 
declined in each country since the mid 1960s. In other words, among those voters 
who accept a partisan label in response to the standard party identification 
direction question, the influence of party identification as an electoral cue in the 
1990s is diminished relative to the mid 1960s.
In summary, the findings presented in this chapter have important implications for 
the role of party identification in preserving long-term aggregate electoral stability. 
Firstly, it is not at all clear whether party identification, as conventionally
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measured in election surveys, represents the long-term partisan predisposition 
initially conceptualised by the Michigan scholars. Nevertheless even if one accepts 
the theoretical underpinning of the social-psychological model, significant changes 
have occurred in the level, strength and behavioural consequences of party 
identification. Dealignment has replaced realignment as the dominant mode of 
partisan change, the partisan strength of younger age-cohorts has failed to 
compensate for the loss of older cohorts, the intergenerational transmission rate of 
partisanship has fallen, and the electoral impact of party identification is in decline. 
With regard to the social-psychological hypothesis, that aggregate electoral stability 
is an outcome of the pervasive role of stable partisan orientations in structuring 
electoral choice, party identification retains a very strong electoral impact, much 
stronger than any social background factor. However the stabilising role of party 
identification has clearly weakened since the mid 1960s. In particular aggregate 
electoral stability has been maintained, as shown in chapter one, despite the 
dealigning trends identified above. Political parties in the 1990s and beyond must 
increasingly attract voters from beyond their own partisan base in order to 
maintain previous levels of electoral support.
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CHAPTER FOUR
POLITICAL ATTITUDES
Over recent decades the dominant research paradigm in political behaviour has 
successively shifted from sociology to socio-psychology, and from socio-psychology 
to economics (Wattenberg 1991a, 17-20). The most recent shift to economics is 
manifest in the rise in scholarly support for rational choice models of electoral 
choice which view voting as an instrumental rather than expressive act of political 
behaviour (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985, 8-10). The electoral decision is thus 
conceived as an act of rational cost-benefit analysis whereby the voter's own 
political beliefs and preferences determine behavioural outcomes rather than 
abstract sentiments of party loyalty based on sociological or social-psychological 
influences. Although rational choice theory, in the context of the study of voting 
and elections, is often associated with an emphasis upon short-term influences and 
a greater potential for aggregate electoral volatility (Dalton 1988, 192-202; Franklin 
1992b, 399-405; cf van der Eijk et al 1992, 417), the theory also provides an 
alternative explanation for the persistence of the major party alternatives and long­
term party system stability. The theory implies that electoral choice is structured, 
not by social group loyalties or party identification, but by stable and enduring 
political attitudes operating as consistent political predispositions (Studlar and 
McAllister 1992).
As the seminal work in the rational choice tradition, Anthony Downs's (1957) An 
Economic Theory of Democracy identifies a number of different factors, dependent 
upon the assumptions employed at any one point, with the potential to influence 
the individual's vote. The electoral influence of these factors have since been 
further expounded by a number of scholars in the Downsian tradition. The 
ensuing works have, in particular, tended to focus upon either theories of 
economic voting (eg Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979), 
based upon the performance in office of the current government, theories of issue 
voting (eg Himmelweit, Humphreys and Jaeger 1985; cf Franklin 1985; Carmines 
and Stimson 1980), the conscious choice between alternative political means, or 
spatial voting theories, based primarily on the ideological proximity of the voter to 
the competing political parties (eg Enelow and Hinich 1984; Rabinowitz and 
Macdonald 1989; cf Iversen 1994). In the context of this study, however, the 
concern is to identify, from within the rational choice tradition, electoral 
influences with the potential to operate as a stable predisposition, similar to social 
group memberships in the sociological approach and party identification in the 
social-psychological model.
The chapter examines the proposition that electoral choice is structured by the 
political attitudes of voters. Section one defines the concept of political attitudes, 
and examines how such attitudes relate to political issues and ideology. Section 
two examines the structure of political attitudes in Australia, Britain, and the 
United States and provides initial evidence regarding those attitudes which divide 
party voters in each country. Section three then examines the voting behaviour of 
attitudinal groups in the electorate, including the extent to which the relationship
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between attitudes and vote has strengthened over the past three decades. 
Multivariate regression analysis is also used to control for the causally prior 
influence of social background factors. Finally, in section four, a more detailed 
analysis of the electoral impact of political attitudes in the 1990s is undertaken in 
the absence of the constraints of a longitudinal analysis.
Attitudes, Issues and Ideology
A feature of the rational choice tradition is the diversity of voting models derived 
from the theory. In recent years there has been a proliferation in economic voting 
models (eg Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Paulson 1994; 
Gow 1990). These models extend from the central Downsian (1957, 297) 
hypothesis that "every citizen rationally attempts to maximise his utility income, 
including that portion of it derived from government activity". From this 
hypothesis Downs introduced the concept of the current party differential, defined 
as the difference between the utility income received under the current 
administration and the utility income that would have been received had the 
opposition been in power, as an important influence upon electoral behaviour 
(Downs 1957, 38-40). These themes of utility income and government performance 
have since been developed into detailed economic voting models in which the 
primary determinants of vote are related to the performance of the government in 
handling the nation's economic affairs. However, in terms of identifying long-term 
predispositions, economic voting is, by definition, a short-term phenomenon 
whereby assessments of the governments economic performance are made afresh in 
each election campaign, and as such is considered with other short-term influences 
in the following chapter.
A more general caution against the use of economic voting models, from within 
the rational choice tradition itself, is that utility income may extend beyond 
material benefits to include non-material benefits, such as altruism. Indeed Downs 
(1957, 37) provides the example in which a citizen's utility income may be raised 
by the government levying higher taxes to fund foreign aid programs, with self- 
denying charity providing a source of non-material benefit to the individual. In 
this context utility income extends well beyond monetary income to include some 
government activities that may actually reduce the material well-being of the 
citizenry. Consequently, Downs's current party differential requires an assessment 
of the current government's policies, and the policies the opposition would have 
enacted had it been in power, rather than the material benefits which have been 
received. The Downs general model is then, in the first instance, a model of issue 
voting in which the citizen is motivated by his or her policy preferences and the 
policies of the competing parties (Fiorina 1981; Miller and Wattenberg 1985).
However, in contrast to rational choice notions of voters acting in response to 
issue priorities, the early studies of voting behaviour in the United States portrayed 
the typical voter as one for whom political issues had little electoral impact. 
Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) characterised the majority of the citizens of 
Elmira, New York, as indecisive and apathetic, often disagreeing with the policy 
positions of the party which they supported or warping their favoured candidate's 
policy position so as pull it closer to their own position. Similarly the Michigan
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scholars (Campbell et al 1960, 168-83) found that, on most issues of public policy, 
approximately one third of respondents either had no opinion, or had an opinion 
but were unaware of what the government was doing in respect to it. 
Furthermore, among those respondents who held an issue position on one of the 
sixteen items they examined, only 20 to 40 percent also perceived party differences 
on that issue, further restraining the potential for issue voting.
Accounting for the inability of respondents to perceive differences between the 
parties on political issues, the Michigan scholars argued that such an ability is, in 
the first place, dependent upon the extent to which there are in fact actual policy 
differences between the parties, and conceded that in 1956 "policy differences 
between the parties ... were narrower than they had been for some time" 
(Campbell et al 1960, 180). The importance of product differentiation with respect 
to the general goals and objectives of the competing parties was initially highlighted 
in Key's (1966) seminal work on the electorate as a form of 'Echo Chamber'. Key 
(1966, 2-3) argued that "... the people's verdict can be no more than a selective 
reflection from among the alternatives and outlooks presented to them. Even the 
most discriminating popular judgement can reflect only ambiguity, uncertainty, or 
even foolishness if those are the qualities of the input into the echo chamber". It 
was not surprising therefore that a revisionist literature identified a rise in the level 
of issue voting in presidential elections during the 1960s and 1970s as the policy 
differences between Presidential candidates widened (Miller et al 1976; Nie, Verba 
and Petrocik 1976; Pomper 1972, 1975; Schulman and Pomper 1975; cf Margolis 
1977; RePass 1976; Kessel 1980). Similarly, in Britain, as the post-war policy 
consensus broke down in the late 1960s, scholars identified a stronger relationship 
between party vote and issue preferences in the 1970s and 1980s (Franklin 1985; 
Himmelweit, Humphreys and Jaeger 1985; Sarlvik and Crewe 1983; cf Heath, 
Jowell and Curtice 1985).
Much of the issue voting controversy in both the United States and Britain is now 
focused upon debate regarding alternative research methods (Abramson 1983, 282-8; 
Denver and Hands 1992, 170-3). Nevertheless, in the context of this study, two 
factors discount the use of political issues as a form of political predisposition. 
Firstly, many political issues are by nature transient, often exerting a strong 
electoral impact in one election prior to disappearing from the political agenda in 
future campaigns. For example, the debate surrounding the goods and services tax 
in the 1993 Australian federal election was a significant influence upon voting 
behaviour in that election (Bean 1994a), but is unlikely to feature in future 
elections for some time with both major parties now opposed to the tax's 
implementation. Secondly, there is evidence that even on the most salient political 
issues individuals do not hold stable opinions (Butler and Stokes 1974, 280-85; 
Converse 1964; Converse and Markus 1979; Heath and McDonald 1988; cf Achen 
1975; Erikson 1979; Pierce and Rose 1974), and that for some individuals a 
correlation between positions and vote reflects the presence of 'persuasion' and/or 
'projection' effects rather than issues independently affecting vote (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, 220-2; Lane and Sears 1964; Miller 1980; Page and 
Brody 1972; Sarlvik and Crewe 1983, 231-40).
As an alternative to issues, political ideologies represent a potential predisposition 
that is also consistent with rational choice theory. Indeed the role of political
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ideology, defined as "a verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of 
constructing such a society", was acknowledged by Downs (1957, 96) in both his 
general and spatial models. In the general model the electoral influence of 
ideologies arises from the presence of uncertainty whereby citizens lack the 
necessary detail, and resources to acquire that detail, to evaluate comprehensively 
each aspect of government and opposition policy. Consequently, "many a voter 
finds party ideologies useful because they remove the necessity of his relating every 
issue to his own philosophy" (Downs 1957, 98). Downs argues that, to the extent 
that ideologies are used as a cost-saving device, it is rational for voters to use their 
ideologies as a voting cue for as long as a relationship exists between the actions 
and ideologies of the parties. Notions of ideological voting also find expression in 
the spatial model, which operates under the additional assumption that "political 
preferences can be ordered from left to right in a manner agreed upon by all 
voters" (Downs 1957, 115). Downs (1957, 141) goes on to argue that the 
distribution of voters along the ideological continuum is a basic determinant of a 
nations' political development, including "whether new parties will continually 
replace old or play only a minor role".
To measure ideological predispositions scholars rely either upon the use of 
ideological self-placement scales (left-right or liberal-conservative) or create their 
own ideological scale through the aggregation of several single issue items. Whilst 
studies using both techniques have found that ideology exerts a strong independent 
effect on vote (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Knutsen 1988, 1989; Shanks and 
Miller 1982, 1990, 1991), there is strong evidence that most citizens lack the 
attitudinal constraint which is implicit in these ideological designations. In other 
words most citizens do not hold ideologically consistent (ie consistently left or 
right-wing, or consistently liberal or conservative) positions across a broad range of 
political issues (Converse 1964; cf Miller and Miller 1976; Nie, Verba and Petrocik 
1976, chapt 8; Sullivan, Piereson and Markus 1978).1 Studies also show that most 
citizens do not use ideological concepts when evaluating political parties (Campbell 
et al 1960, 227-49; cf Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976, chapt 7). While this view of 
an unsophisticated electorate has been challenged over recent decades by a 
revisionist literature, the orthodox view of low levels of ideological constraint and 
conceptualisation remains dominant with much debate now concerned with 
problems of method and measurement (Abramson 1983, 272-6).
A third alternative to the rational choice approach is that political attitudes operate 
as political predispositions in structuring electoral choice and providing party 
system stability (Studier and McAllister 1992; cf Denver and Hands 1990). Political 
attitudes are defined here as "long-term, stable predispositions toward questions of 
public policy or political action" (McAllister and Mughan 1987, 52), which are 
more constrained than opinions on transient political issues but less constrained 
than detailed political ideologies.2 Thus, in terms of voter conceptualisation,
1 For cross-national evidence regarding the low level of ideological thinking see Dalton (1988, 25) 
and McAllister (1992a, 93-7)
2 A range of various terms have been used to describe the same broad concept as political attitudes 
are defined here, including political principles (Rose and McAllister 1986), values (Rose and McAllister 
1990), and even, somewhat erroneously, ideology (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985).
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attitudes are located at some point between issues and ideology. For example, a 
classical Liberal ideology, based on a commitment to individual liberty and a 
spontaneous order of human activities, may extend to political attitudes such as 
support for a smaller role for government in the economy and opposition to the 
coercive practices of labour unions. In turn, these attitudes may extend to support 
for specific policy proposals during an election campaign, such as the abolition of a 
particular welfare program or the introduction of individual employment contracts. 
Whilst issues have the potential to exert a strong electoral impact in a particular 
campaign, broader political attitudes have the potential to exert an electoral impact 
irrespective of whether or not they are explicitly linked to specific campaign-related 
issues (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985, 109). It is in this manner that political 
attitudes have the potential to operate as a predisposition in much the same way as 
a social group membership or psychological attachment.
1
Attitudes
I 4
Ideology
4'
Attitudes
4 i
Issues Issues Issues Issues
Figure 4.1: The hierarchical structure of political beliefs. Source:
McAllister (1992a, 78) adapted from Eysenck (1954).
Studies conducted in Australia, Britain and the United States have specified a range 
of alternative political attitudes in their respective electorates, with the actual 
number of attitudinal dimensions in any one study ranging from just two (eg 
Carmines 1994; Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985; Heaven 1991; Himmelweit, 
Humphreys and Jaeger 1985) to upwards of ten (eg Kelley 1988; Rose and 
McAllister 1990).3 The significance of these findings is the acknowledgment that, 
in most political systems, debate focuses simultaneously on more than one 
attitudinal dimension (Sartori 1969, 334-42).4 For example, in the Australian 
context Kelley (1988, 60-2) found that information regarding an individual's 
attitude towards the extent of government intervention in the economy provides 
little information regarding the attitudes of the same individual towards the power 
of trade unions. Although in terms of ideological consistency it may be expected 
that persons favouring government regulation, generally defined as left-wing 
position, would also be sympathetic towards unions, another left-wing position, in 
reality positions on the two issues among voters are only weakly correlated. The 
use of political attitudes as a political predisposition makes no assumptions 
regarding the attitudinal consistency of voters.
3 See also Graetz and McAllister (1988, 1994); McAllister (1991b), McAllister and Mughan (1985, 
1987), Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976), Shanks and Miller (1992), and Studier and McAllister (1992).
4 Northern Ireland and the nationalist-loyalist debate an obvious exception.
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The Structure of Political Attitudes
To measure political attitudes researchers generally aggregate responses on a 
number of related individual issues items into a single attitudinal scale. For 
example, Kelley (1988) identified a 'royalist' attitudinal dimension in Australia 
based upon responses to questions regarding how important the Queen is to 
Australia and whether or not Australia should become a republic. The resulting 
royalist scale ranged from pro-royalists, those who both favour a constitutional 
monarchy and regard the Queen as very important, to anti-royalists, those both 
who favour a republic and regard the Queen as not very important, with persons 
who gave a mix of pro and anti-royalist responses located at a mid point between 
the other two groups. The technique of aggregation thus identifies a general 
attitudinal dimension which extends beyond the more detailed political issue of 
whether or not Australia should become a republic, but makes no presumption 
regarding how attitudes on this royalist dimension may or may not be related to 
attitudes on any other attitudinal dimensions, such as attitudes towards trade 
unions.
Two alternative techniques are available to identify which individual items may be 
aggregated into a broader political attitude. Studies in the United States have 
tended to simply group those issue items which appear to the researcher to be 
related to a more diffuse political attitude (Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976; Shanks 
and Miller 1991). Thus if the survey contains five questions regarding civil rights 
these items are simply combined into a single civil rights attitudinal dimension. 
An alternative approach, recently adopted in some Australian and British studies, is 
to use factor analysis to specify the structure of political attitudes in the electorate 
(Kelley 1988; McAllister 1991; Rose and McAllister 1986, 1990). Factor analysis is 
a statistical technique which identifies the underlying commonalities, or common 
factors, among a range of individual issue items. The technique identifies the 
extent to which different survey questions are measuring the same latent attitudinal 
trait. The advantage of this approach is that it removes the subjective nature of the 
researcher-specified approach and minimises the potential for confounding, ie 
related or correlated, attitudinal dimensions to be identified.
To identify the structure of political attitudes in Australia, Britain and the United 
States factor analysis was performed in each of the selected national election studies 
upon those issue questions which have been consistently asked over time, with 
minimal changes in question wording. Although the number of such questions is 
limited to under ten issue items in each country, the desire to maximise over time 
comparability made such an approach the most appropriate. Initially all respective 
items were included in each factor analysis. From the first factor solution those 
issue items which either failed to significantly load on any single attitudinal 
dimension, or loaded simultaneously on more than one dimension, were then 
excluded, and the factor analysis was repeated. This process continued until a clear 
factor solution emerged. The results of this process (Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3) shows 
that, for each country, an identical two factor solution was identified across the 
four selected national election studies, with one dimension related to economic 
attitudes and the other dimension related to social attitudes.
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The final factor solutions for Australia identified consistently attitudes towards the 
trade union movement and attitudes towards social conservatism as structuring 
political attitudes among voters (see also Graetz and McAllister 1988, 220; Kelley 
1988; McAllister 1991). The trade union movement represents an important 
grouping in Australian economic and political affairs, particularly in respect to 
Australia's historically centralised system of arbitration and the close links of the 
ACTU to the Labor Party (Jaensch 1989, 69-77). However, many sections of 
economy, particularly those in private enterprise, regard the militancy of the union 
movement as an impediment to economic growth, including those who, in recent 
years, wish to extend Australia's current push for market deregulation to include 
the labour market (Sloan 1993). As expected, issues such as the extent of union 
power and sympathy for strikers are strongly correlated with underlying attitudes 
towards trade unions. The second factor, namely attitudes towards social 
conservatism, identifies divisions in the electorate between those voters who, on 
the one hand, oppose immigration and favour the death penalty and those, on the 
other hand, who favour immigration and oppose the death penalty. Although the 
major parties tend to avoid debate on such issues (McAllister 1992a, 85), they 
nevertheless represent important aspects of a nation's approach to social policy.
In Britain, the dominant economic attitude identified through factor analysis relates 
to attitudes towards economic liberalism, extending to issues of privatization, trade 
union power and social welfare spending. When political scientists describe 
economic debate in terms of conflict between left and right it is often debate 
regarding the desirability of unrestrained market outcomes which is envisaged (eg 
Budge and Robertson 1987; Downs 1957, 116). Those on the political right tend to 
favour more privatization, lower taxation at the expense of lower welfare spending, 
and measures to eradicate the coercive practices of the trade union movement 
which undermine individual liberty and distort labour market outcomes. By 
contrast, those on the political left tend favour more nationalisation and more 
welfare spending, in addition to supporting the role of the union movement in 
protecting workers against capitalist exploitation. The social attitude identified in 
Britain, as in Australia, is one of social conservatism, on which opinions regarding 
immigration and the reintroduction of the death penalty are strongly correlated to 
the underlying dimension.
The United States provides a third example of the consistent division of attitudinal 
dimensions between economic and social attitudes in the electorate. The economic 
attitude identified in this case is labelled economic individualism and is broadly 
related to the extent to which individuals are expected to rely upon their own 
initiative for personal economic advancement, as against the extent to which 
market protection should be provided by external agencies. At one attitudinal 
extreme are those who are unfavourable towards labour unions, believe 
government has too much power, and think that governments should let people 
get ahead on their own. Opposed at the other attitudinal extreme are those who 
are favourable to unions, do not believe government is getting too strong, and 
think that government should see to it that every person has a job and a good 
standard of living. The social attitude identified in the United States differs in 
content to those found in Australia and Britain, but nevertheless may also be 
regarded as related to social conservatism. In particular, opinions regarding
whether or not the Bible is the word of God, and whether civil rights leaders push
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too fast, both show a consistently strong and consistent correlation with the 
underlying social attitude, with social conservatives defined as those who both 
accept a literal interpretation of the Bible and oppose the push of civil rights 
leaders.
The results of Tables 4.1 to 4.3 confirm that the political attitudes of the electorate 
cannot be reduced to a single underlying attitudinal dimension which a simple 
theory of ideological voting would infer (Sartori 1976, 334-42). If voters held 
highly constrained political ideologies only one factor would have been extracted in 
each national survey with opinions on both economic and social issues loading 
upon the one underlying factor. Instead the factor analyses show that, in terms of 
political attitudes, citizens hold a range of attitudes on two separate attitudinal 
dimensions which are only weakly correlated. Some persons may hold right-wing 
economic attitudes and left-wing social attitudes, others may hold left-wing 
economic attitudes and right-wing social attitudes, whilst others may hold 
consistently right or left-wing positions on both. In other words, the range of 
possible political attitudes extending from this analysis may be envisaged as a two- 
dimensional space in which voters may located with respect to both an economic 
and social dimension.
The dominant political attitudes which divide the major parties in the Anglo- 
American democracies are related to economic concerns defined in terms of left 
versus right (Robertson 1987). Thus left-wing parties tend to position themselves 
as supportive of worker interests and defenders of the provision of welfare and 
social services whilst right-wing parties cultivate an image of a strong commitment 
to low taxation, private enterprise and the free market. These positions are further 
strengthened through the on-going relationship between the labour movement and 
the respective parties of the left, while parties on the right enjoy a closer 
relationship than their opponents with business interests. Although the actual 
policy proposals of the major parties are subject to significant change over-time, the 
relative positioning of the parties remains one which finds expression through the 
division between left and right. The acceptance of market economics by left-wing 
parties and the campaign within right-wing parties to adopt radical market reforms 
consistent with a true classical liberal philosophy has not altered the positioning of 
the parties with respect to each other. As in the Downsian spatial model, integrity 
and responsibility prevents political parties from moving past each other on an 
attitudinal dimension (Downs 1957, 122).
In contrast to the centrality of economic attitudes to political debate, divisions on 
social attitudes in the electorate are generally not exploited by the major parties for 
fear of dividing their natural constituency based on economic interests (McAllister 
1992a, 85; Rose and McAllister 1990, 104-8). On the few occasions that a clear 
stand is taken on social concerns, it is often parliamentarians from right-wing 
parties which attempt to position their party towards what may again be defined as 
a social conservative position. For example, in the United States Goldwater's 
opposition to civil rights legislation in 1964 (Sundquist 1983, 357), in Britain Enoch 
Powell's 1969-70 anti-immigration campaign (Miller 1980), and in Australia the 
concerns of successive Liberal leaders during the 1980s regarding the immigration 
mix between Europeans and Asians (Kelly 1992, 128-34; 422-8). Conversely, parties 
of the left have, particularly in recent years, been influenced by internal factions
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committed to social tolerance and support the minority (gender, racial and ethnic) 
rights characteristic of a social liberal position (Lipset 1981, 22-27; McAllister 1991; 
Crewe 1992, 40-1).
In order to locate the attitudinal position of party voters in the early 1990s within 
a two-dimensional space, attitudinal scales were created for both the economic and 
social attitudes identified above. This was achieved by averaging the respondent's 
score (ranging from 0 to 1) on those items which loaded upon the relevant factor. 
The mean score of party voters was then calculated, standardised, and plotted in 
the two-dimensional spaces represented by Figures 4.2 to 4.4, with the mean 
position of the electorate represented by the solid lines in the centre of each scale. 
The terms left and right, whilst acknowledging possible differences in the meaning 
attached to these labels, are defined with respect to their most common 
understanding in political debate. Thus the economic right is associated with lower 
government spending and opposition to trade unions, and the economic left the 
reverse of these positions. The social right is associated with opposition to 
immigration and the civil rights movement, support for the death penalty and 
religious fundamentalism, whilst the social left is defined as holding opposing 
positions.
Left Economic  ---------------------------------- > ■ Right
Figure 4.2: Mean attitudinal position of Australian voters by House of 
Representatives vote, 1993. See Table 4.1 and text for details 
of variables. Source: 1993 AES.
In Australia, major party voters are principally divided on their attitudes towards 
trade unions, with Labor voters holding the furthest left-wing position and Liberal 
and National party voters the furthest right-wing positions on the economic 
dimension (Figure 4.2). The similar attitudes of voters for the two coalition parties
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indicate their common interest in opposing the power of the union movement. 
Australian Democrat and Green Party voters are located on the left of the 
economic dimension, close to Labor voters but slightly less enthusiastic in their 
union support. On social attitudes, although coalition and Labour voters are again 
on opposite sides of the mean position, the furthest left-wing position is held by 
Australian Democrat and Green party voters, with a more moderate position held 
by voters of all major parties. Whilst the major parties consistently emphasise 
their economic differences, both sides down-play the importance of social attitudes 
for fear of alienating sections of their own constituency (McAllister 1992a, 85). By 
contrast, the newer minor parties have an incentive to focus political debate on 
social attitudes on which their own support base is clearly differentiated from the 
major parties. At present, however, the bulk of voters remain divided primarily 
on economic attitudes.
In Britain, major party voters are also divided on economic attitudes, in this case 
attitudes towards economic liberalism (Figure 4.3). The furthest left-wing position 
is held by Labour voters, the furthest right-wing position by Conservative voters, 
with minor party voters, including Liberal Democrats, located on the left between 
Labour voters and the mean position. On the social conservatism dimension both 
Labour and Conservative voters are close to the electorate's midpoint, and slightly 
to the left and right respectively, whilst Liberal Democrat voters are located at a 
position slightly to the left of Labour voters. The extreme left-wing position, 
however, is held by the small proportion of Green Party voters, indicating that 
their focus on the environment and quality of life issues extends to more general 
opposition to conservative social attitudes. Once again, the figure emphasises the 
extent to which the focus of political debate in Britain upon economic attitudes has 
divided major party voters on the basis of their attitudes towards aspects of 
economic liberalism and avoided divisions on social attitudes which may destabilise 
their respective electoral bases (Rose and McAllister 1990, 104-8).
A slightly different analysis is required in the United States where deep divisions 
exist within the Democratic Party on particular social attitudes, in particular those 
attitudes related to race (Carmines 1994). Consequently, in Figure 4.4 Democratic 
voters are divided between white southern Democrats and other Democrats, 
namely northerners and blacks. The figure shows the divisions on attitudes 
towards economic individualism between Republican and Democrat voters, on the 
right and left respectively, although white southern Democrats are much closer 
to the centre than other Democrats. However, on the social conservatism 
dimension the expected divisions with the Democratic Party are readily apparent 
with white southern Democrats holding the furthest right-wing position, indeed 
further to the right than Republican voters, and other Democrat voters 
diametrically opposed towards the extreme left-wing position. The figure 
highlights the difficulties that the Democratic Party has experienced in maintaining 
their southern base over recent decades when nominating social liberals for 
President, with southern Democrats defecting to the more conservative Republican 
candidate, and hence the need for the party to focus debate, as in the 1992 
Presidential election, upon economic attitudes on which their supporters are united 
in their opposition to the Republicans (Lipset 1993; Norris 1993; Pomper 1993; cf 
Carmines 1994).
- 106-
Left ---------------------------  Economic --------------------^  Right
Figure 4.3: Mean attitudinal position of British voters by House of
Commons vote, 1992. See Table 4.2 and text for details of 
variables. Source: 1993 BES
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Figure 4.4: Mean attitudinal position of United States voters by House of 
Representatives vote, 1992. See Table 4.3 and text for details 
of variables. Source: 1992 CPS NES.
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The absence of strong national party organisations in the United States enables 
congressional Democrat candidates to adopt their own positions on divisive social 
issues in accordance with the views of their local constituents Qacobson 1990, 130- 
3). Thus southern Democrats may present themselves to the electorate as social 
conservatives and northern Democrats may stand as social liberals. In other words, 
there is much greater scope for a diversity of attitudinal positions from candidate 
to candidate in the United States than in either of the parliamentary systems of 
Australia and Britain. Although such an approach may lead to detrimental 
outcomes when it comes to aggregating party interests at a national level, it enables 
congressional candidates to maintain an attitudinal proximity to their constituents 
which parliamentary candidates in Australia and Britain are not able to exploit to 
the same extent in the local context.
Political Attitudes and Voting Behaviour
The above figures are particularly useful in identifying those political attitudes 
which divide party voters in their respective electorates. In Australia and Britain 
major party voters are divided on economic attitudes, whilst in the United States 
both economic and social attitudes divide the three major party groupings. 
However, as the figures present only mean attitudinal positions they show only 
part of the total picture; in reality voters for a particular political party may come 
from across a wide range of attitudinal positions. Indeed, it is the extent to which 
party support is concentrated among particular attitudinal groups that is equated 
with the extent to which political attitudes structure electoral choice. In other 
words, if political attitudes operate as the dominant predispositions in the 
electorate it would be expected that, for example, not only is the mean position of 
right wing voters located on the right of the attitudinal dimension, but also that 
support for the party is concentrated around that point. Consequently, Figure 4.5 
examines the party vote of electors on the basis of their position on the economic 
attitudinal scale developed in the previous section. Five attitudinal groups are 
identified, namely those voters on the left, the centre-left, the centre, the centre- 
right and the right of the economic dimension. A right-wing position is defined 
for Australia as opposed to trade unions, for Britain as favourable toward economic 
liberalism, and for the United States as favourable toward economic individualism, 
as defined in the respective factor analyses above.
Figure 4.5 shows that a consistent linear relationship between economic attitudes 
and party vote exists in each country, with the vote for the major right-wing party 
increasing, and the vote for the major left wing party decreasing, as one moves 
across the attitudinal scale from left to right. Among those voters with right-wing 
economic attitudes upwards of 74 percent supported their respective major right- 
wing party, whilst among those voters with left-wing economic attitudes upwards 
of 66 percent supported their respective major left-wing party. Differences in the 
party vote across the scale are lower in the United States where the Democratic 
vote was 55 percent lower among voters on the right than among voters on the 
left, compared to differences of 71 percent for the Australian Labor Party and 67 
percent for the British Labour Party. Similarly the Republican vote ranged from 
74 percent on the right to 17 percent on the left, a difference of 57 which
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United States
_. Democratic
loo n
Q ---------
Republican
Centre
(64) (234) (463) (397) (185)
Figure 4.5: National lower-house vote for major parties by position on
Economic Attitudes scale. Figures in brackets are N upon which 
percentage is based. See Tables 4.2-4 for details of variables. 
Source: 1993 AES: 1992 BES: 1992 CPS NES.
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Figure 4.6: National lower-house vote for major parties by position on
Social Attitudes scale. Figures in brackets are N upon which 
percentage is based. See Tables 4.2-4 for details of variables. 
Sources: 1993 AES; 1992 BES; 1992 CPS NES.
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compared to differences of 83 and 73 percent for the Conservative and Liberal- 
National parties respectively. Nevertheless, across all the three countries, including 
the United States, the relationship between economic attitudes and party vote is 
substantial.
In Figure 4.6 voters are divided according to their position on the respective social 
conservatism scales. A right-wing position is again defined as one which, in 
Australia and Britain, endorses capital punishment and a lower rate of immigration, 
and in the United States as one which opposes civil rights leaders and believes the 
Bible is the word of God. As expected, the vote for the Liberal-National, 
Conservative, and Republican parties is generally higher among those with right- 
wing social attitudes, while the vote for their respective opponents is higher among 
those with left wing social attitudes. However, the relationship between party vote 
and social attitudes is not as consistent across the scale as is the case for economic 
attitudes. For example, in Australia relatively minor differences in party vote are 
apparent among the centre, centre-right and right-wing attitudinal groups, whilst in 
Britain there is little change across the scale from the centre-left to the right-wing 
groups. In the United States the impact of social attitudes is greater and more 
consistent than in the other two countries, but again, in this case primarily as a 
consequence of the diversity of attitudes within the Democratic Party, is also 
weaker than that for economic attitudes.
These findings, particularly with regard to economic attitudes, confirm the 
importance of political attitudes in structuring electoral choice. It is possible, 
however, that, to the extent that a relationship exists between political attitudes 
and party vote, it is simply an outcome of the influence of social background 
factors upon political attitudes and the confounding relationship between social 
background and vote. For example, it is possible that attitudes towards trade 
unions are influenced by whether or not the respondent is a union member, and as 
such it is important to control for the influence of trade union membership upon 
attitudes towards unions. Consequently, in the composite voting model political 
attitudes are defined (Figure 4.7) as causally subsequent to social background 
factors. To measure the independent electoral impact of these political attitudes in 
each country over-time, controlling for the causally prior influence of sociological 
factors, OLS regression is once again used.
Social Background Factors
'i'
Political Attitudes
i
Party Identification <— > Campaign Evaluations 
Vote
Figure 4.7: The composite voting model derived from the sociological, 
social-psychological and rational choice voting models 
(see text for details).
Table 4.4, which reports both the partial (b) and standardised (beta) regression 
coefficients, confirms the strong electoral impact of political attitudes in all three
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countries. Furthermore, it also shows that, in terms of their relative influence, 
economic attitudes consistently outweigh social attitudes across the period. In fact 
the electoral impact of economic attitudes is much stronger than any of the social 
background factors examined in chapter two, whilst in the United States the 
impact of economic attitudes also exceeded that of party identification. In terms of 
changes in the influence of political attitudes over-time there is evidence of 
considerable fluctuation in the electoral impact of social attitudes across the period 
in each country, but no overall evidence of a consistent increased influence. By 
contrast, the electoral impact of economic attitudes rose substantially in both 
Australia and the United States. In Australia the percentage probability of those 
most opposed to trade unions voting for the Liberal-National parties, relative to 
those most supportive of trade unions, doubled from 32 percent in 1966 to 65 
percent in 1993, whilst in the United States the percentage probability of those 
most committed to economic individualism voting for the Republican Party, 
relative to those most hostile, increased from 33 percent in 1964 to 49 percent in 
1992. In Britain, however, an increase in the influence of economic attitudes 
between 1979 and 1987 was arrested in 1992.
The British case underlies the importance of actual differences between the parties 
as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for political attitudes to influence vote 
(Key 1966). In Australia there has been a consistent increase in the proportion of 
voters seeing a good deal of difference between the parties, from 30 percent in 1967 
to 44 percent in 1993 (Table 4.5). Similarly in the United States the percentage of 
voters acknowledging important differences between the parties increased from 52 
percent in 1964 to 68 percent in 1980, a level which has been maintained in recent 
elections. In Britain, however, an increase in the percentage of voters seeing a 
good deal of difference between the parties rose from 48 percent in 1979 to 86 
percent in 1987, but fell to 57 percent in the 1992 election as the Conservatives 
were perceived to move to the left in the post-Thatcher era and Neil Kinnock as 
Labour leader continued his moderating policy reforms which pushed the party 
further to the right (Heath and Jowell 1994). Of course, these questions of 
perceived party differences cannot explain all the variations in the electoral impact
Table 4.5: Extent of Major-Party Differences in Australia, Britain, and the United
States, 1964-93.
Percent Agree
Survey Question Mid '60s Late '70s Late '80s Early '90s
Australia
Good deal of difference 30 39 n /a 44
Britain
Great deal of difference 47 49 86 57
United States 
Important differences 52 68 69 67
Sources: 1967 and 1979 ANPAS; 1993 AES; 1964, 1979, 1987 and 1992 BES; 1964, 1980, 1988 
and 1992 SRC-CPS NES
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of political attitudes over time, as they are likely to also include other campaign 
related perceptions (for example quality of leadership and potential for sound 
economic management), but nevertheless provide a reminder of Key's work which 
stressed the importance of actual differences between the parties as a necessary 
condition for citizens to vote on the basis of their attitudinal preferences.
Overall, the extent to which political attitudes structure electoral choice has risen 
over the past three decades. Table 4.6 shows that between the mid 1960s and the 
early 1990s the variance in lower-house vote explained by political attitudes rose in 
Australia from 4.8 percent to 14.7 percent, in Britain from 9.8 percent to 12.5 
percent, and in the United States from 2.0 percent to 6.3 percent. The rise, 
particularly in Australia and Britain, has not been a steady one, but, as argued 
above, the structuring properties of political attitudes are, to some extent, 
dependent upon actual policy differences between the major parties which vary 
from election to election. Nevertheless, the net increase in the variance explained 
by political attitudes is in stark contrast to the decline in other political 
predispositions, namely social background factors and party identification. Hence 
the rise in the relative contribution of political attitudes to the total variance 
explained, at the expense of sociological and social-psychological influences which 
dominated during the mid 1960s, is even greater than the absolute rise in their 
electoral importance.
Table 4.6: Percent Variance of National Lower-House Vote Explained by Political 
Predispositions in Australia, Britain, and the United States, 1964-93.
Predispositions Mid '60s
Percent variance 
Late '70s
explained (%) 
Late '80s Early '90s Change
Australia
Social Background 25.2 20.5 17.9 18.8 - 6.4
Political Attitudes 4.8 12.5 8.5 14.7 + 9.9
Party Identification 43.8 43.0 43.2 36.4 - 7.4
Total 73.8 76.0 69.6 69.9 + 3.9
Britain
Social Background 33.7 25.9 26.7 28.6 - 5.1
Political Attitudes 9.8 11.5 21.3 12.5 + 2.7
Party Identification 37.9 35.9 23.0 34.4 - 3.5
Total 81.4 73.3 71.0 75.5 - 5.9
U nited  States
Social Background 23.0 14.7 15.5 13.1 - 9.9
Political Attitudes 2.0 3.2 4.8 6.3 + 4.3
Party Identification 16.3 6.7 10.4 8.5 - 7.8
Total 41.3 24.6 30.7 27.9 -13.4
Sources: 1967 and 1979 ANPAS; 1990 and 1993 AES; 1964, 1979, 1987 and 1992 BES; 1964, 
1980, 1988 and 1992 SRC-CPS NES.
A further attraction in identifying political attitudes as an important 
counterbalance to the declining influence of other predispositions in structuring
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vote is that the most important political attitudes, in terms of their electoral 
impact, are those economic attitudes upon which the major political parties have 
traditionally been divided, whilst social attitudes, upon which the parties are less 
divided, remain less important. In electorates in which the social group and 
partisan loyalties of voters have declined substantially over the past three decades it 
is possible that stable and enduring political attitudes related to the fundamentals of 
economic debate will emerge as the new basis of political alignments representing a 
shift from sociological and social-psychological to attitudinal cleavages. However 
this case should not be overstated, as, in terms of the variance in vote explained, 
political attitudes remain below the net contribution of social background and 
party identification variables in each country.
It may also be noted that, despite fluctuations from survey to survey, the total 
variance explained by all three groups of political predispositions has shown a net 
decline over the period. The decline was largest in the United States, from 41.3 
percent to 27.9 percent, but was also in apparent in both Australia, 73.8 percent to 
69.9 percent, and Britain, 81.4 percent to 75.5 percent. A possible explanation for 
this finding is that the latter surveys do not allow for the possibility that the 
domain of political attitudes which influence electoral behaviour has expanded to 
include such new politics concerns, such as environmental protection and minority 
rights, which were not included in the earlier studies. This may also have 
important consequences for the balance of influence between economic and non­
economic attitudes whereby economic issues are not as dominant as the above 
findings would suggest. The following section considers these propositions.
Political Attitudes in the 1990s
A disadvantage of longitudinal studies is that, as a result of a concern for over-time 
comparability, it is difficult to account for changes in the political environment. 
This is particularly the case with regard to attitudinal research which involves 
balancing the inevitable conflict between, on the one hand, the need for 
consistency in the measurement of comparable attitudes over-time, and, on the 
other, a desire to respond to ongoing changes in the structure of political attitudes. 
During the mid 1960s, for example, concerns such as environmental protection, 
nuclear energy and gay rights were generally not regarded as part of the broader 
political agenda and consequently were not included in national election studies. 
However, over recent decades, some scholars have identified attitudes towards such 
New Politics concerns, which extend beyond the traditional Old Politics agenda, as 
an important factor in electoral and party system change (Dalton 1988; Dalton, 
Flanagan and Beck 1984; Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Inglehart 1977, 1990a; Muller- 
Rommel 1989). In particular, it is argued that New Politics issues have the 
potential to undermine the traditional left-right dimension of party competition, 
and foster the growth of New Politics parties.
An increased interest in the impact of New Politics issues has merited their 
inclusion into more recent national election studies in each country, enabling an 
examination of the extent to which these New Politics attitudes structure electoral 
choice in the 1990s, and whether this has in fact been to the detriment of the 
traditional economic attitudes, such as those identified above. This has important
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implications for the view that attitudes represent a new basis of stable cleavages, as 
it would suggest that attitudinal cleavages are not in fact stable but have instead 
recently undergone substantial transformation in response to the New Politics 
agenda. In order to examine this proposition factor analysis was performed on all 
suitable questions from the most recent national election study in each country. 
To facilitate the analysis, given the large number and wide range of questions, 
individual items were initially separated into two groups, namely economic and 
non-economic. As before, those items initially which failed to load significantly on 
any one factor, or loaded simultaneously on more than one factor, were excluded 
and the factor analysis repeated. This process continued until a clear pattern of 
factors emerged, presented in Tables 4.7 to 4.12.
For Australia three economic and seven non-economic attitudes were extracted 
through factor analysis. Among the former (Table 4.7), the factor which explains 
the greatest percentage of the variance, attitudes towards trade unions, largely 
reflects the trade union factor identified as the dominant economic attitude in the 
longitudinal study above. Support for stricter laws to regulate unions, the belief 
that trade unions have to much power, and a lack of sympathy for strikers are all 
elements of a more general attitude which opposes unions, whilst the reverse of 
these positions is characteristic of trade union support. The other two economic 
attitudes extracted also reflect standard aspects of economic debate in Australia. 
The economic redistribution factor identifies the conflict between those who 
support measures to reduce income and wealth inequalities, and oppose business 
power, and those who oppose redistribution and do not regard business as having 
too much power. Similarly the third factor, labelled lower taxation, identifies a 
common underlying attitude among those who view that high taxation rates act as 
an economic disincentive and favour reduced taxation over increased government 
spending.
Table 4.7: Factor Analysis of Economic Attitudes in Australia, 1993
Attitudinal Item
Factor Loadings
I II III
I  Trade U nions
Should be stricter laws to regulate trade unions .92 .02 .13
Trade unions have too much power .91 -.05 .17
Sympathies generally against strikers .65 -.31 .09
II E conom ic R ed istribu tion
Income and wealth should be redistributed -.18 .78 -.03
More money should be spent on reducing .02 .74 -.25
Big business has too much power -.09 .71 .15
III L ow er T axation
High tax makes people less willing to work .17 .18 .77
Favour reducing taxes .14 -.28 .75
Eigen Values 2.7 1.6 1.0
Percent variance explained 33.9 20.1 12.8
Note: Varimax rotated factor loadings from a principal components 
factor analysis with unities in the main diagonal 
Source: 1993 Australian Election Study.
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Among the non-economic factors extracted, the two factors which explained the 
greatest proportion of the variance are closely related to the New Politics agenda 
(Table 4.8). Nuclear power/weaponry, which involves views regarding visits of
Table 4.8: Factor Analysis of Non-economic Attitudes in Australia, 1993
Attitudinal Item I II
Factor Loadings
III IV V VI VII
I  N uclear P o w er/W ea p o n a ry
Favour visits of US nuclear powered warships .8 7 -.08 -.11 .05 -.18 -.11 -.03
Favour visits of US ships with nuclear .82 -.11 -.11 .07 -.18 -.08 -.02
Nuclear energy is a necessity for the future .71 -.15 -.11 .16 .10 .07 .05
Australia should mine its uranium .70 -.22 -.11 .18 -.02 .15 -.02
II E n v iro n m en ta l Protection
Protect environment even if taxes rise -.07 .71 .10 -.23 -.09 -.03 .07
Stronger measures against pollution -.18 .68 .04 .15 .10 -.03 -.07
Nature one of most precious things in life -.09 .68 -.03 .10 .19 .02 .00
Increase spending to protect environment -.24 .6 7 .09 -.01 .23 .01 -.08
Protect environment even if prices rise -.02 .66 .04 -.22 -.21 -.04 .10
III R epublicansim
Australia should become a republic -.13 .10 .90 -.05 .07 .09 -.07
Royal family not important to Australia -.12 .04 .84 -.05 .01 .07 -.11
Favour changing the Australian flag -.14 .06 .81 -.14 .08 .13 -.05
I V  A u th o rita r ia n ism
Number of migrants gone too far .04 .01 -.06 .68 -.15 -.23 .08
Equal opportunities for migrants gone too far .06 -.14 -.05 .68 -.19 -.17 .02
Death penalty should be reintroduced for .20 -.08 -.02 .6 7 .05 .02 -.07
Stiffer sentances for lawbreakers .09 .07 -.11 .60 .05 .08 .09
V  W om en's A d va n cem en t
Govt should increase opportunities for women -.07 .14 .08 -.07 .82 -.01 .01
Favour affirmitive action for women -.06 -.09 -.03 .08 .74 .03 -.03
Equal opportunity for women gone too far .10 -.18 -.13 .27 -.64 .06 -.01
VI A sian  Emphasis
Australia should side with Japan against USA -.18 .00 .12 -.08 .02 .71 -.07
Australia's trading future lies in Asia .09 .20 .27 -.14 -.05 .59 .16
Japan's influence in Australia not too great -.02 -.13 .01 -.27 -.01 .54 -.13
Indonesian trade more important than Timor .23 -.10 -.01 .28 -.01 .54 -.01
VII Censorship
Favour censorship of books and films .03 .04 -.06 -.04 -.02 -.01 .78
Nudity in sex and films gone too far -.05 -.03 -.11 .16 .12 -.07 .74
Eigen Value 4.7 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.1
Percent variance explained 18.8 9.7 7.2 7.1 6.6 5.1 4.5
Note: Varimax rotated factor loadings from a principal components factor analysis 
with unities in the main diagonal.
Source: 1993 Australian Election Study.
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United States nuclear warships and the mining of uranium, and environmental 
protection, related to the primacy the environment above the economy, both 
reflect the conflict identified by Inglehart (1977, 1990a) between materialists, 
concerned with security and economic stability, and post-materialists, with quality 
of life and aesthetic concerns. Another factor extracted, women's advancement, is 
also associated with the New Politics agenda, involving issues of affirmative action 
and equal opportunity. In addition, two of the factors are also related to the social 
conservatism factor of the longitudinal analysis; redneck measures, involving 
opinion on immigration and law and order, and censorship, which identifies the 
conflict between freedom of speech and opposition to pornography. Finally, two 
other factors reflect long-standing, but often dormant, conflicts in Australian 
society which have recently been reignited by the Labor government (Kelly 1992, 
679). Republicanism focuses upon whether Australia should become a republic or 
remain a constitutional monarchy, in addition to opinions on the importance of 
the Royal family to Australia and whether Australia should remove the Union Jack 
from its flag. The seventh and final factor meanwhile is related to wide range of 
international relations issues concerned with Australia's role in the Asian region.
Table 4.9: Factor Analysis of Economic Attitudes in Britain, 1992.
Attitudinal Item I
Factor Loadings
II III IV
I  Econom ic Redistribution
Should be greater equality of wage levels .75 .21 .05 .13
Management always try to get better of .72 .06 .14 .06
Govt's responsibility to provide everyone with .68 .26 .00 .11
Income sould be redistributed to ordinary .61 .32 .06 .23
Govt controls for private business .60 .01 .07 .01
I I  G overnm ent Spending
Govt should spend more on education .04 .84 .07 .05
Govt should put more money into NHS .25 .78 .04 .09
Govt should spend more to get rid of poverty .23 .68 .09 .04
III  Trade Unions
Stricter laws to regulate unions .03 .06 .82 .20
Trade unions have too much power .03 -.01 .81 -.02
No need for unions to protect employees .22 18 .66 .13
I V  P riva tiza tion
Council house sales not gone far enough -.11 .02 .05 .77
Privitization not gone far enough .37 .17 .23 .62
More privitization of companies by govt .30 .06 .09 .59
Eigen Value 4.1 1.7 1.3 1.0
Percent variance explained 29.4 11.9 9.0 7.4
Note: Varimax rotated factor loadings from a principal components factor 
analysis with unities in the main diagonal 
Source: 1992 British Election Study.
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In Britain the four economic attitudes extracted from the factor analysis focus upon 
areas of economic debate central to the policy agenda of the Thatcher Conservative 
government (Table 4.9), namely winding back government intervention, cuts to 
government spending, opposition to union power, and extensive program of 
privatization (Letwin 1992, 97-158). The first factor, labelled government 
regulation, contrasts those who favour a positive role for government to protect 
workers and maintain living standards, and those who favour market outcomes 
above government regulation. Similarly attitudes towards government spending 
identifies a common attitudinal position among voters who support greater 
spending on education, health and welfare against voters who believe the welfare 
state should be contracted. The third factor, attitudes towards trade unions, 
identifies common opinion on issues of union regulation, union power, and the 
general need for unions. Finally, attitudes towards privatization contrasts voters 
who support council house sales and privatization of public companies, against 
those who oppose both those positions. Despite the importance of all four factors 
to the Thatcher agenda, the factor analysis indicates that voters pick and choose 
their own positions on these attitudes rather than necessarily hold a consistent 
position on all four (Rose and McAllister 1990, 94-108).
Table 4.10: Factor Analysis of Non-Economic Attitudes in Britain, 1992.
Attitudinal Item I
Factor Loadings
IT TIT IV V
I  M in o rity  R ights
Equal opportunities for women gone too far .72 -.04 .00 -.03 -.06
Equal opportunities for Asians/blacks gone too .66 .30 .20 -.06 .05
Homosexual relations are always wrong .64 .15 .03 .01 -.07
Equal opportunities for homosexuals gone too far .64 -.03 .38 -.03 -.02
II Censorship
Right to show nudity and sex gone too far .15 .85 -.00 -.04 .04
Censorship necessary to uphold moral standards .10 .83 .16 .01 .03
III S tricter L a w  a n d  O rd er
Stiffer sentances for lawbreakers .19 -.02 .81 -.05 -.08
Britain should bring back death penalty .10 .20 .79 -.02 -.05
I V  E n v iro n m en ta l Protection
Protect countryside even if it means fewer jobs -.02 -.02 .06 .83 .08
Protect countryside even if it leads to higher -.04 -.01 -.14 .81 -.06
V  N uclear P o w er/W ea p o n a ry
Building nuclear power stations gone too far -.07 .09 .07 .05 .82
Britain should abandon nuclear weapons -.09 -.03 -.20 -.03 .75
Eigen Value 2.8 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0
Percent variance explained 23.1 12.4 10.9 8.8 8.5
Note: Varimax rotated factor loadings from a principal components factor analysis with 
unities in the main diagonal 
Sources: 1992 British Election Study.
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The factor analysis of non-economic issues in Britain extracted five factors, three 
connected with New Politics issues and two related to traditional social issues, 
similar to those of the social conservatism factor extracted in the longitudinal 
analysis (Table 4.10). Among the former, attitudes towards minority rights 
explained the greatest proportion of the variance and is strongly correlated with 
opinions regarding equal opportunities for women, Asians and blacks, and 
homosexuals. Also part of the New Politics agenda are the fourth and fifth factors 
extracted, namely attitudes towards the environment, or environmentalism versus 
economics, and attitudes towards nuclear power/weaponry, support for nuclear 
power and weapons against support for a nuclear free Britain. The other two 
factors were censorship, in particular its use against pornography in order to 
maintain moral standards versus the preservation of free speech, and law and order, 
on which opponents of stiffer sentences and the death penalty conflict with voters 
who support stronger punitive measures.
Table 4.11: Factor Analysis of Economic Attitudes in the United States,
1992.
Attitudinal Item I
Factor Loadings
II III IV
I  Econom ic Redistribution
Increase Govt assistance to unemployed .75 .21 .05 .13
Increase Govt spending on poor people .83 .06 .14 .06
Govt's responsibility to provide everyone with 
II Labour Unions
.68 .26 .00 .11
Feel close to labour unions .04 .84 .07 .05
Favourable toward labour unions .25 .78 .04 .09
III Big Business
Feel close to business people .03 .06 .82 .20
Favourable toward big business .03 -.01 .81 -.02
I V  Power o f  G overnm ent
Govt run by a few big interests -.11 .02 .05 .77
Government is too powerful .37 .17 .23 .62
Eigen Value 4.1 1.7 1.3 1.0
Percent variance explained 29.4 11.9 9.0 7.4
Note: Varimax rotated factor loadings from a principal components factor 
analysis with unities in the main diagonal 
Source: 1992 CPS National Election Study.
For the United States the final factor analysis of economic issues extracted four 
factors, once again each related to central areas of national economic debate (Table 
4.11). The first factor extracted, labelled economic redistribution, identifies a 
consistent position between those who favour increased welfare spending and 
regard it as the responsibility for the government to provide everyone with a job, 
opposed to those who reject increased welfare assistance and believe that 
government should let people get ahead on their own. The second and third 
factors are concerned with attitudes key economic groups, namely labour unions
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and big business respectively. The fourth factor extracted relates to the power of 
government and identifies conflict between those who believe that government is 
run by a few big interests and is too powerful, and those who hold the conflicting 
positions.
Table 4.12: Factor Analysis of Non-Economic Attitudes in the United States, 1992.
Attitudinal Item I
Factor Loadings
II III IV V
I  C iv i l  R ights
Favour quotas for black college students .79 -.01 .02 .07 .01
Favour affirmative action for blacks .76 .04 -.17 .01 .03
Support special favours for blacks .64 -16 .21 -.26 -.05
Govt should help blacks .62 -.18 .20 .02 .08
Civil rights leaders push too slow .52 -.11 -.21 .12 -.10
II M illita rism
US should maintain position as military power -.20 .78 .06 .12 -.15
Increase defence spending -.08 .7 6 -.14 .09 -.04
US should use millitary force to solve problems -.02 .69 -.12 .04 .09
III G ay R ights
Favour anti-disrimination laws for gays .10 -.08 .79 -.01 .11
Favourable towards homosexuals .21 -.10 .72 -.20 .15
I V  F undam entalist M ora lity
Scheduled prayers in public schools .02 -.01 -.04 .77 -.03
More emphases on traditional family ties -.26 .15 .00 .61 -.08
Bible is the actual word of God .14 .18 -.40 .58 .06
V  E n v iro n m en ta l Protection
Increase spending on the environment .06 -.05 -.01 -.09 .85
Favourable towrds environmentalists .04 -.00 .28 .04 .75
Eigen Value 3.3 1.8 1.4 1.2 0.9
Percent variance explained 22.3 11.8 9.5 7.8 6.3
Note: Varimax rotated factor loadings from a principal components factor analysis
with unities in the main diagonal
Sources: 1992 CPS National Election Study.
Finally, five factors were extracted from the analysis of non-economic attitudes in 
the United States (Table 4.12). Civil rights, which explained the greatest 
proportion of the variance, has been a central area of political debate since the 
1960s (Carmines and Stimson 1989), with proponents of the cause favouring 
quotas, affirmative action, and general government assistance and opponents 
generally hostile to each of these measures. Other factors extracted with links to 
the new politics agenda included gay rights, related to support or opposition to 
anti-discrimination laws and feelings towards gays, and environmental protection, 
related to views on spending on the environment and feelings towards 
environmentalists. Furthermore, an additional factor, namely traditional morality, 
is related to the religious movement against social liberation, involving support for 
prayer in schools, more emphases on traditional family ties, and the belief that the
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Bible is the actual word of God. The remaining factor, Militarism, identifies a 
common attitude among those who favour the United States maintaining its 
position as a military power, support increased defence spending, and endorse the 
use of military force to solve foreign problems.
As a first step in examining the electoral impact of political attitudes in the 1990s 
each of the factors identified in the above tables were transformed into attitudinal 
scales. This was achieved by re-coding each of the individual items on a scale from 
0 to 100, and calculating the average score for each respondent across all items 
which loaded upon the relevant factor. Voters were then divided into three groups 
of roughly equal size according to their relative position on that scale. The three 
attitudinal groups thus represent those voters most supportive of the attitudinal 
trait or group object, those most opposed, and a moderate group comprised of 
voters centred around the mean position of the total electorate. The percentage 
vote for the respective major right-wing party in each country was then calculated 
for each attitudinal group. In this manner the difference in right-wing vote 
between those most supportive and those least supportive of the relevant attitudinal 
trait or group object provides an index of attitudinal voting, or, in other words, a 
bivariate estimate of the electoral impact of the political attitude.
In Australia, the strongest evidence of attitudinal voting occurs on attitudes 
towards trade unions, with the vote for the Liberal-National parties ranging from 
74% among those voters most opposed to trade unions to just 17% among voters 
most supportive, confirming the importance of attitudes relating to the union 
movement to Australian electoral behaviour (Table 4.13). The analysis also 
confirms the overall electoral importance of economic attitudes generally, with 
substantial differences in the coalition vote also occurring on attitudes towards 
economic redistribution and attitudes towards lower taxation; the coalition gaining 
the vote of 69 percent of those most opposed to redistribution and 56 percent 
those most supportive of lower taxation. Nevertheless, second only to attitudes 
towards trade unions on the attitudinal voting index are attitudes towards 
republicanism. The coalition vote ranges from 21 percent among those most 
supportive of republicanism to 69 percent among voters most opposed, indicating 
that attempts by the Labor Party to politicise the republican question over recent 
years have been successful (Bean 1993b). Further evidence of a broader political 
agenda than suggested by the longitudinal analysis is also evident with statistically 
significant differences in the coalition vote on attitudes towards nuclear power, 
and, to a lesser extent, on attitudes towards redneck measures, affirmative action 
for women, and censorship. The coalition winning majority support among those 
supportive of nuclear power, authoritarian measures and censorship, and among 
those opposed to environmental protection.
In Britain, the greatest differences in the Conservative vote between opposing 
attitudinal groups also occur on economic attitudes, namely attitudes towards 
economic redistribution, privatization, government spending, and trade unions. 
The vote for the Conservative Party is substantially higher among voters opposed 
to economic redistribution and more government spending, and supportive of anti­
union and privatization measures, than among voters who hold the respective
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Table 4.13: Vote for M ajor Right-W ing Party by Position on Political Attitudes 
in Australia, Britain, and the United States
Political Attitude
R ight-W ing  Vote A m ong  
Electors Who Most Strongly:
Support Oppose Difference
A ustralia , 1993
Trade Unions 14 74 60*
Republicanism 21 69 48*
Economic Redistribution 27 69 42*
Lower Taxation 56 27 29*
Nuclear Power/W eaponary 57 29 28*
Environmental Protection 36 55 19*
Authoritariansim 49 34 15*
Advancement of Women 38 52 14*
Censorship 51 38 13*
Asian Emphasis 43 49 6
Britain, 1992
Economic Redistribution 18 74 56*
Privitization 69 14 55*
More Government Spending 22 72 50*
Trade Unions 64 23 41*
Nuclear Power/Weaponary 27 59 32*
Minority Rights 34 54 20*
Stricter Law and Order 46 37 9*
Censorship 43 39 4
Environmental Protection 45 41 4
U nited States, 1992
Economic Redistribution 22 58 36*
Labour Unions 57 24 33*
Civil Rights 24 51 27*
Gay Rights 30 54 24*
Environmental Protection 33 53 20*
Millitarism 49 30 19*
Big Business 50 34 16*
Power of Government 35 49 14*
Fundamentalist Morality 46 33 13*
* significant difference at p < .05 
Source: 1993 AES; 1992 BES; 1992 CPS NES
opposite positions. Indeed, Conservative support among these groups ranges from 
64 to 74 percent of voters, considerably higher than the 50 percent of the vote 
gained from non-manual workers. Nevertheless, as in Australia, evidence of a 
broader political agenda is also evident, particularly with regard to attitudes 
towards nuclear weaponry and power and attitudes to minority rights. Although 
the relationship between these items and party vote is still much weaker than for
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the dominant economic attitudes, Table 4.13 shows that the Conservative Party 
gains clear majority support among voters most supportive of the nuclear industry 
and among voters most opposed to minority rights.
The United States, however, provides the strongest evidence regarding "attitudinal 
diversification" in the 1990s with differences in the Republican Party vote 
statistically significant across all attitudinal items, including all economic and non­
economic attitudes. Certainly the index of attitudinal voting is highest on attitudes 
towards economic redistribution and attitudes towards labour unions, in each case 
Republican support is higher among voters most strongly opposed. Nevertheless, 
only slightly weaker differences occur on attitudes towards civil rights, gay rights, 
and environmental protection, the Republican Party gaining over 50 percent of the 
vote among those most opposed to civil rights, most opposed to gay rights, and 
most opposed to environmental protection. The attitudinal voting index was 
slightly lower again on the remaining items, namely attitudes towards militarism, 
big business, the power of government, and fundamentalist morality, the 
Republican vote higher among voters supportive of militarism, big business and 
fundamentalist morality, and among voters opposed to the power of government.
Once again, however, it is important that when examining the electoral impact of a 
variable upon party vote to control for the influence of causally prior variables 
which may explain much of relationship between any single attitudinal variable 
and vote. In addition, it is also necessary to control for the confounding influence 
of other attitudinal variables in order to identify the unique effect each individual 
variable exerts on party vote. To measure the electoral impact of these political 
attitudes OLS regression was again used, controlling for the causally prior influence 
of social background variables and entering all attitudinal variables into the 
regression equation together as a single block.
The results for Australia show that the largest electoral impact is exerted by 
attitudes towards trade unions, with the strongest opponents of unions 37 percent 
more likely to vote Liberal-National than the strongest union supporters, net of 
other influences (Table 4.14). Nevertheless, economic attitudes are not the only 
attitudes of electoral importance in Australia, with the strongest opponents of 
republicanism 27 percent more likely to vote Liberal-National than the strongest 
republican supporters. The only other attitude to reach statistical significance was 
attitudes towards economic redistribution, on which strong support reduced the 
probability of voting for the coalition by 21 percent. By contrast, none of the 
three attitudes linked to the new politics agenda, namely environmental protection, 
nuclear power, and women's advancement, are statistically significant with regard 
to their electoral impact. Therefore, despite evidence that attitudes towards the 
environment had a significant influence in the 1990 federal election environmental 
concerns are perhaps seen more appropriately as a transient political issue rather 
than an enduring attitudinal predisposition (Bean and Kelley 1993; Bean 1994a). In 
the 1990s those political attitudes of electoral importance in Australia continue to 
centre upon longstanding aspects of economic debate, in addition to the re­
politicised republican debate which the current Labor government has placed 
firmly on the political agenda.
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Table 4.14: Effects of Political Attitudes on Party Voters in Australia, Britain, 
and the United States (ordinary least squares regression)3
Positive Attitude Towards: b beta
Australia , 1993
Trade Unions -.37 -.33**
Republicanism -.27 -.25**
Economic Redistribution -.21 -.17**
Lower Taxation .06 .05
Nuclear Power/W eaponary .03 .02
Environmental Protection -.02 .02
Authoritarianism .02 .02
Assistance for Women -.02 -.02
Asian Emphaisis -.03 -.02
Censorship .02 .02
Britain, 1992
Economic Redistribution -.22 . 2i**
Privatization .22 .21**
Trade Unions -.18 -.18**
More Government Spending -.12 -.11**
Nuclear Power/W eaponary -.09 -.08**
Minority Rights -.05 -.05*
Environmental Protection .04 .04*
Stricter Law and Order .02 .02
Censorship .02 .01
U nited States, 1992
Economic Redistribution -.21 -.10**
Trade Unions -.19 -.10**
Millitarism .24 .09**
Environmental Protection -.16 -.07*
Gay Rights -.10 -.07*
Big Business .11 .06*
Fundamentalist Morality .17 .06
Civil Rights -.11 -.06
Power of Government -.09 -.05
*p < .05, **p<.01.
3 - Partial regression coefficients (b) and regression coefficients calculated on 
standardised data (betas) predicting national lower-house vote. See text and 
appendix for details of variables and method. Controls for the influence of parent's 
partisanship, father's class, gender, age, education, race, occupation, trade union 
membership, housing (Britain only), class self-image, religion, religiosity, urban- 
rural residence and region.
Sources: 1967 and 1979 ANPAS; 1990 and 1993 AES; 1964, 1979, 1987 and 1992 
BES; 1964, 1980, 1988 and 1992 SRC-CPS NES.
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In Britain economic attitudes again exert the greatest electoral impact, although 
there is evidence to suggest that other new politics attitudes are emerging as 
important influences. The largest contribution to voting Conservative is made by 
attitudes towards economic redistribution and privatization, with strong opposition 
to redistribution and strong support for privatization both increasing the 
probability of voting Conservative by 22 percent, net of other influences. In 
addition, substantial influence is also exerted by the two other dominant economic 
attitudes, namely attitudes towards trade unions and government spending. 
Although their influence is only minor relative to that of economic attitudes, three 
non-economics are also identified as statistically significant. Supporters of minority 
rights are 5 percent less likely to vote Conservative, and nuclear power/weaponry 
supporters are 9 percent less likely to do so, than voters at the opposite attitudinal 
extreme. Note, however, that the role of the Labour Party as a vehicle for New 
Politics concerns should not be overstated, given that the strongest supporters of 
environmental protection are actually 4 percent more likely to vote Conservative 
than the strongest environmental opponents (see also Heath et al 1990, 191; Rose 
and McAllister 1990, 107). Overall, economic attitudes continue to dominate 
voting behaviour in Britain, although the range of attitudes influencing the votes of 
Britons has also widened to include a broader political agenda.
In the United States the electoral influence of some non-economic attitudes is equal 
to that of the impact of the more traditional economic attitudes, with vote 
influenced by a much broader agenda than in either Australia or Britain. The 
largest impact is exerted by attitudes towards militarism, with supporters 24 
percent more likely to vote Republican than opponents, net of other influences. 
However, after standardising the respective variables, Table 4.14 shows that 
traditional economic attitudes towards government spending and labour unions 
exercise the strongest electoral influence. Nevertheless, variations in the 
standardised regression coefficients are marginal with three additional attitudes also 
achieving levels of statistical significance, namely attitudes towards gay rights, 
environmentalism, and big business. As the longitudinal analysis demonstrated, 
non-economic attitudes have generally had a greater influence on voting behaviour 
in the United States than in the other two countries, which is confirmed by 
evidence that the range of such attitudes has expanded to encompass new politics 
concerns involving the environmental protection and gay rights, both of which 
formed part of Clinton's "Strategy for Change" (Clinton and Gore 1992). 
However, the electoral impact of civil rights, which showed a strong bivariate 
relationship with congressional vote, fails to reach statistical significance after 
controlling for social background factors and other political attitudes (see also 
Shanks and Miller 1991, 158-61).
Overall Table 4.14 confirms that the longitudinal analysis conceals the emergence 
of particular non-economic attitudes in each country, some of which are directly 
related to the New Politics agenda. Whilst this trend has not been to the 
detriment of the traditional economic attitudes, such as attitudes towards unions 
and economic redistribution, which continue to exert the greatest electoral impact, 
it nevertheless raises the potential of an expanded range of attitudinal influences 
upon voting behaviour. Evidence of such a phenomena is clearly strongest in the 
United States, involving the environment and gay rights, and weakest in Australia, 
where the attitudes towards republicanism are the only non-economic attitudes of
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electoral significance. Britain represents a mixed case in which New Politics 
attitudes are relevant in electoral terms, but nevertheless dwarfed by the larger 
impact of economic attitudes. The results from Australia may appear somewhat 
counter intuitive given the emphasis of the Labor Party over recent decades on 
several aspects of the New Politics agenda (McAllister 1992a, chapt 10; Papadakis 
1990; 1993, 186-96). However, these findings do not refute the role of such 
influences in the Australian context, but rather suggest that they do not presently 
operate as attitudinal predispositions. It may be the case instead that their impact 
is primarily as a short-term electoral influence (Bean and Kelley 1993; cf Bean 
1994a).
Conclusion
With regard to the potential of political attitudes to structure electoral behaviour 
so as to explain party system stability and the persistence of the major party 
alternatives, the limitations of the rational choice explanation rests with two 
factors. Firstly, there is evidence that the political attitudes which structure voting 
behaviour have the potential to change over-time. In particular, new politics 
attitudes now exert a strong electoral impact in the United States, and a somewhat 
lesser, but nevertheless statistically significant, impact in Britain. Similarly in 
Australia, although new politics attitudes have no significant influence, it is likely 
that attitudes towards republicanism have strengthened in their electoral impact 
over the past three decades (Table 4.13 cf Kelley 1988, 71). In other words, the 
attitudinal dimensions upon which political parties compete for voters are not 
fixed, but are subject to alteration. As argued above, the extent of attitudinal 
voting in the electorate would appear to be, in part, dependent upon the 
perception of actual policy differences among the parties. This applies not only at 
the general level of the overall extent to which attitudes structure voting 
behaviour, but also at the more specific level of which individual items have the 
potential to emerge and fade on the political agenda.
Secondly, the increase in the percentage of the variance explained by political 
attitudes is insufficient to compensate for the decline in the variance explained by 
social background factors and party identification. This is even the case when the 
analysis is extended to allow for the influence of new attitudes in recent years, 
which, if anything, may overstate their net contribution in the 1990s relative to the 
1960s (Table 4.15). In Australia, the variance explained by political attitudes rose 
from 4.8 percent to 26.2 percent, whilst the total variance explained by political 
predispositions fell by 2.7 percent. Similarly in Britain, the large increase in the 
variance explained by political attitudes, from 9.8 percent to 22.5 percent, was 
insufficient to prevent a net decline in all predispositions of 5.2 percent. In the 
United States, the overall decline in the variance explained by all political 
predispositions was even greater, 13.4 percent, despite a more than four fold 
increase, from 2 percent to 8.4 percent in the variance explained by political 
attitudes. In sum, the electoral influence of political attitudes are on the rise, but 
just which attitudes structure electoral choice is too malleable, and the increased 
impact is insufficient, to identify political attitudes as the new basis of party system 
stability.
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Table 4.15: Percent Variance of National Lower-House Vote Explained by 
Political Predispositions during the mid 1960s and early 1990s (Expanded
Analysis)
Predispositions
Percent variance 
Mid '60s
explained (%) 
Early '90s Change
A  ustralia
Social Background 25.2 18.8 - 6.4
Political Attitudes 4.8 26.2 + 21.4
Party Identification 43.8 26.1 -17.7
Total 73.8 71.1 - 2.7
B ritain
Social Background 33.7 28.6 - 5.1
Political Attitudes 9.8 22.5 + 12.7
Party Identification 37.9 25.1 -12.8
Total 81.4 76.2 - 5.2
U nited  States
Social Background 23.0 13.1 - 9.9
Political Attitudes 2.0 8.4 + 6.4
Party Identification 16.3 6.8 - 9.5
Total 41.3 27.9 -13.4
Sources: 1967 ANPAS; 1993 AES; 1964 and 1992 BES; 1964 and 1992 
SRC-CPS NES.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CAMPAIGN EVALUATIONS
The net decline in the extent to which voting behaviour in Australia, Britain, and 
the United States is structured by long-term political predispositions suggests that 
the electoral influence of short-term campaign evaluations may have increased over 
the past three decades. While Berelson, Lazarsfeld and colleagues found that the 
actual election campaign had little influence on vote in their locational studies of 
the 1940s (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 
1954), Campbell and colleagues argued that short-term campaign effects were 
responsible for the large vote swings in the United States which occurred during 
the 1950s (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954; Campbell et al 1960; 1966). In 
particular, they identified the role of the campaign issues, presidential candidates, 
and economic conditions of the times as important electoral influences, although 
long-term partisan loyalties remained the dominant influence even in the so-called 
deviating elections characterised by strong campaign effects.
More recently the rise in scholarly support for rational choice models of electoral 
choice (Wattenberg 1991, 19) has contributed to a general de-emphasis of the role 
of long-term predispositions and a greater concern for individual preferences which 
focus, in particular, on short-term campaign evaluations made afresh in each 
campaign (eg Nie, Verba, Petrocik 1976; Sarlvik and Crewe 1983; Franklin 1985; 
Lewis-Beck 1988; Wattenberg 1988). The emphasis of party system literature upon 
aggregate electoral change has furthered scholarly interest in campaign effects, 
under the assumption that issue, economic, and leader-based evaluations are less 
stable than political predispositions (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984, 460-72; 
Dalton 1988, 192-202; cf van der Eijk et al 1992). An increase in the electoral 
impact of campaign evaluations thus represents both a symptom and a potential 
cause of electoral change.
This chapter examines the proposition that the electoral impact of short-term 
campaign evaluations in Australia, Britain, and the United States has risen since the 
mid 1960s, increasing the potential for aggregate electoral instability. In particular, 
the influence of three sets of campaign evaluations are examined. Section one 
examines the electoral influence of the respondent's preferred party on the 
nominated most important issue of the campaign, as an alternative and superior 
approach to the standard analyses of issue-voting. Section two considers the role of 
economic voting in each electorate, developing a summary index of economic 
evaluations to measure the impact of economic evaluations upon voting behaviour. 
Section three examines the electoral influence of party leaders in Australia and 
Britain, and presidential candidates in the United States, upon national legislative 
vote. Finally, in section four, multivariate analysis is performed to examine the 
independent electoral impact of each of these influences after controlling for the 
influence of political predispositions.
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Issue Voting
As descriptions of aggregate electoral instability emerged in the party-system 
literature following the late 1960s and 1970s (Ersson and Lane 1982; Maguire 1983; 
Pedersen 1983; Shamir 1984; Wolinetz 1979), much of the related scholarly interest 
in the influence of short-term campaign evaluations at the individual-level focused 
upon the level of issue voting (eg Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976; Sarlvik and Crewe 
1982). However, the early orthodoxy of electoral behaviour research was that 
political issues had little impact upon electoral choice, with voters characterised as 
uninformed regarding even the most important policy issues of the day, and more 
likely to cast a ballot in response to social group and partisan loyalties (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al 1960). By contrast, a revisionist view 
argued that an erosion of group voting loyalties had created an opportunity for 
issues to exert a greater electoral influence, whilst rising educational standards had 
created a more informed electorate and increased the proportion of voters able to 
make informed electoral decisions reflecting their own issue preferences 
(Himmelweit, Humphreys and Jaeger 1985; Rose and McAllister 1986; Kemp 1978; 
Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976; Sarlvik and Crewe 1982; Franklin 1985). Despite 
cross-national evidence supportive of the issue voting thesis (Franklin et al 1992), 
continuing debate regarding alternative methods of measuring the level of issue 
voting, and indeed what the necessary criteria were for citizens to be classified as 
issue voters, ensures that the results are far from conclusive (Abramson 1983, 282-8; 
Denver and Hands 1992, 170-218; Goot 1994).
Early voting studies conducted in the United States found that political issues had 
little impact upon presidential vote. Indeed Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 
(1954, 204n) found that less than half the voters in Elmira, New York, agreed with 
their own party's position on both of the two major issues of the 1948 election, 
namely the Taft-Hartley Act and price control legislation. The potential for issue 
voting was further constrained by the finding that among those citizens who 
actually held issue positions there was mostly agreement across party lines 
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, 190, 211). The Michigan scholars 
(Campbell et al 1960, 169-71) later established three criteria necessary for a citizen 
to vote on the basis of issue preferences, namely that citizens must be aware of the 
issue and have an opinion on it, the issue must in some sense be important to the 
voter, and the voter must perceive that one party is closer to his or her own 
position than the other parties. Although these criteria represented merely the 
minimum conditions for issue voting, ie. the potential, not actual, pool of issue 
voters, on the sixteen issues they examined, on average, only 28 percent of citizens 
were able to pass all three stages.
The first major revision of the orthodox view of the uninformed voter, largely 
unaffected by the influence of political issues, was Key's seminal work on the 
electorate as a form of echo chamber. Key (1966, 112-4) argued that in 
circumstances such as the ambiguities of the 1960 Presidential campaign, 
characterised by a high level of policy agreement between the two candidates, the 
voter tends to be guided by underlying identifications and group loyalties rather 
than by political stimuli. By contrast stronger evidence of issue-voting was 
available for those elections, such as 1936, 1940, and 1952, in which a clear choice 
was offered to voters. As the policy divisions between presidential candidates
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widened in the 1968 and 1972 elections, scholars identified a corresponding rise in 
the level of issue voting. Thus Pomper (1972) argued that, between 1956 and 1968, 
voters had increasingly perceived differences between the parties and that 
partisanship had become increasingly related to the policy preferences of the voter, 
while Miller and colleagues (Miller et al 1976) portrayed the 1972 election as the 
third successive election in which issues rose in electoral importance relative to 
partisanship and candidate preference. Indeed in that election it was claimed that 
issues were "at least equally as important as party identification" as an explanation 
of vote (Miller et al 1976, 770).
Perhaps the most influential study to challenge the orthodoxy of the early voting 
studies was Nie, Verba, and Petrocik's (1976) work The Changing American Voter. 
The authors found that the relationship between issues and presidential vote rose 
sharply between 1960 and 1964 and remained high in subsequent elections. They 
attributed the rise in issue voting to the clearer issue choice which the presidential 
candidates had offered voters. Thus, expounding a view in accordance with Key's 
echo chamber theory, Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976, 319) concluded that "the 
public responds to the political stimuli offered it ... If candidates offer clear issue 
alternatives, voters are more likely to make political issues a criterion for electoral 
choice". There is now a tendency among American scholars to judge the level of 
issue voting within the context of a specific Presidential campaign, with high levels 
of issue voting expected only in those elections in which clear policy alternatives 
are presented to the electorate. For example, Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode (1994, 
186-7) found that the level of issue voting was high in 1972 and 1984, low in 1976, 
with 1992 falling in between.1
One explanation for the apparent sporadic rise and decline in the level of issue 
voting rests with the distinction made by Carmines and Stimson (1980) between 
"easy issues" and "hard issues". Easy issues are defined as symbolic rather than 
technical, more likely to deal with policy ends than means, and as having long 
been on the political agenda. In essence a position on an easy issue, such as racial 
desegregation, is more likely to be the result of a "gut response" than the rational 
cost-benefit analysis of alternative electoral choices which characterises hard issues, 
such as the Vietnam war. The significance of easy issues is that, unlike hard issues, 
they are not always offered to the electorate, but rather are a "system-determined 
attribute". Furthermore, hard issues require a level of voter sophistication, in 
order to make a rational decision, while easy issues, as gut reactions, do not. 
Therefore, although voting on hard issues is expected to slowly rise over time as 
educational standards rise, "easy issue-voting may occur in waves or surges, as a 
response to the relatively rare occasions when parties engage in the hazardous 
behaviour of staking out opposing positions on a deeply felt issue" (Carmines and 
Stimson 1980, 88). In other words, studies of issue voting may be measuring
1 Although scant evidence is available regarding the effect of national issues on voting in 
congressional elections, the same authors concluded for 1992 that "the relationship between issue 
preferences and congressional vote choices were weak and inconsistent", and even weaker after 
controlling for party identification (Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 1994, 302). Abramowitz (1984) 
found that ideological self-placement on the seven point Liberal-Conservative scale had a significant 
electoral impact in the 1982 mid-term congressional elections, but not the 1980 on-year elections.
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simply the extent to which simplistic choices on symbolic issues are offered to the 
electorate.
In Britain the issue voting debate began, as in the United States, with an orthodoxy 
which largely rejected the notion of the rational voter. In particular, Butler and 
Stokes (1969, 1974) found that respondents were highly volatile in their opinions 
on political issues, suggesting that such opinions were to a large extent random. 
For example, on the issue of nationalisation, the 1963-70 panel study found that 
"only 43 percent were consistent in supporting or opposing nationalisation over 
the four interviews" (Butler and Stokes 1974, 281). The level of attitude formation 
on political issues was also low, to the extent that Butler and Stokes (1974, 284) 
concluded that "most of the policies which provide the focus of conflict at the elite 
level excite little reaction in the mass electorate".
The first major revision of the orthodox view came from Sarlvik and Crewe's 
(1983, 207, 213) analysis of voting behaviour in the 1979 election which found that, 
across six political issues, over 80 percent of respondents held an opinion, and 
upwards of two thirds saw differences in the policy positions of the Conservative 
and Labour parties on those issues. Issues explained more than twice the variance 
in vote that social background factors did and, together with performance 
valuations, the party vote of 69 percent of respondents could be predicted on the 
basis of their issue positions (Sarlvik and Crewe 1983, 113, 286). Also influential as 
a revisionist text was Franklin's (1985) analysis of issue voting in Britain from 1964 
to 1983, which found that the net effect of issues on vote had risen sharply 
between 1966 and 1970, and had remained high in subsequent elections (cf Franklin 
1992a). However, Heath and colleagues (Heath et al 1991, 32-45), in accordance 
with Key, argued that changes in the relationship between issue positions and vote 
choice, which they found to show no secular trend, was largely due to a rise in 
perceived differences between the major parties. Nevertheless, while rejecting 
theories of issue-voting in their initial study (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985, 87- 
99), the scholars subsequently revised their findings to argue that the level of issue 
voting among Britons has been high across the past quarter century, and certainly 
higher in the 1960s than Butler and Stokes had implied (Heath et al 1991, 42-3).2
In Australia there has been considerably less research into the level of issue voting, 
and overall the studies that have been conducted are largely inconclusive. Aitkin 
(1982, 217) largely dismissed the phenomenon having found that during the late 
1960s "voters tended not to have stable opinions on important issues and, when 
they had opinions at all, they appeared to take their cues largely from the party 
they supported". One exception was the issue of Australia's involvement in the
2 In How Britain Votes Heath, Jowell and Curtice (1985) rejected theories of issue-voting, but found 
evidence of ideological voting. However, the distinction between issues and ideology in the study was a 
very tenuous one, based primarily on the tautological definition that differences between party voters 
are greater on ideological questions than on issue questions. The potential anomalies of this approach 
were demonstrated with regard to two survey questions concerning nationalisation, one of which was 
included as an issue, the other as representing an ideological dimension. It was a subsequent blurring of 
this very distinction that enabled the scholars to conclude in Understanding Political Change (Heath et al 
1991) that "there were higher levels of issue voting towards the beginning of our period, in 1966 and 
1970, than we had previously thought", and by inference, given their finding of no secular trend, higher 
levels of issue voting during the 1970s and 1980s.
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Vietnam War, which Aitkin found at least met the standard issue voting criteria. 
More recently McAllister (1992a) found that, in general, the level of issue voting on 
economic issues increased between 1967 and 1979, but had subsequently fallen 
during the 1980s. Although multivariate analysis confirms this recent decline (Bean 
and Kelley 1988; cf Marks 1993), research also indicates that the overall variance 
explained by political issues in Australia remains above the level of the late 1960s 
(McAllister 1992b). Evidence also suggests that salient political issues had a major 
impact in the 1993 election, indeed to the extent that the balance of opinion on the 
dominant issues was sufficient to have alone determined the election outcome 
(Bean 1994a).
A fundamental weakness of most studies which examine the level of issue voting, 
including most of the studies cited above, is that the issues included in the analysis 
are usually determined by the investigating scholars rather than the voters 
themselves (cf RePass 1971; Franklin 1985). Thus it is indeed possible that few, or 
indeed none, of the issues included in a particular study were in fact salient to the 
citizenry at the time of election. Although saliency represents one of the three 
criteria established by the Michigan scholars, RePass (1971) criticised the method of 
Campbell and colleagues in The American Voter on the grounds that many issues of 
importance to voters were not included in their analysis.3 As an alternative RePass 
examined responses to open-ended questions which sought from electors their most 
important issue and which party they believed would best handle that issue. In 
contrast to the findings of The American Voter, RePass (1971, 400) found that 
voters could indeed perceive differences between candidates on issues that were 
salient to them, and that "salient issues had almost as much weight as party 
identification in predicting voting choice".
A related problem which weakens most longitudinal studies of issue voting is that, 
while most studies tend to focus upon the same issues across a number of decades, 
the issues of importance to voters have the potential to change dramatically over­
time. To illustrate this point Table 5.1 lists the three most important issues 
identified by voters over four survey periods. It is immediately apparent that the 
dominant concerns of voters in the mid 1960s are very different to the concerns of 
voters in the early 1990s. One particular example of a transient political issue is 
the Vietnam War, the most important issue in the United States, and the second 
most important issue in Australia, during the mid 1960s. Disruption to the relative 
economic stability of the post-war years in each country then led to inflation and 
unemployment becoming important political issues during the 1970s and 1980s. 
More recently, each country has experienced the sudden emergence of a particular 
issue which has subsequently fallen from the political agenda, notably the goods 
and services tax in Australia, the poll tax in Britain, and responses to the Iranian 
hostage situation in the United States. The emergence of a so-called New Politics 
issue, namely the environment, as an issue of importance during the 1990 
Australian election further emphases the extent to which the political agenda is 
constantly subject to change.
1 The criticism has also been levelled towards Australian analyses of issue-voting, most of which do 
not include the issue of the Vietnam War which was highly salient during the late 1960s (Goot 1994).
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The dynamic nature of political issues, often disappearing as quickly as they 
appear, creates difficulties for longitudinal studies. To maximise comparability 
scholars have tended to rely on identical issue questions from survey to survey in 
order to examine the relationship between issues and vote. However, as 
demonstrated above, the importance of some long-term issues in an election 
campaign is often outweighed by more topical issues which reflect only short-term 
concerns. One potential means of overcoming this difficulty, and the approach 
adopted here, is to follow the work of RePass (1971) based on asking respondents 
to nominate which political issue they currently regard as the most important, and 
the party he or she believes is most capable of successfully dealing with this issue. 
In this manner the respondent's "partisan issue preference" is identified. The 
relationship between partisan issue preferences and party vote then provides an 
indication of the electoral impact of issues in a particular election.
Questions regarding the most important issue, and party best able to handle that 
issue, have been asked in each SRC-CPS National Election Study conducted since 
1960, and similar questions were asked in the 1967 and 1979 Australian Political 
Attitudes surveys. In addition, the 1990 and 1993 Australian Election Study asked 
a series of broadly similar questions which also enables a measure of party 
preference on most important issue to be derived. Although no such questions 
appear in the British Election Studies respondents are generally asked how 
important they regard particular issues. Subsequent questions then allow the 
researcher to identify the preferred major-party on those issues, either through a 
direct question or through a series of scale location questions. To measure partisan 
issue preferences in Britain, the two most important issues measured on an 
aggregate basis were chosen, and the net party preferred on those issues were 
identified.4
Table 5.2 shows that, in each country, a large majority of persons vote in 
accordance with their partisan issue preferences. Thus in Australia 87 percent of 
those respondents preferring the Coalition on their most important issue voted for 
the Liberal-National parties, while a slightly lower 79 percent of those preferring 
Labor voted for the Labor Party. In the United States, although a higher 
proportion of voters were unable to choose between the parties, between 77 and 79 
percent of respondents who did prefer one party to the other also voted for the 
party preferred on their most important issue. In Britain a similar proportion of 
persons preferring the Conservative Party voted Conservative, namely 81 percent, 
but the corresponding figure for their Labour Party was much lower, only 57 
percent. Given that a greater proportion of voters preferred Labor to the 
Conservatives on the nominated issues in the 1992 election, the inability of the 
party to convert this potential support into actual votes represents an important 
factor in the party's electoral failure. It may also be noted that respondents with 
no partisan issue preference showed a slight electoral bias to the major right-wing 
party in each country.
4 Two issues were chosen to increase the likelihood that, for each respondent, their own issue of 
most importance was selected. The limit of two issue items was chosen on the grounds that, in general, 
the relative importance of the two most important issues was substantially greater than the third and 
subsequent most important issues.
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Table 5.2: Vote by Preferred Party on Most Important Issues in 
Australia, Britain, and the United States
Vote Partisan Issue Preference (Percent)
Australia, 1993 Labor Other Lib-Nat
Labor 79 31 7
Liberal-National 11 44 87
Other 10 25 6
Total 100 100 100
(N) (938) (422) (731)
Britain, 1992 Labour Other Conservative
Labour 57 30 8
Conservative 14 47 81
Liberal Democrat 23 22 9
Other 6 2 2
Total 100 100 100
(N) (944) (526) (682)
United States, 1992 Democratic Other Republican
Democratic 77 45 21
Republican 23 55 79
Total 100 100 100
(N) (483) (602) (202)
Sources: As for Table 5.1
To examine the relationship between vote and partisan issue preferences over-time, 
Figure 5.1 shows the increased probability of a voter with a right-wing partisan 
issue preference voting for that party compared to a voter with a left-wing partisan 
issue preference. In accordance with descriptions of an increase in the level of issue 
voting, Figure 5.1 shows that the electoral impact of partisan issue preferences 
increased over-time in Australia and Britain, but actually declined in the United 
States. In Australia those persons preferring the Coalition on their most important 
issue were 58 percent more likely to support the Liberal-National parties during 
the mid 1960s than persons preferring Labor, but were 74 percent more likely to 
do so in the 1993 election. Despite a decline in the electoral impact of issue 
preferences in 1990, their impact in 1993 was equal to that of 1979 and well above 
that of 1967. In Britain the greater probability of persons with a Conservative 
issue preference voting Conservative compared to persons with a Labour issue 
preference also increased, from 56 percent in 1964 to 68 percent in 1992, with an 
accelerating upwards trend occurring over the period. In the United States, 
however, the electoral impact of issue preferences fell between 1964 and 1980, and 
subsequently remained at the lower level in the 1988 and 1992 elections. Thus 
respondents preferring the Republican Party on their nominated most important 
were 62 percent more likely to vote Republican in 1964 than those preferring the 
Democratic Party, but only 56 more likely to do so in the 1980, 1988 and 1992 
elections.
- 136-
Australia
Britain
United States
Figure 5.1: The impact of issue preferences upon parly vote in Australia, Britain, 
and the United States, 1964-93 (bivariate OLS regression). Sources: 
1967, 1979 ANPAS; 1990, 1993 AES. 1964, 1979, 1987, 1992 BES; 
1964, 1980, 1988, 1982 SRC-CPS NES.
It is to be expected that the electoral impact of any type of campaign evaluations 
will wax and wane in response to the idiosyncrasies of specific campaigns, which 
may explain the downward issue-voting trend in the United States. In particular, 
the relatively high electoral impact of issue preferences in the 1964 election in the 
United States is likely to be due to the extremist positions of Goldwater on the 
two most important issues of the campaign, namely Vietnam and Civil Rights, 
which provided voters with a clear policy choice and increased the potential for 
issue voting in the electorate (Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976, 319-29). It is possible 
that if the study had commenced in a different election year, such as 1960 in which 
the policy conflict between candidates was not as severe, the figure would also 
show a rise of issue voting in the United States.
Indeed two separate longitudinal studies tend to confirm this proposition, namely 
Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976, 165) which measured issue voting for the period 
1956-72, and Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode (1992, 186), which did likewise for the 
period 1972-94. Although the measures used in these two studies are not 
comparable, together they do identify 1964 as the highpoint of issue voting. Thus 
Nie and colleagues found that the correlation between issues and vote was strongest 
in 1964, slightly stronger than the correlation in 1972. More recently Abramson 
and colleagues, measuring the percentage of voters voting for the closer candidate 
in terms of their policy positions, found that issue voting over the past two decades 
has failed to reach the levels of 1972 and thus, by implication of Nie, Verba and 
Petrocik findings, the levels of 1964. Overall Figure 5.2 suggests a general upward 
trend in issue voting over the entire period although, if anything, a slight 
downward trend since 1964. On the basis of these studies, it is likely that the level
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of issue voting in the United states has increased over-time, as in Australia and 
Britain, but that the rise occurred earlier than in the other two countries, with 
recent fluctuations a function of the clarity of choice offered to the electorate from 
election to election.
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Figure 5.2: Issue voting in United States presidential elections, 1956-92. See text 
for details. Sources: Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976, 165); Abramson, 
Aldrich and Rhode (1992,186).
Economic Conditions
In addition to a concern with policy preferences expressed through issues, attitudes 
or ideology, the second major theme of electoral behaviour research derived from 
rational-choice theory relates to economic voting. Economic voting studies 
investigate the impact of economic conditions and perceptions of the governments 
handling of the economy on party support. The simple underlying hypothesis of 
theories of economic voting is that "when economic conditions appear better 
(worse), a voter is more (less) likely to favour the incumbent" (Lewis-Beck 1986, 
317). The economic voter is thus conceived as an individual concerned with 
economic ends rather than political means. For example, alternative policies aimed 
at reducing levels of unemployment are less important to the economic voter than 
is the actual achievement of the policy goal. Consequently policy debate is 
regarded as irrelevant as the means by which the desired outcome is achieved is of 
no consequence.
The proposition that economic conditions influence electoral outcomes is perhaps 
one of the most common understandings of electoral behaviour among both 
politicians and the community in general. It is often assumed that governments 
deliberately act so as to bring the political and economic cycles into alignment, 
whereby economic upturns coincide with election years, so as to maximise the 
government's prospect of re-election (eg Nordhaus 1975, Tufte 1978, cf Lewis-Beck
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1988). However, among political scientists widespread scholarly interest regarding 
the relationship between economic conditions and incumbent support did not 
emerge until Kramer's (1971) aggregate-level analysis of the relationship between 
macro-economic conditions and congressional election results from 1896 and 1964.5 
Specifically, Kramer (1971, 141) found that election year change in real per capita 
personal income was an important influence on aggregate congressional vote, a one 
percent rise associated with approximately a 0.5 percent increase in the vote for the 
incumbent's party in the House election, although changes in unemployment and 
the rate of inflation had no significant electoral effects.6
In response to methodological critiques of his study (Stigler 1973; Arcelus and 
Meitzer 1975), Kramer, together with Goodman, later repeated his analysis, 
including the years 1964-70, but on this occasion found that all three variables, not 
just real per capital personal income, were significant influences upon congressional 
election results (Goodman and Kramer, 1975).7 The original Kramer findings, their 
methodological critique, and the subsequent revised analysis are symptomatic of 
scholarly research in general into the relationship between national economic 
indicators and aggregate congressional vote. Thus, despite some continued 
dissension (Gough 1984; Radcliff 1988; Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Erikson 1989), 
the weight of scholarly opinion suggests that economic conditions do matter in 
congressional elections (Tufte 1975, 1978; Hibbs 1982; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; 
Born 1986; Jacobson 1990), although little agreement exists regarding which precise 
economic indicators are important and how to measure them.8 Furthermore, 
debates regarding specifications does not end with the measurement of economic 
indices. For example, some studies make a distinction between the influences 
which affect mid-term elections and those which affect on-year elections (Tufte 
1978; Erikson 1990), while Bloom and Price (1975) argue that the incumbent's 
party is only punished for economic failures, but never rewarded for economic 
success.
One difficulty involved in the study of economic voting at the aggregate-level is the 
limited number of data-points, ie elections, which are available. Although this is 
less of a problem in the United States, given that congressional elections are held 
every two years, the focus in overseas countries has largely centred upon the effect 
of the economy upon the government's popularity in regularly conducted opinion 
polls, thereby providing the analysis with a much greater number of data-points. 
Nevertheless, despite widespread support that economics affects popularity, 
controversies regarding methods and measurement plague economic models of
5 Kramer (1971) provides an overview of earlier, less systematic, studies of economic voting in the 
United States dating back to 1944. Kiewiet and Rivers (1984) argue that notions of economic voting 
may be traced back to the Old Testament.
6 Although the rate of inflation was significant if the economic voting equation did not include real 
personal income.
7 Although Goodman and Kramer (1975) actually specified eight different models, and precisely 
which variables were significant varied from model to model.
8 Generally evidence of a relationship between macro-economic conditions and vote is greater for 
presidential elections than congressional elections (eg Fair 1978; 1988; Tufte 1978; Hibbs 1987; Erikson 
1989) although the studies are again plagued by differences in their model specifications.
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government popularity as they do economic voting models. Thus Schneider (1984, 
214), reviewing studies across a number of countries including Australia and 
Britain,9 concluded that a nation's "economic situation has a predictable influence 
on the election outcome, but how strong this influence is and which economic 
factors are critical is difficult to tell". Furthermore, these studies provide no 
information regarding how economic conditions affect election results, as it is 
likely that responses in periodic opinion polls are influenced by very different 
factors than is voting in a national election (Whiteley 1980, 90).
The first British study into the effect of macro-economic conditions upon aggregate 
vote by Whitely (1980) found no evidence of a relationship based on measures of 
national income, price inflation and the rate of unemployment. Mughan (1987a), 
by contrast, found that the rate of inflation in the year prior to the election had a 
statistically significant relationship with the government vote, although the level of 
unemployment did not. Specifically, his economic voting model showed that for 
very 1 percent rise in the annual rate of inflation the government vote fell by 
approximately 1.5 percent (cf Mughan 1987b).10 Mughan's study also conducted 
the first empirical investigation into the relationship between economic conditions 
and aggregate vote in Australia, but found that neither the rate of inflation nor 
unemployment were statistically significant. However, Jackman and Marks (1994) 
later found that unemployment was a significant electoral influence, the 
government two-party vote falling by approximately 0.8 percent with each a 1 
percent rise in the annual unemployment rate since the last election, although the 
effect of unemployment failed to achieved statistical significance once the rate of 
GDP growth was entered into the regression equation.
Overall, the findings of investigations into the relationship between economic 
conditions and incumbency vote are inconclusive, particularly from a cross-national 
perspective. Studies vary with regard to which economic indices are significant, 
how those indicators should be measured, and the extent to which the effect of 
economic conditions is a lagging influence. Nevertheless, while acknowledging the 
likely relationship between economic conditions and voting behaviour, the 
ecological fallacy, that individual level assumptions should not be inferred from 
aggregate level findings, must also be considered. In the case of economic voting 
analysis, evidence of a relationship between macro-economic indicators and vote 
for the incumbent party, does not provide evidence regarding whether or not
9 For Australia see Douglas (1978), Schneider and Pommerehne (1980), Layton (1992) and Leithner 
(1993). For Britain the literature is much greater but see, in particular, Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), 
Miller and Mackie (1973), Butler and Stokes (1974, 392-8), Mosley (1978), Frey and Schneider (1978), 
Pissarides (1980), Norpoth (1991), Sanders, Ward and Marsh (1991), Sanders (1993).
10 Heath and colleagues (1991, 143-6) found that 1 percent change in the annual rate of growth in 
real personal disposable income over the administrations last year in office was associated with a 0.85 
percent change in the government's vote, although the relationship was not statistically significant.
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citizens actually vote on the basis of economic evaluations.11 Furthermore, 
evidence of a macro-level relationship provides no information regarding what type 
of economic evaluations (past or future, individual or national) influence voting 
behaviour. As a consequence much of the recent work on economic voting has 
turned towards survey data to provide further information on the economic voting 
phenomenon.
The original hypothesis tested at the individual-level, in response to aggregate-level 
findings, was that citizen's vote in response to their personal economic conditions. 
Thus, according to the so-called "pocket-book" voting hypothesis, citizens who feel 
that their financial situation has improved in the recent past are more likely to 
vote for the incumbent than those citizens who feel that their financial situation 
has worsened.12 However studies generally found that although personal economic 
conditions influenced presidential vote, they had only a weak influence in on-year 
congressional elections and no influence in mid-term elections (Fiorina 1978; 
Kiewiet 1983; Markus 1988; Born 1986). The lack of evidence regarding pocket- 
book voting at the congressional level led Kinder and Kiewiet (1979; 1981) to 
develop an alternative "sociotropic hypothesis" that a citizen's political response to 
economic conditions are collectively orientated. In other words, citizens respond 
to national economic conditions not their own personal financial situation. Their 
results confirmed that, rather than voting with their pocket-books in an egocentric 
manner, most citizens act "sociotropically" in both presidential and congressional 
elections. Subsequent research confirmed that although voters tend to hold the 
government responsible for the economic condition of the country, they are less 
likely to hold the government responsible for their own economic circumstances 
(Kinder and Mebane 1983).
The importance of the attribution of responsibility has also been used to account 
for the generally weaker relationship between economic evaluations and vote in 
congressional elections compared to presidential elections. Thus citizens will only 
engage in economic voting under circumstances in which they believe the 
incumbent has been in part responsible for current economic conditions. It then 
follows that, as the President is more likely to be held responsible for the economy 
in the United States than are congressmen, economic voting will be stronger in 
Presidential elections.13 As Kiewiet (1983, 126) found "it is the President who is 
primarily responsible for the general thrust of macro-economic policy ... 
Consequently any sort of economic problem which voters might be concerned
11 Note that Kramer (1983) argues that in regard to economic voting, the ecological fallacy works in 
reverse. He claims that the important variables in regard to economic voting, such as changes in annual 
growth rate of national income, are stable in the time frame of a cross-sectional survey and thus cannot 
be examined. The alternative is to use individual-level estimates of these measures, which he argues are 
"hopelessly contaminated" and "essentially unrelated to the true values of the behavioural parameters of 
interest" (Kramer 1983, 92-3).
12 Kiewiet (1983) proposed an alternative "policy-orientated" hypothesis, that citizens vote on the 
basis of differences in relative macro-economic priorities of the parties, for which he found some 
evidence.
13 Other possible explanations include that public awareness of the President is greater and 
Presidential elections are more homogenous (Kiewiet 1983), and that the quality of congressional 
candidates is affected by economic conditions (Fiorina 1978).
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about will exert a larger influence upon their choice between presidential 
candidates than upon that between the candidates for Congress". Thus what is 
important in terms of economic voting is not the overall change in economic 
conditions, but rather the proportion of that change that the citizen believed was 
specifically the result of the government's actions.
The distinction between general economic assessments and assessments of the 
performance of the government in handling the economy was formalised by Lewis- 
Beck (1988) in his distinction between simple and complex economic evaluations. 
Lewis-Beck (1988, 39) defined complex evaluations as requiring "judgements about 
two sets of objects - general economic conditions and government policy", 
operationalised on questions such as "Compared with a year ago, would you say 
that the government's policies have had a good or bad effect with regard to the 
financial situation of your household?".14 In addition, Lewis-Beck also identified 
dimensions relating to personal versus collective evaluations, which acknowledged 
the Kinder and Kiewiet distinction between pocket-book and sociotropic voting, 
and retrospective versus prospective evaluations, derived from the findings of 
Fiorina (1981) that both past experiences and future expectations influence voting 
behaviour in the United States.15 Examining economic voting in western Europe, 
Lewis-Beck found that, while simple personal retrospective evaluations (pocket- 
book voting) had a negligible impact on vote, the various complex collective 
evaluations (prospective and retrospective) were all significant influences. 
Furthermore, the overall impact of economic voting evaluations on voting choice 
was largely equal to the impact of variables based on occupation, religion, and 
ideology (Lewis-Beck 1988, 84).
The relationship between economic conditions and voting in British elections was 
first examined in detail by Butler and Stokes (1974) who found that changes to 
perceptions of individual economic well-being were related to changes in party 
support. This led to broad support for the proposition that voters "reward a 
governing party for economic benefit and punish a governing party for economic 
deprivation" (Butler and Stokes 1974, 388). Subsequent studies confirm the 
importance of economic evaluations to British voting behaviour but differ with 
regard to which type of evaluations are significant. In an analysis of the relative 
influence of personal and collective simple retrospective evaluations, Heath and 
colleagues (1991) found that collective evaluations had the largest impact on vote in 
1987, but Paulson (1994) found that, if anything, perceived changes in personal 
financial situation had a greater electoral impact than perceived changes in the 
national economic situation in the 1992 election. However, both studies were 
limited to an analysis of just two variables. A broader analysis conducted by
14 As Lewis-Beck (1988, 39) acknowledged, the simple-complex distinction is similar to a distinction 
made by Fiorina between simple and mediated evaluations. Unlike Lewis-Beck, however, Fiorina (1981, 
106-8) envisaged more general performance-based evaluations, such as "How good a job is the 
government doing with economic policy?". Note, however, that Lewis-Beck (1986) initially defined his 
complex evaluations as "mediated", but later adopted the term complex to emphasise his differences 
with Fiorina.
15 A fourth dimension, cognitive versus affective evaluations, was also identified by Lewis-Beck, 
based on the work of Conover and Feldman (1986) that affective economic reactions, including worry, 
anger, pride and hope, influence voting behaviour.
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Lewis-Beck (1988) found that complex prospective collective evaluations were the 
dominant electoral influence in Britain, while neither type of simple retrospective 
evaluation were statistically significant.
In Australia, Aitkin (1977) initially found that, if anything, economic prosperity 
actually worked against the government. Between 1967 and 1969 the greatest 
swing to the opposition Labor Party occurred among those voters who thought 
they were better off in 1969 than in 1967. A tentative explanation was that 
economic decline encourages support for the status quo, whist economic prosperity 
affords the risk associated with a change in government. Nevertheless two studies 
of economic voting in the 1990 Australian federal election provide a more detailed 
analysis of economic voting, in addition to evidence more consistent with research 
in other countries. Gow (1990), examining only simple economic evaluations, 
found that while personal retrospective evaluations were not significant, the other 
variables, namely retrospective collective, prospective personal, and prospective 
collective evaluations were all significant electoral influences. Gow (1990, 70) 
concluded that "the electoral consequences of economic issues are not carried by 
personal hardships; rather a citizen's political response to economic conditions is 
mediated by judgements that are collectively orientated".16 Similarly McAllister 
(1992a, 180-7), who widened the analysis to include complex evaluations, found 
that collective economic evaluations (simple and complex, retrospective and 
prospective) had the largest impact on vote, in addition to complex personal 
retrospective evaluations (ie effect of governments policies on financial situation of 
household in past year).
Overall, the cross-national evidence regarding the economic voting phenomenon 
suggest that the evaluations of electoral importance tend to be, in particular, 
complex and collective evaluations which require an assessment of the impact of 
the governments policies on national economic conditions both retrospectively and 
prospectively. However a study, such as this one, concerned with cross-national 
and over-time electoral trends is faced with a daunting problem of comparability 
with regard to an examination of economic voting. In particular, there is great 
inconsistency in the economic questions asked in the national election survey series 
of all three countries. Even in the United States, where the same institution has 
been responsible for conducting the national surveys since their instigation, there is 
a lack of comparable questions with which to work.
Nevertheless, all surveys, in each country, have asked a number of questions 
requiring respondents to make some form of economic evaluation. In order to 
avoid potential cross-national and over-time differences in selecting just one item in 
each survey, a three point summary index of economic evaluations was constructed 
using three items selected from each survey (see Appendix). In this manner the 
summary measure identifies a positive, neutral or negative economic evaluation on 
the basis of a mix of simple and/or complex, personal and/or collective, and 
retrospective and/or prospective questions. While the items selected for inclusion
16 Gow also noted that under Australia's preferential voting system for the House of Representatives 
the presence of economic voting may not show up in studies that use the two-party preferred measure. 
That is the government's primary vote may fall as a result of economic downturn but its two-party 
share may remain unchanged.
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in the summary measure were chosen on the basis of maximising comparability 
over time, caution should be used when interpreting results based on this measure, 
given the variation in the selected items from survey to survey and from country 
to country.
In all three countries, as expected, the incumbent party vote is highest among those 
respondents with positive economic evaluations, while the vote for the opposition 
party, and for minor parties, is highest among respondents with negative economic 
evaluations (Table 5.3). Among respondents with neutral evaluations an absolute 
majority also voted for the incumbent party, suggesting that for most citizens the 
simple maintenance of economic standards is sufficient for incumbent support. 
From a cross-national perspective the relationship between vote and economic 
evaluations is somewhat weaker in the United States than in the other two 
countries. The 20 percent difference in the Republican Party vote between those 
with positive and negative evaluations, was substantially lower than the comparable 
differences in vote fo the Australian Labor Party (59 percent) and the British 
Conservative Party (49 percent). A likely explanation is that, as argued above, 
congressional candidates are less likely to be held responsible for national economic 
conditions than is the President. Finally, the findings suggest that the Labour 
Party in Britain was particularly unsuccessful during the 1992 election in
Table 5.3: Vote by Summary Index of Economic Evaluations in 
Australia, Britain, and the United States
Vote
Sum m ary Index 
Positive
o f  Economic 
Neutral
Evaluations (Percent) 
Negative
Labor* 77 55 18
Liberal-National 15 34 69
Other 8 11 13
Total 100 100 100
(N) (732) (486) (1046)
Britain, 1992
Labour 14 26 47
Conservative* 73 55 26
Liberal Democrat 11 15 23
Other 3 3 4
Total 100 100 100
(N) (526) (504) (1292)
U nited States, 1992
Democratic 40 48 60
Republican* 60 52 40
Total 100 100 100
(N) (268) (374) (728)
* - Incumbent Party.
Sources: 1993 Australian Election Study; 1992 British Election Study; 
1992 CPS National Election Study.
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mobilising support among the vast majority of respondents with negative 
evaluations, the party winning less than half the vote among this group, compared 
to the other opposition parties which gained upwards of 60 percent among the 
economically disenchanted.
To measure the electoral impact of economic evaluations over-time OLS regression 
was once again used. Figure 5.3 plots the percentage probability of a person with 
positive economic evaluations, relative to a person with negative evaluations, 
voting for the incumbent party. In Australia the electoral impact of economic 
evaluations increased substantially over the period, in particular between the mid 
1960s and the 1990 election. A person with positive economic evaluations was 
only 15 percent more likely to support the Liberal-National government in 1967, 
compared to in the 1993 election when persons with negative evaluations were 57 
percent more likely to vote for the Liberal-National parties in opposition. 
Although, as stated above, caution must be used when interpreting these results, 
the consistency of the upward trend lends further weight to claim that the 
relationship between economic evaluations and party vote has strengthened over­
time. In Britain, by contrast, the percentage probability of a person with positive 
evaluations voting for the incumbent party varied within a very narrow range, 
between 46 and 41 percent, with no evidence of any clear trend. In the United 
States the electoral impact of economic evaluations was also relatively constant 
between 1964 and 1988, but fell in 1992 to the point that respondents with positive 
evaluations were only 21 percent more likely to vote Republican than those with 
negative evaluations.
Britain
.......
.. States
Australia
Figure 5.3: The impact of economic evaluations upon party vote in Australia, 
Britain, and the United States, 1964-93 (bivariate OLS regression). 
Sources: As for Figure 5.1.
A likely explanation for the economic voting decline in the 1992 congressional 
elections is the combination of high levels of economic dissatisfaction in an era of 
divided government. Under these circumstances voters are cross-pressured by a
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desire to punish the incumbent's party, the Republican Party, conflicting with a 
desire to punish the majority party in both houses, the Democratic Party. Table 
5.4 shows that in most years since 1964, presidential election outcomes and House 
vote gains operate in the same direction, such that Democratic presidential victories 
(defeats) are associated with an increase (decrease) in the Democratic House vote. 
The two exceptions to this relationship were the elections of 1976 and 1992, when, 
on both occasions, a Republican President was defeated by the Democratic 
challenger, yet the Democratic congressional vote actually fell. It may also be 
noted that the decline in the Democratic vote was much greater in 1992 than in 
1976. Overall, a majority of voters with negative economic evaluations voted for 
the Democratic Party, but it would appear reasonable to conclude that a lower 
than usual proportion did so on the grounds that House Democrats were also, in 
part, responsible for those economic conditions.
Table 5.4: Presidential and Congressional Election Outcomes,
1964-92.
Election Year
Democratic Presidential 
Candidate:
Change in 
Democratic House 
Vote3
1964 Elected + 4.8
1968 Defeated - 0.5
1972 Defeated - 1.7
1976 Elected - 0.9
1980 Defeated - 3.0
1984 Defeated - 3.1
1988 Defeated - 0.6
1992 Elected - 3.2
a: Change on previous mid-term result
Source: Mackie and Rose (1990), Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report (1993).
Meanwhile, a likely explanation for the increased electoral impact of economic 
evaluations in Australia between the mid 1960s and the 1990s is the weak economic 
management credentials of the Labor Party across the period of the first two 
surveys which resulted in relatively high support for the Liberal-National parties 
among those persons with negative economic evaluations. In 1967 the Labor Party 
had been in opposition for 18 years and represented an alternative government 
with largely no executive experience. By 1979, although Labor had governed from 
1972 to 1975, it was a period characterised by chronic economic ineptitude, 
including post-war high levels of inflation and unemployment. The proposition 
that low levels of economic voting in Australia were due to a reluctance to turn 
away from the Liberal-National parties as the sole option for sound economic 
management is examined in Table 5.5 which shows the percentage of respondents 
with negative economic evaluations voting for the incumbent party in each 
country.
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Table 5.5: Incumbent Vote among Respondents with Negative Economic 
Evaluations in Australia, Britain, and the United States, 1964-93.
Vote fo r  Incumbent (Percent)
Mid '60s Late '70s Late '80s Early '90s
Australia 41 30 23 18
Britain 17 15 21 26
United States 34 38 28 40
Sources: 1967 and 1979 ANPAS; 1993 AES; 1964, 1979, 1987 and 1992 BES; 
1964, 1980, 1988 and 1992 SRC-CPS NES.
While incumbent vote among the economically dissatisfied is generally higher in 
the United States, as explained above, in terms of Anglo-Australian comparison the 
early Australian surveys show an atypical tendency of voters to support the 
Liberal-National government despite a negative evaluation of economic conditions. 
Over two-fifths of dissatisfied voters supported the Coalition government during 
the late 1960s. By contrast, in the early 1990s Australians are substantially more 
likely to punish the incumbent party on the grounds of poor economic 
performance than voters in the other two countries. It may be argued that the 
higher level of economic voting in Australia is an outcome of the Labor 
government's campaign to educate the electorate in economic affairs during the 
1980s restructuring of the economy which has subsequently encouraged voters to 
be more responsive to their economic evaluations than in the past. In other words 
the absence of an effective opposition in the guise of the Labor Party for much of 
the 1960s and 1970s retarded levels of economic voting, while greater economic 
awareness during the 1980s and 1990s had the effect of encouraging Australians to 
vote on the basis of the prevailing economic conditions.
Party Leader Evaluations
The third major type of short-term campaign effects considered here are voter 
evaluations of major-party leaders in Australia and Britain and presidential 
candidates in the United States. As with other campaign evaluations, the role of 
party leader evaluations in influencing voting choice is intuitively clear; citizens are 
more (less) likely to vote for a party if they feel generally favourable (unfavourable) 
towards its leader. In reality, however, the relationship between leader evaluations 
and legislative vote is more complex. In the parliamentary systems of Australia 
and Britain the party leader is only one member of a broader parliamentary team 
from whom, if the party is successful, the executive government is chosen. 
Electors do not vote directly for the office of Prime Minister, although their vote 
has the potential to determine who will fill that role. In the United States the link 
is even more tenuous as electors are able to discriminate between their presidential 
and congressional preferences and vote accordingly. Nevertheless, the so-called 
Presidentialization of politics in parliamentary systems (Bean and Mughan 1989), 
and the declining salience of political parties relative to Presidential candidates in 
the United States (Wattenberg 1990, 79-89; cf Hagen 1994), suggest that the 
electoral influence of party leaders may have risen in all three countries over the 
past three decades.
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In the Australian and British parliamentary systems the role of party leader 
evaluations in influencing electoral outcomes has traditionally been down-played. 
As voters choose between local candidates representing alternative political parties, 
rather than directly between alternative party leaders, the primary focus in 
electoral studies has been on the party and not the leader. For example, Aitkin 
(1982, 241) argued that, although leadership was an important factor in Australian 
electoral behaviour, "the principal link between citizen and the political process is 
his stable loyalty to party" and that "there is ample evidence that many voters have 
only the haziest notions of who the party leaders are" (cf Bean 1993a). Similarly, 
Butler and Stokes (1974, 368) argued that leadership effects in Britain had a 
significantly smaller effect on vote than attitudes towards the parties and, as an 
explanation of short-term electoral change, leader effects were "easily outweighed 
by other issues and events of concern to the public". The tendency to ignore the 
role of party leader as an electoral influence, has, on occasion, been taken to an 
extreme. Thus, as Crewe and King (1994) observed, it is startling that the report 
on the 1987 British Election Study by Heath and colleagues (Heath et al 1991) 
contained only three references to the Conservative Party leader Margaret 
Thatcher.
In recent years there has been a re-evaluation of the electoral importance of party 
leader evaluations in parliamentary systems. Graetz and McAllister (1987) 
identified three trends which have raised the salience of party leaders in Britain, 
and which are likely to apply to all Western nations; the decline in class-voting, the 
greater reliance upon a centralised campaign as the result of weaker of party 
organisations, and the growth of the electronic media. The net result of these 
trends is a greater focus during the campaign upon the individual party leader at 
the expense of the broader parliamentary party, which has become less capable of 
mobilising popular support. Graetz and Mcallister (1987, 500) found that, for the 
1974, 1979, and 1983 British elections, "party leaders are important determinants of 
voting defection, and remain so even after a wide range of other factors have been 
taken out" (see also Bean and Mughan 1989). Similarly, in a study of leadership 
effects in the 1987 election, Stewart and Clarke (1992, 467) found that "leader 
images, net of pre-campaign party identification, had large effects and outperformed 
economic evaluations and issue concerns for Labour and Conservative voting", 
while Miller and colleagues (Miller et al 1990, 248) also found that, again after 
controlling for party identification, "leader images had substantial influences on 
electoral choice in 1987". Reflecting a new orthodoxy, Crewe and King (1994, 143- 
4), who found that leadership effects in 1964 and February 1974 were sufficient to 
determine the election outcome, argue that "the potential impact of party leaders' 
personalities and styles on voting and elections ought in the future to be taken 
more seriously by students of British electoral politics".
In Australia, the electoral effects of party leaders also gained greater prominence 
during the 1980s, perhaps due to the unprecedented electoral success of the Labor 
Party under the leadership of Bob Hawke who enjoyed high personal approval
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ratings through most of his term in office (McAllister et al 1990, 100-1).17 Two 
separate analyses of the 1987 federal election found that a net positive evaluation of 
Hawke, and a net negative evaluation of his Liberal opponent John Howard, were 
of sufficient magnitude to alone determine the outcome of the election (Bean and 
Kelley 1988; Bean and Mughan 1989). Nevertheless, it is notable that after 
Hawke's removal from office, party leader evaluations have continued to exert a 
significant electoral impact. In the 1993 federal election, characterised by highly 
salient issues with strong electoral impact, the influence of candidate evaluations 
generally outweighed the influence of particular issues, especially among voters 
who decided how to vote during the election campaign, while, if anything, the 
leadership effect on vote was greater in 1993 than during the Hawke years (Bean 
1994a; 1994b).
By contrast, recent scholarly interest in the United States into the relationship 
between presidential candidate evaluations and congressional elections has its 
genesis in aggregate-level economic voting studies examined above. In particular 
Tufte's (1978) model of on-year congressional election results found that the net 
presidential candidate advantage, measured through open-ended like-dislike 
questions, together with the change in real disposable personal income per capita, 
explained 70 percent of the variance in party vote. The model estimated that an 
increase of one in the average number of like responses for the incumbent 
increased the vote for the President's party by approximately 1.5 percent in the 
congressional elections of the same year (Tufte 1978, 119). At the individual-level 
two studies have found that Presidential candidate evaluations significantly 
influence the party vote in congressional elections. Abramowitz (1984) found that 
higher personal ratings of Reagan over Carter, measuring on average 8.1 degrees 
higher on the 0-100 feeling thermometer scale, increased the Republican House 
vote by approximately 3 percent in the 1980 elections. Calvert and Ferejohn 
(1983) found that net favourable ratings of Reagan over Carter, measured through 
open-ended like-dislike questions, contributed a net rise of 2.3 percent in the 1980 
House Republican vote. However Cain and Ferejohn found the largest 
Presidential candidate effect in the 1964 House elections, when net favourable 
ratings of Johnson over Goldwater decreased the Republican House vote by 6.5 
percent, and that the relationship between presidential candidates and congressional 
voting was in long-term decline.18
One difficulty in estimating trends in leader effects over-time and cross-nationally 
concerns the different methods adopted to measure leader evaluations. Broadly 
three approaches have been adopted. The first approach, adopted by the Michigan 
scholars (Campbell et al 1960), is through the use of multiple response open-ended
17 Although Bean (1993a) re-analysed Aitkin's (1982) data from 1979 and found that individual 
leadership images, after controlling for party identification, exerted a strong electoral impact upon 
voting intention.
18 This figure is calculated form Calvert and Ferejohn (1983) Table 2. The predicted vote in 1964 
with actual candidate evaluations was 46% Democrat, 28% Republican and 26% not voting, a 
Republican two-party share of 37.8% (28 divided by 74). The predicted vote with neutral evaluations 
was 39% Democrat, 31% Republican and 30% not voting, a Republican two-party share of 44.5% (31 
divided by 70). Therefore Presidential candidate ratings decreased the Republican two-party share of the 
vote by 6.5% (44.3 - 37.8).
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questions, namely "Is there anything in particular that you like (dislike) about 
< candidate > that might make you vote for (against) him?"19 Usually five 
responses are allowed for each question, with the number of dislikes subtracted 
from the number of likes to give the voter's overall evaluation for each leader (eg 
Wattenberg 1990, 79). One alternative is the feeling thermometer, often ranging 
from 0 to 100, on which respondents are asked to place the candidates in 
accordance with their general feelings toward the person in question. A third 
approach is to ask respondents whether they would describe each of the leaders 
individually as possessing various positive and negative attributes, such as caring or 
extreme. The total number of negative attributes may then be subtracted from the 
number of positive attributes to create an overall evaluation measure (eg Rose and 
McAllister 1990, 209).
Although the National Election Study series in the United States has consistently 
asked the multi-response, open-ended, like-dislike questions in all surveys conducted 
since 1952, in Australia and Britain no consistent approach has been adopted over 
time. This is less of a concern in Australia where modified versions of the like- 
dislike questions were asked in the four surveys examined in this study, and which 
enable an identical leadership variable to be calculated in each year. Specifically 
the measure used here is derived from the like question alone, on which 
respondents are restricted to just one response. However in Britain, although the 
like-dislike questions were asked in 1964, only the thermometer questions were 
asked in 1979, and only the attribute questions were asked in 1987 and 1992. 
Nevertheless analysis of the correlation between congressional vote and various 
alternative measures of Presidential candidate evaluations in the 1992 National 
Election Study (Table 5.6) suggests that all approaches are likely to generate 
broadly similar results (Graetz and McAllister 1987; cf Bean 1994b).
Table 5.6: Correlation Between Presidential Candidate Evlautions and Congressional 
Vote, 1992 United States Elections
Question Format (Adopted For:) Correlation with vote, 
USA 1992 (Person's r)
Open-ended, multi-response 
like-dislike
(United States: All) 
(Britain: 1964)
.46
Open-ended, one response, 
like only.
(Australia: All) .44
Attributes/Characteristics (Britain: 1987, 1993) .45
Feeling Thermometer (Britain: 1979) .49
Note: All correlations significant at p < .05.
Sources: 1992 Centre for Political Studies, National Election Study.
19 Early electoral studies in Australia and Britain which also adopted the multi-response open-ended 
questions, deleted the words "that might make you want to vote for (against) him" (Aitkin 1982, 362, 
384; Butler and Stokes 1974, 452).
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Table 5.7 shows that, in each country, a large majority of citizens vote in 
accordance with their party leader evaluations. The relationship between leader 
evaluations and vote is somewhat stronger in Australia where 87 percent of 
respondents preferring Hewson, the Liberal leader, voted for the coalition and 85 
percent of respondents preferring Keating, the incumbent Labor Prime Minister, 
voted Labor. There is a slightly weaker, yet still substantial, relationship in Britain 
where 77 percent of respondents preferring Kinnock voted Labour and 70 percent 
of those preferring Major voted Conservative. Any concern regarding the 
uniqueness of the presidential system is also dispelled with similar results evident in 
the United States. The Republican House vote was 75 percent among respondents 
preferring Bush, while the Democratic House vote was 74 percent among those 
preferring Clinton. In each country respondents in the neutral category tended to 
split their vote evenly among the competing parties, although in each case there 
was a slight tendency towards the major-party of the left. In addition the minor 
party vote in both Australia and Britain was significantly higher among those who 
rated the major-party leaders evenly.
Table 5.7: National Lower-House Vote by Preferred Major-Party 
Leader in Australia, Britain, and the United States
Vote Preferred Major-Party Leader (Percent)
Australia, 1993 Keating N eutral Hewson
Labor 85 37 5
Liberal-National 5 31 87
Other 10 32 8
Total 100 100 100
(N) (913) (254) (935)
Britain, 1992 K innock N eutral Major
Labour 77 44 9
Conservative 3 27 70
Liberal Democrat 16 24 18
Other 5 5 3
Total 100 100 100
(N) (783) (968) (1261)
U nited States, 1992 C lin ton N eutral Bush
Democratic 74 55 25
Republican 26 45 75
Total 100 100 100
(N) (701) (126) (543)
Sources: As for Table 5.1
The extent to which leader evaluations influence party vote is likely to vary from 
election to election dependent, in part, upon the actual candidates offered to the 
electorate. In particular some leaders, such as Barry Goldwater, are, by virtue of 
their style, personality and politics, likely to elicit stronger feelings among voters 
than other less controversial leaders, such as Gerald Ford (Calvert and Ferejohn 
1983). Therefore, in examining the electoral impact of party leaders over-time,
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some fluctuations are to be expected. Nevertheless Figure 5.4 shows that the 
influence of party leaders evaluations on vote in Australia has increased 
substantially over the period. Thus in the mid 1960s persons preferring the Liberal 
leader were 31 percent more likely to vote for the Coalition than those who 
preferred the Labor leader, but by the early 1990s they were 82 percent more 
likely to do so. However the increased electoral impact of the leadership variable 
in Australia was in contrast the results from the other two countries. In Britain 
the electoral impact of leader evaluations remained relatively stable, the increased 
probability of a person preferring the Conservative leader voting Conservative 
ranging between 69 percent in 1979 and 58 percent in 1992. In the United States 
the electoral impact of the presidential candidates was strongest in 1964, 
undoubtedly due to the presence of Goldwater in the campaign, although slightly 
higher in the two most recent elections compared to 1980.
Britain ..................-A -
............. 65
United States
Australia
Figure 5.4: The impact of party leaders/presidential candidates upon party vote in 
Australia, Britain, and the United States, 1964-93 (bivariate OLS 
regression). Sources: As for Figure 5.1.
A tentative explanation for the exceptionalism of the Australian data showing an 
increase in leader effects relates to the timing of the election studies in that 
country. In particular, unlike the election studies of .1990 and 1993, the 1967 and 
1979 surveys were not conducted immediately after a national elections, but rather 
just under one and two years after the 1966 and 1977 elections respectively. 
During the intervening period, on both occasions, the opposition Labor Party 
changed its leader. Consequently the surveys asked respondents their feeling 
towards the new leader, and not the leader that had contested the earlier election. 
As the dependent variable, in this instance, is voting intention this presents no 
difficulties to the analysis, other than the fact that neither of the Labor leaders had, 
at the time of survey, competed in an election campaign as party leader. In terms 
of the electoral impact of party leader evaluations in these surveys it is likely that,
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in the absence of a national campaign focusing attention on the new opposition 
leaders, the leaders were not as salient as they may have otherwise been.
In order to test this proposition Table 5.8 reports the percentage of voters failing 
to provide either a like or dislike response when asked about the competing party 
leaders or presidential candidates. The table shows that the percentage of no 
responses towards the Australian opposition leaders in the 1967 and 1979 surveys, 
42 percent and 34 percent respectively, is substantially higher than in comparable 
overseas studies. The next highest rate of no response was towards the Australian 
Prime Minister in 1967, Harold Holt, who had held the position of party leader 
for less than two years at the time of the survey. The table also confirms that the 
most salient candidates in the United States were the presidential candidates of 
1964: 95 percent of voters mentioned something they liked and/or disliked about 
Lyndon Johnson and 93 percent of respondents mentioned something they liked 
and/or disliked about Barry Goldwater. The table underlines the potential 
variation in the electoral impact of party leaders from election to election on the 
basis of their particular peculiarities. In general, the more likely they are to elicit a 
response from voters, the greater their electoral impact.
Table 5.8: Saliency of Parliamentary Leaders/ Presidential 
Candidates in Australia, Britain, and the United States
Percent o f  Respondents w ith  no 
Likes or Dislikes of:
Survey Incumbent Challenger
Australia, 1967 27 42
Australia, 1979 11 34
Britain, 1964 16 15
United States, 1964 5 7
United States, 1980 9 12
United States, 1988 14 13
United States, 1992 8 10
Note: Table includes only open-ended like-dislike uestions asked in 
face to face interviews. Bush is designated as the incumbent for the 
1988 United States election.
Sources: As for Table 5.1
The Combined Impact of Campaign Evaluations
The previous sections have found that short-term campaign issue, economic, and 
leader-based evaluations are strongly related to vote. However, in reality, all three 
types of evaluation are potentially inter-related, influencing each other in addition 
to electoral choice. For example, studies in the United States have found that 
economic conditions are a significant influence upon evaluations of the incumbent 
President (Mueller 1970; Frey and Schneider 1978; Hibbs 1982; Ostrom and Simon 
1985; Miller and Wattenberg 1985). Similarly, with many voters nominating 
economic concerns as their most important issue it is likely that prevailing
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economic conditions will also influence party-based issue preferences. In addition 
short-term campaign evaluations are particularly susceptible to voter rationalisation, 
whereby political predispositions, most notably party identification, distort the 
perceptions of voters making these type of evaluations. This was, of course, the 
central finding of the Michigan scholars which led to the development of the 
funnel of causality (Campbell et al 1960), and is acknowledged in the composite 
voting model, developed in this study, in which social background factors and 
political attitudes are specified as causally prior to campaign evaluations, and party 
identification is specified as a reciprocal influence. Consequently, to estimate the 
independent effect of campaign evaluations on party vote, Table 5.9 uses ordinary 
least squares regression to control for the influence of all three types of political 
predisposition.
Social Background Factors 
v
Political Attitudes
. . .  4Party Identification <— > Campaign Evaluations
X
Vote
Figure 5.5: The composite voting model derived from the sociological, social-psychological and 
rational-choice voting models (see text for details).
In all three countries there was a net increase in the electoral impact of party-issue 
preferences between the mid 1960s and early 1990s, although it was only in 
Australia that a consistent rise occurred (Table 5.9). Thus, those persons preferring 
the coalition on their nominated most important issue were 15 percent more likely 
to support the Liberal-National parties in the mid 1960s, while by 1993 the 
probability of doing so had steadily increased to 21 percent, net of other influences.
In Britain, by contrast, the electoral impact of party-issue preferences was steady 
between 1964 and 1979, rose between 1979 and 1987, but fell in the 1992 election. 
Nevertheless, over the period, the increased probability of a person with 
Conservative issue preferences voting for the Conservative Party more than 
doubled from 4 percent in 1964 to 9 percent in 1992. The United States showed a 
similar trend to Britain of fluctuations in the variable's influence from survey to 
survey, rising in 1980 and 1992 and falling in 1988, but a net increase over-time, 
from 12 percent in 1964 to 15 percent in 1992. Overall, despite the fluctuations 
which are expected with all campaign evaluations, the findings tend to confirm 
other cross-national studies which suggest that the level of issue voting in recent 
years is higher than found during early electoral studies.
With regard to the electoral impact of economic evaluations the cross-national 
evidence in Table 5.9 is less supportive. Certainly in Australia it would appear that 
economic conditions have become a stronger influence on voting behaviour over­
time. Although economic evaluations had virtually no electoral impact in 1967, in 
the 1993 election persons with negative evaluations of economic conditions under 
the Labor government were 10 percent more likely to vote for the Liberal-National
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parties, net of other influences, than were persons with positive evaluations. In 
Britain the influence of the summary measure of economic evaluations was 
statistically significant in all four election surveys, but at a relatively low level 
throughout, and one which showed no clear trend over-time. In the United States, 
however, the impact of economic evaluations did not reach statistical significance 
in any one survey. Again, the likely explanation of this finding is that the 
President is more likely to be seen as responsible for economic conditions than is 
congress and consequently, after controlling for other electoral influences, such 
evaluations exert no independent influence on House voting behaviour.
Finally, the relatively large fluctuations in the electoral impact of leader evaluations 
in each country suggest that their influence is largely responsive to which 
particular party leaders and presidential candidates are running in a specific election 
campaign, rather than any underlying cross-national trend. In Australia the impact 
of leader evaluations in the 1993 election was similar to its impact in the mid 
1960s, the percentage probability of a person preferring the Liberal leader voting 
for the coalition, net of other influences, increasing by only 1 percent. This 
finding is contradictory to the results in Figure 5.4, but is perhaps explained 
through the strengthening of the relationship between leader evaluations and party 
identification (Bean 1994b), which in turn has reduced the independent effect of 
leader evaluations. In Britain, however, there is evidence of leader evaluations 
exerting a greater influence in recent decades compared to the 1960s, although in 
the United States the strongest influence of candidate evaluations was during the 
1964 elections, a level of influence which has since not been repeated. 
Nevertheless, in each country, the net movements in the electoral impact of leader 
evaluations conceal fluctuations which prevent any clear conclusions being drawn 
regarding changes over-time other than that of susceptibility to individual 
personalities.
Overall, there is no evidence of a consistent increase in the electoral influence of 
campaign evaluations over-time, notwithstanding a rise in the electoral impact of 
partisan issue preferences (Figure 5.6). Certainly the percentage variance in vote 
explained by campaign evaluations in Australia and Britain was higher at the end 
of the period than at the beginning, but in both cases the net increase conceals 
substantial variation from election to election which suggests that the rise is as 
much due to the peculiarities of particular election campaigns as to any underlying 
trend. Furthermore, in the United States, the total variance explained by campaign 
evaluations peaked in the 1964 elections, at 7.5 percent, and failed to even approach 
that level in the three subsequent election surveys examined.
The findings do suggest that, as the extent to which political predispositions 
structure voting behaviour declines, there is a greater potential for campaign 
evaluations to make a larger contribution in any one specific election campaign, 
although just which elections are affected by strong campaign effects is likely to be 
determined by the peculiarities of the campaign itself. In the United States, where 
the electoral influence of political predispositions is weaker than in the other two 
countries, the potential for strong campaign effects has been present since, at the 
very least, the beginning of the study period. Thus in the 1964 elections, 
characterised by highly salient presidential candidates adopting clear policy 
alternatives on the most important issues of the period, campaign evaluations were
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a strong influence. The potential for such effects has, if anything, increased over 
the period, as the structuring properties of social and partisan loyalties in 
congressional elections has further weakened. In Australia and Britain the decline 
in the structuring role of predispositions has also enabled campaign evaluations to 
play a greater role than during the mid 1960s, as indeed occurred in the 1987 
British election and the 1993 Australian election.
United States
Australia
Britain
Year
Figure 5.6: Percent variance in vote explained by campaign evaluations in Australia, 
Britain and the United States, 1964-93. Sources: As for Figure 5.1
In summary, considering the findings of chapters two through five, an analysis of 
electoral behaviour in Australia, Britain and the United States indicates that 
electoral stability in these countries is not an outcome of stable political 
predispositions structuring electoral choice. In particular, as the previous chapter 
shows, the rising electoral impact of political attitudes is insufficient to compensate 
for the eroding influence of social group and partisan loyalties. Rather the 
evidence, to this point, supports the stable dealignment hypothesis, whereby long­
term electoral stability remains a coincidence of circumstances, possibly to be 
eroded at any time. In other words, the electoral effects of weakened political 
predispositions have been self-cancelling with respect to the balance of party 
support, through nothing other than the coincidence of the equal movement of 
voters between the major parties. However, an alternative hypothesis which 
remains consistent with the above findings, but is yet to be examined here, is that 
aggregate electoral stability is an outcome of political parties intervening in the 
political environment in which they compete to secure their long-term persistence. 
Consequently, the following chapters test this party adaptation hypothesis through 
an analysis of the influence of party behaviour upon electoral support.
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PART TWO
PARTY ADAPTATION
CHAPTER SIX
SOCIAL CHANGE, ATTITUDINAL CHANGE 
AND PARTY ADAPTATION
In the last three decades significant changes have occurred with regard to the extent 
to which various sociological, social-psychological and attitudinal influences 
structure voting behaviour in Australia, Britain and the United States. In 
particular, chapters 2 to 5 have identified the gradual erosion of social group and 
partisan loyalties at the expense of attitudinal predispositions, and a greater 
potential for campaign evaluations to influence vote choice. However, in 
examining the nature of party system stability, changes in voting behaviour cannot 
be studied in isolation from two other important influences upon electoral change 
and the balance of party support, namely societal change and party behaviour. 
Societal change in this context refers to those social and attitudinal changes which 
have also occurred over the same period. For example, the general decline in blue- 
collar employment, a common characteristic of advanced industrial societies, 
represents a significant contraction in the support base of labour and social 
democratic parties (Mackie, Franklin et al 1992). The role of party behaviour is 
also significant as voters do not cast their ballots in a political void, but rather are 
cajoled, enticed, persuaded and lured by the electoral appeals of the competing 
parties. To the extent that parties alter their appeals, the electoral strategies 
adopted by political parties represent a dynamic influence upon voting behaviour 
(Kelley, McAllister and Mughan 1985). This chapter expands the analysis to 
include aspects of societal change and party behaviour.
The Lipset and Rokkan (1967) freezing proposition identified the granting of 
manhood suffrage as the point at which western party systems became frozen. 
However, a cursory glance at the structure of society and the focus of the political 
agenda suggests that whilst the late twentieth century may be characterised by 
party system stability the rate of societal change has continued unabated (Mackie, 
Franklin et al 1992; van der Eijk et al 1992). As a consequence, some scholars have 
recently identified a third revolution, the post-industrial revolution, which has 
further altered the dimensions of social conflict in advanced industrial society 
(Inglehart 1977, 1990; Dalton 1988, 135-45). Although much debate centres around 
the precise basis of the conflicts that this new revolution has engendered (see 
Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984, 454-60), it is evident that continued social change 
over this period has also altered the structure of society with respect to the critical 
lines of cleavage identified by Lipset and Rokkan (Mackie, Franklin et al 1992). 
Furthermore, the general weakening in the electoral influence of traditional social 
group predispositions, and the lack of any clear group-based replacement, suggest 
an attitudinal basis to the post-industrial revolution (Inglehart and Rabier 1986).
Two schools of thought offer alternative views regarding the likely outcome of 
these post-industrial trends. On the one hand scholars, attempting to update the 
Lipset and Rokkan analysis argue that the structure of party competition will 
continue to reflect social (and attitudinal) change whereby old politics parties, 
mobilised along the old politics cleavages, will become increasingly irrelevant whilst 
new politics parties, mobilised on the new politics cleavage, gain increased electoral
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support (Harrop and Miller 1987, 193-202; Johnston 1990; Lijphart 1984, 1990, 
Poguntke 1989). On the other hand, scholars identifying political parties as an 
intervening variable between the translation of societal change into party system 
change argue that parties are capable of adapting to, and indeed on some occasions 
actually shaping, the political environment in which they compete (Downs 1957; 
Mair 1983; Sartori 1969). In this manner, old politics parties are capable of 
developing electoral strategies in response to trends which threaten their electoral 
base so as to maintain their long-term persistence. This chapter examines these 
two alternative hypotheses. Section one examines the social changes which have 
altered the balance of electoral forces on either side of the four critical social 
cleavages of the Lipset and Rokkan analysis, and section two examines the 
consequences of attitudinal change in the electorate.
Social Change
As argued in chapter two, the behaviouralist adjunct to the Lipset and Rokkan 
thesis is provided by the locational voting studies of Berelson, Lazarsfeld and 
colleagues. Whilst Lipset and Rokkan argued that the frozen structure of party 
competition during the 1960s reflected the social conflicts of the past, the early 
sociological voting studies were guided by findings which showed that "social 
characteristics determine political preference" (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 
1948, 27), and that "within various social strata (ethnic, religious, and economic) 
the political parties maintain fairly constant rates of support" (Berelson et al 1954, 
299). The sociological approach, in the absence of a critical historical juncture 
which fundamentally alters social group alignments in the party system, posits a 
deterministic conception of electoral change, based on evolutionary social trends 
(Rose and Urwin 1969). In other words, as a country's social structure gradually 
changes in response to differing forces of social and economic development, so too 
the electoral support for the competing political parties will reflect the rise or 
decline of their respective social bases.
An alternative position may be derived from the party adaptation work of Sartori 
(1969) and Mair (1983, 1993) which questions the assumption that societal change 
necessarily leads to electoral change and party system change. In these analyses, 
political parties are seen as independent variables, capable of adapting to those 
social and attitudinal changes which threaten their support base. The mechanisms 
by which adaptation may occur are broad but include, in particular, the altering of 
party appeals to accommodate the significant changes which have been occurring in 
society (Mair 1983). A similar process of adaptation, although from a slightly 
different perspective, is provided by the spatial voting model of Downs (1957). In 
the model political parties tend toward a position of equilibrium, by definition a 
position of electoral stability and equal division of the vote, by altering their policy 
positions in response to attitudinal changes in the electorate. For example, a 
decline in the size of the working class may precipitate a shift to the right on 
economic attitudes in the electorate. In response the major-party of the left will 
move in a rightward direction to re-establish its electoral support, whilst the major 
party of the right will also move further to the right to head off extremist
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defections. The balance of party support is eventually restored to a position of 
equilibrium.1
The work of Kelley, McAllister and Mughan (1985), in an analysis of the electoral 
consequences of social change for the British Labour Party, provides an appropriate 
framework for an analysis of these two competing explanations of the relationship 
between social change and electoral change (see also Heath and McDonald 1987; 
Heath et al 1991; 200-11; Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992). They specified four 
hypotheses regarding the effects of economic growth on politics, presented here in 
Figure 6.1. Hypothesis 1, which states that economic growth has reduced the 
traditional support base of left-wing parties, is generally not disputed among 
adherents to the two approaches. However, what is disputed is the electoral 
consequences of these social trends. The updated Lipset and Rokkan approach is 
based on the premise of evolutionary electoral change reflecting ongoing social 
change, represented by the hypothesis that left-wing electoral support will change 
in direct proportion to change in the size of social groups that traditionally support 
them, hypothesis 2. By contrast, the party adaptation approach identifies the role 
of political parties in this relationship, claiming that left-wing parties, responding to 
the threat of electoral decline, mute their appeals to the working class, hypothesis 
3. To the extent that the electoral strategy is successful, the division between left 
and right-wing parties is unaffected by social change, hypothesis 4.
To test hypothesis 1, three class-related variables were considered, namely 
occupation, trade union membership, and education. As discussed in chapter two, 
the manual/non-manual distinction represents the most appropriate measure of the 
owner-worker cleavage in capitalist society, whilst trade union membership, given 
the links between the left-wing party and the peak union organisation in each 
country, represents an important economic lifestyle cleavage.2 Although education 
was not specified by early sociological voting studies as an aspect of the class 
cleavage, the expansion of tertiary education represents one of the most significant 
social trends over the period, and merits inclusion in this stage of the analysis 
(Kelley, McAllister and Mughan 1985; Franklin et al 1992). Indeed, American neo- 
Marxist Eric Wright (1985), attempting to resolve the ambiguous class location of 
the non working-class wage and salary earner, identified education credentials as a 
potential dimension of exploitation in advanced industrial society. Thus just as 
capitalists, ie owners of the means of production, may exploit workers, so too 
experts, holding scarce skills and talent assets attained through higher education, 
may also exploit the proletariat (see also Bell 1973). In these terms a rise in
1 The collapse of Labour Party support in the 1983 British election provides an example of a 
left-wing party being out-positioned on the right (by the Social Democratic Party), whilst the 
collapse of the Canadian Progressive Conservatives provides an example of a right-wing party being 
out-positioned on the right (by the Reform Party).
2 Class self-image, although also an aspect of economic life-style, is not included in this stage of 
the analysis. The rationale for its omission is that, unlike the other variables, it is a subjective 
measure and consequently its mean value cannot be verified against an external source, such as 
census data. The calculations below are highly dependent upon measurement error and there is 
evidence to suggest that, also unlike the other variables, measures of class self-image are volatile in 
the short-term (Aitkin 1982, 128).
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Hypothesis 1: Economic growth reduces the 
size of social groups that traditionally support 
left-wing parties
Party adaptation thesis
Updated Lipset and 
Rokkan thesis
/  Hypothesis 2: Economic Growth leads
/ parties of the left to mute their appeal to the
/ working class and hence reduces class
/ polarization in politics
Hypothesis 3: The electoral strength of 
left-wing parties declines in direct proportion to 
the shrinkage of social groups that traditionally 
support them
Hypothesis 4: The division of the vote between 
left and right-wing parties is unaffected by 
economic growth.
Figure 6.1: Hypotheses derived from the updated Lipset and Rokkan and party 
adaptation theses. Source: Kelley, McAllister and Mughan (1985)
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educational attainment contracts the size of the working class in the same manner 
as a decline in manual employment or trade union membership. Finally, housing 
tenure in Britain was also included in the analysis in acknowledgment of the 
variable's strong electoral influence in that country (Dunleavy 1979; Franklin 
1992a, 115; Rose and McAllister 1990, 87).
Figure 6.2 confirms that, with respect to these variables, a contraction in the size 
of working class and expansion of the middle class has occurred over the period. 
The proportion of voters from families in which the head of household was in 
non-manual employment rose from 46 percent to 58 percent in Australia, from 40 
percent to 49 percent in Britain, and from 58 percent to 64 percent in the United 
States. Although trade union membership increased as a proportion of all voters 
between the mid 1960s and late 1970s in all three countries, in each case this was 
followed by a steeper decline over the remaining period. By the end of the period 
trade union members had declined to 23 percent of the electorate in Australia, 20 
percent in Britain, and 12 percent in the United States. In Britain the period from 
1979 to 1992 also showed a steep decline, from 30 percent to 18 percent, in the 
proportion of voters renting their homes from local government authorities. 
Finally, Figure 6.2 also shows an increase in the proportion of voters holding 
tertiary qualifications, rising from 4 percent to 15 percent in Australia, from 2 
percent to 9 percent in Britain, and from 14 percent to 31 percent in the United 
States.
These social trends pose a significant threat to the electoral base of left-wing 
parties. White-collar employment is expanding, trade union membership is in 
decline, educational attainment is on the rise, and in Britain voters owning their 
properties outnumber voters holding public tenancies by a margin of over three to 
one. In terms of a deterministic relationship between social change and party 
system change these social trends raise a query regarding the continued 
competitiveness of major left-wing parties. But the party adaptation thesis holds 
that political parties, operating to secure their long-term persistence, will seek to 
mute their appeals to their contracting social base in acknowledgment of the 
electoral imperatives of appealing to a broader social constituency than was 
previously the case, hypothesis 3. Analyses of the changing emphases of party 
platforms over-time tend to support the hypothesis that the party leadership of all 
three left-wing parties have moved away from the economic interventionist agendas 
over-time (Robertson 1987; McAllister and Moore 1991; Topf 1994). Although, at 
this point, a lengthy determination of the changing nature of party appeals is 
beyond the scope of the study, anecdotal evidence also tends to support the 
hypothesis.
In the case of the Australian Labor Party, some scholars identify the late 1960s and 
1970s, under the leadership of Whitlam, as the beginning of Labor's re-positioning 
in the electorate. Whitlam's rise to the position of party leader itself reflected a 
general middle-classing of the parliamentary party (Jaensch 1989, 51), and unlike 
the preceding Labor Prime Ministers Curtin and Chifley, "Whitlam rarely referred 
to the link between the Labor Party and the 'working class'" (Johnson 1989, 90). 
However, the need for an altered appeal was formally acknowledged by Labour's 
1978 Committee of Inquiry, established in response to the party's devastating 1977
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of selected social group variables in Australia, Britain, and 
the United States, 1964-93. Sources: 1967,1979 ANPAS; 1990, 1993 
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election loss. The committee found that "The ALP must recognise that it is not 
just 'a working men's party' ... It is time to consider whether we ought to project 
an image of a Party which is less confrontationalist in political style, less urban, 
less industrial" (Jaensch 1989, 67). The response of the party during the 1980s, 
under the leadership of Hawke, was consensus politics: "Replacing confrontation, 
consensus was to be a surrogate for Australianness - a cry to national unity 
bordering on the jingoistic" (Maddox 1989, 11). Although a term which
eventually waned as a rhetorical device, political consensus, as a process of 
inclusion in the policy process extending beyond the traditional Labor 
constituency, is a characteristic which has been nurtured by successive Labor 
administrations throughout the late 1980s and 1990s (Maddox 1989, 9-13).
In Britain, the Labour Party has also undergone a two-stage transformation in 
terms of its party appeals. During the 1960s, for example, Harold Wilson, in 
technocratic style, adopted the unifying theme of the "white heat of technology" 
designed to "transform the lives of all citizens" to broaden the party's appeal (Ingle 
1989, 115-6). As with Whitlam in Australia, the middle-classing of the 
parliamentary party also gained momentum under Wilson (Kavanagh 1982). 
Following a shift to the left after the election defeat of 1979, precipitating the 
formation of the SDP, the party slowly began another transformation under the 
leadership of Neil Kinnock. The most significant step in this period was taken 
through the party's 1989 Policy Review and the resulting program for government 
Meet the Challenge, Make the Change. The document stressed the importance of 
market forces in "meeting the demands of consumers, promoting efficiency and 
stimulating innovation", and prescribed a role for government intervention limited 
to cases in which market mechanisms had clearly failed (Seyd 1993, 77). Crewe 
(1992, 42) aptly described Meet the Challenge, Make the Change as "the least socialist 
party policy statement to be published by the party", whereby "the universal 
discourse of 'citizenship' has superseded the discourse of 'class'". In particular, 
Crewe observed, the document does not appeal to the 'working class', but rather 
to new liberal and market orientated groups of 'citizens' and 'consumers'.
The Democratic Party in the United States was confronted by the need for a new 
direction in its popular appeal during the late 1960s, following the defeat of the 
New Deal Democrat Hubert Humphrey to the Republicans' Richard Nixon in 
1968, and the independent candidacy of George Wallace which split the core 
Democratic vote. One response, originating from the New Left of the party, was 
the nomination of George McGovern as the party's 1972 presidential candidate. 
McGovern sought to broaden the party's electoral base by appealing to diverse 
range of minority groups, but the consequences of this strategy was the alienation 
of traditional supporters and an election annihilation (Nie, Verba and Petrocik 
1976; cf Miller and Levitan 1976). Twenty years later, an alternative "New 
Democrat" approach characterised the candidacy of the Clinton-Gore ticket in the 
1992 presidential election (Congressional Quarterly 1992, 2087). As a past chairman 
of the Democratic Leadership Council, created to shift the party away from its 
traditional New Deal liberalism (Crotty 1992), Clinton represented a break with 
the his more liberal predecessors (Lipset 1993). One aspect of this approach was 
the emphasis Clinton and Gore (1992) placed upon the "forgotten middle-class" in 
their election manifesto Putting People First. For example, while the 1972 policy 
platform criticised Republican policies which had kept worker's wages down while
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executive salaries soar" (Congressional Quarterly 1972, 1727), Clinton and Gore 
(1992, 3) argued that, in the 1980s, "while the rich got richer, the forgotten middle 
class - the people who work hard and play by the rule - took it on the chin".
The evidence presented above, while again anecdotal, suggests that each party has 
strategically altered its electoral appeals in an attempt to attract a broader 
constituency. What then have been the electoral consequences of these strategies? 
The updated Lipset and Rokkan thesis states that parties will gain or lose support 
in proportion to the changing size of their social base, whilst the party adaptation 
thesis states that the party division will be unchanged, consistent with the 
explanation that the parties have adapted to these threatening social trends. The 
Kelley, McAllister and Mughan (1985) work also provides a statistical method to 
test these alternative hypotheses. This approach involves, firstly, calculating the 
projected changes in party support which would have occurred as a result of social 
change had the relationship between social background and party vote remained 
constant over the period. For example, examining occupational change in 
Australia, Table 6.1 shows that in 1966 non-manual workers were 18 percent more 
likely to vote for the Liberal-National parties, net of other influences. The table 
also shows that, between 1966 and 1993 the proportion of voters from non-manual 
households rose from 46 percent to 58 percent, an increase of 12 percent. 
Therefore, had the relationship between occupation and party vote remained 
constant over the period, these calculations predict a gain to the Liberal-National 
parties, and a loss to the Labor Party, of 2.2 percent.3
To test the alternative hypotheses, a second calculation is also necessary, namely 
the estimated change in party support which occurred as a result of both changes 
in the proportion of voters from non-manual households, and changes in the 
relationship between occupation and party vote. The updated Lipset and Rokkan 
thesis holds that the estimated gains to the Liberal-National parties would equal the 
estimated gains of 2.2 percent. However it is the contention of the party 
adaptation thesis that the muted appeals of the Labor Party acted to reduce the 
electoral impact of the class cleavage to the extent that the rise in non-manual 
employment did not alter the balance of party support. To calculate the estimated 
change in party support as a result of occupational change in Australia, Table 6.1 
shows that in 1993 non-manual workers were only 9 percent more likely to vote 
for the Liberal-National parties, net of other influences. Given the 12 percent rise 
in non-manual occupations, the estimated change in party vote as a result of 
occupational change was a gain to the Liberal-National parties, and loss to the 
Labor Party, of 1.1 percent.4
Figure 6.3 shows the predicted and estimated gains to the major-right parties due to 
the rise in the proportion of non-manual workers in each country. Overall the 
figure suggests that, the left-wing parties have negated the predicted gains
3 The 1966 partial regression coefficient (.18), from Table 2.12 above, multiplied by the rise in 
the proportion of voters from non-manual households (12%) equals 2.2%.
4 The 1993 partial regression coefficient (.09) multiplied by the rise in the proportion of voters 
from non-manual households (12%) equals 1.1%.
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Table 6.1: Sample Mean and Electoral Impact of Class-related Variables in Australia, 
Britain, and the United States, 1964-93
Mean Im pact
Variable Scoring 1960s 1990s 1960s 1990s
A  ustralia
Occupation1 1 = non-manual, 0 = manual .46 .58 .18 .09
Union 1 = member, 0 = non-member .26 .23 -.13 -.16
Education 1= tertiary, .5 = post-secondary, 
0 = no further education
.11 .37 .02 -.02
B ritain
Occupation1 1 = non-manual, 0 = manual .40 .49 .20 .13
Union 1 = member, 0 = non-member .24 .20 -.10 -.13
Education l= tertairy , .5 = post-secondary, 
0 = no further education
.17 .27 .06 -.03
Housing 1 = owner occupier,
.5= private rent, 0 = LA 
tenantb
.60 .78 .18 .25
U nited  States
Occupation3 1 = non-manual, 0 = manual .58 .64 .07 .04
Union Memberhip 1 = member, 0 = member .14 .12 -.17 -.09
Education 1 = tertiary, .5 = post-secondary 
0 = no further education
.29 .44 .18 .09
a Head of Household 
b Local Government Authority Tenant
Sources: 1967 APAS and 1993 AES; 1964 and 1992 BES; 1964 and 1992 SRC-CPS NES. 
Regression coefficients are from Table 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14 above.
2.5-1
Australia Britain United States
Figure 6.3: Gains to major right-wing party due to the decline in manaul occupations 
in Australia, Britain, and the United Slates, 1964-93. Source: 1967 APAS, 
and 1993 AES; 1964 and 1992 BES; 1964 and 1992 SRC-CPS NES.
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to the right, consistent with the party adaptation thesis, although not to the extent 
that the balance of party support is unchanged. In Australia and the United States 
the estimated losses to the Labor Party and the Democratic Party respectively 
equalled only half the losses predicted on the bases of a consistent occupation-vote 
relationship. The changes were only slight in the United States (a projected gain of 
0.4 percent and estimated gain of 0.2 percent to the Republicans), a function of the 
weak impact of occupation in that country, but in Australia the gap between 
projected and estimated gains to the Liberal-National parties equalled 1.1 percent, a 
margin less than the coalition requires to win the next federal election (Mackerras 
1994). In Britain, although the Labour Party has been somewhat less successful in 
adapting to occupational change, negating one third (0.6 percent) of the predicted 
Conservative gain (1.8 percent), there is again evidence consistent with the 
explanation that left-wing losses were partly restrained through the party muting 
its appeals to blue-collar workers in an attempt to increase support among white- 
collar workers. Consequently, the weakening electoral impact of occupation is 
consistent with descriptions of the strategic decision-making, in response to an 
eroding social base, on the part of left-wing parties.
Figure 6.4, however, suggests that in Australia and Britain both labour parties have 
been much less successful in adapting to the decline in trade union membership, a 
likely outcome of the close organisation bonds both parties experience with their 
respective union movements. Despite the need to increasingly appeal to non- 
unionised voters, the percentage probability of a non-union member voting for the 
party of organised labour in Australia and Britain declined by 3 percent over the 
period. In conjunction with the downward trend in union membership, the 
estimated gains to the right in each party actually exceeded the predicted gains by 
0.1 percent. By contrast, the Democratic Party, which enjoys a weaker 
relationship with the union movement in the United States, was again able to 
negate half the predicted gain to the Republican Party. Although the predicted 
gains to the major right-wing party in each country were similar, it was only in the 
United States that the electoral impact of trade union membership declined. 
Unlike in the United States, the explicit union-party relationship which exists at 
the policy and organisational levels in Australia and Britain is more difficult to 
down-play than the implicit, or perhaps mythical, relationship between the 
Democratic Party and manual workers.
From the reverse perspective, however, it is very much in the interests of the 
major right-wing parties to politicise social division on the union membership 
cleavage, given that the union movement represents a shrinking minority in each 
electorate. In these terms the increased electoral impact of trade union
membership in Australia and Britain may be seen as successful "reverse adaptation" 
by the Liberal-National and Conservative parties respectively. As a feature of a 
broad commitment to a radical free-market agenda which extends to labour market 
reform, both parties have adopted strong anti-union policy programs on the 
grounds that the interests of organised labour, in particular the union elite rather 
than the ordinary rank and file members, undermine national economic interests, 
create inefficiencies in the labor market, and, on occasion, subjugate individual 
liberty (Craig 1990, 427; Fightback! 1991, 38). With the vast majority of the 
electorate non-unionised, the union movement represents a convenient, and highly
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visible, political opponent for the major parties on the right to exploit. The 
findings suggest that in Australia and Britain they have been successful.
Figure 6.4: Gains to major right-wing party due to the decline in union memebership 
in Australia, Britain, and the United States, 1964-93.
Sources: As for Figure 6.3.
The relationship between educational attainment and party support requires some 
initial discussion, given that is was not covered in chapter two. Table 6.1 shows 
that, in each country, during the mid 1960s a tertiary education increased the 
percentage probability of a person voting for the major right-wing party, although 
the electoral impact of the variable varied greatly. In the United States a tertiary 
education increased the probability of voting Republican by 18 percent, net of 
other influences, in Britain the probability of voting Conservative by 6 percent, 
and in Australia the probability of voting for the Liberal-National parties by only
2 percent. Given the expansion of higher education in each country the predicted 
gains to the right by the early 1990s equalled 2.7 percent in the United States, 0.6 
percent in Britain, and 0.5 percent in Australia (Figure 6.5). Over the same period, 
however, the relationship between education and party vote altered significantly. 
In the United States the percentage probability of a tertiary educated person voting 
Republican fell to 9 percent, whilst in both Australia and Britain the effect of a 
tertiary education actually switched direction, increasing the probability of voting 
Labor in Australia by 2 percent, and the probability of voting Labour in Britain by
3 percent.
As a consequence, the estimated gains and losses resulting from the expansion of 
higher education are substantially different to the changes predicted on the bases of 
a stable education-vote relationship. In Australia a 0.5 percent gain to the Liberal- 
National parties was reversed to a 0.5 percent gain to the Labor party. Similarly in 
Britain, a predicted 0.6 percent gain to the Conservatives was reversed to a 0.3 
percent gain to Labour. In the United states, although the tertiary educated remain 
predisposed to the Republican Party, the Democratic Party nevertheless halved the 
predicted Republican gains over the period, from a predicted gain of 2.7 percent to
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an estimated gain of 1.4 percent. Overall the left-wing parties either negated or 
reversed a right-wing biased trend in education between the mid 1960s to the early 
1990s by 0.9 percent in Britain, 1.0 percent in Australia, and by 1.3 percent in the 
United States.
Australia Britain United States
Figure 6.5: Gains or losses to major right-wing party due to the rise in educational 
attainment in Australia, Britain, and the United States, 1964-93. 
Sources: As for Figure 6.3.
The overall effect of occupation, union, and educational changes on the party 
balance in the electorate are shown in Figure 6.6. With respect to these three 
variables the most successful left-wing party adapting to social changes which 
threatened its support base was the Australian Labor Party. On the basis of a 
stable relationship between social group factors and party vote, the model predicted 
a net loss to the Labor Party of 3.1 percent. However, as the result of changes in 
the electoral impact of these variables the estimated loss to the party was only 1 
percent, down 2.1 percent on the predicted loss. In Labor's past five election 
victories, on a two-party preferred basis, the Labor vote has exceeded 52 percent on 
only one occasion, namely 1983 (Mackerras 1993, 1994),5 suggesting that if the 
party had not adapted to social change Labor may have lost the 1984, 1987, 1990 
and 1993 elections. Similarly in the United States the gap of 1.7 percent between 
predicted Republican gains of 3.5 percent and estimated gains of 1.8 percent was 
grater than the Democratic Party's winning margin in the 1980 House elections. 
In Britain, although Labour has not gone close to regaining power since 1979, the 
electoral competitiveness of the party has been strengthened by the partial negation 
of predicted Conservative gains of 2.8 percent to an estimated gain of 1.4 percent.
5 Labor actually polled fewer votes than the Liberal-National parties, on a two-party preferred 
basis, in the 1990 election (Mackerras 1990).
- 170-
2
<D
■S
o
.5a
W)
w
o
Ö
Australia Britain United States
Figure 6.6: Gains to major right-wing party due to occupational, union 
membership and education changes in Australia, Britain, and 
the United States, 1964-93. Sources: As for Figure 6.1.
The results from Britain require modification as they do not, as yet, include 
changes with respect to the influence of housing tenancy trends, in particular the 
increase of owner occupiers at the expense of public renters. In 1964 owner- 
occupiers were 18 percent more likely to vote Conservative than were public 
sector tenants. On the basis of a consistent relationship between housing and vote, 
the model predicted a Conservative gain of 3.2 percent over the period. However, 
the electoral impact of housing actually increased during those years, to the extent 
that in 1992 owner occupancy increased the probability of a person voting 
Conservative by 25 percent. The estimated gains to the Conservative Party as a 
result of changes in housing tenure was 4.5 percent, 1.3 percent higher than the 
predicted gains (Figure 6.7). Housing again represents a successful process of 
"reverse adaptation" by the Conservative Party. The party has politicised a social 
division, by encouraging home ownership and popular capitalism "as a means of 
promoting the vigorous virtues in individuals" (Letwin 1992, 101), on which its 
traditional constituency greatly, and increasingly, exceeds Labour's traditional 
constituency.6 Consequently the negated Conservative gains with respect to the 
other variables are largely eliminated by the influence of the housing variable. 
Combining all four variables, predicted Conservative gains of 6 percent were only 
marginally higher than the estimated gains of 5.9 percent. In other words, the 
success of Labour's adaptive strategies with respect to occupation and education 
have been almost entirely negated by the Conservative's exploitation of the 
housing cleavage.
6 Note that studies using panel surveys to examine the electoral behaviour of council house 
buyers found Labour experienced substantial defections among council house buyers (Heath with 
Garrett 1987; McAllister 1989; Studier, McAllister and Ascui 1990; Garrett 1994). Although it is 
not clear the extent to which these losses directly benefited the Alliance/Liberal Democrats or the 
Conservatives, in either case, on a two party basis, this shift in party support away from Labour 
among council house buyers represents a clear net gain to the Conservatives.
- 171-
&
Üa,
>
cd
Housing Total
Figure 6.7: Gains to the Conservative Party due to the rise in owner occupancy, and total 
gains due to all class-related change, including housing, in Britain 1964-92.
Sources: 1964 and 1992 BES.
Overall, the results presented above do provide some evidence in support of the 
party adaptation hypotheses that, in response to social change, left-wing parties 
mute their appeals to social groups which traditionally support them, which, in 
turn, limits the detrimental electoral effects of such social change. However, the 
extent to which the party balance is altered by social change varies greatly from 
variable to variable, and from country to country. In some cases predicted gains 
on the basis of a stable group-party relationship are only partially negated by 
changes in the extent of that relationship. In other cases predicted losses are 
translated into estimated gains through a reversal in the direction of the variable's 
effect. A third scenario is when predicted gains (losses) are exceeded by estimated 
gains (losses) through a process of "reverse adaptation" whereby the respective 
right-wing party is successful in politicising a social division on which distribution 
of the electorate is trending in a favourable direction.
In these terms hypothesis 4 finds no more support than hypothesis 3, other than 
the acknowledgment that group-party relationships are not stable over time. 
Although the party balance does not simply mirror social trends, neither are the 
successes and/or failures of adaptive strategies of precise magnitude to ensure that 
the party balance is unaltered. In particular it must be acknowledged that if it is in 
the interests of left-wing parties to de-emphasise a social cleavage in response to 
unfavourable social trends, it is in the interests of right-wing parties to politicise 
that cleavage (Sartori 1968). The precise outcome of the party support in the 
electorate is an outcome of these competitive processes. The results show that 
some variables are more conducive to being exploited through reverse adaptation, 
such as union membership and housing, whilst other variables are more conducive 
to being de-emphasised, such as occupation. As discussed in chapter two, the 
former variables are likely to be those which are explicitly linked to aspects of 
policy debate, such as opposing industrial relations policies or opposing housing 
policies in Britain. By contrast, the latter set of variables are likely to be those
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which reflect past social divisions of declining relevance in advanced industrial 
societies.
Other Social Changes
The class cleavage is but one of the four critical social cleavages identified by Lipset 
and Rokkan. An analysis of the relationship between social change and party 
system change also requires consideration of the electoral impact of changes with 
regard to the distribution of the electorate along the church-state, centre-periphery, 
and land-industry cleavages. In particular, in addition to a decline in the 
proportion of the electorate employed in manual occupations, advanced industrial 
societies are generally characterised by a rise in secularism, a continued decline in 
the rural population, as well population shifts between various regions in particular 
countries (Mackie, Franklin et al 1992; Dalton 1988, 161-3). The significance of the 
decline in religious adherents and the rural sector is that, in general, both groups 
tend to disproportionably support right-wing political parties. Social change 
therefore cannot be considered solely as a threat to the electoral base of left-wing 
parties. Indeed on social divisions other than the class cleavage, social trends may 
be in operation which threaten to erode the traditional support base of right-wing 
parties.
Figure 6.8 shows social trends between the mid 1960s and early 1990s with respect 
to the three non-class cleavages of the Lipset and Rokkan analysis. The church- 
state cleavage is represented by both denominational and religiosity divisions, 
namely the proportion of Protestants (Anglicans only in Britain) and regular (ie at 
least once a month) churchgoers of any religious denomination respectively. The 
rural-urban cleavage is represented by the proportion of voters from rural 
designated electorates. In addition, the centre-periphery cleavage is represented in 
both Britain and the United States as the proportion of voters from their respective 
southern regions, in Britain the south (London, the south-east, the south-west and 
East Anglia) representing the centre, in the United States the South (the eleven 
states of the old Confederacy) representing the periphery. An Australian variable 
for the centre-periphery cleavage is not included in the analysis on the grounds that 
the country lacks any meaningful basis upon which to construct any such a 
variable, demonstrated in chapter two.
The figure confirms the rise in secularism in each country which is a common 
characteristic through advanced industrial societies. In Australia, Britain, and the 
United States this process has taken two forms. Firstly, a decline in the proportion 
of voters who are churchgoers of the "privileged" denominations, namely 
Anglicans in Britain and Protestants in general in Australia and the United States, a 
likely consequence of their voluntary membership and focus upon social and 
community functions rather than worship (Kelly 1978; McAllister 1988). Secondly, 
a decline in the proportion of voters, from all faiths and denominations, attending 
church at least once a month as local community networks erode and alternative 
organisations compete for leisure time. Advanced industrial societies are also 
characterised by a continued contraction of the rural-based population, another 
group traditionally predisposed to the major-party of the right. Population shifts
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Figure 6.8: Distribution of selected social group variables in Australia, Britain, and 
the United States, 1964-93. Sources: As for Figure 6.3
also represent an important aspect of social change in Britain and the United States, 
in both countries towards the southern region. In Britain the proportion of voters 
from the south, a region of traditional Conservative strength, increased from 37 
percent to 43 percent, in the United States the proportion of voters from the 
South, a region of traditional Democratic strength, increased from 19 percent to 26 
percent. Overall, it is not only the electoral support of left-wing parties which is 
threatened by ongoing aspects social change. Indeed political parties with any form 
of social distinctiveness in their electoral base must be responsive to social change.
To examine the effect of the these aspects of social change upon the party balance 
in each country the method of the previous section was again adopted. The 
updated Lipset and Rokkan hypothesis positing a change in party support in direct 
proportion to the changing size of the relevant social group, the party adaptation 
thesis positing that the party balance of support will remain unchanged (see Table 
6.2 for means and impact of variables). With regard to these variables, however, 
the potential for political parties to adapt to social trends is somewhat lower than 
with regard to the class-based cleavages. In particular, as demonstrated in chapter 
two, religious, regional, and residential social divisions represent secondary 
cleavages, with the structure of party competition centred primarily around the 
social divisions of the class cleavage. As political parties, in general, no longer 
make explicit appeals on the bases of these divisions, it is likely that parties will be 
less able to adapt to relevant social trends by muting appeals which, for some time, 
have not explicitly been made. With the exception of the National Party in 
Australia, all the major parties seek the support of both rural and urban groups, 
throughout all regions of the country. Similarly no party would risk the ensuing 
divisiveness which would result from explicitly sectarian appeals towards a
Table 6.2: Sample Mean and Electoral Impact of Non-Class Variables in Australia, 
Britain, and the United States, 1964-93
Variable Scoring
Mean
1960s 1990s
Impact
1960s 1990s
A ustralia
Denomination 1 = Protestant .56 .47 .08 .10
Religiosity 1 = at least once a month .37 .22 .06 .04
Residence 1 = rural, 0 = urban .36 .32 .02 .04
B rita in
Denomination 1 = Anglican .65 .41 .09 .08
Religiosity 1 = at least once a month .27 .20 .03 -.01
Residence 1 = rural, 0 = urban .26 .18 .05 .04
Region 1 = South/London .37 .43 .02 .05
U nited  States
Denomination 1 = Protestant .67 .60 .14 .08
Religiosity 1 = at least once a month .67 .56 .05 .06
Residence 1 = rural, 0 = urban .39 .32 -.08 .07
Region 1 = South, 0 = Non-south .19 .26 -.09 .03
Sources: As for Table 6.1.
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particular religious group. Although certain social or moral issues, such as 
abortion, may be linked to religious divisions, as chapter four demonstrated, the 
attitudes which dominate the political agenda in each country continue to be those 
reflecting the dominant class cleavage. In other words, it is difficult to mute 
appeals which are no longer made.
Figure 6.9 shows the predicted and estimated losses to the major right-wing parties 
as a result of the combined effects of changes in religious denomination and 
attendance. In each country the model predicted a substantial loss on the basis of a 
consistent relationship between religion/religiosity and party support, namely a 
loss of 1.5 percent for the Republican Party, a loss of 1.6 percent for the Liberal- 
National parties, and a 2.3 percent loss for the Conservatives in Britain. The 
Conservatives were particularly threatened by the steep decline in the proportion 
of Anglicans in the electorate. Over the period, the electoral impact of the 
religious cleavages remained only moderate to weak, with most variables showing, 
if anything, a slight decline in influence over the period. The only two cases of an 
increased influenced was religious denomination in Australia, and religiosity in the 
United states, but in both cases the rise was only marginal. As expected, the 
estimated changes in the party balance, a loss to the right in each country, were 
closer to the predicted changes than was the case on the occupation variable. 
Nevertheless, the figure does identify a degree of successful Conservative Party 
adaptation, perhaps reflecting the rift between Margaret Thatcher and the Church 
of England during her term in office, actually an electoral bonus given waning 
Church membership (Kavanagh 1987, 288-9; Crewe 1993, 7).
Figure 6.9: Losses to major right-wing party due to the rise of secularism 
in Australia, Britain, and the United States, 1964-93.
Sources: As for Figure 6.3
The declining proportion of voters from rural electorates represents an additional 
threat to the major right-wing parties who, traditionally, have gained 
disproportionate support from rural voters. In both Australia and Britain the
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independent electoral impact of rural residence was relatively weak, but consistent, 
throughout the period. The small estimated losses to the right in both countries, 
which resulted from the urban drift, were similar to the losses predicted on the 
basis of a constant urban/rural-party relationship (Figure 6.10). In the United 
states, however, the results were very different. As discussed in chapter two, 
despite the traditional predisposition of rural voters to the Republican Party 
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948, 25-7), the volatility of the rural vote has, on 
occasion, delivered the group to the Democrats (Burnham 1974). Such was the 
case in the 1964 congressional elections in which rural voters were 8 percent more 
likely to vote Democrat than urban voters, net of other influences. A consistent 
1964 relationship between rural residence and party vote, given a 7 percent decline 
in the ural population, would predict a 0.6 percent loss to the Democrats over the 
period. However, throughout the 1980s and 1990s the rural vote has shown a 
consistent Republican predisposition, whereby in 1992 rural voters were 7 percent 
more likely to vote Republican than urban voters. Thus the estimated change in 
the balance of party support is in fact a 0.5 percent loss to the Republicans. Given 
the contraction of the rural sector over the period, the 'success' of the Republicans 
in reasserting its advantage in rural areas, relative to urban areas, actually represents 
an electoral shortcoming.
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Figure 6.10: Losses to major right-wing party due to the decline in the rural population 
in Australia, Britain, and the United States, 1964-93.
Sources: As for Figure 6.3
The final aspect of social change related to the four critical cleavages of the Lipset 
and Rokkan thesis is the population shifts in Britain and the United States towards 
their respective southern regions. In Britain this represents a shift to the centre, a 
region predisposed to the Conservatives, in the United States a shift towards the 
periphery, a region traditionally predisposed towards the Democrats. In 1964 
region in Britain was, at most, only a marginal independent influence on party 
vote, southerners 1 percent more likely to vote Conservative than other Britons. 
Thus the predicted gain to the Conservatives as a result of population growth in 
the south over the period was only 0.2 per cent (Figure 6.11). The electoral impact
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of region actually increased over the period, a likely consequence of the divergent 
economic trends between the regions under the Thatcher government, the south 
initially experiencing better economic conditions than other regions (Johnston and 
Pattie 1989; cf Curtice and Steed 1982).7 Nevertheless, the independent impact of 
region upon voting in Britain remains limited, generating a net gain to the 
Conservatives of just 0.3 percent.
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Figure 6.11: Gains or losses to major right-wing party due to populations shifts to 
the south in Britain and the United States, 1964-93. Sources: 1964 
and 1992 BES; 1964 and 1992 SRC-CPS NES.
In the United States the regional cleavage was a stronger electoral influence at the 
beginning of the period, reflected in the finding that in 1964 southerners were 9 
percent more likely to vote Democrat, net of other influences. However steady 
Republican gains in the South over the period, a consequence of regional migration 
(Wolfinger 1985; cf Converse 1966b; Petrocik 1987) and/or the alignment of 
ideological and partisan preferences (Carmines and Stanley 1990), shows that in 
1992 southerners were 3 percent more likely to vote Republican than northerners. 
A predicted 0.6 percent loss to the Republicans was translated into a 0.2 percent 
gain for the party. Republican gains in the South represent an effective electoral 
strategy whereby the party has replaced the Democrats as the dominant party in 
the rapidly expanding region.
The combined effects of social change on the four critical cleavages are shown in 
Figure 6.12. Although social change was not solely limited to a contraction in the 
size of social groups which traditionally support left-wing parties, analysis based on 
stable group-party relationships predicted a net gain to the right in each country. 
In Australia the analyses predicted a net 1.4 percent gain to the Liberal-National
7 For evidence that migration from north to south increased the likelihood of voting 
Conservative, and migration from south to north the likelihood of voting Labour see McMahon et 
al (1992)
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parties, in Britain a net 3.4 percent gain to the Conservatives, in the United States 
a net 1.9 percent gain to the Republican Party. The larger predicted gain to the 
Conservatives is an outcome of the electoral influence of housing tenure in that 
country. However, the extent to which the estimated changes diverged from the 
predicted changes varied greatly from country to country. In Australia the 
predicted Labor loss was reversed into an estimated Labor gain of 0.6 percent, a 
turnaround of 2 percent which is greater than the margin in Labor's past three 
election victories. In the United States predicted Democratic losses were reduced 
by 1.6 percent to an estimated loss of 0.3 percent, representing a negation of over 
four fifths of the predicted Republican gains. By contrast the estimated gains to 
the Conservatives of 4.0 percent actually exceeded the already substantial predicted 
gains by 0.6 percent. Although social trends on these variables have clearly 
worked against Labour over the period, the party's electoral performance is worse 
than that predicted on the bases of a consistent group-party relationship.
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Figure 6.12: Gains or losses to major right-wing party due to social change 
in Australia, Britain, and the United States, 1964-93.
Sources: As for Figure 6.3.
In assessing the success or failure of the major party of the left in each country to 
adapt to social change, the importance of the class cleavage to expanding electoral 
appeals beyond the traditional working class constituency appears crucial. In 
Australia the 2.1 percent turnaround in the party balance towards Labor on the 
three class-related variables alone more than accounted for the total turnaround of 
2.0 percent on all variables combined. In the United States the 1.7 percent 
turnaround towards the Democrats on the class related variables alone accounted 
for the total turnaround of 1.5 percent on all variables combined. In Britain, 
however, estimated gains to the Conservatives on the class variables almost equalled 
predicted gains, largely as a result of the impact of the housing variable. The 
results for Australia and the United states are consistent with the explanation that 
the Labor and Democratic parties, respectively, muted their electoral appeals to the 
working class and gained at the polls as a result. In Britain, despite similar 
although weaker achievements by Labour on the occupation and education
- 179-
variables the dominant influence on the party balance was the ability of the 
Conservative Party, through a process of reverse adaptation, to politicise the 
housing tenure cleavage upon which it was able to achieve substantial electoral 
gains.
Whilst acknowledging that party support does not change in direct proportion to 
the changing size of critical social groups (ie. in contradiction to the updated Lipset 
and Rokkan thesis), the findings suggest that the party adaptation thesis requires 
some modification. In particular, the electoral impact of particular social group 
influences do not always change in a direction which maintains the pre-existing 
balance of party support in the electorate. Whilst the evidence presented is 
consistent with the explanation that parties do represent a potential intervening 
variable in the extent to which social change is translated into electoral change, in 
some situations it is very much in the interest of parties to politicise a social 
cleavage which is undergoing change in its distribution among voters. Housing 
tenure in Britain is the prime example. The extent to which the party balance is 
altered by social change is an outcome of the success or failure of competing parties 
to raise or lower the saliency of various social cleavages in accordance with 
maximising their electoral support. To the extent that parties are successful in 
politicising favourable cleavages and de-politicising unfavourable cleavages their 
electoral support will increase. Just as there is no reason to suspect that electoral 
change will directly reflect social change, neither is there a reason to suspect the 
party balance will be unaltered. What does in fact occur will reflect the success or 
failure of the parties in influencing the social bases of electoral support.
Attitudinal Change
A related concern to social change in the electorate is the extent to which political 
parties may have gained or lost support as the result of attitudinal change among 
voters. A possible interpretation of the election victories of Thatcher in 1979 and 
Reagan in 1980 was that their electoral successes were indicative of a general shift 
to the right in public opinion throughout the Anglo-American democracies (Hall 
1979, 1985; Wirthlin 1981; Cooper, Kornberg and Mishler 1988). Although the 
specifics of their policy proposals varied, both leaders used strong rhetoric in 
criticising the prevailing post-war Keynesian economic consensus and campaigned 
with strong ideological conviction for less government intervention in the 
economy and the winding back of the welfare state (Letwin 1992, 114-29; Stein 
1988, 235-62; Thomas 1988). The trend to the right on economic matters was also 
apparent in Canada with Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives elected in the 
1984 elections on a free-market platform (Gibbins 1988). Furthermore, in Australia 
and New Zealand, where left-wing parties governed for most of the 1980s, a shift 
in public opinion to the right was also consistent with political events. In both 
countries the Labo(u)r prime minister (Hawke in Australia, Lange in New 
Zealand), and more particularly their respective Treasurers (Keating and Douglas), 
were committed to many of the same market reforms to which Thatcher and 
Reagan were originally committed (Honey and Barnett 1990; Kelly 1992, 54-94). 
The re-election of all these administrations for, at least, a second term suggested 
that governments of all persuasions had carried their electorates with them in a 
decisive shift away from the interventionist policies of the Keynesian era.
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Although political scientists were hesitant to describe these electoral successes as 
evidence of a widespread shift to the right in public opinion in their respective 
electorates (Hibbs 1982; Crewe and Searing 1988; Fiorina 1988; Franklin 1988; 
Heath et al 1991, 171-85; Wattenberg 1991, 92-129), Figure 6.13 shows that a shift 
to the right did occur between the mid 1960s and late 1970s in each country on the 
dominant economic attitudes identified in chapter four (see also McAllister 1992a, 
90; Sarlvik and Crewe 1983, 183-96; Studlar and McAllister 1992, 153; Fiorina 1988, 
435; Wattenberg 1991, 102). Note, however, that although Americans on average 
held their position through the 1980s, in both Britain and Australia a shift back 
towards the left occurred between the late 1970s and early 1990s. Nevertheless the 
significance of this reversal should not be overstated as, for the most part, these 
measures represent relative rather than absolute measures. In other words, a 
position of 50 represents support for the status quo, regardless of the prevailing 
conditions of the time, while a position greater than 50 represents support for 
further right-wing policies. The substantial market reforms which occurred over 
the period in Australia and Britain, together with evidence that the mean position 
of the electorate remains to the right of the position of the mid 1960s, suggests an 
acceptance of reform which was not present in the earlier period.
1965 -
1975 -
1985 -
Britain United
States Australia
Left -----------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ►- Right
Mean Score on Economic Attitude Scale (0-100)
Figure 6.13: Mean electorate position on dominant economic attitudes (see Chapter 4) 
in Australia, Britain and the United States, 1964-92. Sources: As for 
Figure 6.2
The shift to the right in the electorate on dominant economic attitudes provides a 
challenge to the left-wing parties in the same manner as a decline in the size of the 
working class. In both situations the left experiences a contraction in the size of 
its traditional social base. However, an analysis of the extent of left-wing party 
adaptation to attitudinal change requires a somewhat different approach to that 
adopted in the previous section. In particular, calculations of predicted and 
expected changes in party support, such as those performed above, are very 
dependent upon the measurement error of the variables involved. The advantage 
with social background factors is that survey estimates may be verified against
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census and population data, while attitudinal data are subject to question format 
and response coding variation which cannot be verified against any external source. 
Political attitudes are also subject to contextual effects of the campaign period, 
while social change tends to occur slowly over-time, often in the one direction, 
which makes it more suitable for the application of projection techniques. Finally 
the relative, rather than absolute, nature of many attitudinal questions prohibits a 
clear interpretation of the extent of party adaptation based upon the interaction of 
opinion (sample means) and saliency (electoral impact). Consequently, to analyse 
attitudinal adaptation a more descriptive approach, relying upon selected attitudinal 
data in each country, is adopted below.
Australia
The findings of both the longitudinal and expanded 1993 analyses of political 
attitudes in Australia identified attitudes towards trade unions as the dominant 
attitudinal influence upon electoral behaviour (see also Kelley 1988; McAllister 
1991a, 1991b, 1992a, 83-93). In the longitudinal analysis voters most opposed to 
trade unions were 65 percent more likely to vote Liberal-National, net of other 
influences, than those most supportive of unions in the 1993 elections. Although 
the introduction of additional economic attitudes in the expanded analysis reduced 
the percentage probability of union opponents voting for the Coalition to 37 
percent, attitudes towards unions remained the most influential variable, other than 
party identification, on Australian electoral behaviour. One aspect of attitudes 
towards trade unions concerns the extent to which trade unions have too much 
power, an increase in the perception that trade unions are too powerful 
representing a shift in public opinion detrimental to Labor Party support and 
beneficial to the Liberal-National parties. In other words, as an aspect of electoral 
strategy it is very much in the interests of the Labor Party to minimise perceptions 
of excessive union power and for the Liberal-National parties to maximise those 
perceptions.
Table 6.3 shows that a minority of voters in 1967, 47 percent, believed unions had 
too much power, but that by 1979 the figure had increased to 80 percent. While 
the factors underlying that increase are necessarily speculative, it is likely that one 
important influence was the 1974 wages explosion which occurred during the term 
in office, from 1972 to 1975, of the Whitlam Labor government. These 
circumstances provided the Liberal-National parties with an opportunity to 
campaign strongly on the threat of another wages explosion under Labor, until the 
Coalition itself experienced a wages breakout in 1982 (Indecs Economics 1984, 39- 
42). The election of the Hawke Labor government in 1983 provided the party 
with an opportunity to dispel fears regarding the threat of union power. Labor 
introduced the Accord as the centrepiece of their industrial relations agenda (Gruen 
and Grattan 1993, 111-34; Kelly 1992, 54-75), whereby restraint in union wage 
claims was promised by the peak union organisation in exchange for employment 
growth, an increase in the social wage (ie living standards), and "immunity for 
unions from punitive civil laws or common law penal sanctions" (Kelly 1992, 62).
- 182-
Table 6.3: Attitudes Towards Trade Union Power in Australia, 1967-93
1964
Percent Agree 
1979 1990 1993
Trade U nion Power
Too Much Power 46 80 69 63
D on't Know/It Depends/Neither 14 4 19 17
N ot Too Much Power 40 16 12 19
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (2038) (1815) (1951) (1917)
Source: 1967 and 1979 APAS; 1987, 1990 and 1993 AES.
The economic consequences of the Accord process remain a topic of controversy 
among commentators (Gruen and Grattan 1993, 116-21). One view, promoted by 
the Labor Party, is that over the past decade the Accord has provided Australia 
with a period of substantial wage restraint unprecedented in the modern era (Kelly 
1992, 499-500). Figure 6.14 shows that the annual growth in average weekly 
earnings since the Accord was introduced in 1983 compares favourably to the 
wages growth which occurred during the mid 1970s under the Whitlam 
government and the early 1980s under the Fraser government. Although the causal 
process between wages growth and perceptions of union power are also speculative, 
it is notable that the proportion of voters believing that trade unions have too 
much power has declined during the Accord and wage restraint era of the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Indeed, between 1979 and 1993 the proportion of voters in that 
category fell by 17 percent to 63 percent. One plausible interpretation, consistent 
with the party adaptation thesis, is that Labor has reduced voter anxieties regarding 
union power through its wages policy, which in turn has predisposed an increased 
proportion of the electorate towards Labor on the basis of their attitudes towards 
trade unions.
Year
Figure 6.14: Annual growth in average weekly earnings in Australia, 1968-92.
Source: ABS Average Weekly Earnings, States and Australia (6302.0)
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The expanded attitudinal analysis of chapter four also identified attitudes towards 
Republicanism an a dominant electoral influence in Australia. In the 1993 election 
the strongest opponents of the various aspects of republicanism were 27 percent 
more likely to vote Liberal-National than the dimension's strongest supporters. 
Over the past three decades issues related to republicanism have twice risen to 
prominence. The first occasion was in the wake of the 1975 dismissal of the 
Whitlam Labor government by the Governor-General, the Monarch's 
representative in Australia, which promoted underlying republican sentiment 
among the Labor Party and its supporters (Warhurst 1993). More recently, debate 
regarding Australia's ties with Britain, changes to the Australian flag (which 
currently includes the Union Jack), and Australia switching from a constitutional 
monarchy to a Republic, surfaced following a motion passed at the 1991 Labor 
National Conference endorsing a Republic by the year 2000, and ongoing pro­
republican sentiments expressed by Labor Prime Minister Keating following his 
ascent to that position in 1992 (Gruen and Grattan 1993, 226; Kelly 1992, 679). As 
a consequence Labor has positioned itself as the party of Republican sentiment and 
the Liberal-National parties, although divided internally, as the defenders of the 
existing order (Warhurst 1993).
Table 6.4: Popular Support for Republican Positions, and Correlation with 
Party Vote, in Australia 1967-93.
Variable 1967
Percent A g  
1979
ree
1987 1993
Republic
Australia should become a Republic 34 59
(Correlation with vote - Pearson's r) - (.28) - (.41)
R oyalty
Queen and Royal Family Not Very 47 46 52 64
Important to Australia 
(Correlation with vote - Pearson's r) (.08) (.27) (.22) (.35)
Flag
Australia Should Change its Flag 28 41
(Correlation with vote - Pearson's r) - (.26) (.34)
Sources: 1967 and 1979 APAS, 1987 and 1993 AES.
Table 6.4 shows that on three aspects of the general republican debate, public 
opinion has clearly shifted over time towards the pro-republican position (see also 
Bean 1993b). Support for an Australian republic increased from 34 percent in 1979 
to 59 percent in 1993, opinion that the Queen royal family are not very important 
to Australia increased from 47 percent in 1967 to 64 percent in 1993, and support 
for a change to the Australian flag increased from 28 percent in 1987 to 41 percent 
in 1993. In addition, over the same period, the relationship between republican 
sentiments and party vote has strengthened as the major parties have tended to 
adopt contrasting positions on these issues. The electoral benefits of these trends 
for Labor are two-fold. Firstly, opinion is moving strongly in a direction towards 
Labor's position of constitutional and cultural identity change, whilst the Liberal- 
National parties, should they continue to adopt a conservative position, are 
becoming increasingly marginalised on these issues. Secondly, through Labor's
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politicisation of these issues, voters are increasingly likely to bring into alignment 
their republican and party preferences. The Republican agenda of the Labor Party 
thus represents a successful process of reverse adaptation whereby the party has 
politicised and raised the impact of an attitudinal cleavage upon which public 
opinion is trending in a favourable position.
Britain
In contrast to the Australian Labor Party, the recent electoral failures of the British 
Labour Party suggest that the party failed to respond adequately to the shift to the 
right in the electorate which occurred during the 1970s. Although the party 
governed from 1964 to 1970, and again from 1974 to 1979, findings from the 1964 
British Election Study provided Labor with an early warning of the need to adapt. 
The survey of that year asked respondents what they liked and disliked about each 
political party. The overwhelming dislike of the Labour Party, the first response 
of 51 percent of those with an opinion, was the party's policies of public 
ownership, whilst the second most frequent response was a dislike of Labour's 
defence policies. In the 1964 election Labour campaigned on a public ownership 
policy which called for "a coordinated policy for the major fuel industries", "major 
expansion programs ... in the existing nationalised industries", and nationalisation 
of the steel industry, and a defence policy which opposed the development of an 
independent British deterrent (Craig 1990, 47, 59). The issues of public ownership 
and defence have been the focus of many electoral studies in Britain which have 
tended to highlight both the electoral impact of public ownership and defence 
issues on British voting behaviour, in addition to the extent to which Labour's pro­
nationalisation and anti-nuclear positions are an electoral liability (Sarlvik and 
Crewe 1983, 183-96; Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985, 118; McAllister and Mughan 
1985; McAllister and Studier 1989; Studier, McAllister and Ascui 1990).
The expanded analysis of political attitudes in the 1992 British Election showed 
that attitudes related to privatization/nationalisation and defence remain dominant 
influences on the political agenda (see also Rose and McAllister 1990, 107). The 
extent to which Labour's policy positions on public ownership and defence were 
inconsistent with mainstream public opinion is shown in Table 6.5. Support for 
increased nationalisation, favoured by only 29 percent of respondents in 1964, fell 
to just 16 percent in 1979. Despite an increase in support during the 1980s and 
1990s, and a massive privatization campaign by the Conservative government, only 
a quarter of respondents favoured more public ownership in 1992, still below the 
levels of the mid 1960s. Certainly support for continued privatization in Britain 
has eroded in recent years, but nevertheless the findings suggest an underlying 
acceptance of the changes to the structure of the British economy over that period 
(cf McAllister and Studlar 1989).8 On the issue of Britain's nuclear defence, a 
policy of "nothing to do with nuclear weapons" has never been supported by more 
than a minority of voters. Although support for the Conservative policy of an
8 There is also evidence that the Conservative Party's extension of popular capitalism via the 
massive share issues associated with the privatization program of the 1980s was electorally beneficial, 
with a new share purchase increasing the likelihood of a person voting Conservative after their 
purchase (McAllister 1989; Studier, McAllister and Ascui 1990; cf Heath with Garrett 1987; Garrett 
1994).
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independent nuclear deterrent has declined since 1964, it nevertheless outnumbers 
support for unilateral disarmament by a margin of two to one. In addition, the 
strong support for a nuclear deterrent as part of a western alliance again suggests an 
underlying acceptance of a pro-nuclear policy among British voters.
Table 6.5: Popular Opinion on Issues of Public Ownership and Defence 
Scales in Britain, 1964-92
Variable 1964
Percent Agree 
1979 1987 1992
Public Ownership
More Nationalisation 29 16 17 26
Stay the Same 51 44 49 51
More Privitisation 21 40 33 23
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (1421) (1465) (3061) (2172)
Nuclear Defence
Independent Nuclear Deterrant 43 - 34 35
Nuclear Weapons only as part of 46 - 49 50
Western Alliance
No Nuclear Weapons 
Total
11 _ 17 14
100 - 100 100
(N) (1468) - (3031) (2199)
Source: 1964, 1979, 1987 and 1992 BES.
The Labour Party largely maintained its unpopular stances through the electoral 
defeats of 1979, 1983 and 1987. The party's 1983 Manifesto, the peak of Labour 
alienation of the electorate (Paulson 1994), committed Labour to "cancel the 
Trident [nuclear missile system] program, refuse to deploy [United States] Cruise 
missiles and begin discussions for the removal of nuclear bases from Britain, which 
is to be completed within the lifetime of the Labour government" (Craig 1990, 
350). On nationalisation the manifesto called for "return to public ownership the 
public assets and rights hived off by the Tories, with compensation of no more 
than that received when the assets were denationalised" (Craig 1990, 356).9 The 
1989 Policy Review, however, fundamentally altered policy on both issues. On 
defence it provided no timetable to end Britain's nuclear capability, with weapons 
retained pending unilateral settlements, and abandoned plans to close United States 
military bases. On nationalisation, whilst maintaining support for a degree of 
social ownership of public utilities, the review stressed the importance of market 
forces in meeting the demands of consumers and promoting efficiency. Re-
9 This position was moderated somewhat in the 1987 manifesto which committed the party to 
"social ownership of basic utilities like gas and water". The manifesto stated that "Private shares in 
British Telecom and British Gas Labour will be converted into special new securities [to be] bought 
and sold in the market in the usual way and will carry either a guaranteed return, or dividends 
linked to the company's growth (Craig 1990, 461).
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nationalisation requiring "substantial resources" was rejected, effectively endorsing 
most of the Conservatives privatization agenda (Crewe 1992; Seyd 1993).
The effect of Labour's 1989 Policy Review upon perceptions of the party's position 
on privatization and nuclear defence is shown in Table 6.6 (see also Heath and 
Jowell 1994). The table reports the mean position of the electorate, and the mean 
perceived position of the two major parties, in the 1987 and 1992 elections on a 
scale ranging from 0 (strongest opposition) to 100 (strongest support). On 
privatization, voters perceived a clear shift to the right in Labour policy, consistent 
with the policy review, towards the mean position of the electorate. Indeed the 
policy distance between Labour and the electorate was narrowed further by a shift 
to the left among voters, while voters perceived a slight shift to the right, away 
from the electorate's mean position, by the Conservative Party. On nuclear 
defence, voters also perceived a decisive shift to the right by the Labour Party, 
away from support for unilateral disarmament and towards the mean position of 
the electorate. Although voters were unchanged from the position of 1987, a shift 
to the left, away from support for an independent nuclear deterrent, also 
positioned the Conservatives closer to the electorate's mean position.
Table 6.6: Position of British Electorate and Major Parties on 
Privatization and Defence Scales, 1987 and 1992
Variable 1987
Scale (0-100) 
1992 Chanee
Privatization
Electorate 54 47 -7
Labour 19 26 + 7
Conservative 82 84 + 2
(N) (3021) (1100)
Indepedent Nuclear Defence
Electorate 42 42 0
Labour 11 29 + 18
Conservative 70 52 -18
(N) (3082) (1089)
Equality for Women
Electorate - 85 -
Labour - 76 -
Conservative - 71 -
(N) - (1094) -
Source: 1987 and 1992 BES.
The findings in Table 6.6, however, only report average attitudinal positions. 
What is important for each voter is their own personal perception of Labour's, the
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Conservative's, and their own position relative to each other.10 In particular, 
whether their own position is closer to Labour or the Conservatives, or equidistant 
between the two.* 11 Table 6.7 shows that in 1987 38 percent of voters were closer 
to Labour on the issue of privatization, but in 1992, after the Policy Review, 47 
percent of voters were closer to Labour. Over the same period the proportion of 
voters closer to the Conservatives declined by 8 percent, so that a 7 percent 
Conservative advantage on privatization in 1987 was translated to 10 percent 
Labour advantage in 1992. On the issue of nuclear defence a different process 
occurred whereby in 1992, although the proportion of voters closer to Labour 
remained unchanged, fewer voters were closer to the Conservatives and more 
voters were equidistant between the two major parties. Consequently, as a result 
of party movements between 1987 and 1992, the Conservative Party's net 
advantage over Labour fell from 18 percent to 6 percent. Overall, the Policy 
Review worked to the extent that voters perceived a shift in Labour policies 
towards a more mainstream position, so more voters were positioned closer to 
Labour than the Conservatives on the issue of privatization, whilst the 
Conservative advantage on defence policies was substantially reduced (cf Heath and 
Jowell 1994).
Finally, evidence is also available regarding voter and perceived party positions on 
the issue of gender equality. The advancement of women was identified in chapter 
four as a component of underlying attitudes towards minority rights, a significant 
electoral influence in the 1992 election. Table 6.6 shows that the mean position of 
voters and perceptions of the major parties are located towards the extreme 
supportive position. With voters holding the most supportive position, and 
Labour positioned at a somewhat less supportive position but more supportive 
than the Conservative's, the party is ideally located to exploit the issue for electoral 
gain. Table 6.7 shows that, although the highest proportion of voters are 
equidistant from both parties, Labour holds a clear advantage over the 
Conservatives. In the 1992 election Labour campaigned on a policy to create a 
minister for disabled, a minister for children, a minister for women, 14 weeks 
maternity pay, and home carers to get improved allowances (The Economist 1992, 
65). Although somewhat speculative, the results suggest that minority rights, 
including gender equality, provides Labour with an opportunity, through a process 
of reverse adaptation, to raise the saliency of a political attitude on which it is 
clearly advantaged (cf Franklin 1988). The fact that minority rights attitudes were 
significant in 1992 suggests the party had some success in achieving that end.
10 This is the main weakness of similar studies conducted by Heath and colleagues (Heath, 
Jowell and Curtice 1985, 91-96; Heath and Jowell 1994). In particular, the scholars calculate the 
closest party to each voter by comparing the voter's position to the average position of the parties, 
on the grounds that voter's perceptions of the parties positions is subject to distortion. However, as 
there is no guarantee that the mean position of a party represents its actual position, given the 
subjectivity of the scale (only the endpoints are defined), such comparisons are entirely meaningless. 
Furthermore, to the extent that policy proximity has any electoral impact, logically it must be an 
outcome of the policy distances as assessed by the voter, not those determined by a social 
researcher.
11 The Liberal Democrats are excluded from the analysis on the grounds that the centre vote in 
Britain is largely ephemeral and lacks a distinctive attitudinal basis (Crewe 1982; Curtice 1983; 
Studier and McAllister 1987, 1992).
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Table 6.7: Closest Party on Privatization and Defence Scales 
in Britain, 1987 and 1992
Closest Party:
Percent
1987 1992
Privatiza tion
Labour 38 47
Equidistant 16 16
Conservative 45 37
Total 100 100
Net Labour Advantage -7 + 10
(N) (2993) (1088)
Indepedent Nuclear Defence
Labour 36 36
Equidistant 10 23
Conservative 54 42
Total 100 100
Net Labour Advantage -18 -6
(N) (3047) (1071)
Equality fo r  W omen
Labour - 33
Equidistant - 41
Conservative - 26
Total - 100
Net Labour Advantage - + 7
(N) - (1088)
Source: 1987 and 1992 BES.
United States
The 1980 elections represented the worst electoral performance of the Democratic 
Party since the 1950s in a clear shift in voter support to the Republican Party. 
Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter on radical free-market agenda of tax cuts, 
cuts to welfare spending, and government deregulation, and carried his party to 
Senate majority status for the first time since 1956. The Carter Administration had 
begun in 1976 with an interventionist agenda, the reduction of unemployment, 
targeted by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in the Keynesian tradition, 
the top priority. A policy reversal, in response to rising inflation and falling 
productivity, later switched to a fight inflation first strategy through a policy of 
fiscal and monetary restraint (Stein 1988, 218-32; Thomas 1988, 103-7). 
Nevertheless, at the 1980 Democratic Convention the camp of defeated primary 
candidate Edward Kennedy was successful in forcing the party to re-adopt a more 
interventionist and expansionary economic platform. In particular, the Kennedy 
campaign was successful in seeking a $12 billion anti-recession jobs program as part 
of the policy platform, with Kennedy triumphantly announcing in his speech to
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the convention that "unemployment will be the first priority of our economic 
policy". It was notable that, in the end, the policy platform "won only half 
hearted endorsement from the President" (Congressional Quarterly 1980, 2360-2).
The results in Table 6.8 suggests that the adoption by the Democratic Party of a 
distinctly pro-jobs policy platform in 1980 may have been a strategic mistake. 
Almost half of all respondents in the 1980 National Election Study believed that 
"government should let people get ahead by themselves", rejecting the view that 
"government should guarantee people a job and a good standard of living". A 
further one fifth of the electorate adopted a midpoint between the two positions. 
Consequently less than one in three voters supported the interventionist position. 
Public opinion was somewhat more favourable towards increasing public spending, 
with those supporting increased spending outnumbering those supporting lower 
spending by 47 percent to 34 percent. Nevertheless, if anything, a slight majority 
of voters were opposed any spending increase, with a further 20 percent of 
respondents adopting a position favouring the status quo. By 1992 opinion on 
these issues had failed to shift in a direction more favourable to the Democratic 
Party. Indeed, although on the government intervention issue opinion was largely 
unchanged, support for increased public spending had fallen considerably.
Table 6.8: Popular Opinion on Issues of Government Intervention 
and Public Spending in the United States, 1980 and 1992
Variable
Percent Agree 
1980 1992
Government Intervention
Guarantee Job and Standard of 31 30
Midpoint 21 22
Let People Get Ahead by Themsleves 49 47
Total 100 100
(N) (1179) (2172)
Public Spending
More Services/Higher Spending 47 37
Midpoint 20 31
Fewer Services/Less Spending 34 31
Total 100 100
(N) (1468) (2199)
Source: 1980 and 1992 CPS NES.
In 1992 the choice of Bill Clinton as the Democratic candidate reflected a new 
Democratic approach which acknowledged the limitation of government 
intervention and accepted the market realities faced by an activist administration. 
This was reflected in Putting People First (Clinton and Gore 1992, 6), which stated: 
"We believe in free enterprise and the power of market forces. We know 
economic growth will be the best jobs program we'll ever have". Although the 
policy included a "Rebuild America Fund", involving $20 billion federal investment 
each year over four years, it was part of an integrated approach aimed at
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accelerated reduction of the federal government deficit and which included 
substantial spending cuts. The cuts included the elimination of 100,000 positions in 
the federal government bureaucracy, the requirement that "federal managers and 
workers ... achieve a 3 percent across-the-board savings in every federal agency", 
the elimination of "taxpayer subsidies for narrow special interests", and support for 
a line item veto enabling the President "to eliminate pork-barrel projects and cut 
government waste" (Clinton and Gore 1992, 25). In short it was an 
acknowledgment from the Democratic Party that big government had become part 
of the problem.
Table 6.9 shows the extent to which these policy changes were perceived by the 
electorate as a shift to a more moderate position. Responses on the issues of 
government intervention and public spending were re-scaled from 100 (strong 
support for the policy position indicated) to 0 (strong opposition to the policy 
position indicated). On the issue of government intervention, the electorate clearly 
perceived a shift in Democratic policy between 1980 and 1992 to a position more 
favourable to "letting people get ahead by themselves". Indeed the policy 
difference between the Democratic Party and the mean position of voters, which 
was relatively stable, narrowed from 23 points to just 15 points. Although voters 
also perceived a similar shift to a more laissez-faire position by the Republicans, it 
was to a point further away from the mean of the electorate. On the issue of 
government spending, voters also identified a shift to the right by the Democratic 
Party, away from increased public spending and towards the mean of the electorate 
near the scale's midpoint. Once again, voters perceived a slight shift further to the 
right by the Republican Party, although in this case voters also moved in a 
rightward direction.
Table 6.9: Position of Electorate and Parties on Government Intervention 
and Public Spending Scales in the Unites States, 1980 and 1992
Scale (0-100)
Variable 1980 1992 Chanee
Government Should Let People Get 
Ahead by Themselves
Electorate 56 55 -1
Democratic 33 40 + 8
Republican 64 70 + 6
(N) (1614) (2487)
Government Should Increase Public 
Spending
Electorate 56 52 -4
Democratic 69 66 -3
Republican 43 39 -4
(N) (1614) (2487)
Source: 1980 and 1992 CPS NES.
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The effect of these policy changes on the policy proximity of voters to each party 
is shown in Table 6.10. Between 1980 and 1992 the proportion of voters closer to 
the Democratic Party on the issue of government intervention increased from 29 
percent to 36 percent, whilst the proportion closer to the Republican Party fell 
from 46 percent to 36 percent. Overall, a net Republican advantage on the issue of 
17 percent in 1980 had been totally negated by 1992. Although there was 
somewhat less movement with regard to policy proximity on the issue of public 
spending, the proportion of voters closer to the Democratic Party rose by 3 
percent between 1980 and 1992 and the proportion closer to the Republican Party 
fell by 6 percent. Consequently, respondents closer to the Democrats 
outnumbered those closer to the Republicans, reversing a 6 percent Republican 
advantage into a 3 percent Democratic advantage. These results tend to suggest the 
adoption of a successful adaptive strategy by the Democratic Party, even more 
successful given that by 1992, if anything, the electorate had moved further from 
the party's policy positions of 1980.
Table 6.10: Closest Party on Government Intervention and 
Public Spending Scales in the United States, 1980 and 1992
Closest Party:
Percent
1980 1992
G overnm ent Should Let People Get 
Ahead by Themselves
Democratic 29 36
Equidistant 25 28
Republican 46 36
Total 100 100
N et Democratic Advantage -7 0
(N) (1614) (2487)
G overnm ent Should Increase 
Public Spending
Democratic 36 39
Equidistant 23 25
Republican 42 36
Total 100 100
Net Democratic Advantage -6 + 3
(N) (1071) (3047)
Source: 1980 and 1992 CPS NES
Finally, the expanded attitudinal analysis identified two "New Politics" attitudes 
which were significant influences on voting in the 1992 election, namely gay rights 
and the environment, with supporters of both causes significantly more likely to 
vote Democrat than Republican. It is also notable that both these items were 
politicised by Clinton and Gore during the campaign. Putting People First 
supported "federal civil rights legislation for gays and lesbians", in addition to 
"executive orders to repeal the ban on gays and lesbians from military service" 
(Clinton and Gore 1992, 64). Similarly the environment, on which Gore was an
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acknowledged activist, represented one of four areas targeted in the Rebuild 
America Fund for substantial increase in funding (Clinton and Gore 1992, 93-9). 
Consistent with these policy positions, Table 6.11 shows that a clear majority of 
Americans support increased spending on the environment, as well as legislation to 
protect homosexuals against discrimination. Although these questions were not 
asked in previous National Election Studies, the evidence from a breakdown of 
opinions by age suggest that, if anything, opinion is trending further towards the 
Democratic positions through the entrance of new voters. Although the 
differences between the under 30s and 30 and over groups on gay rights is 
marginal, on the issue of environmental spending the younger age is group is 
significantly more supportive of an increase than the older group. There is, 
therefore, tentative evidence that views on environmental and gay rights have 
provided the Democratic Party with an opportunity for reverse adaptation by 
politicising attitudinal dimensions on which they are advantaged.
Table 6.11: Public Opinion on the Environment and Gay Rights in the
United States, 1992
Variable All
A g e  G ro u p  
Under 30 30 & Over
F ed era l S p e n d in g  o n  Im p r o v in g  
a n d  P ro te c tin g  th e  E n v i r o n m e n t
Increase spending 61 71 59
Stay the same 35 27 36
Decrease spending 4 2 5
Total 100 100 100
(N) (2427) (483) (1944)
L a w s  to  P ro te c t H o m o se x u a ls  
A g a in s t  J o b  D is c r im in a t io n
Favour 60 62 60
Oppose 40 38 40
Total 100 100 100
(N) (2139) (418) (1721)
Source: 1992 CPS NES.
It must be stressed, once again, that, due to the nature of the data being examined, 
any conclusions derived from the empirical analysis must be treated with caution. 
This section on attitudinal change cannot attempt to explain all aspects of policy 
change across three decades of party competition and their implications for changes 
in the balance of party support, and consequently has been forced to isolate only a 
number of particular examples. Nevertheless the results presented are certainly 
consistent with the party adaptation thesis that electoral outcomes are, in part, 
influenced by the strategic policy positions adopted by the competing parties. In 
particular, in response to a general shift to the right on economic attitudes in the 
electorate, the analysis suggests a two-part strategy adopted by each of the three 
major-left wing parties. Firstly, a diffusion of the potential losses incurred from
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the rightward shift on economic attitudes in the electorate. In Australia this 
represented the Labor government using wages policy to restrain the power of 
trade unions in seeking pay rises, in Britain the Labour Party moderating its 
nationalisation and defence policies, and in the United States the Democratic Party 
adopting a less interventionist economic agenda. The second aspect of the strategy 
involves the politicisation of policy items on which the party is advantaged; in 
Australia the republic, in Britain minority rights, and in the United States the 
environment and gay rights.
Overall, the above analysis of social and attitudinal change suggests that, in part, 
political parties are responsive to trends with threaten their electoral base. In 
particular left-wing parties threatened with a decline in the size of the traditional 
working-class, and a shift of economic attitudes to the right, appear to have muted 
their appeals to their traditional constituency and adopted more moderate policies, 
in addition to promoting a new policy agenda. Nevertheless, it must be noted that 
just as parties of the left will attempt to de-politicise cleavages on which they are 
disadvantaged, and politicise cleavages on which they are advantaged, so too parties 
of the right will adopt a similar strategy (Sartori 1969). As a consequence changes 
in the balance in party support reflect, in part, the outcome of the respective 
adaptation strategies of the competing parties. Just as there is nothing deterministic 
regarding the translation of societal change into electoral change, neither is there an 
underlying source for the preservation of particular party organisations. This is 
particularly the case given the eroding influence of political predispositions in 
structuring electoral choice, found in Part 1. In the end, the success or failure of a 
political party rests, in part, with the strategic decisions of the party leadership 
(Mackie and Rose 1988). To the extent that a party is threatened and adapts it will 
persist, but to the extent the party is threatened and fails to adapt it will fail. The 
fact that all three left-wing parties have persisted is an indication, albeit a 
tautological one, that they have had some success in adapting. On the other hand, 
the fact that, alone of three, the Australian Labor Party currently holds a majority 
in its national legislature is an indication that it has experienced somewhat greater 
success in adapting to societal change. At this stage of the analysis the adaptive 
strategies adopted by Labor merit further examination.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
ELECTION POLICIES AND THE 
BROADENING OF PARTY SUPPORT: 
THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY 1946-93
Since the early 1980s the Australian Labor Party has been undoubtedly one of the 
most electorally successful left-wing parties in the industrialised world. Labor has 
governed uninterrupted since 1983, including five successive federal election 
victories, representing the second longest period of continuous party government 
in Australian political history. By comparison, the major left-wing parties in other 
Anglo-American democracies have achieved much less electoral success. The 
British Labour Party has not won an election since 1979, the New Zealand Labour 
Party has been in opposition since 1987, the Canadian Liberal's were in opposition 
from 1984 to 1994, whilst the Democratic Party in the United States lost three 
consecutive presidential elections between 1980 and 1992, control of the Senate 
between 1981 and 1986, and control of both the House and the Senate in 1994. In 
Europe, the German Social Democrats have not governed at the federal level since 
1982, losing four consecutive elections, whilst the French Socialists were defeated in 
the 1986 and 1993 National Assembly elections. Throughout the western 
democracies, the mean vote for social democrat/labor parties fell by 1.4 percent 
during the 1980s whilst the average national vote for the Australian Labor Party 
rose by 1.3 percent (Piven 1992, 10-11).
Previous chapters have argued that the electoral success of Labor is due, in part, to 
attracting a broader constituency of voters compared to the 1960s, in particular 
beyond its traditional working-class base. It has been argued that such a 
development is precisely what the party adaptation thesis would predict, namely 
that the continued presence of labour parties, and thus continued party-system 
stability throughout the industrialised, world is the result of parties adapting to 
societal changes which erode their traditional support base by altering their 
electoral appeals to attract a broader range of voters. Up to this point the study 
has only been concerned with an investigation into the shifting electoral base of 
political parties. Whilst these findings are certainly consistent with an 
interpretation of political events in line with the party adaptation thesis, the 
analysis must now extend further to consider whether the party has indeed altered 
its appeals to attract this broader constituency, and thus whether any identifiable 
relationships exist between, on the one hand, certain electoral appeals, and, on the 
other, support for the Labor Party among key social groups.
In general, there are two methods available to measure electoral appeals over time. 
One method involves the use of survey data to examine the political attitudes of 
parliamentarians and parliamentary candidates as they relate to the major areas of 
policy debate. Although candidate surveys have been recently introduced into 
Australia, the series began in 1987 and is therefore inadequate for the purposes of 
long-term analysis. A second method is through the content analysis of election 
programs, whereby researchers code each sentence of an election program 
according to its policy content. Unfortunately, in the context of an election 
campaign Australian parties produce neither policy platforms, as in the United
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States, nor election manifestos, as in Britain.1 Nevertheless election policy speeches 
represent a suitable Australian alternative. The policy speeches, presented by the 
respective party's parliamentary leader, are made in the early weeks of the 
campaign and represent an important focus point in each election. They receive 
substantial nationwide media attention and establish the general campaign themes 
for each of the major parties (McAllister and Moore 1991, xi-xiv; Robertson 1987, 
47-8).
The content of Australian party speeches, from 1946 to 1993, were coded as part of 
a quantitative study of the dimensions of Australian electoral competition 
conducted by McAllister and Moore (1991). For all election policy speeches made 
by the leaders of the Labor, Liberal and National parties the authors coded each 
sentence according to the specific area of policy with which it dealt, using a 
"coding scheme originally devised by Robertson (1976) for British party manifestos, 
and developed in a major-cross-national project of nineteen countries conducted by 
Budge, Robertson and Herl (1987)". The coding scheme comprised seven broad 
issue domains, namely external relations, freedom and democracy, government, 
economy, welfare and quality of life, social fabric, and social groups. These issue 
domains were further divided into separate policy areas, sixty two in total. The 
data-set thus specifies, for each policy speech, the number of sentences which deal 
with each of the sixty-two policy areas. It is this data-set, provided by the authors, 
which forms the basis of this chapter.
In the context of the policy speech data-set, the proposition that the Labor Party 
has successfully adapted to social and attitudinal change by altering its electoral 
appeals posits two hypotheses: Hypothesis 1, that the Labor Party has altered the 
content of its policy speeches by reducing its past emphasis on an interventionist 
economic agenda, and hypothesis 2, that increases in the Labor vote among 
traditional non-Labor social groups is related to changes in the content of its 
electoral appeals. To test these hypotheses requires three distinct stages of analysis 
which provide the structure for the remainder of the chapter. Section one 
identifies the underlying structure of electoral competition in Australia as expressed 
in campaign election speeches. In other words, what are the election issues which 
divide Australian political parties. Section two then examines the extent to which 
the parties have altered their appeals with respect to these dominant areas of 
policy. Finally, sections three and four examine the extent to which changes in the 
policy emphasis of Labor election campaign speeches are related to changes in the 
Labor vote among key social groups. Section three considers occupational groups 
and section four social groups defined on the basis of religion, gender, age, 
education and ethnicity.
1 Although the parties do publish more comprehensive party platforms, the Liberal Party has 
only altered its platform on three occasions since the party’s formation, and the Labor Party policy 
platform is merely updated on an incremental basis rather than written specifically in the context of 
an election campaign. Similarly, although the parties now publish separate policy documents on a 
wide range of policy areas, as separate documents they provide no information regarding the policy 
emphasis of a particular campaign
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The Structure of Election Appeals in Australia
To test the party adaptation hypotheses requires us to identify the dominant 
dimensions of electoral competition in Australia, in terms of the party appeals 
expressed in campaign policy speeches. As stated above, the content analysis 
conducted by McAllister and Moore covered sixty-two separate policy areas. 
Although this provides the researcher with a substantial breadth of information, in 
terms of identifying the dominant dimensions of electoral appeals it requires some 
simplification. Table 7.1 shows that three particular issue domains have dominated 
post-war policy speeches in Australia, namely references to the economy, social 
groups, and welfare and quality of life. Although differences exist between the 
parties (Labor is the party most likely to refer to welfare and quality of life issues, 
the Liberal Party to the economy and external relations, the Nationals to particular 
social groups) the saliency of the top three issue domains is apparent. Overall, in 
excess of three-quarters of codeable sentences in the policy speeches of Australia's 
three main political parties dealt with issues to do with either the economy, social 
groups, or welfare and quality of life. As previous research has confirmed that 
issues within these broad areas have formed the principal dimensions of Australian 
political debate (Budge and Farlie 1987, McAllister and Moore 1991), the study will 
also focus upon these three issue domains.
Table 7.1: Issue Content of Policy Speeches as a Percentage of Total Codeable
Sentences, 1946-93
Issue D om ain A ll  Major 
Parties
Labor Liberal N ational
Economy 41.0 37.3 43.2 42.7
Social Groups 21.4 19.3 16.1 29.9
Welfare and quality of life 14.3 21.4 14.5 6.0
External Relations 8.4 8.8 10.9 5.0
Fabric of Society 5.5 4.2 6.3 6.0
Freedom and democracy 4.8 5.5 3.9 5.1
Government 4.6 3.5 5.2 5.2
Total 100 100 100 100
(N) (59) (20) (20) (19)
Source: Content Analysis of party platforms, 1946-93.
Within the issues domains of the economy, welfare and quality of life, and social 
groups, twenty-three separate policy areas, of the total sixty-two, were specified for 
the purposes of the content analysis (Table 7.2). Nevertheless further consolidation 
of the data-set is appropriate. In particular, as with any comprehensive attitudinal 
data-set, it is likely that some sets of policy areas are in fact different measures of 
the same underlying variable. As a consequence, factor analysis is performed 
below on the individual issue items within each broad issue domain to identify the 
underlying communalities. Each domain is analysed separately on the grounds 
that, in the first instance, to examine the structure of policy within a single broad 
area is of greater substantive significance than the identification of factors across 
the entire range of issue variables. This approach greatly assists in the 
interpretation of the factors, whilst the use of second-order factor analysis allows
- 197-
Table 7.2: Coding Frame for Economy, Welfare and Quality of Life,and Social Groups
Issue Domains
Policy Area Includes Favourable Mentions of:
Economy
Enterprise 
Incentives 
Fair Competition 
Economic Planning 
Protectionism 
Economic Goals 
Demand Management 
Full Employment 
Productivity 
Technology & 
Infrastructure 
Controlled Economy 
Nationalisation 
Economic Orthodoxy
property rights, personal enterprise and initiative, free enterprise
policies to induce enterprise, small business, Home Ownership
regulations against monopolies and trusts to protect consumer
central planning, governments to create national plan
extension or maintenance of tariffs
general statements of intent to pursue economic goals
use of economic policy to contract/expand economy
use of economic policy to establish/maintain full employment
need to encourage and facilitate greater production
importance of science and technology, govt sponsored research 
general need for direct control of the economy 
government ownership and control
balanced budgets, low taxation, support for banks and Stock Market
Welfare and Quality of Life
Environmental 
Protection
Art, Sport/Leisure &
Media
Social Justice 
Social Services 
Education
Social Groups
Labour Groups Labour, working class, unemployed, poor, manual and other employees
Agriculture & Farmers support for agriculture and farmers
Middle-Class Groups employers, self-employed, middle-class and professional groups
Underprivileged Groups eg handicapped and homosexuals
Non-economic
Demographic Groups elderly, immigrants, indigenous peoples, youth, women
preservation of countryside, forests, natural resources, national parks
culture and leisure activities, museums, art galleries, development of media 
fair treatment for all, equality of opportunity, end discrimination 
maintain or expand any basic service or welfare scheme 
expand and/or improve education at all levels
Source: Budge, Robertson and Hearl (1987, 459-65)
for the identification of the overall dominant dimensions of competition (Budge, 
Robertson and Herl 1987, 468-70). In each case, to further aid interpretability, 
those issue items which failed to load significantly upon any factor, or which 
loaded significantly upon two or more factors simultaneously, were progressively 
eliminated until a clear pattern of relationships emerged.
The first issue domain considered is the economy (Table 7.3). Overall, including 
Labor, Liberal, and National party policy speeches, 41 percent of total codeable 
sentences have made reference to economic issues in Australian policy speeches. 
These comprised 13 different issue items, ten of which remained in the final factor
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analysis after the progressive elimination of non-contributing or ambiguous items.2 
The first factor, labelled Market Protection, explains 18 percent of the total 
variance, and reflects an emphasis upon the need to ensure that private enterprise 
works better. This includes actions against monopolies in defence of consumer and 
small businessmen (Fair Competition3), and the need for policies to encourage 
small businesses and induce enterprise, as well as the encouragement of home 
ownership (Incentives). However the factor also represents the rejection of the need 
to facilitate greater production, including special aid to specific sector of the 
economy (Productivity). In this context Market Protection refers to an emphasis 
upon policy prescriptions designed to protect consumers, home owners, and small- 
business proprietors from the potential veracities of a market economy, against 
policies designed towards simply maximising production.
The second factor, labelled Small Government, explains 15 percent of the total 
variance, and is immediately recognisable as a central issue of economic debate 
(Dodd 1976, 98; Sartori 1976, 337). The factor is, on the one hand, positively 
related to policy statements which stress the need for a balanced budget and low 
rates of taxation (Economic Orthodoxy), and, on the other hand, negatively related 
to general statements of intent to pursue specific and general economic goals 
(Economic Goals). The small government factor thus represents the core of macro- 
economic debate between those who believe in market outcomes and those that see 
a positive role in government prescribing economic outcomes. The third factor, 
labelled Private Enterprise, may be seen as the micro-economic corollary of the 
second factor. It is measured by favourable references to the free-market, including 
support for traditional economic institutions such as the Stock Market and the 
banking system (Free-Market economics), and favourable mention of private 
property rights, personal enterprise and initiative (Enterprise), as against references 
to the importance of technology and infrastructure, including government 
sponsored provision (Technology and Infrastructure). The final factor deals 
exclusively with the two essential components of Keynesian economics, namely the 
management of aggregate demand as a control on employment and inflation 
(Demand Management), and belief that it is the government's responsibility to 
ensure full employment (Full Employment).
2 The excluded items were economic planning, protectionism, controlled economy, and 
nationalisation.
3 In both Budge, Robertson and Herl (1987) and McAllister and Moore (1981) this item was 
labelled Regulation of Capitalism. However such a label suggests a desire to impose regulations to 
meet certain social justice objectives, rather than an acknowledged need to restrict unfair 
commercial or trading practices. In order to avoid such a misconception the label Fair Competition 
is preferred in this study.
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Table 7.3: Factor Analysis of Issues in Economy Domain
Factor Loadings
Issue / II III I V
I  M arket Protection
Fair Competition .78 -.02 .10 -.14
Productivity -.64 .01 -.22 .02
Incentives .60 .22 -.31 .28
II Sm all G overnm ent
Economic Orthodoxy .20 .82 .03 .09
Economic Goals .32 -.51 -.15 .29
III Private Enterprise
Free-Market Economics .14 -.04 .76 -.15
Enterprise .03 .48 .57 .03
Technology & -.02 -.26 -.50 -.39
I V  Keynesian Economics
Demand Management .13 -.32 .16 .71
Full Employment -.17 .17 -.19 .59
Eigen Values 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.0
Percent variance explained 18.3 15.4 11.9 10.4
Varimax rotated factor loadings from a principal components factor analysis with 
unities in the main diagonal 
Source: As for Table 7.1.
In the welfare and quality of life domains two factors were identified from the 
initial six items (Table 7.4). The first factor, labelled New Politics, explains 29 
percent of the total variance. This factor emphasises the preservation of
countryside, forests, national parks, and natural resources in general
(Environmental Protection), the need to expand and/or improve education 
provision at all levels (Education), and the need for fair distribution of resources 
and removal of class barriers, as well as fair treatment for all and the end of 
discrimination (Social Justice). The issues clearly relate to the New Politics 
concerns of the environment, education, and equal opportunity (perhaps as it has 
come to be defined, including affirmative action, rather than equality of 
opportunity). The second factor, labelled Welfarism, is measured by favourable 
mention of need to maintain or expand any basic service or welfare scheme, 
including public health or housing (Social Services Expansion), as well as favourable 
mention of leisure activities (Art, Sport, Leisure, and Media). The term Welfarism 
was chosen on the grounds that the factor includes support for both traditional 
social services, as well as the more middle-class welfare support of art galleries, 
cultural and leisure activities.
Factor analysis conducted upon the five issue items in the social group policy 
domain also identified two factors (Table 7.5). The first factor, which explained 42 
percent of the total variance, was specifically related to references towards the 
principal economic groups of Australian society. Labelled Economic Groups the
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Table 7.4: Factor Analysis of Issues in Welfare and Quality 
of Life Domain
Issue
Factor Loadings 
I  II
I  N ew  Politics
Environmental Protection .73 -.36
Education .67 .20
Social Justice .58 .20
II  W elfarism
Social Services Expansion -.05 .83
Art, Sport, Leisure & Media .25 .65
Eigen Values 1.5 1.2
Percent variance explained 29.3 24.8
Varimax rotated factor loadings from a principal components 
factor analysis with unities in the main diagonal 
Source: As for Table 7.1.
factor is positively related to favourable references to primary industry groups 
(Agriculture and Farmers) as well as favourable references to employers, the self- 
employed, middle-class and professional groups (Middle-class Groups), and 
negatively related to favourable references to labour, the working class, 
unemployed and poor (Labour Groups). These economic groups of course 
represent the natural constituency of Australia's three largest parties, National, 
Liberal and Labor respectively, the positive relationship between the rural group 
and urban middle-class group reflecting the conservative coalition which 
historically has been opposed to the party of organised labour. The second factor, 
labelled Minority Groups, represents a concern for those historically disadvantaged 
groups (according to the coding frame) not defined in economic terms. This 
includes, for example, a concern for groups such as the handicapped and the 
homosexual community (Underprivileged Groups), and favourable references of 
need for assistance to women, elderly, young, indigenous Australians, and 
immigrants (Non-economic Demographic Groups). Just as the economic groups 
represent the traditional constituencies of parties in industrial society, the minority 
groups represent the newly politicised groups of post-industrial society.
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Table 7.5: Factor Analysis of Issues in Social Groups Domain
Issue
Factor Loadings 
I  II
I  E conom ic Groups
Agriculture and Farmers .83 -.28
Middle-class Groups .82 -.09
Labour Groups -.58 -.03
II M in o rity  Groups
Underprivileged Groups .07 .8 7
Non-economic Demographic -.30 .74
Eigen Values 2.1 1.1
Percent variance explained 42.0 21.9
Varimax rotated factor loadings from a principal components factor 
analysis with unities in the main diagonal 
Source: As for Table 7.1.
The eight factors identified in the above analysis represent the underlying areas of 
policy emphasis which form the basis of electoral competition in Australia, as 
measured by campaign policy speeches. In addition, each factor may be 
conceptualised as representing an issue dimension along which the relative positions 
of the competing parties may be placed. For example, the Economic Groups 
factor may be conceptualised as representing an issue dimension ranging from 
maximum support for rural and urban middle-class groups through to maximum 
support for labour groups. Towards the former end we would expect to find the 
Liberal and National parties, at the latter end the Labor Party. To facilitate an 
analysis of the positioning of party policies, a scale was created for each of the 
eight issue dimensions identified through the initial factor analysis. Firstly, the 
sentence score for each individual issue item was standardised ie. recalculated so 
that the mean of the item across all 59 speeches was equal to zero, the standard 
deviation equal to one. Within each policy speech a score for each of the eight 
issue dimensions was then calculated by summing the standardised sentence score 
for each item which loaded significantly upon the factor, and dividing by the 
number of items. In the case of variables with a negative loading on the factor, 
their scale was simply reversed, such that negative values became positive and 
positive values became negative, prior to the variable being added to the other 
variables in the dimension. Table 7.6 presents the mean value, for the period 1946- 
90, calculated for each of the main parties on the eight issue dimensions.
The table shows that Labor policy speeches have, over the period, placed the most 
emphasis upon Keynesian Economics, New Politics, Welfarism and support for 
Minority Groups. By contrast, Liberal Party leaders have been the most prolific 
supporters of Market Protection and Small Government, whilst National Party 
policy speeches have placed the greatest emphasis upon Private Enterprise and 
support for Economic Groups. These results are consistent with expectations, 
given the support bases and ideological commitments of each of the parties. Labor, 
with its disproportionate support among lower income groups and historical 
commitment to state intervention, the strongest of the parties committed to full
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employment and welfare support. On the other hand, the New Left influences in 
the party, beginning with the leadership of Whitlam in the late 1960s Qaensch 
1989, 50), has contributed to support for New Politics concerns and minority 
group assistance, including the expansion of tertiary education, environmental 
protection, and anti-discrimination legislation. The Liberal Party, with its middle- 
class support base and liberal ideological roots, was understandably the strongest 
protector of the consumer and small-business proprietors in addition to being the 
most committed to home ownership and fiscal prudence. Finally the National 
Party, which remains a rural rump despite attempts to broaden its constituency 
during the 1980s, has been the largest supporter of economic groups largely 
through its commitment to primary industry groups, and of private enterprise, 
presumably through a similar commitment to rural values which invoke personal 
enterprise and initiative.
Table 7.6: Mean Score of Parties on Issue Dimensions, 1946-93 (Z Scores)
Issue D im ensions Labor Liberal N ational
Market Protection -.01 .45 -.47
Small Government -.35 .26 .10
Private Enterprise -.37 .05 .32
Keynesian Economics .30 -.24 -.07
New Politics .53 -.01 -.55
Welfarism .49 .09 -.61
Economic Groups -.50 -.19 .73
Minority Groups .52 .02 -.52
Source: Content Analysis of party platforms, 1946-93.
Similarly, the ordering of the three parties across each dimension is generally 
intuitively clear. On all four dimensions from the welfare and social group policy 
domains, in addition to the private enterprise dimension, it is the Labor and 
National parties which adopt the extreme positions, with the Liberal Party located 
at some position in between. This is generally the ordering of party positions 
which spatial models of the Australian party space tend to describe (Robertson 
1987, 70; McAllister 1992, 235).4 On two the of the four economic dimensions, 
namely Small Government and Keynesian Economics, it is the Labor and Liberal 
parties which are located at the extremes, perhaps indicating a greater willingness in 
the National Party, relative to the Liberal Party, to support the use of government 
spending as a macro-economic policy instrument. However, the Market Protection 
dimension is rather unique in having the Liberal and National parties at opposite 
ends of the scale with Labor located in the middle. This ordering may be 
explained as representing the alternative priorities of the two coalition partners: the 
Liberal's support for the small business owner, consumer, and home owner, against 
the National's support for simply maximising rural production, including through 
government sponsored means.
4 McAllister actually found that on various issues Greens and/or Australian Democrat 
candidates held the extreme position opposite to the Nationals, but neither are considered in this 
analysis.
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The Dynamics of Party Policies
It must be acknowledged that party positions on political issues are far from static. 
A dramatic long-term example was Labor's policy shift on the banking sector, 
calling for nationalisation during the 1940s, but instigating deregulation in the 
1980s. In other words, policies are under constant review and revision in response 
to factors such as the prevailing economic conditions, internal ideological debate, 
and even the particular priorities of the current party leader, which may differ 
dramatically from his predecessor. Furthermore, given that this analysis is based 
upon policy speeches written anew for each election, the potential for the parties 
to change their position on these issue dimensions is increased. Indeed it is the 
central argument of this study that Labor has in fact been successful in altering its 
appeals so as to broaden its constituency beyond its traditional, but shrinking, 
support base.
Debate regarding the extent to which the major parties, and in particular the Labor 
Party, have altered their policy positions over the post-war years has been the 
focus of much scholarly attention. Most of the focus has undoubtedly been upon 
the Labor Party and the extent to which the Hawke and Keating Labor 
governments have followed the policy traditions established by earlier Labor 
governments, particularly with regard to Labor's deregulatory economic agenda of 
the 1980s and 1990s (Battin 1993; Beilharz 1994). On the right of the Labor Party 
it is argued that the current Labor Government "is operating completely in concert 
with the tradition of the Labor movement ... [by] adopting practical, pragmatic 
measures to create growth and jobs" (Keating 1987, 173).5 However, the position 
of the non-marxist Left, whilst acknowledging that differing strands of thought 
have traditionally co-existed within the Labor Party, is that the Labor tradition has 
been betrayed. Thus the charge is made that under Hawke and Keating the party 
has been hijacked by the dominance of the pragmatic Right within Caucus Qaensch 
1989, 176), silencing the "tradition which breathed life into the collectivist 
sentiments of the ALP - the socialist tradition" (Battin 1993, 234).
Policy traditions within the Liberal Party have also been under debate, particularly 
in the wake of the party's five successive federal electoral defeats. Some members 
on the left of the party, the so-called wets, have argued that during the 1980s the 
party has abandoned its commitment to traditional Liberal principles, much to the 
party's electoral detriment, as policy directions have increasingly been determined 
by the economic rationalists, or drys, within the party. By contrast dries argue 
that economic rationalism as the dominant influence in the party is firmly in the 
Liberal tradition of promoting private enterprise whilst acknowledging a strategic 
but limited role for government Qaensch 1993, 157-62).
The symmetry of policy conflicts within the two major parties is clearly apparent. 
In the 1980s the dominant policy force within both the Labor and Liberal 
parliamentary parties was from the Right, under the broad term economic
5 Whilst argued from a contrasting perspective, the concept of continuity is also endorsed by the 
marxist left which argues that Labor has always fallen short of being a socialist party and as such 
the Hawke-Keating governments represent the same policy failures of previous Labor governments 
(see Kuhn 1992).
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rationalism. Whilst both the ALP Right and the Liberal drys maintained that their 
policy prescriptions were within their respective parties' policy traditions, both 
sought to justify the use of new policy instruments, such as market deregulation, 
and the abandonment of others, including deficit financing, as responses to changed 
world economic circumstances (Kelly 1992, 660-3). However, while the policy 
ends of the two parliamentary parties may or may not have remained within their 
respective party's historical traditions, what is clear is that for both Labor and the 
Liberals the policy means advocated by the leadership group had clearly changed 
dramatically from the policy means advocated by their predecessors.
Thus it would be expected that to some extent the position of the parties has 
changed over time on the eight policy dimensions identified above. However to 
simplify such an analysis a second-order factor analysis was performed, enabling 
changes in party positions to be plotted in a two-dimensional space. The results of 
the analysis are presented in Table 7.7.6 The first factor extracted, explaining 34 
percent of the total variance, reflects for what may be broadly termed a "New 
Left" issue priority; welfare expansion, support for minority groups, and a New 
Politics agenda, against a concern for economic groups, including employers, 
professional groups, small businesses, farmers and pastoralists. Note that the 
negative loading of the Economic Groups dimension also indicates that positive 
references to labour groups are associated with the New Left factor. Overall what 
the factor appears to be tapping is a policy priority directed towards the equality of 
outcomes, with outcomes defined in terms of either material conditions (welfare) 
or non-material life-styles (quality of life).
Table 7.7: Second Order Factor Analysis
Issue D im ension
Factor Loadings 
I  II
I  N ew  Left
Economic Groups -.77 -.27
Welfarism .70 -.01
Minority Groups .69 -.11
New Politics .55 -.31
II  Econom ic Liberalism
Private Enterprise -.25 .77
Small Government -.02 .64
Eigen Values 2.0 1.3
Percent variance explained 33.9 21.8
Varimax rotated factor loadings from a principal components 
factor analysis with unities in the main diagonal.
Source: As for Table 7.1.
The second factor, labelled Economic Liberalism, explains 22 percent of the total 
variance and brings together the classical economic concerns of free-market 
economics, and personal enterprise and initiative (Private Enterprise), with the
6 Keynesian Economics and M arket Protection failed to load upon either factor and were 
excluded from the analysis.
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commitment to balanced budgets and low taxation (Small Government). As 
described in the first-order factor analysis, these two items may be regarded as 
complimentary, but mutually essential, aspects of a classical liberal economic 
agenda, involving both budgetary and regulatory priorities of minimal government 
intervention. Although Market Protection also loads significantly upon this factor, 
as a consequence of the items similar loading on the New Left factor, it was 
eliminated from the construction of the Economic Liberalism scale.
Building upon this analysis the policy positions of Australia's three main political 
parties may now be presented in a two-dimensional space, shown in Figure 7.1. 
The horizontal axis represents the Economic Liberalism scale, the vertical axis the 
New Left scale. Election years have been categorised into four time periods. The 
first period, 1946-54, covers the first election contested by the modern Liberal 
Party to the last election held prior to the ALP split of 1955. The second period, 
1955-66, covers the period of continued Liberal success up to the modernisation of 
Labor under Whitlam, which began with his accession to party leader in 1967. 
The third period, 1969-80, covers the turbulent electoral years dominated by the 
Whitlam and Fraser governments. Finally the fourth period, 1980-93, covers the 
period of Labor's unprecedented electoral success under Ffawke, and continued 
under Keating. For each period the mean position of the three parties on the New 
Left scale was calculated by summing the scores for the welfarism, minority 
groups, and new politics dimensions, subtracting the score for the enterprise groups 
dimension, and dividing the result by four. Similarly scores on the Economic 
Liberalism scale were calculated by summing scores in each period on the private 
enterprise and small government dimensions, and dividing by two.
support
Labor
« Liberal
National
1: 1946-54 
2: 1955-66 
3: 1969-80 
4: 1983-93
oppose
oppose •<- support
Economic Liberalism
Figure 7.1: Policy positions of Australian parties over time plotted in a two 
dimensional space, 1946-93. See text for details. Source: As for 
Table 7.1.
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The figure shows that, in terms of the content of their respective policy speeches, 
all three parties have generally moved in the same direction, on both dimensions, 
across the four periods. The move to a more liberal position on economic issues 
over the past two decades is evident, and gives some currency to interpretations 
that Labor has "captured the middle-ground" in terms of economic policy. Indeed 
on the Economic Liberalism scale the Labor Party now holds a position broadly in 
the same range to that held by the Liberals during the late Menzies years. In terms 
of relative policy shifts the continued drift in Labor's position on the New Left 
scale, to the equality end, has been more significant, with particularly large shifts 
occurring during both the Whitlam and Hawke-Keating years. A greater emphasis 
upon New Left concerns has however also occurred in Liberal Party and National 
Party policy. This has established a pattern of policy movements whereby the 
parties tend to shadow one another, with all three placing greater emphasis upon 
both classical liberal economic policy, and equalitarianism as a principle of welfare 
and quality of life outcomes.
The Broadening of Labor's Electoral Constituency I: Social Class
Figure 7.1 confirms claims in chapter 6 that, in terms of party policy, the 
Australian Labor Party was "modernised" under the leadership of both Whitlam 
and Hawke. However, the study is yet to be establish whether these policy 
changes were in fact related to the broadening of the party's electoral constituency, 
and in particular whether Labor has attracted greater support among particular 
social groups as a result of these policy changes. As a first point of inquiry the 
study will investigate trends in the Labor vote among the major occupational 
groups in Australia, with the use of opinion poll data and academic surveys, and 
whether these trends are related to changes in Labor Party policy.
The first major evidence of a decline in the level of class voting in Australia was 
provided by Kemp's (1978) analysis of polling data collected between September 
1946 and December 1975. Of practical consideration for the electoral future of 
the Labor Party was establishing which process was proceeding more rapidly, 
either the decline in Labor's manual vote or the rise in Labor's non-manual vote. 
Kemp (1978, 69) found that although there was evidence of mutual convergence in 
Labor support among the classes, "the decline in ALP support among manuals has 
been more than twice as rapid as the increase in ALP support among non-manuals 
- that the ALP's loss of support among its blue-collar base has been easily the most 
significant element in the declining importance of occupational class for voting 
patterns". However further analysis showed that Labor had in fact made 
substantial gains among professionals (in particular) and managers, whilst support 
among lower status non-manuals, as with manual workers, was in decline. Thus 
although there was evidence of convergence in voting patterns, the convergence 
was "not that between manual and non-manual workers but between upper-status 
non-manuals on the one hand and the remainder of the population on the other" 
(Kemp 1978, 77).
Despite the positive trend of rising Labor support among professionals and 
managers, the fact that this group represented less than one-fifth of the electorate, 
and that the rest of the electorate was moving away from Labor, the future
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electoral prognosis for Labor in the mid 1970s was bleak (cf Aitkin 1982). Such an 
interpretation is however difficult to reconcile, almost two decades later, with the 
unprecedented electoral success of Labor throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
While this study has shown that the decline in class voting has continued over the 
past two decades, the continued electoral success of the ALP suggests that 
significant changes must have occurred to the trends identified by Kemp in the mid 
1970s, otherwise Labor would not have achieved its five consecutive electoral 
victories.
More recent evidence on class voting trends, conducted by Jones and McAllister 
(1989), challenges the Kemp analysis. The authors examined the reported first vote 
among differing age-cohorts of manual and non-manual workers and found that, 
from the 1910s to the 1980s, Labor averaged approximately 70 percent of the vote 
among incoming manual workers. The only exception was during the 1940s and 
1950s when support fell away dramatically, presumably due to the issue of 
communism in the union movement. However, among non-manual workers 
voting for the first time, the Labor vote rose from below 50 percent, up to and 
including the 1960s, to over 60 percent, in the 1970s and 1980s. Although the 
analysis was based upon only new voters, the results nevertheless directly 
challenged predictions of a Labor decline based on Kemp's findings, with evidence 
Labor was not only retaining its vote among manual workers but also making 
significant gains among non-manual workers.
In searching for solutions to these class voting trends Jones and McAllister differed 
from Kemp. Kemp viewed the altered electoral behaviour of occupational groups 
as a phenomenon to be explained by the processes of structural change in 
Australian society. His explanation of the decline of class voting is expressed 
primarily in terms of the processes of embourgeoisement. This, however, is not to 
deny that Kemp (1978, 356) regarded "the behaviour of party elites a key element 
in political embourgeoisement", but that he viewed Labor as in a lose-lose situation 
with regard to alternative responses. On the one hand, the party could choose not 
to respond to the middle-classing of its traditional constituency, but in doing so 
continue to lose support. On the other hand, if Labor did respond by altering its 
appeals, Kemp argued the party risked actually contributing to the 
embourgeoisement process by "breaking down any sense of social distinctiveness 
among their supporters". By contrast, Jones and McAllister viewed the success of 
Labor in retaining the support of manual workers while making inroads into non- 
manual workers as resting precisely with party's ability to adapt to structural 
change, and by doing so contributing to the decline of the class cleavage.
With the use of the policy speech data, this study can go further than either the 
Kemp or Jones and McAllister studies to investigate the direct impact of particular 
electoral appeals upon the Labor vote among manual and non-manual workers. 
The study has shown that Labor had indeed altered its electoral appeals, as 
measured by policy speeches, considerably over the post-war years. But the crucial 
question is whether these changes have been successful in maintaining support 
among its traditional working-class voters, whilst also increasing the party's support 
among the middle-classes. The first task then is to identify class voting patterns 
over time. Figure 7.2 uses opinion polls and academic surveys to estimate the
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Source: As for Table 7.8
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Labor Party vote in successive elections between 1946 and 1993 among four 
occupational groups, namely professionals and managers, routine non-manual 
workers, skilled manual workers, and unskilled manual workers.7
The figure shows, for federal elections held between 1946 and 1993, the estimated 
Labor vote among each group relative to the national Labor vote. The use of such 
a relative measure has the advantage of controlling for the effect of short-term 
fluctuations in the Labor vote when considering the overall trend in each 
occupational group's voting pattern. This is a reasonable approach given that 
earlier evidence has shown that over time the Labor vote has shown no significant 
trend. In addition, the manual and non-manual groups have each been subdivided 
on the grounds that, as demonstrated by Kemp, different occupational groups 
clearly display differing trends in party support. However to subdivide each class 
into more than two groups would unnecessarily trade-off the reliability of the 
voting estimates, due to smaller sub-sample sizes and thus higher sampling error, 
for little gain in understanding.
Figure 7.2 shows that Labor support over the period, relative to the total Labor 
vote, declined among both skilled manual and unskilled manual workers, but rose 
among routine non-manuals and professionals and managers. The largest fall in the 
Labor vote occurred in the unskilled manual group, among whom Labor support, 
through to the mid 1960s, was consistently more than 20 percentage points above 
the total Labor vote. From the early 1980s onwards Labor's relative electoral 
advantage in the group was halved to only around 10 percent. On the other hand 
the largest Labor gains were in the professional and managerial group among 
whom the Labor vote, up until 1966, was generally 20-30 percentage below the 
national Labor vote. Labor success among these upper-status non-manuals since 
the mid 1970s resulted in the group's Labor vote being only some 10 points below 
the national vote. Among both skilled manual and routine non-manual workers 
the pattern was one of general convergence with the two groups in the 1990s 
differing little in their Labor support from the electorate-wide results, representing 
consistent Labor losses and gains respectively. The figure also shows the trend line 
in Labor support for each group, estimated through OLS regression, which not 
only highlight these electoral patterns, but also demonstrate the relative consistency 
of the trends, with little systematic variation around each line of best fit.
The regression equations for each of the trend lines are presented in Table 7.8. 
The table confirms that the largest Labor gains were among the professional and 
managerial groups, with the regression coefficient of .48 indicating that, relative to 
the total Labor vote, Labor support among this group has been rising at a rate of 
4.8 percent each decade, and 22.6 percent over the total period. By contrast Labor 
support among semiskilled and unskilled manual workers (b = -.32) has been falling, 
again relative to overall Labor support, at an average of 3.2 percent per decade and 
15.0 percent over the period. In between is the almost identical decline in Labor 
support among skilled manual workers and rise in support among routine non-
7 Routine non-manual is predominantly comprised of clerical and sales occupations. The 
unskilled non-manual group also includes semi-skilled workers.
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manual workers, both trends however are smaller than those for either of the other 
two groups.
Table 7.8: Annual Trend in the Labor Party Vote among Major 
Occupational Groups* relative to Total Labor Vote, 1946-1993
Regression equation SE b r2
Unskilled Manual Vote = 25.3 - .32 T (.03)* .67
Skilled Manual Vote = 15.3 - .21 T (.02)* .57
Routine Non-manual Vote = -11.3 + .23 (.03)* .85
Professional/Managerial Vote = -28.9 + .48 (•03)* .85
* p < .05
Note: OLS regression predicting Labor vote among selected groups by 
year.
aHead of Household; Vote = Group Labor vote - Total Labor vote;
T = Year - 1946; SE b - standard error of the coefficient T 
Sources: 1967, 1969, and 1979 ANPAS; 1987, 1990, and 1993 AES.
Australian Gallup Polls (SSDA No. 76, 79, 82, 92, 162, 166, 168, 179, 284,
313, 392); Age Poll (SSDA No. 64, 67, 147, 150). All weighted to 
respective election results.
These trends are generally in line with those identified by Kemp, but with two 
important differences. First, the rate of Labor gains among non-manuals since 1946 
now exceeds the rate of the party's losses among manual workers. The second 
difference, which in part explains the first, is that while Kemp found the trend in 
the Labor vote among lower-status non-manuals was static prior to 1975, or 
slightly in decline, Figure 7.2 shows that Labor had made significant relative gains 
in the routine non-manual group during the late 1970s which, despite some erosion 
during the early 1980s, were recaptured in the 1990s. The end result was an 
upward trend in the Labor vote across the entire period 1946-93. Therefore, with 
an examination of voting patterns post-1975, Kemp's findings are easily reconciled 
with the fact of Labor's electoral success of the 1980s and 1990s.
Is it the case that these developments in the voting patterns of the major 
occupational groups, particularly among the professional and managerial group, are 
the result of successful electoral appeals made by the Labor Party or are they 
merely the outcome of the types of structural change noted by Kemp? To 
investigate this question, data from the McAllister and Moore content analysis of 
party speeches was again used to estimate the impact of election policies upon 
group voting patterns. This was estimated through OLS regression analysis, with 
the Labor vote among each of the four respective occupational groups as the 
dependent variable, and the eight issue dimensions, identified through factor 
analysis in section one of this chapter, as the independent variables. Also entered 
as independent variables were the six individual issue items which failed to load 
upon any single factor, to ensure that all potentially important policy areas were 
included. Due to the large number of independent variables (14) and small number 
of cases (20), creating problems of multicollinearity, the regression analysis was 
performed by entering all independent variables into the equation, and then
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excluding, in succession, those variables with coefficients which failed the tolerance 
criteria (p<0.10).
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 7.9. Examining firstly the results 
for the professional and managerial group, the analysis indicates that increases in 
Labor support among this group are associated with positive references in policy 
speeches to small government, private enterprise, new politics issues, and welfarism, 
whilst references to a controlled economy are detrimental to party support. 
Although the results of such an analysis must be interpreted with the utmost 
caution, given the limitations of the data, nevertheless they would appear at the 
very least to be intuitively defensible. Certainly it would be reasonable to suspect 
that high-status non-manual workers would respond favourably to calls for fiscal 
prudence and low taxation (small government), and free-market economics and the 
encouragement of personal enterprise and initiative (private enterprise), but oppose 
government plans for direct control of the economy (controlled economy). 
Similarly, support for environmental protection and social justice (new politics) can 
be seen as related to a more general postmaterialist value-priority which, as cross­
national research has shown, tends to have its greatest representation among the 
professional and managerial group (Inglehart 1990, 164). Finally welfarism, given 
that the variable is a significant positive coefficient in each of the four equations, is 
possibly a motherhood issue which will invariably receive support across all 
occupational groups. Overall the relatively high adjusted r-squared indicated that 
the model accounts for over two-thirds of the variance in the professional and 
managerial Labor vote.
Of the five variables with significant effects upon the Labor vote among the 
professional and managerial group, only two variables, private enterprise and 
welfarism, showed a significant impact upon Labor support among routine non- 
manual workers. The adjusted r-squared of the model was also much lower for the 
routine non-manual group. Nevertheless the fact that the two variables in 
common are positive in both equations and, again, are intuitively defensible, 
consolidates the finding that references to private enterprise and welfarism in Labor 
policy speeches are related to increases in the Labor vote among non-manual 
workers.
Among skilled manual workers, five policy areas were shown to have a significant 
effect upon the Labor vote. Specifically references in Labor policy speeches to 
market protection, controlled economy, welfarism, and economic groups were 
positively related to Labor's skilled manual vote, whilst references to small 
government had a negative impact on the party's vote among this group. 
Electoral campaigns which focus upon the provision of social services (welfarism) 
and the need for government control over prices and wages (controlled economy), 
whilst rejecting philosophies which abrogate what is regarded as the essential 
responsibilities of government (small government), represent perhaps what may be 
regarded as the traditional working-class appeals of the Labor Party, and as such 
their positive impact upon Labor's vote among skilled manual workers is to be 
expected. Similarly it is not surprising that appeals based on the need for 
consumer protection from the perceived potential veracities of market outcomes, 
particularly through action designed to encourage home ownership, are positively 
related to increases in Labor support among this group. However the positive
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coefficient for the economic groups variable requires some explanation, as it 
suggests in particular that favourable references to trade unions have a negative 
impact upon Labor's skilled manual vote. A tentative explanation would be that 
this group in the main does not perceive its interests in terms of the union 
movement, and indeed as union representation declines across the skilled trades 
generally, the union movement is perceived in more negative than positive terms.
Table 7.9: Effects of Issue Dimensions on the ALP vote among Occupational Groups,
1946-93
Professional/
Managerial
Standardised Coefficient
Routine Skilled
Non-Manual Manual
Semi/Unskilled
Manual
Market Protection - - .34* .43*
Small Government .63** - -.91** -
Private Enterprise .39** .52** - -
Keynesian Economics - - - -
Controlled Economy -.39** - .68** -
New Politics .30* - - -
Welfarism 2 9 ** .45** 40** .50**
Economic Groups - - .57** .36**
Minority Groups - - - -
R-squared (adj) .6 8 .36 .65 .35
Note: OLS regression predicting Labor Party vote among social groups from emphasis in Labor 
policy speeches upon various issue dimensions.
* p < .05; ** p< .10
Source: As for Table 7.1 and Table 7.8
Among the low-grade manual group three variables had a significant impact upon 
the Labor vote, namely market protection, welfarism, and economic groups. The 
coefficients for all three variables were positive and all three were common to both 
working-class groups. As with the two non-manual groups, the similarity of results 
across both high and low-grade occupations within the same occupational class 
provides a degree of confidence that the results are not spurious.
A crucial question then becomes to what extent Labor has altered its position on 
these policy issues over time, bearing in mind the electoral consequences. Figure 
7.1 provided some indication, with evidence that Labor had moved to a position 
which advocated stronger support for Economic Liberalism (small government and 
private enterprise) and the New Left (welfarism, new politics, minority groups). 
Given the findings of Table 7.9 it is relevant now to examine how the party has 
moved along the individual policy dimensions. These findings are presented in 
Table 7.10 which shows the mean Labor position on each dimension for the period 
1946-54 and the period 1980-93, and the degree of change between the two periods. 
The table shows that the greatest changes occurred on the dimensions of new 
politics, minority groups (positive references towards both being higher during 
Hawke-Keating years), and controlled economy (support for which had fallen
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steeply from the post-war years). Other smaller changes in Labor policy positions 
included greater support for small government, private enterprise, Keynesian 
economics, and welfarism, but less support in policy speeches for market 
protection and economic groups. Some of these changes would appear to be 
ideologically contradictory, such as a shift to a policy position which places, at the 
same time, a greater emphasis upon both small government and welfarism. In 
terms of the rhetoric and policies of campaign speeches such an outcome is not 
only possible, but given the differing issue priorities of various social groups, is 
indeed likely.
Table 7.10: Mean Labor Score on Issue Dimensions, 1946-90
Issue Dimensions
Z Scores 
1946-54 1983-93 Change
Market Protection -.08 -.50 -.42
Small Government -.33 .04 + .37
Private Enterprise -.46 -.30 + .16
Keynesian Economics -.16 .16 + .32
Controlled Economy 2.10 .19 -1.91
New Politics -.72 1.27 + 1.99
Welfarism .63 .80 + .17
Economic Groups -.37 -.44 -.07
Minority Groups .13 1.56 + 1.43
Source: As for Table 7.1.
Reading Table 7.10 in conjunction with Table 7.9 provides an indication of the 
electoral impact, in relation to the four occupational groups, of these policy 
changes. For example, increased Labor support for small government, private 
enterprise, new politics, and welfarism, can now be seen, on the basis of this 
analysis, as a contributing factor in the upward trend in the white-collar Labor 
vote, particularly among the professional and managerial group, identified in Figure 
7.2. However, these shifts on the small government and controlled economy 
dimensions were also detrimental to Labor's skilled manual vote, illustrating the 
nature of the trade-off on these policy areas. Together with Labor's shift away 
from support from market protection, policy changes may also be seen as an 
important factor in the withering of Labor's blue-collar support base.
As an electoral strategy the concentration of electoral appeals towards the 
professional and managerial group, even though possibly to the detriment of the 
party's blue-collar base, is a rational response to structural changes which have 
occurred in Australian society over the post-war years. An understanding of the 
extent to which the changing nature of Labor's electoral appeals have, consciously 
or not, been in accordance with the issue priorities of the upper-status non-manual 
group may be gained by focusing upon changes along policy dimensions which 
statistical analysis identified as having an significant impact upon the group's level 
of Labor support. Although there is a danger in identifying policy shifts on the 
basis of only one or two specific policy examples, particularly given the on-going
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debate regarding the continuity of Labor Party policy, such anecdotal evidence 
does tend to confirm the policy directions estimated in Table 7.10.
The variable with the largest effect upon the Labor vote among the professional 
and managerial group was that of the small government issue dimension, on which, 
as Table 7.6 shows, Labor had adopted a stronger position during the Hawke- 
Keating years. No policy signified better Labor's new-found commitment to the 
principles of small government than Hawke's economic trilogy which, during the 
1984 election, promised that: Commonwealth tax revenue would not be allowed to 
rise as a percentage of GDP; Commonwealth spending would not be allowed to 
grow faster than the growth of the economy; and the federal Budget deficit would 
be further reduced in 1985-86, both in money terms and as a percentage of GDP - 
and in the following two years would not be allowed to increase as a percentage of 
GDP (Gruen and Grattan 1993; 100). Such commitments were in stark contrast to 
Chifley's plan for reconstruction through the post-war years, the direction of 
which had already been set in 1945 by the White Paper on Full Employment, 
which regarded high levels of public-sector expenditure and deficit financing as the 
central tool of the government's macro-economic policy.
Policies directed towards the banking industry also demonstrated differing positions 
on issues relating to private enterprise. While Chifley proposed nationalisation of 
the private banks, believing that government control of banking was necessary to 
ensure that Labor's policy objectives were met, Hawke deregulated the financial 
sector, issuing licences to foreign-owned banks to foster competition in the 
domestic market. The third policy development which was associated with
increased Labour support among professionals and managers was the shift away 
from support for a controlled economy. In 1944 the Labor government failed in 
its referendum to extend direct government control to fourteen areas of the 
economy, including profiteering and prices. Nevertheless support for greater 
government control was maintained in opposition, with Chifley in 1951 arguing 
that "the Commonwealth Parliament must be given power to control prices and 
profits effectively" (McAllister and Moore 1991, 40). Although Hawke established 
a Prices Surveillance Authority, a watered down version of Whitlam's Prices 
Justification Tribunal, it had no legislative power, while with regard to profits, 
Treasurer Keating regarded the growth of corporate sector profits by 70 percent 
between 1983 and 1985 as an indication of the Hawke government's success 
(Johnson 1989, 102).
The largest change in policy direction, as measured in Table 7.10, was in the 
welfare and quality of life domain, in particular along the new politics issue 
dimension. An important element in this was the rise of the environment issue 
during the Hawke government. The environment became a national electoral issue 
for the first time during 1983, with Hawke's commitment to thwart the plans of 
the Tasmanian state government to dam the Franklin River. Environmental issues 
were also a significant issue during the 1990 election campaign, the result of an 
electorate with unprecedented environmental concerns and Labor's re-election 
strategy which focused upon the securing of preferences from Green Independents 
and the pro-green Australian Democrats. As a consequence of Labor's 
environmental commitments, Hawke won the endorsement of key sections of the 
Green Lobby who consequently advised their supporters to direct their preferences
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to Labor ahead of the Coalition (Papadakis 1990, 1993). However it has been 
argued that the rise of Labor's new politics agenda in the areas of education and 
social justice perhaps rested with the policy priorities of the Whitlam government 
(Johnson 1989, 101). In particular some of the more significant Labor policy 
initiatives in these areas, including the abolition of tertiary fees, establishment of 
the Tertiary Education Assistance Scheme, introduction of the Racial 
Discrimination Act and the extension of equal-pay provisions for women, occurred 
under Whitlam.
Finally, the fifth issue dimension associated with the rise in Labor support among 
the professional and managerial group was welfarism, which showed a slight 
increased emphasis in Labor policy speeches. Certainly both Whitlam and Hawke 
introduced national universal heath insurance schemes which provided for free 
treatment in public hospitals, although Chifley did attempt a similar proposal but 
failed. Similarly while Whitlam and Hawke both introduced significant programs, 
including the supporting mothers benefit and the family allowance supplement 
respectively, Chifley also introduced major programs, such as child endowment and 
unemployment benefits. However with regard to support for the Arts, it may be 
noted that the first substantive statement in a Labor policy speech was made by 
Whitlam in 1974 (McAllister and Moore 1991, 120). Indeed the close relationship 
which has since existed between the Labor Party and the Arts community, which 
was particularly evident during the 1993 election campaign, was largely established 
during the Whitlam years.
For ease of interpretation these five policy dimensions, identified as significant in 
attracting the support of professionals and managers, can be combined to create 
two scales, thereby allowing for Labor's policy issues on these important five ares 
to be plotted in a two-dimensional space (Figure 7.3). The Figure shows on the 
horizontal axis an economic scale (small government + private enterprise - 
controlled economy), and on the vertical axis a welfare scale (new politics + 
welfarism). The economic scale ranges from support for the market to support for 
government control, while the welfare scale ranges from the expansion of social 
services to the exercise of restraint in their provision. Evidence above has shown 
that for Labor to increase its support among professionals and managers it would 
need to shift its policy position to the upper right-hand corner of the policy space, 
that is to a position which simultaneously advocated greater welfare provision and 
greater support for market outcomes.
Figure 7.3 shows the mean Labor position on these two scales for four periods 
across the post-war years. The figure indicates that Labor has indeed moved 
successively to policy positions closer to the upper right-hand corner of the policy 
space, that is to a position supporting both welfare and quality of life concerns and 
market outcomes. This has occurred across all four periods, but with important 
differences between each of the eras. The largest shift away from support for a 
controlled economy occurred between the post war (1946-54) and post-split (1955- 
66) years, with a further "shift to the right" occurring during the Hawke-Keating 
years (1983-93). On the welfare and quality of life dimension it was during the 
Whitlam-Hayden years (1969-80) that the largest shift occurred, with a significant 
movement towards the expansion end of the scale, significantly larger than in any
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of the other era's, although the direction was also continued through the Hawke- 
Keating years.
Expansion
1983-93
1969-80
1955-66
1946-54
Restraint
Govt Control Market
Economy
Figure 7.3: Policy position of the Labor Party over time, plotted in a two-dimensional 
space, 1946-93. See text for details. Source: As for Table 7.1.
These findings are consistent with interpretations of the changing policy priorities 
of the Labor party leadership over the post-war years as described above. It 
provides further support for the party adaptation thesis, indicating that Labor 
policy responses have been in accordance with, what evidence above suggests are, 
the policy priorities of upper-status non-manual workers. Although once again it 
must be stressed that, given the limitations of both the policy platform and 
opinion poll data-sets, all relationships identified in the analysis must be interpreted 
with caution, the consistency of the results, in addition to their accordance with 
actual political developments, provides further support for the findings. On this 
basis, to the extent that Labor continues to place greater emphasis upon liberal 
economic policies and the New Left agenda, support from the professional and 
managerial groups can be expected to increase.
The Broadening of Labor's Electoral Constituency II:
Non-Occupational Groups
The analysis may now be extended to investigate trends in Labor support among 
other groups which political commentators and academics have identified as 
important elements of the broadening of Labor's constituency. To a large extent 
the groups considered in such an analysis are constrained by the limitations of 
polling data. Nevertheless, extending back to 1946, polling data are available, on 
the basis of voting intention and recalled vote polling questions, for social groups
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defined on the basis of three key cleavages, namely gender, religious denomination, 
and age. The gender cleavage has been a significant factor in Australian electoral 
politics due to historical reports of a pro-conservative bias among women (Aitkin 
and Kahan 1974, 457; Aitkin 1982, 116), representing over half the electorate, a bias 
however which some have argued that Labor has in recent years been successful in 
eradicating (Aitkin and Bell 1984; McAllister 1992, 138). Similarly reports of a 
decline in the religious cleavage (Kemp 1978, 191-98; Jones and McAllister 1989, 
16), under which a clear majority of Protestant's, again over 50 percent of the 
electorate, have traditionally supported the coalition parties, if correct would 
represent an important element in Labor's electoral success. Finally, evidence that, 
since the late 1960s, Labor has been able to attract a majority of younger voters to 
the party, thereby reversing the earlier drift of youth towards the Liberals under 
Menzies, forms an important element in Labor's broadening constituency. Figure 
7.4 shows ALP support among women, Protestants, and voters aged under 35, 
estimated for each post-war election, relative to the aggregate Labor vote. The 
trends in support for all three groups are certainly less clear than were the 
corresponding trends among the four occupational groups, but nevertheless some 
evidence of changed voting patterns is apparent (Table 7.11).
Among women, despite assumptions that pervade the literature regarding a 
historical pro-conservative bias (eg Graetz and McAllister 1988, 281; Jaensch 1990, 
414; Chaples 1993, 330), polling data show that there was no consistent pattern in 
the aggregate women's vote until the mid 1960s. Prior to that the Labor vote 
among women merely oscillated around the national Labor vote, certainly 
significantly lower in four of the eight elections between 1946 and 1963, but either 
higher than or very close to the national vote in the other four election years. It 
was not until the years 1966 to 1975 that Labor's electoral disadvantage among 
women was established. Note that it was precisely during this period that Aitkin 
(1977) conducted his first two rounds of voting studies which showed that among 
every sub-group of the population (divided on the basis of fourteen sociological 
characteristics) men were 5-15 percent more likely to identify with Labor than 
were women. Of course party identification is a different variable and concept to 
vote, but nevertheless this finding institutionalised a belief that Labor's poor 
support among women was a historical fact. By doing so, however, it ignored the 
pattern prior to 1966. Then after 1975, when Labor's support among women, 
relative to the national Labor vote, began to rise this was (correctly) seen as an 
important component of Labor's electoral improvement into the 1980s (Aitkin and 
Bell 1984), although this argument failed to recognise that what was occurring was 
a reinstatement of the electoral pattern prior to the mid 1960s when no consistent 
gender differences were evident. Indeed the overall trend in Labor support among 
women across the entire post-war period is actually downward, again emphasising 
that descriptions of unprecedented gains by Labor into the female constituency 
during the 1980s tend to ignore the history of the gender-party relationship.
This analysis suggests that it was the period during the 1950s and 1960s, when the 
coalition enjoyed an electoral advantage among women, which deviated from the 
norm, and not the 1970s and 1980s, when the overall voting allegiances of women 
merely returned to one of non-party bias. Consistent with this finding is the
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Figure 7.4: Labor support among women, Protestants, and voters aged under 35. Figures show 
the deviation from the national Labor vote (percent). Source: As for Table 7.8.
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argument, proposed by Brett (1992) in her analysis of Robert Menzies, that women 
formed an integral component of the Menzies electoral coalition, the so-called 
"forgotten people". Brett (1992, 56) argues that
"... the forgotten people Menzies was addressing were the middle- 
class, but they were also women whose particular interests and 
problems had generally been forgotten by a politics organised around 
the conflicts of the economy and the work place. In elaborating the 
virtues of the home as central to non-labor ideology, Menzies was 
elaborating the virtues of women's traditional social space. While 
this could be seen as reinforcing women's traditional role, it also 
made it easier for the needs of women in the home to be articulated 
as political demands ... A generation before the women's movement, 
Menzies was politicising the non-political."
The link between women and the non-Labor parties would appear to be the result 
not of a traditional pro-conservative bias gradually eroded by the Labor Party over 
the past two decades, but rather a temporary phenomenon linked to the specific 
electoral appeals of Menzies throughout the post-war years.
The historical alignment between Protestants and the conservative parties, as 
discussed in chapter one, has a much stronger link in political history. 
Nevertheless contemporary literature tends to down-play the importance of the 
denominational cleavage, largely in the face of the secularisation of Australian 
society and the lack of political debate focused upon issues likely to ignite the 
cleavage (Graetz and McAllister 1988, 293-96; McAllister 1992, 139-42). Figure 7.4 
shows that a crucial event in the decline in the link between Protestantism and 
opposition to Labor was the 1955 split in the ALP, which saw a predominantly 
Catholic minority leave to form the Democratic Labor Party. Whilst a majority of 
Catholics remained loyal to Labor, it is likely that the exit of some of the more 
prominent Catholic activists acted to dilute fears among some Protestants regarding 
links between Labor and the Catholic Church. However the temporary fall in 
Labor's support among Protestant's between 1972 and 1977, is more difficult to 
account for, beyond the tentative explanation that Labor's overall vote during 
those years perhaps fell to such a low level during the latter Whitlam years that 
what remained was only the traditional core of Labor's support base. Similarly it 
is not clear whether the fall in Labor's Protestant vote in the 1993 election, 
returning to the level of the 1940s, represents only a temporary aberration, perhaps 
related to the overt Irish-Catholic ancestry of the new Labor leader, Paul Keating, 
and in particular his opinions towards the country's historical ties to Britain and 
his push for Australia to become a republic, or whether issues such as the republic 
and Australia's cultural traditions have the potential to reignite the denominational 
cleavage.
The third group considered in this expanded analysis are youth, defined here as 
electors aged under 35. Ideally a group of younger voters, perhaps under 30, 
would be examined, however the limitations of some of the earlier polls precludes 
this. Nevertheless Figure 7.4 does provide an indication of how the voting 
loyalties of younger voters have changed over the post-war years. Prior to the mid 
1950s the figure shows that, relative to its overall support, Labor polled
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disproportionably well among electors aged under 35, generally three to six percent 
higher than across the national electorate. Once again, the split of 1955 appears to 
be an important event in the group's voting pattern, with younger supporters 
abandoning the party to the extent that in the election of that year Labor polled 4 
percent lower among the under 35s than among the electorate as a whole. 
Although Labor support among the young was slightly below average during the 
early 1960s, successive increases in the vote through until 1975 re-established 
Labor's electoral advantage. This is confirmed by Aitkin's (1982, 298) analysis that 
during the Whitlam years Labor was again successful in gaining the majority of 
first time voters. Into the 1980s and 1990s Labor's relative advantage among this 
group continued. Although somewhat volatile from election to election, the 
upward trend is clearly evident in the figure.
Table 7.11: Annual Trend in the Labor Party Vote among Women, 
Protestants, and Youth, relative to Total Labor vote, 1946-1993
Regression equation SE b r2
Women Vote = -1.5 - .03 T (.01)- .07
Protestants Vote = -3.5 - .02 T (.02) .01
Youth Vote = -1.2 + .04 T (.03) .03
Note: OLS regression predicting Labor vote among selected groups by 
year. Vote = Group Labor vote - Total Labor vote, T = Year - 1946 
SE b, standard error of the coefficient T 
* p < .05
Sources: As for Table 7.8.
Table 7.12: Effects of issue dimensions on the ALP vote among 
Women, Protestants, and voters aged Under 35, 1946-93 (standardised
coefficients).
Women Protestant Under 35
Market Protection - . -
Small Government -.57** - -
Private Enterprise .37** - -
Keynesian Economics - - -
Controlled economy .53** - -
New Politics - - -
Welfarism .58** .40** .47**
Economic Groups .35* - -
M inority Groups - - -
R-squared (adj) .46 .11 .65
Note: OLS regression predicting Labor Party vote among social groups from 
emphasis in Labor policy speeches upon various issue dimensions.
* p < .05; ** p < .10
Source: As for Table 7.1 and Table 7.8
Analysis of the relationship between Labor's electoral appeals and changes in group 
voting patterns (Table 7.12) provides only limited explanation. Among women,
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Labor appeals based on private enterprise, controlled economy, welfarism, and 
economic groups, had a positive impact upon the Labor vote, whilst references to 
small government had a negative impact. Among Protestants and voters aged under 
35 the only policy area which had a significant effect upon the Labor vote, in both 
cases a positive effect, were issues related to welfarism. Overall, beyond
confirming the positive impact of welfarism upon Labor support across a wide 
range of social groups, the results perhaps illustrate the limitations of using the 
policy speech data set in such an analysis, in particular beyond the key 
occupational groupings that were used in the previous section. Certainly there is 
little evidence to hand that would suggest that women as a group prefer a 
controlled economy to small government, whilst also supporting private enterprise.
Two final social groups can also be identified as important components of Labor's 
success in broadening the party's electoral constituency, namely voters from non- 
English speaking backgrounds and the tertiary educated. Due to the limitations of 
polling data the electoral patterns of these two groups may only be examined for 
the elections held from 1966 onwards. Nevertheless the limited data available does 
provide evidence of Labor success (Figure 7.5 and Table 7.13). This is particularly 
the case among voters from non-English speaking backgrounds. Prior to 1975 the 
volatility of the migrant vote, relative to the national Labor vote, is consistent with 
the findings of Aitkin that foreign-born voters exhibited comparatively low levels 
of partisanship and were yet to become fully socialised into Australian politics. To 
the extent that migrant voting patterns differed from those of Australian born 
citizens, this was in terms of a pro-Conservative bias (Aitkin 1982, 157). Aitkin 
argued however that this situation had changed by the mid 1970s, demonstrated by 
the swing in partisan loyalties to Labor. This trend is evident in Figure 7.5, as is 
the continued success of Labor among the voters from non-English speaking 
backgrounds. Aitkin attributed the swing to Labor to two possible causes: 
Whitlam's active courting of the immigrant vote, particularly among the Greek and 
Italian communities, and the concentration of migrant communities in Labor-held 
seats which, upon politicisation during the 1970s, encouraged them to seek active 
participation in the dominant party of the area, the Labor Party (Aitkin 1982, 334- 
35). However caution must be used in assuming that the ethnic vote in Australia 
is monolithic, given that recent studies have detected differing voting trends among 
various ethnic groups over the past two decades (McAllister 1992, 145).
Historically the relationship between tertiary education and party support, as 
reported in early voting studies, has been far from clear. While Labor received the 
support of a lower than average percentage of tertiary educated voters during the 
1960s, this concealed a contrasting education effect among the social classes. Kemp 
(1978, 342-43) confirmed the earlier findings of Aitkin and Kahan (1974, 460) when 
he reported that "within the non-manual stratum, respondents with tertiary 
education are somewhat less likely to support the Liberal and Country government 
than are respondents with secondary education only. By contrast, within the 
manual stratum, the probability of supporting the Liberal and Country Party 
government increases consistently with education." However by the mid 1970s 
Labor's support among the tertiary educated group suddenly rose, no doubt aided 
by Whitlam's plan to abolish tertiary fees and introduce the Tertiary Education 
Assistance Scheme to provide financial assistance to tertiary students who otherwise 
would not have been able to attend university. Labor may also have gained
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further tertiary educated support from aspects of Whitlam's post-materialist agenda. 
Despite a fall in Labor support among the tertiary educated in the years following 
the defeat of the Whitlam government, support remained well above the levels 
recorded in the mid 1960s. Indeed over the past six elections support for Labor 
among the tertiary educated was relatively consistent at around 5 percent lower 
than the national Labor vote, but with the low support of the 1966 and 1969 
elections leading to an upward trend over the entire period.
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Figure 7.5: Labor support among voters from Non-English speaking backgrounds and tertiary educated 
voters. Figures show the deviation from the national Labor vote (percent). Source: As for 
Table 7.8.
Table 7.13: Annual Trend in the Labor Party Vote among voters from 
Non-English Speaking Backgrounds and the Tertiary Educated, 1966-1993
regression equation SE b r2
Non-English Speaking Back. Vote = -8.3 + .53 (.29)' .09
Tertiary Educated Vote = -7.8 + .12 (.09) .04
Note: OLS regression predicting Labor vote among selected groups by year. 
Vote = Group Labor vote - Total Labor vote, T = Year - 1946 
SE b, standard error of the coefficient T 
* pC.10
Sources: As for Table 7.8.
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Conclusion
Overall, the combined analysis of patterns of electoral support among key social 
groups, together with an analysis of the changing emphasis of Labor policy 
speeches over time would suggest that Labor has indeed been successful in 
broadening the party's electoral constituency as the result of changed electoral 
appeals. This relationship was most clearly established with regard to white-collar 
workers, and in particular professionals and managers, the Labor vote among this 
group having improved by some 20 to 30 percent over the period, relative to the 
national Labor vote. Moreover it was found that related to these gains was a 
greater emphasis in Labor policy speeches to small government, private enterprise, 
new politics, and welfarism. In other words, Labor's increased emphasis upon 
both liberal economic policies and welfare/quality of life issues was clearly to its 
electoral advantage commends the party's ability to adapt. Although these gains 
were somewhat at the expense of losses among the party's blue-collar base, the 
continued shift towards a greater emphasis upon welfarism, which was associated 
with Labor gains among all social groups considered, acted to maximise gains and 
minimise losses. The results of the analysis into non-occupational groups were less 
clear, but nevertheless over the period upward trends in support were identified 
among voters aged under 35, the tertiary educated and voters form non-English 
speaking backgrounds.
Although the results, based on polling data subject to sampling error and party 
platform data derived only from campaign policy speeches, must be interpreted 
with caution, they do act to confirm the thesis that Labor has adapted to a 
shrinking electoral base based on blue-collar workers. In particular, through 
changed appeals, Labor has attracted increased proportions of non-manual workers 
into the party's electoral coalition. These results are also consistent with the 
findings of Chapter 6 which showed that the balance of party support is not purely 
an outcome of simple social or attitudinal determinism, but rather is, in part, an 
outcome of the success and/or failure of particular electoral strategies adopted by 
the competing parties. In this case the greater emphasis of Labor upon market 
outcomes and the New Politics agenda represents a response to the prospect of 
electoral decline which confronted the party on the basis of a constant group-party 
relationship. In other words, the weakening of social group alignments in 
Australia, identified in Chapter 2, which is often seen as a potential threat to 
aggregate electoral stability, is in fact an outcome, in part, of the behaviour of a 
political party seeking to maintain its long-term persistence in the party system. 
The fact that the Labor Party has been so successful in the 1980s and 1990s is an 
indication that the adaptive strategies of the party have gone beyond mere 
persistence to providing the party with a slight electoral advantage. This 
advantage is not the result of societal change, but rather the result of Labor 
intervening in the process by which societal change is translated into electoral 
change, and thus, in part, shaping the political environment in which it competes.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
NEW POLITICS AND PARTY ADAPTATION
Over the past three decades the Lipset and Rokkan (1967) thesis regarding the 
freezing of the major party alternatives in the 1920s has been heavily challenged by 
scholars investigating recent trends in advanced industrial democracies (eg Dalton, 
Flanagan, and Beck eds 1984; Dalton 1988; Inglehart 1990a; cf Bartolini and Mair 
1990). Whilst scholars widely acknowledge the comparative cleavage analysis as a 
description of the development of West European party systems, few hold that the 
thesis now allows for an accurate description of contemporary political alignments 
(Harrop and Miller 1987, 193-202; Johnston 1990; Lijphart 1984, 1990, Poguntke 
1989). To the extent that the revisionist literature agrees, three strongly inter­
related indicators of the unfreezing of party systems have been identified, namely a 
decline in group-voting loyalties, including processes of class and partisan 
dealignment, a rise in the level of electoral volatility and instability, notably a high 
turnover of governments and the electoral demise of some major parties, and the 
emergence of a New Politics, including the success of New Politics and Green 
parties (Mair 1993).
Disentangling the causal processes at work amongst these three developments is, at 
best, difficult. In so far as agreement does exist, it is generally argued that an 
initial decline in cleavage politics precipitated a rise in electoral volatility, as voters 
were freed from the constraining loyalties of the past, which in turn facilitated the 
rise of New Politics parties (Crewe and Denver 1985, 16; Harrop and Miller 1987, 
140). Again, however, it must be stressed that the causal processes at work are in 
fact far from clear, although the historical incidence of these events would tend to 
confirm such a causal chain. Thus the decline in group-voting loyalties which 
began during the 1950s and 1960s (eg Butler and Stokes 1974; Kemp 1978; Nie, 
Verba and Petrocik 1976) was followed by the rise of electoral volatility of the 
1970s (Pedersen 1983), providing for the rise in New Politics parties in the 1980s 
(Muller-Rommel 1989).
In chapter one it was argued that the underlying characteristic of Anglo-American 
democracies, and of western party systems generally (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mair 
1993), is the persistence of the major party alternatives. Nevertheless, such a 
finding is not incompatible with the findings of later chapters which showed a 
decline in group voting loyalties since the mid 1960s, as well as evidence that the 
range of political attitudes which structure voting choice now extended to include 
New Politics issues. The missing link between, on the one hand, social and 
attitudinal change, and, on the other, aggregate electoral stability, is the role of 
political parties as independent actors in the party system acting so as to ensure 
their long-term persistence (Sartori 1969; Mair 1983). Thus chapter six identified 
the hypothetical implications for party support had the major parties not adapted 
to the social and attitudinal changes which have occurred since the mid 1960s. 
Chapter seven then examined trends in post-war electoral appeals of the Australian 
Labor Party which showed that the party had altered its campaign messages in 
such a manner that the party extended its electoral base beyond the contracting 
working-class. This notion of party adaptation, initially identified by Sartori (1969)
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and later developed by Mair (1983, 1993), represents a fourth challenge to the 
freezing proposition, in so far as the idea of the historical persistence of parties 
requires the additional step of recognising the adaptive strategies of political parties. 
Significantly it also provides the basis of an understanding of why some Old 
Parties have been more successful than others in the face of the social and 
attitudinal changes of the past three decades.
This chapter investigates the challenges posed to the freezing proposition by each 
of three indicators, or aspects, of party system change, with reference both to the 
evidence presented earlier in the study and research from other studies. The first 
section deals with the widespread finding that the impact of group loyalties upon 
vote has declined over-time. The second section briefly retraces arguments, dealt 
with in chapter one, regarding the rise in electoral volatility throughout western 
democracies since the early 1970s. In section three the literature on the emergence 
of a New Politics is reviewed and the implications of the rise of New Politics 
parties is considered with regard to the Lipset and Rokkan schema. Section four 
then considers the role of party adaptation, thereby recognising the role played by 
party organisations themselves in providing for the continued inertia of western 
party systems. The final chapter then considers the implications of these findings 
with regard to the persistence of Old Parties, the internal tensions which limit 
their adaptive strategies, and the mechanisms available to overcome these tensions.
The Weakening of Group Voting Loyalties
Early sociological models of electoral behaviour identified social groups, 
particularly occupational and denominational memberships, as the primary 
determinants of voter choice (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson and Gaudet 1948). As the social composition of the electorate was 
relatively stable from election to election, the influence of cues provided by social 
group leaders represented an important force for party system stability. In the 
1960s the influence of social-psychology upon electoral behaviour led to a new 
voting model in which the political party itself was identified as a primary group 
towards which citizens displayed affective orientations (Campbell et al 1954; 
Campbell et al 1966). Despite the differences in the two approaches, the role of 
group orientations as a force for aggregate electorate stability was central in both 
(Crewe 1985). However, a common finding in electoral behaviour research over 
the past three decades has been a decline in group voting loyalties (Franklin et al 
1992), particularly those based on social class (eg. Borre 1984; Butler and Stokes 
1974; Dalton 1988, 157; Denver 1989, Kemp 1978; McAllister 1992a, 169; Nie et al 
1976) and party identification (McAllister 1992a, 41; Rose and McAllister 1990, 163; 
Wattenberg 1990, 165). Chapters two and three above confirmed the withering of 
both class and partisan voting loyalties in Australia, Britain, and the United States. 
Although some particular sociological variables had become more significant as an 
influence upon vote over the period, most notably housing occupancy in Britain, 
invariably they failed to compensate for the declining impact of other withering 
cleavages. The overall effect, confirmed by cross-national research, is that social 
background factors now structure vote to a lesser extent than at any time certainly 
since the introduction of mass survey techniques, and possibly since the general 
establishment of modern party systems (Franklin 1992b, 387). With regard to
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party identification not only has it become a lesser influence upon vote, but the 
levels and/or strength of identification has also declined in all three countries.
A possible implication of voters no longer constrained by the social divisions of 
the past is that political parties may have lost the certainty of a minimum level of 
electoral support provided by their core social base. The consequence for the 
proposition that party systems remain frozen is severe. If voters no longer view 
their interests as being represented by political alignments derived from the 
conflicts of the national and industrial revolutions, the continued electoral survival 
of Old Politics parties is threatened. In this respect the focus in the literature upon 
class voting is understandable. The class cleavage, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
argued, was the most uniformly divisive in western Europe of the four critical 
cleavages. While party system diversity was the result of each country's individual 
response to the Reformation, the Democratic Revolution, and the Industrial 
Revolution, the common thread throughout Europe was the development of the 
nationwide working-class movement (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 46). The long-term 
erosion of party loyalties based on such a universally divisive conflict would have 
profound implications for party system change.
The argument that the decline in class voting represents a force for the thawing of 
party systems is, however, flawed on two counts. Firstly, descriptions in the 
literature regarding the decline in group voting loyalties generally overstate the 
overall significance of the decline. This in particular stems from the writings of 
many of the early scholars who often alluded to a supposed golden-age of cleavage 
politics in which voter behaviour was almost totally structured by social 
background factors. For example, Alford (1963, 170) described Britain as 
exhibiting pure class politics in so far as "very little except class matters for politics 
in Great Britain".1 This conclusion was drawn from findings which showed that 
even when class voting was at its height, during the late 1950s, Labour still failed 
to gain the vote of approximately one third of the manual strata. Although the 
precise level of class voting required for an electorate to exhibit "pure class politics" 
is necessarily subjective, clearly with such a large proportion of voters defying their 
class cues, it is apparent that factors other than class have always mattered in 
British politics.2 As Sartori (1969, 76) argued, the fact that the working class has 
comprised a majority of the electorate for most of the century, yet Labour has 
spent more time in opposition than in government, indicates that voting behaviour 
in Britain has never been structured by class to the extent that some scholars 
intimate (also Aitkin 1982, 119-20). Indeed the historical necessity of parties 
appealing beyond their natural class constituency was actually acknowledged by 
Alford (1963, 130): "Labour's electoral fate depends largely on gaining more of the 
middle-class vote ... and a Conservative victory rests inevitably upon heavy 
working-class support." In other words, the argument that the historical 
persistence of parties is guaranteed by the support of their respective traditional
1 Also Pulzer's (1967, 98) claim: "Class is the basis of British party politics; All else is 
embellishment and detail".
2 Similarly scholars in Australia often quote Encel (1970, 96), who argued that "the 
correspondence between class identification and voting is so close in the survey results that the two 
may be regarded as largely alternative measures of the same general outlook".
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constituencies is a historical fraud. Party competition has always involved 
poaching elements of the opponent's support base, with electoral success or failure 
heavily reliant upon the success of doing so.
The second flaw in the argument that the weakening of group voting loyalties 
challenges the freezing proposition advanced by Lipset and Rokkan is that it is 
simply a clear misrepresentation of their position. The scholars undoubtedly 
selected their words carefully when they wrote "the party systems of the 1960's 
reflect ... the cleavage structures of the 1920's" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 50). The 
key word in this respect is reflect. Reflection does not imply a necessary statistical 
relationship between, on the one hand, social group memberships and, on the 
other, party support, nor for that matter some acknowledged form of 
representation by the party organisation of the social group's interests (Sartori 
1969, 74). What it does suggest is that the party conflicts of the present have their 
genesis in the social divisions of the past. To some degree the reflection is simply a 
function of the persistence of the party organisations, to the extent that the 
continuance of a party structure will exert some degree of pressure, albeit varying 
greatly from party to party, for consistency in the dimension of opposition (Rose 
and Mackie 1988). However, the reflection of historical cleavage structures is by 
no means contingent on the persistence of particular party organisations (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967, 53).
The notion of the continued reflection of cleavage structures requires neither stable 
group voting loyalties nor the persistence of individual party organisations; rather 
it requires continuity with regard to the underlying conflicts upon which party 
competition is based. In this respect the findings of Budge and Robertson (1987), 
in their cross-national study of party manifesto's in twenty post-war democracies, 
are instructive. The authors found that the dominant dimension of competition in 
most countries was confrontation on a Left-Right cleavage, referring principally to 
"classic economic policy-conflicts - government regulation of the economy through 
direct controls or takeover (sometimes associated with Keynesian economic 
management) - as opposed to free enterprise, individual freedom, incentives, and 
economic orthodoxy" (Budge and Robertson 1987, 394-5). Whilst the specific 
issues upon which the fundamental left-right economic conflict focuses may have 
changed significantly, and the specific positions of the parties may also have 
changed, as in classic Downsian spatial analysis, the underlying ideological 
continuum, based on the desired level of State intervention on economic policy, 
continues as the basis of party competition. Naturally other dimensions of 
competition exist and are politically significant, and exceptions to the general case 
are present, but once again it is important to note that this has always been the
case. What is significant is that, in general, the dominant dimension of party
competition in western democracies continues to centre upon conflict on economic 
issues between Left and Right.
Budge and Robertson acknowledged that as the principal dimension of party
competition identified through their analysis - the Left-Right cleavage - represents
only those issues upon which the parties themselves wish to conduct electoral 
debate, and not necessarily the issues which structure voting behaviour. But as 
argued above, the historically imperfect link between class and party itself indicates 
that other political concerns, beyond even the three other critical cleavages, have
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always motivated some voters. The point here is that it is the party system which 
continues to reflect the cleavage structures of the past. Nevertheless, cross-national 
research confirms that the decline in group voting loyalties was associated with a 
rise in the saliency of traditional left-right economic attitudes, independent of prior 
sociological influences (Franklin 1992a, 402). As Knutsen (1988) has argued, the 
decline in class voting has implications for the owner-worker cleavage at the mass 
level only in so far as the divisions based on this cleavage are represented by 
distinct social classes. However, in advanced industrial societies this is no longer 
the case: the "Left-Right dimension has altered from a structural class or status 
cleavage to an independent ideological cleavage" (Knutsen 1988, 349).
Consequently the decline in cleavage politics cannot be taken as evidence of a 
decline in the role of left-right conflict as a dimension of party competition. 
Rather, what has changed is the social composition of the opposing camps, not 
necessarily what the camps themselves propose.
The decline in group voting loyalties, in isolation, does not challenge the Lipset 
and Rokkan freezing proposition. In the first place, even at the point of the 
establishment of modern party systems, social cleavages alone have never totally 
structured the vote choice of citizens. To suggest otherwise is a distortion of 
political history. Furthermore, and in any case, Lipset and Rokkan were 
concerned with the translation of social cleavages into political oppositions, and 
not with the statistical specificities of mass electoral behaviour. Thus providing the 
dimension of party competition remains constant, changes to the social bases of 
competing ideologies are irrelevant. On the other hand, changes in the electoral 
cohesion of key social groups does have implications for other aspects of party 
system change which may, in turn, challenge the freezing proposition. One such 
aspect of party system change relates to the rise in electoral volatility.
Electoral Volatility
One of the hypothesised effects of the decline in group voting loyalties is a 
concomitant rise in electoral volatility as voters, freed from the constraining 
loyalties of the past, make their voting decisions predominantly on the basis of 
short-term influences, particularly in response to economic conditions, party 
candidates, and election issues (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976, 352-56; Sarlvik and 
Crewe 1983, 336-38). The absence, or more accurately weakness, of long-term 
predispositions, in addition to the transitory nature of election-specific influences, 
creates an environment conducive to voters switching from party to party at a 
much higher rate than was previously the case (McAllister and Mughan 1987a). 
Such a scenario places even greater strains on political parties as the self-reinforcing 
nature of partisanship becomes a factor for a declining proportion of the electorate 
(Campbell et al 1960, 163-5). The potential for new parties to mobilise dissatisfied 
voters is also increased, and the threat to party system stability is raised. Electoral 
volatility may be regarded as analogous to the shifting of tectonic plates, which, if 
it occurs too rapidly, will raze existing structures, in this case the established 
political parties. Evidence that volatility was indeed on the rise was, in many 
cases, consistent with the pattern of election results throughout the western 
democracies from the late 1960s onwards. Long-serving governments suffered 
electoral defeat, some of Europe's oldest parties were in terminal decline, whilst
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many minor parties made significant electoral breakthroughs (Crewe and Denver 
1985, 3-4). A body of studies emerged (reviewed in chapter one), utilising a range 
of statistical procedures and measurement devices, to confirm the long-term secular 
rise in the level of electoral volatility and instability throughout the western 
democracies (Ersson and Lane 1982, Maguire 1983, Pedersen 1983, Shamir 1984, 
Wolinetz 1979).
The implications of a rise in electoral volatility for the freezing of party 
alternatives is generally misunderstood. As with the debate regarding the decline in 
class voting, the root of the misunderstanding rests with an analysis which actually 
supported the original proposition. When Rose and Urwin (1970, 295) confirmed 
the Lipset and Rokkan thesis, concluding that "the electoral strength of most 
parties in western nations since the war had changed very little from election to 
election, from decade to decade, or within the lifespan of a generation", the 
accuracy of the thesis had become linked to measures related to individual parties 
which, quite clearly, was not their intention. As Bartolini and Mair (1990, 63-65) 
have argued, Lipset and Rokkan were concerned with parties as organised 
expressions of historical cleavages, not as individual entities. Thus when conflicts 
in the labor market produced a diversity of working-class parties, from Marxist to 
revisionist Social Democrat, the significance of these parties was not with their 
individual political agendas, but simply as different organisational expressions of the 
same mass movement which had generated a new dimension of opposition in 
western party systems. Consequently, when Bartolini and Mair (1990, 103) 
adopted the cleavage block, rather than individual party, as the unit of analysis in 
their study of electoral volatility, the scholars actually found a secular decline in 
volatility.
Australia, Britain, and the United States however tend to differ from many of the 
party systems of continental Europe in that national politics on the left has been 
dominated by a single reformist party. Consequently aggregate electoral volatility 
in these countries may be taken at face value, with the majority of the transfer of 
votes across parties in any one election representing volatility across the class 
cleavage. Under such circumstances the electoral instability of the 1970s, in 
particular, represented a more serious challenge to notions of aggregate electoral 
stability. Nevertheless, as chapter one demonstrated, there has been no general rise 
in volatility in the electorates of Australia, Britain, and the United states over the 
past quarter of a century. Indeed the data, if anything, provided evidence of a 
decline in aggregate electoral instability since the 1920s. In addition, regression 
analysis showed that any observed trends in the electoral support for each of the 
six major parties considered were either statistically or substantively insignificant.
Recent election results in the two other Anglo-American democracies, Canada and 
New Zealand, seriously question any notion of aggregate electoral stability in the 
English speaking nations (Figure 8.1). In Canada, the ruling Progressive 
Conservative Party won only two parliamentary seats in the 1993 national 
elections, whilst a new party of the right (formed in the 1980s), the Reform Party, 
became the main party of opposition representing western Canada. In New 
Zealand the 1990 and 1993 election results represented a bifurcation of electoral
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support on the left and right of national politics, NewLabour3 and New Zealand 
First both gaining parliamentary representation in traditional Labour and National 
seats respectively. Both countries appear to represent an excellent example of the 
pervasiveness of party system change extending to the generally resilient Anglo- 
American democracies (Rose and Urwin 1970, 297). Once again, however, the 
distinction between party organisation and political alternative is crucial. For 
example, the party systems of Germany, France, and Italy are "littered with the 
remains of extinct political parties", but, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 53) observed 
in relation to these three countries, "the continuities in the alternatives are as 
striking as the disruptions in their organisational expressions."
100 —I
Canada
Figure 8.1: Major-Party Vote in Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United States, 1970-94. Sources: Mackerras (1994), Mackie and Rose 
(1990), and various election reports.
One possible interpretation, therefore, of the outcomes in Canada and New 
Zealand, consistent with the approach of Bartolini and Mair, is simply that of a 
realignment of electoral support within the existing left-right political tendencies,4 
which continue to reflect the conflicts that have existed throughout modern party
3 Prior to the 1993 election NewLabour, together with four other minor party groupings, 
formed the Alliance.
4 The class-cleavage volatility measures for the 1993 Canadian and New Zealand elections were 
4.1 and 4.0 respectively. Both figures were well within one standard deviation (2.5) of the mean 
(2.9) for western Europe 1885-1985 (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 76).
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competition (Lijphart 1990).5 Indeed Table 8.1 shows that despite the electoral 
collapse of the Progressive Conservatives, and the rise of the Reform Party, the 
total vote for the right in the 1993 Canadian election was consistent with the 
average vote for the Progressive Conservatives across the post-war period. 
Similarly in New Zealand the combined National Party and New Zealand First 
vote in the 1993 election was consistent with the average post-war National vote, 
whilst on the centre-left of New Zealand politics the combined Labour and 
Alliance vote matched the combined post-war average vote of Labour and the 
Alliance's political predecessors. The structure of political conflict has not changed 
in either country, merely the organisational expressions of that conflict.
Table 8.1: Party Vote in Canada and New Zealand 
by Cleavage Block (percent).
C anada A v  1945-88 1993
Progressive Conservative 36 16
Reform Party - 19
Total Right 36 35
N e w  Z ea la n d A v  1945-90 1993
National Party 45 35
NZ First . 8
Total Right 45 43
Labour Party 44 35
Alliance 9a 18
Total Centre-Left 53 53
a Combined average vote for Social Credit, Values, Democrat, 
Greens and NewLabour parties.
Sources: Mackie and Rose (1990) and 1993 election reports.
The development of modern party systems, as described by Lipset and Rokkan, 
was one of new political organisations emerging in response to conflict across social 
cleavages. Thus in response to the industrial revolution, and the emergence of the 
industrialised working-class, labour parties were formed throughout western 
Europe. However, the rise of new political parties, which is associated with a rise 
in electoral volatility (Mair 1993), does not necessarily imply that new social 
cleavages are being translated into the party system. Just as communist and 
socialist parties represented different organisational expressions of the same political 
alternative, so too the new political parties of recent decades may also represent 
simply a diversity of policy approaches within the same political tendency. 
Nevertheless, one new form of political organisation, the so-called New Politics 
party, is generally regarded as a precursor to a new cleavage dimension, and is 
considered in the next section.
5 The success of the Bloc Quebecois in 1993 Canadian election represents the continuation of 
another Old Politics cleavage, namely centre versus periphery.
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Rise of New Politics
The third challenge to the Lipset and Rokkan freezing proposition, related to both 
the decline in group voting loyalties and the rise in electoral volatility, is the 
emergence, since the late 1960s, of a variety of New Politics concerns in advanced 
industrial countries (Dalton and Kuechler 1990). The significance of the New 
Politics is that it represents an additional form of political opposition in western 
party systems to those identified by Lipset and Rokkan, whereby a new group of 
political concerns, including citizen participation, protection of the environment, 
and the rights of minority groups, conflict with the interests of the existing 
political establishment, committed to economic growth, secure national borders, 
and the maintenance of law and order (Dalton 1988, 132-4; Inglehart 1977, chapt 
10). As a consequence of such conflict, a New Politics cleavage is said to have 
emerged, with proponents of a radical quality of life agenda (post-materialists or 
the New Left) opposed to the defenders of the existing economic and social orders 
(materialists or New Right) (Inglehart 1990a, 273-278). The New Politics cleavage 
has the potential to cross-cut the Old Politics dimension described by Lipset and 
Rokkan as involving conflict between, on the one hand, tenants, labourers, and 
workers (the Old Left) and, on the other, owners and employers (the Old Right).
Lipset and Rokkan identified two historical junctures, the National and the 
Industrial revolutions, which sparked the four critical cleavages which structured 
party competition through to the 1960s. In terms of identifying an historical 
juncture which sparked the New Politics cleavage, the student movement of the 
1960s would seem appropriate, exemplified by the violent student demonstrations 
which occurred in Paris, Berlin and Berkeley (Dalton, Kuechler, Burklin 1990, 3). 
Whilst the actual objectives of student protests differed from campus to campus, 
throughout Europe and the United States, their effect was to initiate demands on 
the existing political elite which lay outside the scope of existing political 
organisations. The legacy of the student movements continue among a range of so- 
called new social movements, covering a range of New Left concerns, including 
environmentalism, opposition to nuclear power and weaponry, support for 
affirmative action, and greater citizen participation in governmental decision 
making (Kuechler and Dalton 1990). Studies have shown that the demographic 
characteristics of the student movements have also been inherited by the New Left 
groups, which tend to represent a disproportionably young, affluent, and highly- 
educated segment of society (Andersen 1990b; Kitschelt 1990; Mueller-Rommel 
1990). Some scholars have argued that this exerts a particular further strain on Old 
Left parties as they attempt to accommodate two conflicting groups, divided both 
on value priorities (Old versus New Left) and social background (working versus 
middle-class) (Inglehart 1977, 70; Lipset 1981b, 23-5).
To the extent that Old Left parties either choose not to represent the views of the 
New Left, or attempt to represent them but are unsuccessful in doing so, the 
opportunity is created for new parties to mobilise on the New Politics cleavage 
(Dalton 1988, 133-49; Inglehart 1990a, 275-78). This indeed appeared to be the case 
during the 1980s when, throughout continental Europe and Scandinavia, a number
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of New Left parties, particularly Green parties,6 were successful in gaining 
representation in both national and European parliaments (Curtice 1989; Muller- 
Rommel 1990). Although environmentalism played only a minor role in early 
conceptions of post-materialism,7 scholars now tend to regard it as a quintessential 
New Politics issue (Inglehart 1990a, 267; Poguntke 1989). Furthermore whilst 
gaining initial recognition on the basis of specific environmental concerns, these 
Green parties have generally expanded their program to encompass a range of 
other New Left concerns (Lawson and Merkl 1988, 5-7; Muller-Rommel 1989, 8- 
14). As the rise of Green parties was seen to be related to general trends in 
advanced industrial nations (Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 1984; 15-22), in particular 
cognitive mobilisation and value change, it was argued that, should these trends 
continue, New Left parties may continue to gain electoral strength (Muller- 
Rommel 1989), and the New Politics cleavage become established as a major 
dimension of party competition (Inglehart 1990a, 285-88).
In the Anglo-American democracies the vote for Green parties has generally been 
lower than that achieved in some European and Scandinavian countries. In 
Australia this is in part due to the lack of a national Green political organisation 
since the demise of the Nuclear Disarmament Party in the late 1980s (Papadakis 
1990, 1993).8 Campaigning under different party labels from state to state the 
Green vote in lower-house elections reached only 1.7 percent in 1993 (Australian 
Electoral Commission 1993).9 By contrast the Green Party in Britain has a long 
history of contesting parliamentary elections, extending as far back as 1974 (Parkin 
1989, chap 13; Rudig and Lowe 1986). Despite achieving a vote of 15 percent in 
the 1989 European elections, support fell to less than 1 percent in the 1992 general 
election. In the United States, the Citizens Party, committed to a strong 
environmentalist platform, emerged to contest the 1980 and 1984 Presidential 
elections, however its candidates failed to achieve more than 0.3 percent of the 
popular vote (Parkin 1989, chap 18).10
A common explanation offered for the limited electoral success of Green and New 
Politics parties in the Anglo-American democracies is their respective electoral
6 Following Rohrschneider (1993, 684-5), this study uses the term New Left to include three 
types of party: newly founded Green parties; left-wing parties which are socially progressive but 
with a historical commitment to socialism; and liberal centre parties which stress participatory 
democracy and environmentalism.
7 The item "more beautiful cities" was included in the 12 item battery designed by Inglehart to 
measure value priority, but failed to cluster with the five other post-materialist items (Inglehart 
1977, 43-50: also 1990, 136-144).
8 Although the formation of a national Green Party was announced in August 1992 (Papadakis 
1993, 183), in the 1993 federal election Green candidates continued to stand as either the endorsed 
candidate of their respective state organisation or as an independent.
9 In the 1984 Senate election the NDP won 7.2% of the vote, whilst Green candidates won 3.3% 
of the 1993 Senate vote (Mackerras 1989, 1994)
10 An exception among this group of countries is New Zealand, home to the first national 
Green party, the Values Party formed in 1972. The Green vote in New Zealand reached 5.2% in 
1975 and 6.9% in 1990, whilst the restructured Green Party was the largest political grouping within 
the new Alliance which achieved a vote of 18.2% in the 1993 election (Parkin 1989, chap 16).
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systems (Rootes 1992), all of which involve majoritarian voting in single-member 
constituencies (Harrop and Miller 1987, 50). As Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 31) 
recognised in their discussion of the barriers faced by rising parties mobilising 
along a new cleavage, such systems "set high barriers against rising movements of 
new entrants into the political arena". Indeed in Australia a number of Green 
candidates have in fact been elected to both the federal upper-house and the 
Tasmanian state lower-house under a proportional voting system. Nevertheless, 
the role of the electoral system should not be taken too far in regard to variations 
in Green electoral support, given that two of the highest Green votes recorded to 
date, namely the British 1989 European elections and the French 1993 national 
elections, were both achieved under majoritarian voting systems.
It may also be argued that the apparent exceptionalism of the Anglo-American 
democracies is simply the result of a lack of perspective regarding the electoral 
success of Green parties in Continental Europe, rather than any factors relating to 
voting systems or cultural differences. The tendency to overstate Green electoral 
successes has been observed by Mair (1993, 129), who commented that "since 
newness is exciting, we also assume it to be very important, and thus focus upon 
the fact that 5 percent of voters support the Greens, while forgetting the more 
obvious fact that 95 percent do not". Similarly Lijphart (1990) has argued that it is 
significant that even in proportional systems Old Parties still remain dominant, 
whilst only in 'low-barrier' systems have New Politics parties been (moderately) 
successful. An examination of the electoral fortunes of Green parties (Figure 8.2) 
tends to show that the Green vote often increases rapidly during the party's initial 
years, but subsequently tends to stall in the range of 5 to 8 percent of the national 
vote, well below any level to suggest a significant alteration to the party system.
The extent to which the rise of Green parties represents a new dimension of 
opposition in the modern party system is certainly less clear than is often 
suggested. For example in Belgium and France Green parties have recently been, 
in relative terms, spectacularly successful. In the 1991 election for the Belgian 
lower-house the combined Green vote was 10 percent, with 17 candidates elected 
through a form of proportional representation. However, the impact of this 
success in Belgium was negligible; the Left formed a majority coalition, whilst the 
Green parties were simply two of the seven parties in opposition, alongside the 
National Front and the anarchists (Deruette and Loeb-Mayer 1992). In the 1993 
elections for the French National Assembly various Green groups together gained 
7.4 percent of the national vote, but, due to the plurality voting system, no 
candidates were elected. Again the Greens represented one political grouping 
among many, including the National Front and other extremist groups, whose 
support was insufficiently concentrated to gain representation. In both cases the 
essential argument is that the Greens at present simply represent nothing more 
than another minor party, or grouping, struggling at the lower end of popular 
support. To the extent that their vote is rising in particular countries provides 
some encouragement for the revisionist scholars, but again the actual level of 
popular vote must be seen in the context of party systems still dominated by old 
parties (Mair 1993).
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Figure 8.2: Vote for green parties in die national elections of selected countries 1978-94.
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On the other hand, there are cases in which Green parties, holding the balance the 
power in a particular legislature, have been in a position to form part of a 
governing coalition. Most notable are a number of German Land parliaments 
(including Lower Saxony, Hesse, and Bremen),11 and the Tasmanian state legislature 
in Australia. What is notable in these instances is that the Greens supported the 
Old Left. This is not surprising given that some common ground exists between 
the Old and New Lefts, particularly a hostility towards market outcomes 
(Andersen 1990a, 114; Inglehart 1977, 243).12 This raises a separate but important 
question as to the extent to which the success of Green parties truly represents a 
new dimension of political opposition. For instance European social democratic 
parties have often relied upon the support of a wide range of hard-left and centre 
political groupings to form parliamentary alliances, for example between the PS 
and PCF in France and between the SPD and FDP in West Germany. To the 
extent that Green parties represent an additional minor grouping with whom 
strategic alliances may be formed, this reduces their significance as a force for a 
new dimension of opposition separate from traditional cleavages. In other words 
Green parties may be regarded as another minor player on the centre-left (eg 
Swedish Environment Party) or far left (eg German Green Party) of the traditional 
party divide (Listhaug, Macdonald and Rabinowitz 1990). Such an argument is 
supported by evidence of a link between the rise of Green parties and the decline 
of Communist parties (Inglehart 1990a, 283).
Also portrayed by some scholars as a potential vehicle for the emergence of a New 
Politics dimension of party competition are those liberal centre parties which have 
adopted various New Left policy stances (Andersen 1990b, 199).13 In Australia the 
Democrats were identified as such a potentially realigning force early after their 
establishment in the late 1970s (Kemp 1978, 16).14 To a lesser extent in Britain, the 
Liberal party, and its successors, have also been identified as a possible vehicle for 
New Politics concerns (Crewe 1982, Heath et al 1985). Although debate centres 
on the extent to which either party has a distinct social base (Crewe 1982; Marks 
and Bean 1992; McAllister 1982; Studlar and McAllister 1987) voters for the centre 
parties in Australia and Britain do exhibit some characteristics consistent with 
supporters of New Politics parties in Europe. In particular support for each is 
drawn disproportionably from tertiary educated voters, post-materialists, and those 
supportive of New Left concerns (Dalton 1988, 171; Heath et al 1985, 117; 1991,
11 A Red-Green coalition may be more difficult at the federal level however, requiring 
agreement on defence and foreign policy issues on which the Greens and SDP are strongly divided 
(Smith 1987, 142).
12 There is also evidence at the mass level of a relationship between a Left position on particular 
New Politics and Old Politics issues (Inglehart 1990a, 274-5; Heath et al 1991, 194), and of a 
relationship between environmentalism and a left-wing ideological self-perception (Inglehart 1990b, 
Muller-Rommel 1985, 1989).
13 This includes the Swedish 'Centre Party', the Norwegian Liberal Party 'Venstre', and the 
Danish 'Radical Liberals' (Andersen 1990; Rohrschneider 1993, 685).
14 Prior to the formation of the Australian Democrats in 1977, the Australia Party (AP) was 
similarly portrayed as a potential new politics party. Born out of opposition to Australian 
involvement in the Vietnam War, and committed to notions of participatory democracy, the party's 
support was heavily drawn from tertiary-educated professionals. Many AP activists subsequently 
joined the Democrats (Kemp 1978, 16, 336-42; Reynolds 1979; Warhurst 1983).
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191; Rose and McAllister 1990, 56; Marks and Bean 1992; McAllister 1992a, 84-5, 
262).
In terms of party policy the Australian Democrats have clearly shown the stronger 
emphasis upon a specific New Politics agenda, including environmental protection, 
opposition to uranium mining, and a commitment to participatory democracy 
(Jaensch 1993, 310-12; Papadakis 1990, 1991), although the election manifesto's of 
the British Liberal party show a similar emphasis upon participatory democracy, 
whilst an anti-nuclear and environmentalist wing remains a significant grouping 
among Liberal activists (Byrne 1990; Craig 1990, 500-3). However, the case that 
these centre parties represent the potential for a party system realignment along the 
New Politics cleavage should not be overstated. In particular much debate 
surrounds the extent to which, rather than representing a positive endorsement of 
policy positions consistent with New Politics concerns, support for both parties 
rests with short-term political factors, including the temporary defection from 
partisan cues and approval of the current party leader (Crewe 1982; Curtice 1983; 
Marks and Bean 1992; McAllister 1982: Studier and McAllister 1987).
This last point leads to a final note of caution in associating the rise of a New 
Politics cleavage with the rise of Green parties. On the one hand, the relationship 
between environmental concern and the support for Green parties is somewhat less 
than would be expected given the link that is often assumed (Bean and Kelley 1993; 
Franklin and Rudig 1991). Conversely, it appears that to some extent New Politics 
parties are victims of their own success, as some New Politics positions, 
particularly with regard to the environment, have gained such widespread 
acceptance that they are becoming valence issues (Andersen 1990b; Bean and Kelley 
1993), with general community agreement regarding the desirability of their goals 
(Butler and Stokes 1974). For example, 79 percent of Britons favour greater 
protection of the countryside (Heath et al 1991, 191), 80 percent of Australians 
agree that industry should be prevented from causing damage to the environment 
(Papadakis 1994, 71), and 74 percent of Americans agree that environmental 
improvements must be made regardless of cost (Dunlap 1991, 300). It is therefore 
not surprising that Old Parties of all hues now tend to address environmental 
concerns in their election manifesto's or policy speeches. Furthermore the conflict 
between economic growth and preservation of the countryside may not be as 
initially envisaged. For example, research in Norway showed that "68 percent of 
those supporting environmental protection also support economic growth and 
productivity" (Aardal 1990, 154). Similarly Inglehart (1990a, 280) found that 38 
percent of materialists would consider voting ecologist, despite the obvious 
contradiction with their own value orientation in doing so. To the extent that 
cross-party and community consensus exists, Green politics will have little impact 
upon the underlying dimensions of party competition. Consequently one possible 
outcome of the increased saliency of environmental issues is that, with apologies to 
King Edward VII and Richard Nixon, 'We are all Environmentalists now'.15
15 King Edward VII stated "we are all socialists now", Richard Nixon stated "we are all 
Keynesians now".
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Party Adaptation
Much of the literature on change in western party systems is predicated upon the 
assumption that electoral change necessarily leads to party system change (cf Mair 
1989; Smith 1989). The result is a model of party system dynamics which specifies 
that through structural and value change the historical alignments between voters 
and parties are eroded, electoral instability and volatility occur, and the 
opportunity is created for new political concerns to be articulated (Crewe and 
Denver 1985, 16; Harrop and Miller 1987, 140). As a consequence of this
deterministic approach, recognition of the role of political parties with regard to 
influencing outcomes related to electoral and party system change is often 
neglected. To some extent this neglect is a legacy of the impact of Lipset and 
Rokkan's (1967) work upon our understanding of political alignments in modern 
party systems. The ability to account for varieties of national political alignments 
across western Europe on the basis of differing responses to two historical 
junctures, each translating two social cleavages into political oppositions, suggested 
that explanations of party system stability beyond the narrowing of the support 
market were perhaps unnecessary. Indeed empirical research which confirmed the 
persistence of party support since the 1920s, strengthened the Lipset and Rokkan 
thesis (Rose and Urwin 1970).
Sartori (1969) took issue with the adequacy of the argument that the freezing of 
party alternatives was due to the granting of universal suffrage which reduced 
opportunities for mobilising voters on any new cleavage (also Aitkin 1982, 8). 
Instead he sought to emphasise the role of political parties as intervening variables 
in the link between, on the one hand, the rise and decline of cleavages and, on the 
other, the persistence of political alternatives. Consequently what is required by 
the political scientist is recognition of a mutually dependent relationship between 
society and the party system. Operating at the level of conjecture Sartori (1969, 
84) offered an alternative hypothesis regarding the statistical relationship between 
class and party, namely that "the party is not a 'consequence' of the class. Rather, 
and before, it is the class that receives its identity from the party".
Recognition of the role of political parties in shaping the electoral environment 
offers an alternative approach when considering the phenomenon of a decline in 
cleavage politics. Erosion of group voting loyalties are generally explained on the 
basis of the social changes, for example embourgeoisement, social and locational 
mobility, etc., which are necessarily involved in the transition from industrial to 
post-industrial society (for an overview see Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984, 15- 
19). However, following Sartori, it may be argued that the actual behaviour of 
political parties, in responding to social change, has furthered the decline of 
cleavage politics. Thus the evidence presented in chapter seven was consistent with 
an interpretation that, confronted with a contraction in its blue-collar electoral 
base, the Australian Labor Party chose, as part of a vote maximising strategy, to 
down-play the class cleavage which, if fully operationalised, would place it in a 
permanent minority. As a consequence Labor formulated its electoral appeals 
increasingly on the need to attract a greater proportion of middle-class supporters, 
both through moderating its state interventionist appeals and by taking the lead on 
pertinent issues. Consequently, it may be argued, the decline in class voting in 
Australia reflects, in part, a successful adaptive strategy by Labor whereby,
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confronted with debilitating social change, the party's support base has been 
expanded beyond its traditional constituency. Evidence presented above suggests 
that the strategies of the Labour Party in Britain and the Democratic Party in the 
United States are also consistent with such an explanation of class dealignment in 
their respective party systems.
A further aspect of party adaptation relates to the strategic decisions of political 
parties in response to the rise of new political issues. In order to mobilise electoral 
support it is in the interests of political parties to base their appeals on a set of 
reinforcing issue concerns, which comprise a single attitudinal dimension. 
Generally this dimension is based on left-right economic conflict (Budge and 
Robertson 1987), confirmed in this study (chapter four above) for Australia, 
Britain, and the United States. However, chapter four also showed there to be a 
number of distinct attitudinal dimensions within the electorate in the 1990s. The 
potential danger for political parties is that should cross-cutting issues become part 
of the political agenda it will divide the party's traditional constituencies. Such a 
scenario is widely canvassed by writers on value change who emphasise the role of 
the New Politics dimension in cross-cutting the Old Politics dimension (Inglehart 
1977, Dalton 1988). In such circumstances both the traditional right and left-wing 
constituencies are divided between materialists and post-materialists, threatening the 
long-term persistence of Old Politics parties.
However, the role of the adaptive strategies of political parties again represent an 
important intervening variable in the process by which the rise of New Politics 
issues affect party system change (Kitschelt 1993). Although the rise of New 
Politics issues is often portrayed as the result of inexorable processes in advanced 
industrial societies, through either social or value change, the New Politics cleavage 
represents simply one of many cleavages in society and, as Sartori (1968, 23) has 
argued, is a manipulative resource, and thereby may be "over or underplayed 
according to alignment and coalition strategies". Consequently political parties are 
active players in the process by which issues become politicised. To the extent 
that political parties recognise that it is not in their interests to politicise issues 
which have the potential to divide their traditional constituencies, then, it may be 
argued, they will act in such a manner to prevent such issues becoming politically 
relevant.
Research conducted on election manifestoes has confirmed that parties operate on 
the basis of selective emphasis, whereby they limit their campaign pronouncements 
to those issues upon which they enjoy an electoral advantage (Budge and Farlie 
1983a 1983b). In other words parties "own" certain issues, to the extent that 
parties of the Left will almost always be seen as the party most likely to extend 
social welfare programs, whilst parties of the Right will generally be seen as the 
most likely to support traditional institutions. As a consequence party strategies 
tend to focus less upon direct confrontation with their opponents than upon 
"attempts to assert the saliency of different issues that favour one or the other side" 
(Budge and Farlie 1983b, 288). Therefore it is in the interests for Left parties to 
raise the saliency of issues associated with socioeconomic redistribution (including 
social welfare and unemployment) whilst parties of the Right attempt to raise the 
saliency of issues associated with civil order, constitutionalism, defence, government 
control and regulation, and individual initiative. Although issues related to
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environmentalism, and the New Politics generally, were not included in the 
research, the analysis may be extended to suggest that it is in the interests of 
neither the Left nor the Right to raise the saliency of these issues. It may thus be 
argued that, by definition, such issues are owned not by traditional parties but by 
Green and New Politics parties.
A possible hypothesis extending from this analysis is that New Politics issues will 
emerge on the political agenda only when parties lose their ability to control that 
agenda. Mair (1983) has argued that parties alone do not control the political 
agenda, but rather share control with non-electoral organisations. Consequently a 
key determinant of political control rests with the linkage between parties and non- 
electoral organisations. However, Lawson (1988) has argued that Old Politics 
parties have largely failed in providing "acceptable forms of linkage" with such 
organisations, the result being the emergence of alternative organisations, including 
the rise of ecological parties. Furthermore voting studies have shown that as issues 
related to the New Politics have become salient at the mass level (Andersen 1990b; 
Kuechler 1991; Young 1990), they have increasingly structured voting behaviour 
(Knutsen 1988; Rohrschneider 1993). Whilst the rise of new parties has been dealt 
with above, the structuring properties of the new politics dimension appears to 
suggest that if Old Politics parties were acting so as to keep New Politics issues off 
the political agenda then they have been partly unsuccessful in doing so.
However Knutsen (1988) argues that in countries where the impact of New Politics 
issues upon vote is significant, so too are attitudes related to the Old Politics 
agenda. Thus where vote choice is structured predominantly by political attitudes 
rather than social cleavages, it is attitudes related both to the Old Politics and to 
the New Politics which have a significant impact. Such a finding is consistent with 
the interpretation that what has occurred in western democracies is not the 
replacement of the Old Politics agenda with the agenda of the New Politics, but 
rather, as van der Eijk et al (1992, 412) have argued, that the range of issues which 
represent the domain of party competition has expanded, representing an 
"enormous increase in issue diversification in political life". The significance of this 
issue diversification, scholars argue, is that it precludes the aggregation of political 
interests at a level that was previously possible. Rather political parties must now 
"pick and choose" which issues, from both the Old Politics and New Politics 
agendas, to politicise on the basis of forming a successful electoral coalition. 
Echoing the earlier writings of Inglehart (1977, 215), van der Eijk et al (1992) 
argued that the rise of the New Politics presents a particular window of 
opportunity for parties of the Old Left. Confronted with a declining electoral 
base, the contracting working-class, there now exists a more radical post-materialist 
middle-class with values in conflict to the parties of the Old Right. It then 
becomes a strategic decision on the part of Old Left parties whether or not to 
politicise the new politics by adopting a New Left position, and thereby seek to 
recruit the radicalised middle-class but risk the alienation of its traditional 
constituency. In reality the choice need not be one of all or nothing, but rather 
may involve either a greater or lesser emphasis upon particular New Politics issues.
The extent of party system change which results from the increased saliency of 
New Politics issues is, in part, dependent upon the reactions, or adaptive strategies, 
of Old parties. Rohrshneider (1993) identified the British, German, and Dutch
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party systems as representing three alternative outcomes of the rise in 
environmentalism, based on variations in the response of the Old Left as well as 
the structure of the nation's electoral laws. In the Netherlands an 'Old Left 
realignment' had occurred whereby the PvDA, the major Old Left party, 
responded early and adopted a strong pro-Green position such that party choice 
between the Old Left and the Right was increasingly based on ecological 
preferences.16 In Germany a 'New Party realignment' had occurred whereby the 
early unresponsiveness of the Social Democratic Party to environmental issues led 
to the rise of the Green party, aided by the country's proportional electoral laws. 
In Britain the Labour party was similarly unresponsive to green issues, however the 
plurality laws retarded the growth of the Green party such that there was 'No 
Party Realignment.'
Rohrschneider found that in all three countries, as well as in France, the major Old 
Left party had, by the end of the 1980s, made at least some favourable response to 
the rise of environmentalism, although the timing of the response varied greatly. 
Consistent with this finding is evidence that Old Left parties have had some success 
in attracting New Left voters in the face of competition from ecological parties. 
For example, an analysis of party preferences among new political movement 
supporters in Table 8.2 shows that Old Left parties generally receive greater 
support than do New Left parties (see also Muller-Rommel 1989, 226-7; 
Rohrschneider 1993, 690). The only two exceptions are in Denmark and France, 
although not even in these two countries do New Left parties gain an absolute 
majority of environmentalist support. Similarly, although post-materialists 
represent the natural constituency of New Left parties, a plurality of 
postmaterialists, across a number of countries, actually support Old Left parties 
(Table 8.3).
The ability of Old Left parties to recruit New Left supporters, through the 
adoption of various environmental and socially progressive policy stances, raises a 
further possibility that New Politics issues may become just another aspect of the 
left-right dimension of party competition (Andersen 1990b, 203-4). Sani and 
Sartori (1983) found that the left-right ideological continuum represented a 
meaningful dimensional space across a broad range of issues, extending well beyond 
narrow questions of economic redistribution. Thus left-right self placement was 
related with voters' attitudes towards a range of Old Politics groups, including 
unions and big business, and New Politics groups, namely women's movements, 
student protesters, revolutionary groups, clergy and police. The scholars concluded 
that "it may be asserted that the left-right dimension obtains a superior, all- 
inclusive status within the hierarchy of cleavages" (Sani and Sartori 1983, 329). 
Similarly Andersen (1990b) found that ranking Danish parties on the basis of the 
environmental attitudes of their supporters corresponded almost perfectly to their 
ranking on a left-right dimension.
16 Rohrschneider also identified France as an example of an 'Old Party Realignment' under 
plurality electoral laws. However the credentials of the French PS in this respect were highly 
dubious, as the author admits, and its case adds little to the overall schema.
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Table 8.2: Party Preference of Environmental Group Supporters 
in Selected Countries (percent)
Country (year) New Left Old Left Centre/
Right
Other Total (N)
Australia (1993) 14 55 29 3 100 (654)
Belgium (1986) 11 40 44 5 100 (150)
Britain (1992) 33 45 17 5 100 (159)
Denmark (1986) 42 35 18 5 100 (183)
France (1989) 44 43 13 - 100 (119)
Germany (1989) 18 59 23 - 100 (327)
Italy (1986) 7 44 40 9 100 (305)
Netherlands (1989) 20 40 41 - 100 (452)
Note: Party preference is voting intention in Belgium, Denmark and Italy, vote in Australia and 
Britain, and partisanship in France, Germany, Netherlands. New Left parties refer to: Australia, 
Australian Democrats and Greens; Belgium, ECOLO and AG ALEV; Britain, Greens and Liberal 
Democrats; Denmark, Greens, Socialist Peoples Party, and Left Socialists; France, Greens and 
Socialist Union; Germany, Greens; Italy, Radicals and Proletarian Democracy; Netherlands, 
Green Left and D'66.
Sources: 1993 AES; 1992 BES; Muller-Rommel (1989, 226-7); Rohrschneider (193, 690).
Table 8.3: Party Preference of Post-Materialists in Selected Countries3 (percent)
Country (year) New Left Old Left Centre/
Right
Other Total (N)
Australia (1993) 12 52 31 5 100 (329)
Belgium (1980-87) 23 34 28 10 100 (1393)
Britain (1992) 33 47 14 6 100 (156)
Denmark (1980-87) 47 27 24 2 100 (1612)
France (1980-87) 25 54 18 3 100 (1393)
Italy (1980-87) 23 52 24 2 100 (829)
West Germany (1980-87) 27 48 24 - 100 (1985)
Netherlands (1980-87) 32 44 24 - 100 (2551)
Note: See Table 8.2 for definitions.
Sources: 1993 AES; 1992 BES; Inglehart (1990a, 458-60).
Finally, the role of Old Right parties in influencing the outcome of issue 
diversification requires recognition. On the one hand, the emergence of New 
Politics issues provides parties on the Right with an opportunity to mobilise on 
issues such as law and order and economic development to recruit working-class 
materialists and thereby split the Left. However, the danger in doing so is a split 
in their own ranks between the liberal post-materialist and conservative materialist 
wings. An alternative strategy is for Old Right parties to de-politicise New Politics 
issues by either ignoring them (Budge and Farlie 1983a), or going some way 
towards matching the commitment of the Left to particular New Politics concerns. 
The widespread support for environmental issues has led some Old Right parties to 
become environmentally conscious in their electoral appeals. Papadakis (1989) 
argues that the established parties in Germany have demonstrated 'immense 
flexibility' in response to the rise of the Greens by adopting New politics positions
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which highlight policy convergence across the party system. In Norway, Aardal 
(1990, 160) found that all parties have increasingly emphasised environmental 
concerns with the Green vote now spread across the political spectrum, from 
Conservative to Socialist Left parties: "the Norwegian experience shows that 
environmental awareness can to a large extent be assimilated into a political 
system". To the extent that consensus on environmental issues exists across a 
party system it is an indication that both parties of the left and right have adapted 
to the rise of New Politics issues and thereby limited the opportunity for Green 
parties to mobilise on the New Politics cleavage.17
In sum, two trends often identified as threats to the persistence of Old Politics 
parties, the decline in cleavage politics and the rise in New Politics, have on 
occasion been furthered by the parties own strategic decisions. However, these 
decisions do not reflect suicidal tendencies among the party leadership, but rather 
that party leaders recognise, as the suppliers of political appeals (Kitschelt 1993), 
they have some ability to shape the political environment in which they compete. 
Thus party competition encompasses attempts to either raise or lower the saliency 
of particular cleavages and attitudinal dimensions for electoral gain. To the extent 
that parties adopt a vote maximising strategy, then they will attempt to raise the 
saliency of cleavages upon which they are advantaged and lower the saliency of 
cleavages on which they are disadvantaged. While the social and attitudinal trends 
of post-industrial society present challenges to the persistence of Old parties, the 
opportunity to exploit these trends for their own political gain, through a process 
of adaptation, ensures that political parties are, to some extent, in control of their 
own destiny.
17 The adaptive strategies of Old Politics parties with respect to environmentalism may well 
explain the van der Eijk and Oppenhuis (1991) finding that, in the 1989 European elections, Green 
parties generally were the least successful group of parties in converting potential support into votes
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CONCLUSION
THE PERSISTENCE OF OLD POLITICS PARTIES
Over the past three decades the persistence of Old Politics parties, originally 
established in response to the conflicts involved in the national and industrial 
revolutions, has been challenged by a number of trends. Firstly, the traditional 
support base of Old Left parties has been eroded by the contraction of blue- 
collar employment. As economic resources increasingly shift from secondary to 
tertiary industries and membership of industrial unions continues to decline, 
working class parties have been forced to appeal to new social groups beyond 
their traditional constituency. Secondly, secularisation and declining religiosity 
has weakened the support base of parties of the Old Right. This is particularly 
the case in the Anglo-American democracies where the high status Protestant 
churches have suffered the greatest declines in membership and attendance. 
Thirdly a general broadening of the political agenda has occurred whereby those 
political attitudes which influence electoral choice has diversified to encompass 
New Politics issues. The rise of the New Politics threatens Old Politics parties 
on both the left and the right and provides an opportunity for new political 
parties to mobilise electoral support.
All three trends have been a feature of the three countries examined in this 
study, in addition to a further threat to the Left involving a right-ward 
attitudinal shift on dominant economic matters.1 However the electoral impact 
of these trends has varied greatly. In Australia, Labor has experienced its most 
successful era to date, holding office at the federal level continually since March 
1983 with five consecutive election victories. By contrast, in Britain, the 
Labour Party has not governed since early 1979, suffering four decisive election 
defeats over the past fifteen years. The United States represents a third scenario 
in which, despite holding a majority in the House of Representatives from 1955 
to 1994, the Democratic Party has won only two Presidential victories since the 
mid 1960s. This study argues that to understand the electoral trends of the 
period, political scientists should look beyond social and attitudinal trends and 
changes in electoral behaviour towards the role of political parties in responding 
to, and indeed on occasion shaping, these trends.
The Australian Labor Party may be identified as an Old Left party which 
identified early the need to adapt to social and attitudinal change if it were to be 
successful at the polls. This process began in the early 1970s with Gough 
Whitlam articulating various New politics concerns which were successful in 
bringing into the party a new constituency of middle-class voters and 
parliamentarians. The process continued when Whitlam's Keynesian approach 
was replaced by the economic orthodoxy of Hayden, Hawke, and Keating 
which in turn led to the introduction of strident free-market reforms, during a
1 For a general explanation of the twin phenomena of the 'shift to the right' and the rise of 
New Politics issues based on changes in the class structure, see Kitschelt (1993).
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period in which the electorate had also moved to the right. In recent years, 
attention has focused upon the party's successful exploitation of the 
environment as an election issue, particularly in the 1990 campaign. The risk in 
politicising the environment was diminished by the general community support 
for environmental conservation (Papadakis 1990), and the preferential voting 
system which ensured that, even though the Australian Democrats and various 
Green independents were endorsed by environmentalists (Papadakis 1994), 
preferences from these candidates disproportionably flowed to Labor (Mackerras 
1994). Although Labor's first preference vote actually fell in 1990, it has been 
estimated that the environmental issue generated a swing to Labor in marginal 
seats of sufficient magnitude to have been decisive in Labor's victory (Bean and 
Kelley 1993). However the impact of the environment upon the 1993 election 
result was greatly diminished (Bean 1994a), suggesting that the saliency of the 
issue in 1990 was in part due to the strategic decision of Labor to politicise 
environmental issues during that campaign.
The issue of uranium mining represents a New Politics issue, given its links 
with debates concerning nuclear power generally, that the Labor Party has 
chosen not to politicise. Involving a greater potential trade-off in terms of the 
loss of manual employment (and export revenue) Labor struck a compromise, 
the Three Mines Policy, which has essentially removed the issue from the 
political agenda (Gruen and Grattan 1993, 8-9). A recently re-politicised issue, 
placed firmly on the political agenda by the Labor Prime Minister Keating in 
1992, was whether Australia should retain the monarch as head of state or 
become a republic. Whilst the long-term electoral consequences of politicising 
the Republican issue are not clear (the issue received little attention during the 
1993 campaign) it precipitated a minor rift in the Liberal Party between 
progressives, who endorse the change, and traditionalists, who wish to retain the 
monarchy. What the republic issue illustrates however is that strategic decisions 
related to whether or not to politicise an issue extend to all political issues, not 
merely those associated with the New Politics.
In Britain, the Labour Party has been less adept in successfully politicising New 
Politics issues and responding to attitudinal change in the electorate. The most 
salient New Politics issue in the recent past was that of Britain's role as a 
nuclear power, with Labour adopting a policy of unilateral disarmament in the 
1983 and 1987 general election manifestos (Craig 1990, 384, 473-4).2 However, 
the party's anti-nuclear position was favoured by only a small minority of 
voters, and the issue contributed to a significant decline in electoral support 
(McAllister and Mughan 1987b). Similarly, on economic policy, Labour shifted 
to the left following the party's defeat in 1979, advocating expansion of public 
spending, price controls, re-nationalisation (Butler and Kavanagh 1984, 63), 
whilst evidence (see chapter six above) showed that the electorate had, if 
anything, adopted a more right-wing position. Since the 1987 election however 
Labor has undergone a process of modernisation, in which some of the more 
unpopular elements of its policy platform have been removed, whilst on
2 Although the unilateralist policy met with some resistance among Labour parliamentarians 
during the 1983 campaign (Butler and Kavanagh 1984, 93-7).
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economic policy much of the party's historical ties to socialism have been 
replaced with an agenda considerably more sympathetic to the market economy 
(Crewe 1992; Seyd 1992).
In the United States Democratic presidential candidates have been hampered by 
an inability to build a new national coalition in response to the gradual decay of 
the New Deal coalition (Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 1990, chap 5). The 
attempt by Stevenson and McGovern to repudiate Old Politics and adopt a 
strong New Left position floundered upon popular reaction to the anti-war and 
pro-civil rights movements (Lipset 1981b), whilst the credibility of the 
Democratic Party's interventionist economic policies collapsed with the 
Keynesian economic orthodoxy under the effect of stagflation during the late 
1970s (Stein 1988, 216-26). Successive Democratic nominees were variously 
described, with considerable success by their Republican opponents, as beholden 
to minority groups, soft on crime, sympathetic to a pacifist defence policy, and 
representative of traditional 'tax and spend' liberalism. However, a process of 
modernisation of the party was begun during the Carter administration, which 
involved a policy of government deregulation, a fight inflation first strategy, 
fiscal and monetary restraint, cuts to public works, and establishment of links 
with the business community (Jackson 1988, 40-44; Stein 1988, 226-33). Carter's 
legacy was evident in Clinton's 1992 campaign which represented a more 
moderate, market-driven, candidacy than his immediate predecessors (Lipset 
1993; Pomper 1993). Clinton was also successful in focusing upon New Politics 
issues, such as abortion, on which he was advantaged, and diffusing historically 
debilitating issues such as law and order (he supported capital punishment which 
was law in Arkansas), while the end of the Cold War helped to lower the 
saliency of defence and foreign affairs issues (Baker 1993).
The Democratic Party has been more successful at the congressional level, 
controlling the House continuously from 1954 to 1994. One explanation for 
the contrasting electoral fortunes of Congressional and White House candidates, 
advocated by Jacobson (1990), contends that the lack of a national partisan 
campaign allows House Democrats to frame their own policy agendas in light of 
the social and attitudinal characteristics of each individual electoral district and 
thereby target their appeals directly to either traditional New Deal 
constituencies, social liberals of the New Left, or moderate middle-class 
suburbanites.3 Jacobson (1990, 132) argues whilst Democratic Presidential 
campaigns are hampered by the attempt to "build a national coalition out of 
mutually antagonistic groups: blacks, Jews, working-class whites, Southern 
traditionalists, and affluent college-educated liberals", Democratic congressional 
candidates "are free to assemble local coalitions that may or may not include 
groups important to the party nationally." The weak party system facilitates 
party adaptation, with the Democratic Party generally moderating its 
interventionist policies whilst positioning itself as the more credible alternative 
in terms of localised New Politics issues.
3 For alternative explanations see Fiorina (1992), Tacobson, (1990, chap 4), Petrocik (1991), 
Wattenberg (1994, 188-197).
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Consistent with the electoral success of the political parties therefore are the 
respective adaptive strategies each has adopted. The Australian Labor Party and 
Congressional Democrats have generally made strategic decisions which have 
expanded their electoral base, whilst the Labour Party in Britain and 
Democratic Presidential candidates have tended to adopt strategies which trade­
off potential constituencies. In fact the political decisions regarding which 
aspects of the New Politics agenda to politicise, and to what extent traditional 
commitments to public-sector expansion should be modified in the light of 
contemporary economic reality, are decisions faced by all Old Left parties 
throughout the Western democracies with their electoral success and long-term 
persistence in large part dependent upon the actual course taken. In New 
Zealand, for example, the Labour Party adopted a radical free-market reform 
agenda combined with a policy of strong anti-nuclearism (Honey and Barnett 
1990; Lijphart 1990) and won two elections during the 1980s, while the German 
Social Democratic Party rejected policies for economic reform, alienated 
environmentalists, and suffered heavy defeats in the 1983 and 1987 national 
elections (Braunthal 1994; Papadakis 1989; Rohrschneider 1993). Similar 
strategic political decisions also confront the parties of the Old Right with 
regard the extent to which government intervention should be wound back, and 
whether or not to politicise New Right issues such as immigration, capital 
punishment, abortion, and other traditional morality concerns.4
But electoral prospects are not the sole consideration that party leaders face 
when framing their electoral appeals (cf Downs 1957). Their leadership position 
is also dependent upon maintaining, or attracting, support from within their 
own party. As a consequence, the adaptive strategies of all party leaders are 
constrained to a degree by the what Mackie and Rose (1988) have described as 
the introverted pressures to maintain ideological cohesion within the party. 
The potential difficulty of reconciling electoral (extroverted) and introverted 
pressures, the scholars argue, is that the latter are likely to focus upon the 
party's established principles (cf Kitschelt 1989). This represents a particular 
problem for Old Left parties given widespread rejection of the fundamental 
tenets of socialism and Keynesian economic policy. One means of dealing with 
these pressures is through factionalism which provides an outlet for both 
ideologues, committed to the party's ideological legacy, and pragmatists, 
committed to capturing public office (McAllister 1991a). Within Old Left 
parties the ideological role of the party is espoused by factions still committed 
to extensive government intervention, while more moderate factions, which 
acknowledge the limits of state intervention, represent the role of the
4 Some commentators in Australia explained the Liberal party's loss in the 1993 general 
election as the result of the party's radical market-reform agenda being too extremist (Quadrant 
1993), whilst in the United States the "family values" emphasis of the Republican party 
convention in 1992 was seen in hindsight as a strategic mistake (Baker 1993).
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pragmatists.5 Similar tensions exist within parties of the Old Right, particularly 
in relation to a recent growth in activists committed to classical liberal thought 
and the opposition of more pragmatic less ideological party elements.6 The rise 
of New Politics issues have put further strains on these pressures through an 
extension of the party's ideological baggage to include demands from New 
Politics elements within the party organisations. Consequently the persistence 
of old parties involves not only party adaptation, but also the successful 
reconciliation of electoral and ideological pressures.
Party adaptation and ideological reconciliation represent two intervening 
variables which influence the link between social and attitudinal change and the 
electoral success of competing parties.7 Conflicting evidence regarding the 
electoral success of Old Left parties in the 1990s, in the face of a contracted 
social base, indicates that party strength is not simply structurally determined 
(Mackie, Franklin et al 1992; Kitschelt 1993; cf Przeworski and Sprague 1986). 
Rose and Mackie (1988, 556), for example, in an empirical investigation into the 
careers of political parties in nineteen Western nations, found "no association 
between a party's social base and its career". In other words, working-class 
parties were as likely to survive intact as were religious, middle-class, language, 
and catchall parties. However, the authors also found that old political parties 
in general were less likely to persist intact, that is continue under the same 
name without experiencing splits or mergers, than were later formed parties. 
This was the case whether old parties were defined as organised at either the 
foundation of competitive elections, prior to the introduction of universal 
suffrage, or before the first world war. The most common career path of old 
parties was to experience some form of modification or change in the guise of a 
split or merger.
Scholars tend to view splits and mergers in Old Politics parties as an indicator 
of major party decline. Lawson (1988), for example, described party failure in 
terms of the inability of parties to provide adequate linkage between citizen and 
state leading to the establishment of new political organisations. Thus the 
failure of the German Social Democrats to adequately address environmental
5 These tensions are played out in the Australian Labor Party between the respective, 
nationally organised, Left and Right factions (McAllister 1991a); in Britain between a range of 
Labour groupings including the Campaign Group (hard left), the Tribune Group (soft left), and 
the Manifesto Group (centre-right), Ingle (1989, 131-2); whilst in the United States the 
Democratic Leadership Council was formed in 1984 by moderate Democrats to mobilise against 
the nomination of liberal candidates (Crotty 1994).
6 In Australia the Liberal party loosely divides between radical free-market dries and 
pragmatic interventionist wets Qaensch 1993, 157-62); in Britain various groupings within the 
Conservative party have existed on the Right (including the Selsdon, Salisbury, and the 92 
groups) and on the Left (including the Tory Reform and Bow Groups, and the Lollards) (Ingle 
1989, 71-3); in the United States one recent study has identified four current factions in the 
Republican Party, namely Progressive Conservatives (Jack Kemp) and Pragmatic Republicans 
(Pete Wilson) on the Left, and Centre-Right Republicans (Phil Gramm) and the Religious Right 
(Pat Buchanan) on the Right (Duffy 1992)
7 Other intervening variables include personal assessments of the party leader, economic 
conditions, the competency of election campaigning, the responses of competing parties etc.
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issues was related to the emergence of the German Greens, while the SDP in 
Britain was formed by Labour moderates alienated by the party's leftward lurch 
during the 1980s. These outcomes were the result of conscious decisions made 
by the respective party leaderships not to represent the views of the alienated 
groupings; furthermore, not only were the failings self-induced, but the decisions 
that led to them may be reversed at any time. In effect the new parties' 
existence is partly contingent upon old party strategies. As Lawson notes, the 
continued success of alternative political organisations is continuously threatened 
by the possibility that, upon a re-emergence of extroverted pressures, major 
parties will adopt at least some of the policies proposed by the alienated groups. 
Indeed in recent years the German Social Democrats have become more 
sympathetic to environmental interests (Rohrschneider 1993), whilst the Labour 
Party has adopted a policy position virtually identical to that of the British SDP 
at the time of its formation (Crewe 1992). In the context of linking major 
party failure to the inability to reconcile conflicting pressures, it should also be 
noted that New Politics parties appear to be particularly susceptible to the 
conflict between introverted and extroverted pressures. For example, the recent 
split in the German Greens essentially represented a split between 'realists' 
(pragmatists) and 'fundamentalists' (ideologues) (Poguntke 1992; Smith 1987), 
whilst in Britain tensions between electoralists and anarchists have persisted 
throughout the history of the Green Party (Rudig and Lowe 1986).
Recognition of the role of ideology in maintaining internal party cohesion raises 
problems of party change. One objection to an analysis which views Old Party 
persistence as the outcome of successful adaptation, is that although the party 
organisation persists, the ideological commitments of the party leadership may 
have been so contorted by electoral pressures that any notion of historical 
continuity must be seriously challenged. Crewe (1992, 46), for example, argues 
that while Labour's more moderate policy program might be successful in 
electing a Labour government, it would not be one "that is recognisably of the 
Left in the sense of being socialist, or at least radical, or at least allied to the 
interests and values of labour". Similar arguments have been put forward in 
Australia with regard to the electoral success of the Labor party by what some 
elements regard as the betrayal of Labor tradition (Maddox 1989; also Batten 
1993; Jaensch 1989). It may be argued that it is misleading to claim that parties 
persist when they have altered their appeals to the extent that they are no 
longer recognisable as the same party. However, as Mair (1989, 254-56) has 
argued, when the research problem becomes whether a party continues to 
reflect its original form, the difficulties in reaching a definitive conclusion 
become insurmountable, as parties are largely in a state of permanent flux. In 
terms of party competition, the location of parties along the left-right dimension 
are changing continuously, but crucially the main political alternatives continue 
to reflect opposing reactions to the onset of industrial development.
One of the primary dynamics for changes in party appeals are electoral 
pressures. As the electorate is continuously changing in terms of social 
composition and attitudinal beliefs, so too parties must continue to respond to 
such change, even if they are to simply retain their market share of the 
electorate. As Rose and Mackie (1988, 334) have argued "parties must 
necessarily adapt to changes in the larger social environment if they are to
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sustain electoral support." It is notable therefore that their findings showed that 
while old parties are less likely to remain intact than more recently formed 
parties, they are also less likely to disappear from the party system altogether. 
In the face of the inability to explain the weak association between hypothesised 
determinants of a party's career and observed historical outcomes, the authors 
concluded that the career of the party is determined by the voluntary choices of 
party leaders. Old parties are clearly advantaged over new political parties with 
regard to both the narrowing of the support market and their own ability to 
incorporate new political issues into their own policy agendas. To the extent 
that Old Politics parties adapt their electoral appeals in accordance with social 
and attitudinal change, and reconcile adaptation with internal ideological 
pressures, they will continue as the dominant organisational alternatives. Party 
competition will continue to reflect the labour market conflicts of the industrial 
revolution providing that New Politics issues are either incorporated into the 
traditional left-right dimension of party competition or diffused through cross­
party consensus.
The conclusions reached in this study regarding the extent of party adaptation 
in the Australian, British and United States party systems are necessarily 
tentative. This is particularly the case with regard to the analysis, in chapter 
seven, of Australian Labor Party policy speeches as a vehicle for broadening the 
party's electoral base to include increasing proportions of non-manual workers. 
The results which showed the party adopting a more right-wing position on the 
classical liberal scale while placing greater emphasis upon 'New liberal' concerns, 
and the party gaining increased support from upper-status white-collar workers 
as a result, are consistent both with narrative descriptions of concurrent political 
developments and related empirical findings. Similarly, in both Britain and the 
United States the evidence presented above was also consistent with 
interpretations of electoral change in response to the adaptive strategies of the 
competing parties.
To further our understanding of the nature of party adaptation, additional 
research is required into the relationship between party policy positions and the 
response of voters, extending beyond manifesto, or party speech, data to include 
political advertising and ongoing policy statements which occur throughout the 
election campaign. This would provide more detailed information regarding the 
agenda setting cues provided by party leaders in the electoral context. Budge 
and Farlie (1983a) went some way to achieving this at the macro-level, however 
this needs to be integrated with survey data, involving a panel-design across the 
election period, to focus upon the impact of agenda-setting upon specifically 
targeted social and attitudinal groups. In regard to the dynamics of attitudinal 
change, similar work is required to identify the effects of party political 
statements upon those attitudes and short-term evaluations (leadership, issues, 
and the economy) which are central to the electoral outcome. The work of 
Page, Shapiro and Dempsey (1987), in an analysis of the effect of television news 
upon changes in the policy preferences of citizens, provides a framework for 
such research to be extended to the campaign period. Finally, the actual 
conscious decision-making of party strategists requires some further
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investigation. There is perhaps a tendency among political scientists to credit 
political parties with a greater capacity for conscious adaptation than is actually 
due, as such decisions may be a secondary outcome of internal political 
processes, such as factional conflict, or unintentional alternative strategies. 
Given the bank of knowledge available regarding party adaptation, it is perhaps 
time to return to the party organisations and, through qualitative research, 
ascertain the motives and goals of party strategies and how they relate to our 
perceptions regarding the notion of the role of adaptation in ensuring the long­
term persistence of Old Politics parties.
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APPENDIX
Data
Election Studies
In each survey only those respondents who reported voting in their respective 
national lower-house elections are included in the analyses. For the United States, 
due to the small number of minor party voters, only Democrat and Republican 
voters are included. All surveys are weighted to reflect election results. For 
weighted Ns see Tables 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14.
Australia
The Australian National Political Attitudes Surveys of 1967 and 1979 are multi­
stage stratified probability samples of the Australian electorate in the six states, 
with interviews conducted fate-to-face. The 1990 and 1993 Australian Election 
Studies are random samples stratified by State/Territory collected through self­
completion (mail out, mail back). For details see Aitkin (1982, appendix), Bean, 
McAllister and Warhurst (1990, appendix B), and Jones et al (1993, vii-ix).
1967 Australian National Political Attitudes Survey (1967 ANPAS);
Aitkin, D. et al. 1976. Australian National Political Attitudes Survey, 1967. 
[machine-readable data-file]. Principal investigators Donald Aitkin, Michael Kahan 
and Donald Stokes. Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political Research 
through Social Sciences Data Archives, The Australian National University 
[distributor]. Number of cases: 2054
1979 Australian National Political Attitudes Survey (1979 ANPAS);
Aitkin, D. 1979. Macquarie University Australian Political Attitudes Survey, 1979 
[machine-readable data-file]. Data collected by ANOP Market Research under 
contract to the principal investigator Don Aitkin. Sydney: Don Aitkin, Macquarie 
University [producer], 1980. Michigan: Social Sciences Data Archives, The 
Australian National University [distributor]. Number of cases: 2016
1990 Australian Election Study (1990 AES);
McAllister, I. et al. 1990. Australian Election Study 1990 [computer file]. 
Principal investigators Ian McAllister, Roger Jones, Elim Papadakis, David Gow. 
Canberra: Roger Jones, Social Sciences Data Archives, Research School of Social 
Sciences, the Australian National University [producer], 1990. Canberra: Social 
Sciences Data Archives, The Australian National University [distributor]. Number 
of cases: 2037.
1993 Australian Election Study (1993 AES);
Jones, R. et al. 1993. Australian Election Study 1993 [computer file]. Principal 
investigators Roger Jones, Ian McAllister, David Denemark, David Gow. 
Canberra: Social Sciences Data Archives, The Australian National University 
[distributor], 1993. Number of cases: 3023.
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Britain
British Election Studies are conducted by nationally representative probability 
sampling in England, Scotland and Wales. All studies prior to 1992 excluded voters 
north of the Caledonian Canal. Interviews were conducted face to face, although 
the 1987 and 1992 surveys contained self-completion sections. For details see 
Butler and Stokes (1974, 425-39), Sarlvik and Crewe (1983, xiv-xv), Heath, Jowell 
and Curtice (1985, 177-84), Heath et al (1994, appendix).
1964 British Election Study (1964 BES);
Butler, D., and Stokes, D. 1970. British Election Study; 1964 Cross Section 
[computer file]. Principal investigators David Butler and Donald Stokes. Data 
collected by British Market Research Bureau Ltd. Colchester: ESRC Data Archive 
through Social Sciences Data Archives, The Australian National University 
[distributor]. Number of cases: 1828.
1979 British Election Study (1979 BES);
Crewe, I. et al. 1979. British Election Studies; May 1979 Cross-Section [computer 
file]. Principal investigators Ivor Crewe, Bo Sarlvik and David Robertson. Data 
collected by Research Services Ltd. Colchester: ESRC Data Archive through Social 
Sciences Data Archives, The Australian National University [distributor]. Number 
of cases: 1893.
1987 British Election Study (1987 BES);
Heath, A. et al. 1987. British General Election Study [computer file]. Principal 
investigators A. Heath, R. Jowell, and J.K. Curtice. Data collected by Social and 
Community Planning Research. Colchester: ESRC Data Archive through Social 
Sciences Data Archives, The Australian National University [distributor]. Number 
of cases: 3826.
1992 British Election Study (1992 BES);
Heath, A. et al. 1992. British General Election Study [computer file]. Principal 
investigators A. Heath, R. Jowell, J.K. Curtice, J.A. Brand and J.C. Mitchell. 
Data collected by Social and Community Planning Research. Colchester: ESRC 
Data Archive through Social Sciences Data Archives, The Australian National 
University [distributor]. Number of cases: 3534.
United States
The American National Election Studies are produced by the Political Behaviour 
Program of the Survey Research Center and the Center for Political Studies. They 
entail both a pre-election and a post-election re-interview based on a multi-stage 
area probability sample. The study population is defined to include all United 
States citizens of voting age on or before election day, excluding persons living in 
Alaska or Hawaii.
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1964 SRC National Election Study (1964 SRC NES);
Political Behaviour Program, University of Michigan. The 1963 Social Research 
Centre Election study, 1964, 1964; Pre- and Post-election Survey [computer file]. 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Political Behaviour Program [original 
producer], 1982. revised ICPR edition. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Science Research, through Social Sciences Data 
Archives, The Australian National University, [distributor]. Number of cases: 
1571.
1980 CPS National Election Study (1980 CPS NES);
Miller, Warren E., and the National Election Studies. American National Election 
Study 1980, 1980; Pre- and Post-election Survey [computer file]. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan, Center for Policy studies [original producer], 1982. 2nd 
ICPSR Ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Science Research, through Social Sciences Data Archives, The Australian National 
University, [distributor]. Number of cases: 1614.
1988 CPS National Election Study (1988 CPS NES);
Miller, Warren E., and the National Election Studies. American National Election 
Study 1988, 1988; Pre- and Post-election Survey [computer file]. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan, Center for Policy studies [original producer], 1989. 2nd 
ICPSR Ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Science Research, through Social Sciences Data Archives, The Australian National 
University, [distributor]. Number of cases: 2040.
1992 CPS National Election Study (1992 CPS NES);
Miller, Warren E., Donald R. Kinder, Steven J. Rosenthone and the National 
Election Studies. American National Election Study 1992, 1992; Pre- and Post­
election Survey [CPS Early release Version] [computer file]. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan, Center for Policy studies [producer], 1993. Ann Arbor, 
MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Science Research, through 
Social Sciences Data Archives, The Australian National University, [distributor]. 
Number of cases: 2487.
Australian Opinion Polls (Chapter 7)
Australian Gallup Polls (Roy Morgan)
SSDA catalogue numbers; 76, 79, 62, 82, 92, 166, 168, 179, 189, 313,
Representative cross-section of approximately 2200 Australian adults aged 21 and 
over throughout the six states, using random area-cluster sampling with sex quota.
Age Poll (Irving Saulwick and Associates)
SSDA catalogue numbers; 64, 67, 147, 231.
Commissioned by The Age (Melbourne, Vic) and conducted by undertaken by 
Australian Sales Research Bureau Pty Ltd from 1972 to 1974, and by Irving 
Saulwick and Associates in association with Beacon Research Company Pty Ltd 
from 1975. Approximately 2000 respondents, aged 18 years and over, based on an 
area-cluster sample of federal electorates prior to 1975, and of all federal electorates 
thereafter.
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Australian Gallup Polls (McNair Anderson Associates)
SSDA catalogue numbers; 242, 284, 392.
Approximately 2200 respondents, consisting of persons 16 years and over 
(excluding the Northern Territory), selected using multi-stage cluster sampling with 
age and sex quotas.
Means and Scoring of Variables
Table Al: Mean and Scoring of Variables, Australia 1967-93 (decimals omitted)
1967 1979 1990 1993
Fam ily Background
Father's Occup 1 = Non-manual, 0 = Manual 45 47 51 51
Parent's Party l = Lib-Nat, 0 = ALP, .5 = Oth/M ixed 47 47 47 47
Social Background
Occupation1 1 = Non-Manual,0 = Manual 46 51 58 58
Union Membership 1 = Member, 0 = Non-member 26 29 28 23
Church Denomination 1 = Protestant, 0 = O ther/N ever 56 (38)b 49 47
Religious Attendance l = At least monthly, 0 = Other 37 25 21 22
State 1 = NSW, 0 = Other 34 35 32 33
Place of Residence 1 = Rural, 0 = Urban 36 29 30 32
Gender 1 = Female, 0 = Male 50 51 52 50
Age 1 = Under 30, 0 = 30 & Over 19 28 17 13
Place of Birth 1 = Overseas, 1= Australia 23 20 22 22
Education 1 = Degree, .5 = Post-secondary 11 23 31 37
Subjective Class 1 = Middle, 0.5 = None, 0 = Working 53 59 49 48
Political A ttitudes
Economic Attitudes ) From high = 1 58 76 71 67
Social Attitudes ) To low = 0 68 69 65 71
Party Identification l = Lib-Nat, 0.5 = None, 0 = Labor 52 51 48 50
Cam paign Evaluations
Issues ) 1 = pro-Liberal 45 44 51 45
Economy ) .5 = Neutral 65 50 73 43
Leaders ) 0 = pro-Labor 47 44 51 45
Vote l = Lib-Nat, .5 = Other, 0 = Labor 55 54 52 50
a - Head of Household
b - Lower mean due to screening question (see Chapter 2) 
Sources: 1967 and 1979 APAS; 1990 and 1993 AES.
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Table A2: Mean and Scoring of Variables, Britain 1964-92 (decimals omitted)
1964 1979 1987 1992
Fam ily Background
Father's Occup 1 = Non-manual, 0 = Manual 31 33 35 35
Parent's Party l = Cons, 0 = Lab, 51 45 42 43
Social Background
Occupation1 1 = Non-Manual,0 = Manual 40 45 49 49
Union Membership 1 = Member, 0 = Non-member 24 31 23 20
Housing Tenure 1 = OwnOcc, .5 = PrvTen, 
0 = Public Tenant
60 65 76 78
Church Denomination 1 = Anglican, 0 = O ther/N ever 65 (33)b 42 41
Religious Attendance l= A t least monthly, 0 = Other 27 23 19 20
Region 1 = South & London, 0 = Other 37 42 42 43
Place of Residence 1 = Rural, 0 = Urban 26 21 18 18
Gender 1 = Female, 0 = Male 54 52 52 54
Age 1 = Under 30, 0 = 30 & Over 13 18 21 19
Race 1 =N on White, 0 = White 3 3 3
Education 1 = Degree, .5 = Post-secondary 17 21 25 27
Subjective Class l = Middle, 0.5 = None, 0 = Working 32 36 36 39
Political A  ttitudes
Economic Liberalism ) From high= 1 43 74 56 46
Social Conservatism ) to low = 0 58 52 52 39
Party Identification l = Cons, 0.5 = Lib/None, 0 = Labour 50 50 54 54
Cam paign Evaluations
Issues ) 1 = pro-Conservative 34 54 50 44
Economy ) .5 = Neutral/Lib 42 49 44 34
Leaders ) 0 = pro-Labour 33 55 49 62
Vote l = Cons, .5 = Lib/Other, 0 = Labour 49 54 56 54
a - Head of Household
k - Lower mean due to screening question (see Chapter 2) 
Sources: 1964, 1979, 1987 and 1992 BES.
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Table A3: Mean and Scoring of Variables, United States 1964-92 (decimals omitted)
1964 1980 1988 1992
Family Background
Father's Occup 1 = Non-manual, 0 = Manual 31 51 51 50
Parent's Party l = Rep, 0 = Dem, .5 = Oth/M ixed 42 45 42 42
Social Background
Occupation3 1 = Non-Manual,0 = Manual 58 61 66 64
Union Membership 1 = Member, 0 = Non-member 14 17 13 12
Church Denomination 1 = Protestant, 0 = O ther/N ever 67 61 63 60
Religious Attendance l = At least monthly, 0 = Other 67 53 56 56
Region 1 = South, 0 = Other 19 21 22 26
Place of Residence 1= Rural, 0 = Urban 39 33 31 32
Gender 1 = Female, 0 = Male 52 55 55 52
Age 1 = Under 30, 0 = 30 & Over 14 20 13 14
Race 1 = Black, 0 = Other 6 9 9 9
Education 1 = Degree, .5 = Post-secondary 29 35 41 44
Subjective Class 1 = Middle, 0.5 = None, 0 = Working 50 56 54 54
Political Attitudes 
Economic Individualism ) From high = 1 44 59 56 58
Social Conservatism ) to low = 0 74 61 59 54
Party Identification l=R ep, 0.5 = Ind, 0 = Dem 42 45 50 49
Campaign Variables
Issues ) 1 = pro-Republican 45 68 52 39
Economy ) .5 = Neutral 35 60 60 33
Candidates ) 0 = pro-Democratic 33 55 48 44
Vote 1 = Republican, 0 = Democrat 42 49 46 47
a - Head of Household
Sources: 1964, 1980, 1988 and 1992 SRC-CPS NES.
Summary of Economic Evaluations
Australia
1967. 1979
Are you and your family better off now than you were three or four years ago, are 
you worse off or have you stayed about the same?
Now looking ahead over the next three or four years do you think that you will 
be better off, worse off, or will you stay about the same?
Has the Liberal government in Canberra made you better or worse off, or hasn't it 
made much difference?
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1990
How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 
12 months ago?
And do you think the general economic situation in this country will be in 12 
months time compared to now?
Compared with a year ago, would you say that the federal government's policies 
have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that they have not made much 
difference to the financial situation of your household?
1993
How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 
12 months ago?
Compared to now, what do you think the general economic situation in this 
country will be in 12 months time?
Compared with a year ago, would you say that the federal government's policies 
have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that they have not made much 
difference to the financial situation of your household?
Britain
1964
Compared with a year ago are you and your family better off now, worse off, or 
have you stayed about the same?
Now looking ahead over the next three or four years do you think you will be 
better off, worse off, or will you stay the same?
Do you think that the fact that Labour winning the election will make any 
difference to how well off you are?
1979
Looking back over the last year or so, would you say that the state of Britain's 
economy has stayed the same, got better, or got worse?
And what do think will be the state of Britain's economy in the next few years, 
will it stay about the same, get better, or get worse?
How well do you think that the recent Labour government handled the problem 
of rising prices?
1987
Since the last general election in June 1983, would you say that prices have 
increased or fallen?
Since the last general election in June 1983, would you say that unemployment has 
increased or fallen?
Between 1983 and 1987 how well or badly do you think the Conservative 
government handled prices?
1992
Looking back over the last year or so, would you say that Britain's economy has 
got stronger, got weaker, or stayed the same?
Since the last general election in June 1987, would you say your own standard of 
living has increased, stayed the same or fallen?
Since the last general election in June 1987, would you say the general standard of 
living has increased, stayed the same or fallen?
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United States
1964
During the last few years, has your financial situation been getting better, getting 
worse, or has it stayed the same?
Do you think it will make any difference in how you and your family get along 
financially whether the Republicans or the Democrats win the election?
Is there anything in particular that you like/don't like about the Democratic 
Party? (only references to economic management included).
1980
Would you say that you (and your family living here) are better off or worse off 
financially than you were a year ago?
Do you think inflation would be handled better by the Democrats, by the 
Republicans, or about the same by both?
Do you think unemployment would be handled better by the Democrats, by the 
Republicans, or about the same by both?
1988
Would you say that you (and your family living here) are better off or worse off 
financially than you were a year ago?
Would you say that over the past eight years the economic policies of the Reagan 
administration have made the nation's economy better, worse, or haven't 
they made a difference?
Have you personally been helped or have you been hurt by the Reagan 
Administration's economic program?
Political Attitudes
Australia
Trade Union Power
1967, 1979: Do you think that the trade unions in this country have too much 
power or not too much?.
1990, 1993: The trade unions in this country have too much power, strongly
agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?
Sympathy for Strikers
1967, 1979, 1990, 1993: When you hear of a strike are your sympathies generally 
for or against the strikers?
Death Penalty
1967, 1979: Do you want to see the death penalty kept or abolished?
1990, 1993: The death penalty should be reintroduced for murder, strongly agree, 
agree, disagree or strongly disagree?.
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Immigration
1967, 1979: Which of these statements comes closest to what you yourself feel
should be done? Asians should be allowed to enter Australia as immigrants, just 
like people of european descent; there should be a small quota of asian migrants; 
asians should not be allowed to enter Australia as migrants; we should only allow 
people from Britain and northern Europe to enter Australia as migrants; we should 
not have any more migrants at the present time.
1990, 1993: The number of migrants allowed into Australia, gone much too far, 
not gone far enough or is about right?.
Britain
Trade Union Power
1964, 1979: Do you think that the trade unions have too much power or not?
1990: Do you think trade unions in this country have too much power or too 
little power?
1992: Do you think trade unions in this country have too much power or not? 
Nationalisation
1964: Which of these statements comes closest to what you yourself feel should be 
done? A lot more industries should be nationalised; only a few more industries, 
such as steel, should be nationalised; no more industries should be nationalised, but 
the industries that are nationalised now should stay nationalised; some of the 
industries that are nationalised now should be de-nationalised.
1979: Which of these statements comes closet to what you yourself feel should be 
done? A lot more industries should be nationalised; only a few more industries 
should be nationalised; no more industries should be nationalised, but the 
industries that are nationalised now should stay nationalised; some of the industries 
that are nationalised now should become private companies.
1987, 1992: Are you generally in favour of more nationalisation of companies by 
government, more privitization of companies by government, or things should be 
left as they are now?
Welfare Spending
1964: Do you feel that the government should spend more on pensions and social 
services, or do you feel that spending for social services should stay about as it is 
now?
1979: Which of these statements comes closest to your own views? More social
services are needed; social services and benefits should stay much as they are; social 
services and benefits have gone somewhat too far and should be cut back a bit; 
Social services and benefits have gone much too far and should be cut back a lot. 
1987, 1992: Welfare benefits that are available to people today have not gone far 
enough, are about right, or have gone too far.
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Death Penalty
1964: Would you like to see the death penalty kept or abolished?
1979: Bringing back the death penalty, should be done or should not be done? 
1990: For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence.
1993: Britain should bring back the death penalty, agree or disagree?
Immigration
1964, 1979: Do you think that too many immigrants have been let into this
country or not?
1990: Immigration into Britain has gone to far, is about right, or has not gone far 
enough?
1992: Attempts to give equal opportunities to black people and Asians in Britain, 
has gone to far, is about right, or has not gone far enough?
United States 
Labor Unions
1964: There are many groups in America that try to get the government or the 
American people to see things more their way. We would like to get your feelings 
towards some of these groups. Where would you put (on a scale from 0 to 100) 
labour unions?
1980, 1988, 1992: Using the thermometer (0 to 100), how would you rate the
following; labor unions?
Guarantee Employment
1964: Do you think that the government should see to it that every person has a 
job and a good standard of living, or should let each person get ahead on his own. 
1980, 1988, 1992: Some people fee the government in Washington should see to it 
that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the 
Government should just let each person get ahead on this own. Where would you 
place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?
Power of Government
1964, 1980, 1988, 1992: Some people are afraid the government in Washington is 
getting too powerful for the good of the country and the individual person. 
Others feel that the government is not getting too strong (not gotten too strong 
for the good of the country). What is your feeling, do you think the government 
in Washington is getting too powerful, or that the government is not getting (has 
not gotten) too powerful?
Civil Rights
1964, 1980, 1988, 1992: Do you think that Civil Rights leaders are trying to push 
too fast, are going too slowly, or are moving about the right speed?
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Bible fundamentalism
1964, 1980, 1988: Here are four statements about the Bible and I'd like you to tell 
me which is closest to your own view: the Bible is God's word and all it says is 
true; the Bible was written by men inspired by God but it contains some human 
errors; the Bible is a good book because it was written by wise men but God had 
nothing to do with it; the Bible was written by men who lived so long ago that it 
is worth very little today.
1992: Here are four statements about the Bible and I'd like you to tell me which is 
closest to your own view: the Bible is the actual word of God's and is to be take 
literally, word for word; the Bible is the word of God but not everything in it 
should be taken literally, word for word; the Bible was written by men and is not 
the word of God.
Partisan Issue Preferences
Australia
1967: In your opinion, what are the most important problems the federal
government should be doing something about? Which party would be the most 
likely to do what you want on < first problem mentioned > the Liberals, Labor, 
Country Party, or DLP?
1979: In your opinion, what are the most important problems the federal
government should be doing something about? Which party would be the most 
likely to do what you want on < first problem mentioned > the Liberals, Labor, 
National Country Party, or Australian Democrats?
1990, 1993: Which of these issues has worried you and your family most in the last 
12 months? Who's policies - the Labor Party's or the Liberal-National Coalition's - 
would you say come closest to your own views on < first issue mentioned > ?
Britain
1964: Which party would be more likely to keep nuclear weapons for Britain - the 
Conservatives or Labour, or wouldn't there be much difference between them on 
this? Which party would be more likely to spend more on pensions and social 
services - the Conservatives or Labour, or wouldn't there be much difference 
between them on this?
1979: People have different views about whether it is more important to reduce 
taxes or keep up government services. Which of the statements come closet to your 
view, the view of the Conservative Party, the view of the Labour Party? Some 
people think that the best way to tackle unemployment is to allow private 
companies to keep more of their profits to create more jobs. Others think it is 
mainly up to the government to tackle unemployment by using tax money to 
create jobs. Which statement comes closest to your view, the view of the 
Conservative Party, the view of the Labour Party?
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1987: Some people feel that getting people back to work should be the 
government's top priority, other people feel keeping prices down should be the 
government's top priority? Which comes closer to your own views, the views of 
the Conservative Party, the views of the Labour Party? Some people believe we 
should get rid of all nuclear weapons in Britain without delay, others believe we 
should increase nuclear weapons in Britain without delay. Which comes closer to 
your own views, the views of the Conservative Party, the views of the Labour 
Party?
1992: (Half sample A) Some people feel that government should put up taxes a lot 
and spend much more on health and social services, other people feel that 
government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social 
services. Which comes closer to your own views, the views of the Conservative 
Party, the views of the Labour Party? Some people feel that getting people back to 
work should be the government's top priority, other people feel keeping prices 
down should be the government's top priority? Which comes closer to your own 
views, the views of the Conservative Party, the views of the Labour Party? (Half 
sample B) Some people feel the government should see to it that every person has a 
job and a good standard of living, others think the government should just let each 
person get ahead on their own. Which comes closer to your own views, the views 
of the Conservative Party, the views of the Labour Party? Some people believe 
that we should spend much less money on defence, others fell that defence 
spending should be greatly increased. Which comes closer to your own views, the 
views of the Conservative Party, the views of the Labour Party?
United States
1964: What would you personally feel are the most important problems the 
government should try to take care of when the new President and Congress take 
office in January? Who do you think would be the most likely to do what you 
want on this most important issue to be faced, the Democrats, the Republicans or 
wouldn't there be any difference?
1980, 1988, 1992: What do you think are the most important problems facing this 
country? Of those you've mentioned, what would you say is the single most 
important problem the country faces? Which political party do you think would 
be the most likely to get the government to do a better job in dealing with this 
problem-the Republicans the Democrats, or wouldn't there be much difference 
between them?
Leader Evaluations
Australia
1967, 1979, 1990, 1993: Is there anything in particular you like about < Liberal 
Party leader >? Is there anything in particular you like about < Labor Party 
leader > ?
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Britain
1964: Is there anything in particular you like about < Conservative Party leader >? 
Is there anything in particular you dislike about < Conservative Party leader > ? Is 
there anything in particular you like about < Labour Party leader > ? Is there 
anything in particular you dislike about < Labour Party leader > ?
1979: What mark out of ten would you give the following; < Conservative Party 
leader > , < Labour Party leader > ?
1987: Would you describe Mrs Thatcher/Mr Kinnock as good or bad at getting 
things done, as extreme or moderate, as looks after one class or looks after all 
classes, as capable or not capable of being a strong leader, as caring or uncaring, as 
likely to unite or divide the nation, as likeable or not likeable as a person?
1992: Would you describe John Major/Neil Kinnock as extreme or moderate, as 
looks after one class or looks after all classes, as capable or not capable of being a 
strong leader, as caring or uncaring?
United States
1964, 1980, 1988, 1992: Is there anything in particular about < Republican 
candidate > that might make you want to vote for him. Is there anything in 
particular about < Republican candidate > that might make you want to vote 
against him. Is there anything in particular about < Democrat candidate > that 
might make you want to vote for him. Is there anything in particular about 
< Democrat candidate > that might make you want to vote against him.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
The multivariate analysis conducted through the study relies upon ordinary least 
squares regression. A composite voting model was developed from the sociological, 
social-psychological and rational-choice models of electoral behaviour to test the 
hypotheses of electoral stability derived from each. The estimated OLS equations 
predict the major right-wing party (ie Liberal-National, Conservative, Republican) 
vote for each country's national lower-house legislature among voters. The 
variables were entered by a block stepwise method, with missing data treated by 
pairwise deletion. The model assumes a causal ordering of variables, beginning 
with family background factors, to social background factors, to class self-image, to 
political attitudes, to party identification and campaign evaluations, to vote. Each 
table reports the partial regression coefficient (b), and the partial regression 
coefficient calculated on standardised data (beta), in addition to percent variance in 
vote explained by the addition of all variables to that stage (R2 x 100).
As party vote is scored as an ordinal variable for Australia and Britain (0 for the 
major left-wing party, .5 for minor parties, and 1 for the major right-wing party) 
and as a dichotomous variable for the United States (0 for the Democratic Party, 1 
for the Republican Party) there may be concerns regarding the appropriateness of 
OLS regression, particularly with regard to the assumption of a linear relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables, in addition to the possibility 
that the predicted value may lie outside the logical range of 0 to 1. Nevertheless
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empirical studies have demonstrated that substantive conclusions are altered only 
when the dependent variable is highly skewed (Gillespie 1977). As the dependent 
variable, party vote, was within the range 0.4 to 0.6 in each of the twelve election 
studies examined, the advantages in terms of interprebility in using OLS regression 
were deemed to outweigh any concerns regarding the use of the technique. To 
allay concerns the following tables report the regression estimates using OLS 
regression with a trichotomous dependent variable (Australia and Britain only), 
OLS regression with a dichotomous dependent variable, and logistic regression 
with a dichotomous dependent variable. The tables show that irrespective of the 
method used, in general, the variable achieves a similar level of statistical 
significance.
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